

The Roma in Hungary

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In its transition to democracy, Hungary has established institutions that provide for democracy and the rule of law. As a result, the country has by all accounts achieved a respectable human rights record since the first free elections in 1990. However, one serious problem remains: police misconduct against the Roma. The problem is partly attributable to social forces, most notably the alienation and poverty of the Roma, which have been exacerbated by the country's transition to democracy. However, political and police authorities are largely responsible.

Politicians and police leaders purport to reform the policing system. They have made some important steps, such as attempting to diversify the force and improve relations between the police and the Roma. Yet they have failed to fundamentally change the system. Politicians have not removed police leaders, even those who advocate discriminatory treatment, and have passed laws that reinforce oppressive policing methods and increase discrimination against the Roma. Meanwhile, the police have not initiated or supported efforts to change their methods or organization. Perhaps more important, neither politicians nor police leaders have developed sufficient mechanisms to make the police more accountable.

Without the proper vigilance, the police serve as a bridge between totalitarian states and democracies.¹ By failing to sufficiently reform the system, political and police leaders have not only subjected vulnerable residents to state-sponsored discrimination, harassment, and abuse, but also have preserved elements of the communist regime. Reforming the police is essential to completing the transition to democracy.

In this paper, I will analyze the problem of police misconduct against the Roma. After providing some background information about the Roma and police misconduct, I will discuss the institutional problems of the police, which must be overcome, and the mechanisms of accountability, which must be improved.

The Roma

Hungarians are no strangers to oppression. Turkish occupation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries followed by Austrian dominance until 1867 hardly allowed for self-determination. Foreign occupation fueled widespread nationalism, which remained the predominant ideology of political elites during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which

ruled until 1919. Although the monarchy made some progressive reforms, intensifying nationalism during World War I led to open discrimination against minorities, especially Jews and gypsies. The monarchy ensured its demise by entering World II on the side of Nazi Germany. Soviet troops expelled the Nazis and their Hungarian collaborators in 1945. Communist forces, supported by Moscow, gradually implemented a totalitarian system of government, which stayed in power until 1989.

The Roma are one of the two main ethnic groups commonly referred to as gypsies (the Sinti are the other). Little is known about their early history. They lived in India until they moved eastward before 300 BC, perhaps because of the raid on Northwest India by Alexander the Great.² At the end of the Middle Ages, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Roma arrived in Hungary. The Roma have faced discrimination and oppression throughout history, and their experience in Hungary has been no exception. During World I, for example, the monarchy gave vagrant Roma identity cards. Although the communist regime had no official policy of discrimination against the Roma, their inferior status was evident. In 1974, a government instruction pertaining to criminal statistics stated that the term Roma could not be officially applied to people conducting an honest way of life. In other words, the Roma were dishonest.³

The Roma have suffered greatly during the transition to democracy. Largely uneducated, they have not fared well in market competition. Roma, who make up 5 to 6 percent of the Hungarian population (10.5 million), have an unemployment rate of 60 percent, almost five times that of the overall population.⁴ Many Romani families, usually large and poor, qualify for government benefits, exacerbating tensions between the Roma and the white majority. The Roma have been the target of attacks by skinheads and of governmental discrimination, less overtly racist but no less pernicious. Local governments have, for example, expelled Roma in the name of public health or security.

Police Misconduct

In Hungary, as in all countries, it is difficult to gauge the prevalence of police misconduct. Nonetheless, several studies paint a disturbing picture. For example, in the Hungarian Helsinki Committee's police custody monitoring program, 23 of 106 people said that they had been physically mistreated by the police.⁵ The Roma, a poor, visible minority, are especially vulnerable. Reports invariably underestimate, often drastically, incidents of misconduct against the Roma. Official records cannot identify the ethnicity of complainants, and the Roma are unlikely to report or discuss misconduct for fear of retaliation, ignorance about the system, or knowledge that officers are seldom punished. Reports therefore offer only a snapshot of the reality.

The 1996 *White Booklet*, published by the Hungarian National and Ethnic Rights Legal Defense Bureau (NEKI), documents nine incidents of serious police misconduct involving the Roma. They include cases in which the police injured two people when they shot into

a crowd; fractured the rib of a suspect during an interrogation; put Benzidene, a carcinogen, on a suspect to simulate blood stains; failed to intervene when a Romani man was threatened by a pitchfork-wielding assailant; and joined with the residents of a village to brutally beat a Romani man.⁶

The European Roma Rights Center cites many other incidents of brutality, which I will not list here. It is sufficient to point out that police mistreatment of the Roma is undeniably a grave problem, one that even Parliament has acknowledged, albeit indirectly.

Institutional Problems

Foreign and domestic experts tend to accept the claims of political and police leaders about the alleged democratic transformation of Hungarian law enforcement.⁷ These leaders dismiss incidents of misconduct as isolated. However, theories about “rotten apples” and “temporary difficulties of transition” do not explain all the incidents of brutality, harassment, and discrimination. The problem is largely attributable to institutional and structural deficiencies. In this section, I will discuss four primary problems: the failure to replace corrupt police leadership, legislation perpetuating old police methods, the structure of the police, and new laws increasing discrimination against the Roma.

Actors Remain on the Stage

A change in police leadership did not accompany the transfer of political power in the early '90s. Although more than two-thirds of the 1989 police staff—many attracted by the superior working conditions and income at private security companies—have left the force, almost all of today's chiefs began their career under the communist regime. By failing to replace even those officials who champion discriminatory treatment, political leaders have sent a clear message to the police rank and file. This message undoubtedly carries more weight than constitutional provisions about individual rights.

Prior to the free elections of 1990, András Turós was the national commissioner of police. When the new government took over, it appointed a civilian to the post of national commissioner and Turós to the post of general deputy commissioner. Because the new national commissioner lacked practical experience, Turós maintained control of the police. One might be tempted to credit the political leadership for a wise professional choice that was not influenced by superficial slogans about parting resolutely with the past. However, the decision was neither professional nor wise. Under the communist regime, Turós, an outspoken hardliner, had ordered a number of raids with the express purpose of restraining the Roma. For that reason, the Liberal Free Democrats, the strongest opposition party in the first Parliament, objected to the appointment of Turós. The Minister of the Interior acknowledged Turós's infamous history but refused to remove him, citing his professional credentials. In 1994, a coalition of Socialists and

Liberal Free Democrats took control of the government, but the new Minister of the Interior, a liberal, did not dismiss Turós until 1996.

Turós is hardly the only hardliner still in power. László Tonhauser, head of the Department of Police for the Fight Against Violent Crime, published an article in *Interior Review* about a 1979 raid against Roma “criminals.”⁸ The police raided suspects’ houses and apprehended all the inhabitants, including children. Tonhauser praised the action, noting that the use of dogs contributed to its success (the suspects eventually confessed). He also claimed that the operation restored the self-confidence of the officers and public respect for the police.

The only effort to install new police leadership was a competitive selection scheme at the county and local level in 1990. Committees—consisting of representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the National Police Headquarters, research institutions, police staff, and local governments—made recommendations for new police chiefs based on written and oral statements by candidates. Local assemblies could reject the committees’ decisions. Unfortunately, very few new candidates applied, and those who did lacked the qualifications to compete with acting police chiefs, who were permitted to apply. In most cases, committees (one of which I chaired) were forced to recommend the acting chiefs. In some instances, the national police commissioner simply disregarded recommendations for new chiefs.

Legislative Confirmation of Old Methods

The Police Act of 1994 covered all the important organizational and functional aspects of law enforcement. Regrettably, the legislation failed to place policing into a solid constitutional framework, and legitimized oppressive policing methods inherited from the previous regime. During the Parliamentary debate, the Minister of the Interior explained the theoretical background of the bill. “Freedom guaranteed by the state belongs only to those having respect for the law,” he said.⁹ Of course, this belief is antithetical to the notion that all citizens, including offenders, have inalienable rights.

The failure of Parliament to reform policing was not a surprise given that the police leadership helped to write the Act. The police in fact used the Act to solidify their inordinate political power. A section of the Act states that the Minister of the Interior represents the police before Parliament. The provision is unprecedented in Hungarian law; Ministers normally do not represent the agencies that they direct. The Act also says that the police must be involved in the crafting of all legislative proposals concerning them. To be sure, the police should have some say on law enforcement matters, but investing them with such expansive power inhibits reform.

Perhaps most significant, the Act effectively upheld the core tenant of traditional policing: that virtually any means may be employed in pursuit of goals set prior to an action. Constitutional policing, by contrast, is based on the principle of proportionality: that the harm caused by an action must not be greater than the harm that the action aims

to prevent. Section 15, paragraph 2 of the Act attempts to combine those two principles but greatly skews the balance in favor of the former. Although it says that the police should use the least harmful means possible, it also says that the effort to complete an action trumps consideration of the harm caused by the action; the ends still justifies the means.

Thus, the Parliament endorsed the police behavior displayed in the 1993 action in Orkeny, for example. There, police attempting to search a house in the Romani community were obstructed by a crowd of civilians. The officers brought in reinforcements and severely beat people who blocked their way to the house. The police injured many people, including a man whose tracheotomy tube was ripped off and a pregnant woman who lost her baby. Some Roma were charged with assault on the police. No officers were charged, however, presumably because they were attempting to achieve the stated goal.

The Orkeny case illuminates another disturbing aspect of Hungarian police—militarization. The 1996 Service Relations of Officers of Armed Organs Act overturned guidelines requiring that the police have service regulations different from those of the military. The law makes regulations uniform for all “armed organs,” which include the police, the military, the border guard service, prison service, state and local fire brigades, custom service financial guard, civil defense, and national security agencies.

By law, police officers are soldiers, meaning that they are subject to special provisions of the criminal code. Disobedience even of an unlawful order is an offense. Officers may refuse to obey an order only if they are avoiding a criminal offense (in Hungary, many unlawful acts—petty theft, prostitution, driving under the influence of alcohol—are not criminal). Members of armed organs may be punished by criminal sanctions only if they harm others for personal gain. Superiors bear responsibility for the implementation of unlawful orders. Yet, they are also the ones charged with investigating potentially unlawful acts. In other words, they often determine the lawfulness of their own orders.

The Parliament has reversed the course set by the Minister of the Interior of the first democratic Parliament, who knew that a militarized police has no place in a constitutional democracy. In a democracy, police officers—partially autonomous—seek to serve the people, while soldiers—unconditionally obedient—seek to destroy the enemy. As K. A. Schlichter says, “The military is designed, organized, and equipped to effect the rapid, violent, and efficient destruction of the ‘enemy,’ whoever that may be. Military methods are not designed to handle the shades of gray that a police officer encounters on the beat, but are tailored to the stark black and white of the battlefield.”¹⁰ The Act of 1996 contributed to the militarization of the Hungarian police force, which—not coincidentally—has carried out a number of oppressive actions like the one at Orkeny.

Organizational Structure

All police officers are organized under one agency, controlled by the National Headquarters. The national commissioner, appointed by the Prime Minister but reporting directly to the Minister of the Interior, is chief of all police officers. The national commissioner has two deputies, the directors general. One director general heads criminal investigation, and the other oversees public security. They usually exercise direction through the 19 county police forces, although some special units, like the Airport Police and the Central Riot Police, report directly to National Headquarters. At the bottom of the pyramid are local police forces, which usually serve several municipalities. Hungary has 31,500 police officers, and 10,000 civilian employees who perform background functions.

The highly centralized structure inhibits the efforts of local police forces to respond to the security needs of their jurisdictions and may even exacerbate their oppressive tendencies. For example, under pressure from the National Headquarters to increase revenue, many local and county police forces engage in random road checks to find violations punishable by administrative fines. The practice distracts the police from more important tasks and increases the chances of harassment. A decentralized structure, in which local police forces could work with communities to set their own priorities, would greatly improve service and guard against misconduct.

Measures That Increase Discrimination Against the Roma

At the same time that the Parliament was conserving elements of totalitarian policing, it was introducing new grounds for discrimination against the Roma. A provision in Act LXXXVI says that aliens who would be unable to integrate into Hungarian society may not be granted immigration permits. Liberal leaders managed to include in the legislation a clause stating that race, color, sex, native language, religion, ideology, national or other social origin, and condition of birth may not be obstacles to integration. According to the law, however, habits and attitudes deviating from "the Hungarian average" are legal grounds for refusing permits. The police, who are in charge of granting permits, determine what constitutes "the Hungarian average."

The Roma and other minorities therefore may be barred because of habits and attitudes that derive directly from their ethnicity. Many aspects of Romani culture do not conform to majority values. For example, the Roma customarily become sexually active at a much younger age than do most other Hungarians. Under the law, the police could deny immigration permits to the Roma because of their sexual precocity.

Another piece of legislation that invites discrimination against the Roma is a provision in the Police Act of 1994 requiring that police officers have a good reputation. The vague language demands clarification, but subsequent legislation further obscured the provision. A section of the Service Regulations Act of 1996 says that people cannot become police officers unless relatives and roommates agree to comply with police

investigations. The investigations, which may take place throughout the officers' service, aim to ensure that officers and the people close to them are leading "decent lives." Police investigators would likely find that the Roma do not lead decent lives. Moreover, affirmative action programs may be challenged on the grounds that the beneficiaries or their relatives do not lead decent lives. These provisions are one reason why the Roma are not proportionally represented among the police. Although the Roma make up more than five percent of the population, they represent less than one percent of police officers.

Accountability

In the previous chapter, I discussed laws that lead to oppressive policing. None of the laws, however, contain openly discriminatory statements. Interpretation and implementation are supposed to conform to the Constitution and international standards adopted by Hungary. In this section, I will examine how various institutions seek—and generally fail—to prevent illegal police practices.

Parliament

Neither the plenary session nor committees of Parliament have condemned the police for misusing their power against the Roma. Parliament's silence may be attributable to the lack of minority representation. Although the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities of 1993 provides for minority representation, the Parliament has yet to pass electoral regulations that make it a reality. An amendment to the electoral law, to be considered in 1998, calls for the election of minority delegates later in that year.

The Parliament, however, has indirectly criticized the police for attacks against the Roma by approving the reports of the four Parliamentary commissioners or ombudsmen, elected by Parliament in 1995. The report by the Minority Ombudsman explicitly addressed discriminatory treatment of the Roma.¹¹

The ombudsman can influence policy only with suasion and publicity; they cannot issue binding instructions. Nor can they force agencies to comply with their investigations. The reports point out that the Prosecution Service refused to give the ombudsmen access to their records. A provision in the 1993 Ombudsman Act explicitly gave the National Police Commissioner the power to deny access to confidential files. Although Parliament has repealed that provision, the ombudsmen are still restricted in various ways. They cannot, for example, examine data concerning collaboration between the police and the Secret Service.

The Prosecution Service

The Prosecution Service is responsible for investigating and prosecuting police officers. Prosecutors initiate investigations or open them when officers are indicted. Required to collect both incriminating and exonerating evidence, they have full subpoena powers and

may interrogate witnesses and suspects. An investigating prosecutor may close the case; according to the Code on Criminal Procedure, prosecutors are to close cases if they cannot establish—and further investigation is unlikely to establish—guilt. When the offense is not serious, the investigating prosecutor may issue a reprimand. Otherwise, the investigating prosecutor forwards the evidence to prosecutors in another department of the Service, who present the case in court.

The Minority Ombudsman and others have criticized the Prosecution Service for failing to investigate allegations against the police. Ferenc Koseg reviewed the response of the Prosecution Service to allegations of police misconduct that frequently but not exclusively involved the Roma. He focused on three common offenses—mistreatment during arrest, forced interrogation, and unlawful detention. Koseg found that the Prosecutor Service failed to investigate more than 25 percent of the complaints against the police. Meanwhile, the police failed to investigate only about 8 percent of the allegations against civilians. Prosecutors claim that they fail to investigate a high percentage of allegations of police misconduct because the complainants are often criminals making reckless charges or attempting to justify their own actions. Certainly, some complaints against the police are spurious. Many, however, are valid and, in any case, most people who are mistreated by the police do not make complaints.

The Courts

The courts have not provided the Roma and other Hungarians with an effective vehicle for combating police misconduct. A primary problem is that people may only challenge formal, written declarations. The system seems to contradict section 70/K of the Constitution, which subjects all government actions that violate basic rights to judicial review. Police generally do not produce written documents even in cases where they deprive people of their rights. For example, police can take people into custody for up to 12 hours without charging them. They often use the time to extract confessions. Because such a practice is not sanctioned by a formal, written declaration, it is not open to judicial review.

The Constitutional Court, a separate entity, has wide powers to determine if legal norms comply with the constitution. It has issued some important decisions on discrimination and affirmative action but has yet to rule on police powers.

In theory, it is possible to win civil damages for police misconduct. However, in practice, it is virtually impossible because of the police's wide scope of discretion. For example, a famous lute player is suing the police for a broken wrist caused by what he alleges to be an unjustified handcuffing. The Police Act of 1994 says that the police may handcuff people in order to prevent attack, escape, or self-injury and to break resistance to arrest. In addition, the Service Regulations issued by the Minister of Interior said that police may use handcuffs for "security reasons," a vague description that could cover virtually any action. Furthermore, even if the action was illegal, the officer would not be

liable if he or she was instructed to use the handcuffs. The musician would lose his case if a superior officer said that he or she ordered the action.¹²

More generally, the court system has not been very diligent in protecting the rights of the Roma and other minorities; they certainly have not met the high standard enshrined in the Constitution and the Criminal Code. A section of the Criminal Code, for example, states that “the person who causes grave bodily or mental injury to a member of any national, ethnic, racial or religious group because the latter belongs to that group commits a felony and is punishable with imprisonment from two to eight years.” The Supreme Court ruled that the provision does not apply to skinhead attacks against the Roma, Arabs, or blacks.¹³

A system that fails to protect minorities from skinheads seems unlikely to protect them from police abuse and discrimination. Indeed, NEKI reports on a 1996 case in which the court accepted the police’s evidence without investigation and dismissed the statements of the Roma as “gypsy legend.”¹⁴ In another case, in which a Romani man was charged for having sexual relations with a 13-year-old girl, the court failed to consider as a mitigating circumstance the fact that the Roma tend to become sexually active at a much younger age than the general population. While ethnic values should never be grounds for acquittal, the court should have considered them in sentencing because they obviously influenced the *mens rea* of the defendant.¹⁵

Local Government

Local governments have limited power to influence policing in their jurisdictions. Although they have some say in the establishment of police units and the hiring of police chiefs, the national police organization has the final word on these matters. Local governments and police units are free to work out policy, which may pertain to police misconduct. The 1993 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities provided for the establishment of minority self-governments. However, these bodies have little official authority and even less ability than local governments to influence policing.

Nongovernmental Organizations

A range of nongovernmental organizations scrutinize police behavior. Some monitor and protect civil liberties—the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, the Hungarian National and Ethnic Rights Legal Defense Bureau, and the Hungarian Center for Protecting Human Rights. Others focus on the rights of the Roma—the European Roma Rights Center and the Romani Center for the Protection of Rights. NGO representatives are permitted by law to visit people detained by the police. The Ministry of the Interior and the police have acknowledged the importance of NGO oversight. But the relationship between the police and NGOs has not always been smooth. The police often accuse NGO representatives of obstructing their work. Nor do the efforts

of the NGOs always produce their intended consequences. The police frequently use the reports of NGOs to demand a larger budget for building more prison cells.¹⁶

Internal Accountability

The police have made limited efforts to improve their system of accountability. For example, the National Police Commissioners ordered all interrogations of Romani suspects to be tape-recorded.¹⁷ The order, though well intentioned, was revoked because it unconstitutionally singled out the Roma. However, a simple solution exists: to tape record all interrogations regardless of suspects' race.

Much to their credit, the police have attempted to improve their relationship with the Roma. After consulting with the Minority Ombudsman, the National Headquarters of Police organized a conference focusing on police-Roma relations. The national leadership instructed police chiefs to cooperate with Roma self-governments. In a number of areas, the police fund and organize events for Romani children. Such efforts should not be underestimated; they foster mutual understanding and help both the police and the Roma overcome misconceptions.

Research, Hiring, and Training

To reduce police misconduct against the Roma, Hungarians need reliable information about its causes, nature, and extent. Researchers have conducted a number of studies, one of which sought to determine the prevalence of racism and prejudice among the police force. Based on a survey of 1,529 officers, a team of researchers headed by sociopsychologist Gyorgy Cspeli categorized 10 percent as racist, 27 percent as prejudiced, 23 percent as not prejudiced, 23 percent as empathetic to the Roma, and 17 percent as tolerant.¹⁸ Although these findings are subjective, they suggest that racial factors cannot explain all incidents of misconduct.

Several studies sponsored and managed by the Institute of Criminology focused on Roma criminality. They have found no evidence that the Roma have a higher crime rate than the rest of society—a somewhat surprising finding given the Roma's social deprivation. Some researchers have argued for a change in the law that would allow police documents to cite the race of offenders and victims.¹⁹ They say that such a policy would facilitate research and deter discrimination. However, other researchers and minority organizations are opposed to the idea. They say that free choice of identity is a constitutional value that transcends research interests and that racial statistics can be misused.²⁰

The police have taken steps to improve hiring and screening procedures. The National Headquarters of Police has established scholarships for talented Roma in an effort to increase their representation in the force (the aforementioned “decent life” provision is

disregarded). The police have also begun to use psychological tests designed to weed out racist officers.

Conclusion

Research, hiring, and training initiatives help to ease tensions between the police and the Roma. Yet they are clearly not enough; police abuse and harassment of the Roma persists. Although the problem is partly due to deep and intractable social woes, political and police leaders could take a number of steps to decrease misconduct. They could repeal laws that preserve totalitarian policing and discriminate against the Roma. They could remove officers who advocate oppressive tactics. They could decentralize and demilitarize the police. They could strengthen and expand internal and external mechanisms of accountability. The measures are dramatic, but then so are the stakes. By taking these actions, political and police authorities would not only improve policing for the Roma and all Hungarians, they would do away with the final vestiges of the totalitarian regime.

¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. San Diego-New York-London: Harvest HBJ, 1993, 288.

² A. Fraser, *The Gypsies*. Oxford, UK - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1992, 21-22.

³ S. Hegedűs, "A cigánybűnözés statisztikai megítélése" (Statistical Assessment of Gypsy Criminality), *Belügyi Szemle*, 12/1978, 54-59.

⁴ "Jogfosztottan - Romák Magyarországon" (Deprived of Rights—Roma in Hungary) *Human Rights Watch Report*, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, Budapest, 1996, 13.

⁵ F. Kőszeg, "Are Police Officers Punishable?" manuscript (in English), Budapest, 1996.

⁶ I. Furmann, ed. *White Booklet 1996*, Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities, Budapest, 11-49.

⁷ See L. Salgó, "Az új típusú biztonság" (New Type of Security) Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1994; D. G. Wilson, *Policing in Emerging Democracies: Observations and Recommendations Based on an Assessment of the Hungarian National Police Manuscript*, Louisville, Kentucky, 1996.

⁸ L. Tonhauser, "Cigánybűnözők elfogására szervezett akció" (Operation Designed for Apprehending Gypsy Criminals), *Belügyi Szemle*, 1/1979, 99-103.

⁹ Parliamentary Records, October 5, 1993.

¹⁰ K. A. Schlichter, "Locked and Loaded: Taking aim at the Growing Use of the American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement Operations," *Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review*, Summer 1993, 1291-1333.

¹¹ *Report of the Minority Ombudsman*, 1995/1996, no. 54/1997, V. 21.

¹² "Benkő perel" (Benkő Litigates), *Mai Nap*, January 14, 1998, 5.

¹³ BH (Published Court Decisions), 1994, 299.

¹⁴ Furmann, 38-41.

¹⁵ BH (Published Court Decisions), 1988, 218.

¹⁶ M. Benke, P. Buzas, G. Finszter, R. Mawby, I. Szikinger, and A. Wright, "Developing Civilian Oversight of the Hungarian Police. Report on a comparative research into police accountability," organized and financed by the Phare Project of the European Union. Stafford, U.K.: Staffordshire University Business School, 1997, 105-107.

¹⁷ Instruction no. 19/1996.

¹⁸ Gy. Csepeli, A. Örkény, M. Székelyi, "Szertelen módszerek—Rendőrök és romák: A megkülönböztetésmentes viselkedés lehetőségei és akadályai" (Disarranged Methods—Police and Roma: Possibilities and Obstacles of Behaviour Free of Discrimination) preliminary research report, Budapest, 1997.

¹⁹ Sz. Póczik, "Cigányság, bűnözés, büntüldözés" (Gypsies, Criminality, and Prosecution of Crime), *Belügyi Szemle*, 6/1997, 5-11.

²⁰ A. Horváth, J. Bársony, "Hozzászólás Dr. Szilveszter Póczik: 'Cigányság, bűnözés, büntüldözés,' valamint Dr. Bólyai János: 'A rendőrség és a cigányság viszonya Magyarországon' című tanulmányainak megállapításaihoz" (Reflection on findings of the studies "Gypsies, Criminality, and Prosecution of Crime" by Dr. Szilveszter Póczik and "Relations Between Police and Roma in Hungary" by Dr. János Bólyai), *Belügyi Szemle*, 6/1997, 36-42.