MIDA Evaluation Technical Report

Vera INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

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Introduction

This report supplements the Vera Institute of Justice's (Vera's) report "The Impact of Legal Representation on Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Evidence from the MIDA Program" with additional information about the legal background of removal proceedings and a detailed explanation of the quantitative methods and data sources Vera used.[1] It also presents the full results from the analyses Vera conducted, supplementary analyses to explore heterogeneous results, and robustness checks Vera conducted to ensure the validity of the results. Section 1 provides background information on removal proceedings and the potential outcomes of those proceedings. Section 2 describes the datasets Vera used and the matching algorithm that Vera created to connect client data from the Midwest Immigrant Defenders Alliance (MIDA) to nonclient data in order to construct treatment and control groups for the casual analyses. Section 3 describes how Vera measured the variables used, including definitions of program eligibility, program participation, outcome variables, and control variables. Section 4 describes the statistical methods Vera employed. Section 5 presents the results from those analyses. Section 6 explores and discusses the heterogenous results by presidential administration and immigration judge. Finally, Section 7 provides evidence of the robustness of the results to different modelling specifications.

1. Removal Proceedings: Legal Processes and Outcomes

This section provides further information on how and why the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiates removal proceedings, what the process entails, and the possible outcomes of those proceedings that are relevant to this study.

1.1. Detailed explanation of removal proceedings

The executive branch of the United States has broad authority to remove people from the country.[2] The people covered by this authority include people who are undocumented, those seeking admission to the United States, lawful permanent residents (green card holders), and noncitizens of all legal statuses—such as people residing on temporary student or work visas.[3]

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), a federal statute that is codified at Title 8 of the United States Code, governs immigration law and specifies the grounds for inadmissibility or deportability as well as the process and protections for removal proceedings.[4] Though codified in 1952, the government has repeatedly and extensively amended the INA, especially through the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 (which consolidated previously separate exclusion and deportation proceedings into a single removal proceeding process), and the REAL ID Act of 2005.[5] Some examples of grounds for removal listed in the INA include entering the country without inspection or without proper documentation; re-entering the United States after being previously removed; being involved in criminal or related activity; for reasons related to national security; and, in the case of inadmissibility, being a likely "public charge," or fiscal drain.[6] Despite the gravity of deportation, removal proceedings are considered civil proceedings, and immigration laws and courts—and people's rights within them—differ from the criminal justice system.[7]

When DHS accuses a person of violating immigration law or of having a criminal conviction that may make them removable, in certain circumstances, the agency initiates removal proceedings against the person according to the rules set forth in the INA section 240 ("240 proceedings").[8] These 240 proceedings encapsulate the process through which those charges are brought before an immigration judge and eventually adjudicated in an immigration court.[9] A person in removal

proceedings is considered "inadmissible" if they were never lawfully admitted to the United States and "deportable" if they were lawfully admitted to the United States but are found to no longer have a right to stay.[10]

Certain people who are ineligible for 240 proceedings but who have demonstrated a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in their home country are placed in "withholding-only" proceedings in which a judge can grant more limited relief from removal though not full relief.[11] There are some circumstances, described in the next section, in which people are subjected to "summary removal" and do not have the opportunity to present their case before a judge. This includes, as one example, expedited removal, which applies to people seeking admission at a port of entry who are deemed "inadmissible" because of fraud or misrepresentation or lack of proper entry documents.[12] It also applies to people anywhere in the United States who entered without inspection, coupled with an inability to prove physical presence in the country for more than two years.[13] There are other, less-common types of limited proceedings—those that involve a credible fear review, reasonable fear review, claimed status review, or asylum-only proceedings, for example—in which the government has already determined a person must be removed unless a judge finds they qualify for certain types of protection.[14]

The U.S. immigration courts are part of the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).[15] To initiate removal proceedings, DHS files a Notice-to-Appear (NTA) in immigration court.[16] NTAs list one or more charges under the INA that DHS claims subject the person ("respondent" in court proceedings) to removal.[17] The immigration court then schedules the person for an initial "master calendar hearing" before an immigration judge.[18] During this initial hearing, the immigration judge advises unrepresented people of their rights and obligations during removal proceedings, including the right to be represented by an attorney, and explains the charges and factual allegations that DHS claim subject them to removal.[19] The person may either request a "continuance" (postponement) of the hearing to find an attorney or may move forward without an attorney and admitting to or denying the government's allegations, in full or in part, and filing applications for relief, if eligible.[20]

Master calendar hearings: In initial or subsequent master calendar hearings in which a person admits to the government's charges without filing an application for relief, a judge orders the person removed.[21] Judges may also rule on dispositive motions (for example, a motion to terminate, dismiss, or administratively close the case), which, if granted, would end the proceedings and allow a person to remain in the United States, at least temporarily.[22]

Merits hearings: If the case remains unresolved after the person's master calendar hearings, their case proceeds to the next stage, the individual merits hearings. Here, a person can make their case for relief from deportation before an immigration judge.[23] At the end of the merits hearing, the immigration judge reaches a decision on the case.[24] Both DHS and the person have 30 days to appeal the decision before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)— an appeals board that also sits within the DOJ—unless either party explicitly waives their right to appeal.[25] A person may appeal an unfavorable BIA decision to the federal circuit court, which presents the first opportunity for a judge outside of the DOJ to hear the matter.[26]

Bond hearings: People in immigration detention may be released while their immigration case is pending. The mechanisms for this vary by circumstances but can form part of a person's removal proceedings. First, ICE has discretionary power to release people with a pending final outcome—such as through release on recognizance, on an order of supervision, or by setting an ICE bond that a person may or may not be able pay.[27] ICE uses its own internal agency guidelines in determining whom to release.[28] In such instances, the person may be released without a bond hearing in

immigration court.[29] In other cases, people in detention or their attorneys may request a bond hearing before an immigration judge while their removal proceedings are ongoing.[30] The judge determines whether they may be released back into the community and may set bond either for the first time (if no ICE was bond set) or may set a redetermined bond amount.[31] A person may have one or more bond hearings.[32]

1.2. Potential outcomes of removal proceedings

The outcomes of removal proceedings are not as clear cut as "win versus lose." There are several outcomes that can leave people in limbo or with lack of clarity about how to regularize their status going forward. While some people are granted relief that results in lawful permanent residency or a pathway to such, some people are granted a legal right to remain that does not lead to a pathway to legal permanent residency or citizenship. In other circumstances, people's cases are concluded in a manner that does not grant them a formal legal right to remain but does not require them to leave the United States either. Vera grouped the outcomes into five categories to facilitate analysis for this study:

Category 1 – Full protection: People who are deemed removeable may be eligible to apply for different categories of relief from removal. Some categories of relief, if granted by the immigration judge, give a person full protection, meaning they are granted legal status or allowed to maintain their lawful permanent residency. These categories of relief also allow a person to gain or retain a pathway to lawful permanent residence or citizenship for themselves and for certain qualifying family members.[33] Forms of relief in this category can include asylum, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status.[34]

Category 2 - Case closure with partial protection: People deemed removeable who are not eligible for full protection may apply for more limited protection against being removed based upon a fear of torture or persecution. These partial protections do not confer lawful, permanent status. Outcomes in this category include protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and withholding of removal.[35] These outcomes prevent removal to certain countries but may allow removal to other countries under certain circumstances. They do not create a pathway to legal residency or citizenship, nor do they allow for family reunification pathways, but people may qualify for employment authorization in certain circumstances.[36]

Category 3 - Case closure without protection: A removal proceeding may be closed with an outcome that neither requires the departure of a person from the United States, nor grants full or partial protection as described above. This includes termination of a case, which may be granted by the immigration judge upon a finding that the government has not met its legal burden or for other discretionary reasons.[37] The judge may also grant a dismissal of the case at the request of the DHS.[38] Immigrants who have legal status (e.g., visa holders, legal permanent residents, etc.) whose removal cases are dismissed or terminated maintain their current status, but they may be at risk of DHS initiating new removal proceedings against them for the same charges in the future.[39] Some may be subjected to expedited removal after their case is closed, with limited opportunities to have a hearing before a judge to contest their removal.[40]

Category 4 - Case pause without protection: Outcomes in this category include administrative closure and DHS failure to prosecute. Administrative closure is requested by either the government in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, or by a person facing removal, for example while they are awaiting a decision by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) that would impact their immigration status.[41] DHS failure to prosecute occurs when the government does not file the

necessary paperwork to commence the proceedings with the court.[42] These outcomes indefinitely pause the case, do not grant a legal right to remain but do not require removal, do not protect from removal for the same charges, and do not create a pathway to legal residency or citizenship.[43] People whose cases are administratively closed or paused in this way have their cases taken off the court docket, but the case can be re-calendared by the government.[44] Because many people whose cases are administratively closed have applications pending with USCIS, they are able to maintain employment authorization even after their cases achieve this outcome.[45]

Category 5 - Case closure and required departure from the United States: Outcomes in this category neither grant relief nor allow a person to remain in the United States. These outcomes include a removal order, voluntary departure, and withdrawal of application for admission. A removal order is issued after the judge finds that the person is removeable and does not qualify for immigration relief.[46] A person may also be ordered removed *in absentia* if they fail to appear at a hearing after receiving written notice.[47] Removal orders bar people from returning to the United States and from applying for certain forms of relief for varying lengths of time, ranging from five years to permanent bars to reentry. Conversely, voluntary departure is requested by the person facing removal and is considered a "return" to their country as opposed to a "removal" and does not carry the same gravity, such as barring re-entry into the United States if the person otherwise has legal options to return.[48] A withdrawal of an application for admission in immigration court applies when a judge permits someone who arrived at a port of entry seeking admission into the United States to withdraw their application for admission and exit immediately, and would not bar people from returning to the United States if they otherwise have legal options to do so.[49]

2. Data Matching

To study the impact of the MIDA program, it was necessary to build a dataset in which the researchers could identify MIDA clients to see how their outcomes differed from the outcomes of nonclients. To do this, Vera had to connect various datasets. These included data collected by MIDA attorneys about their clients and their clients' removal proceedings. They also included administrative data on all people (both clients and nonclients) in detained removal proceedings in the Chicago immigration court and on the progression of their removal proceedings. This section describes how Vera completed this task.

2.1. Datasets

The analysis in this study relied on four datasets:

1. EOIR data: Through its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) library, EOIR makes government data that contains information on all immigration court proceedings (dating back to 2001) available to the public.[50] Every month, EOIR updates this dataset—which contains raw, anonymized data of the entire population of people who are or have been in removal proceedings—to include the last full month of data. These EOIR datasets follow the trajectory of people's cases and contain granular data at the level of hearings, proceedings, and cases, as well as data on custody status, bonds, applications, and filed motions. While the EOIR dataset is anonymized, it contains demographic information on the individual people in each hearing, proceeding, and case, including nationality, language the proceedings were being heard in, age, and gender. The EOIR data is comprised of several tables that can be connected. However, the tables sometimes contain conflicting information that Vera had to reconcile to the best of its ability. For example, in 0.7 percent of proceedings, the language

the proceedings were heard in as listed in the EOIR Proceedings table did not match the language the proceedings were heard in as listed in the EOIR Case table. Similarly, in 2.4 percent of proceedings, there was a mismatch between the nationality of the person as listed in the two tables. In both cases, Vera resolved the conflict by keeping the information as given in the EOIR Case table.

2. Safety and Fairness for Everyone Data (SAFE) data: MIDA program attorneys enter data about their clients' cases into a database—the SAFE database—primarily for programmatic purposes. The SAFE data contains basic demographic information as well as information about clients' legal proceedings, which the attorneys update as their clients' cases progress. To validate the accuracy and coverage of the SAFE data, during the three years of Vera's evaluation, Vera reviewed the SAFE database and provided MIDA with summary reports on a monthly basis. MIDA used these reports to ensure the client records they entered into the SAFE database matched those maintained by MIDA in their other internal case management system.

3. Chicago immigration court data: The Chicago immigration court distributed spreadsheets on a weekly basis containing the hearing calendar for all immigration judges on the detained docket for that week. This docket-level data included the individual names of the people in proceedings as well as limited additional demographic information, such as nationality and the language the proceedings were heard in.

4. MIDA data: MIDA analysts compiled a client-tracking spreadsheet of all people whose initial master calendar hearings were observed by MIDA attorneys over the course of the evaluation.

Vera's primary objective was to match the SAFE data to the EOIR data. Vera used both the Chicago immigration court data and MIDA data as supplementary "bridging" datasets to aid in Vera's matching. For example, Vera used the Chicago immigration court data to obtain a list of hearing dates for each MIDA client by matching on client name between the SAFE data and Chicago court data. Vera resolved discrepancies in names between the two datasets by comparing both to the MIDA data, which included the names of MIDA clients together with the date of their initial master calendar hearing.

2.2. Matching algorithm

Although case outcomes of MIDA clients are available in the SAFE data, and case outcomes of all people in immigration court are available in the EOIR data, there are no shared unique identifiers available to directly classify which cases in the EOIR data relate to MIDA clients and which cases relate to nonclients. To identify clients and nonclients in the EOIR data, Vera developed an algorithm to match MIDA clients with their proceedings in the EOIR data, based on the clients' records in the SAFE data.

First, Vera identified all proceedings in the EOIR data with an initial master calendar hearing on the Chicago immigration court's detained docket during the sample period—the beginning of March 2022 through the end of March 2025. Vera used the 12 criteria described in Table 1 to match these records with the MIDA data. For each MIDA client, the matching algorithm assigned a score between zero and 12 to every proceeding in the overall pool of cases. This score was based on how many of

the 12 criteria were true for that client-proceeding pair. For each client, the proceeding with the highest score above a fixed threshold of eight was considered a match.

Two main factors complicated this matching process: missing data and apparent data entry errors in the EOIR data. As an example of data missingness, 1,118 of the 3,439 individual people in Vera's initial pool of cases had null values in the C_BIRTHDATE field in the EOIR data. As an example of apparent data entry errors, one MIDA client matched an EOIR record in the most stringent criteria, including hearing dates, immigration judge (IJ), disposition date, and birthdate, but their nationality code in the EOIR data was given as "SM", corresponding to San Marino, instead of "SO", corresponding to Somalia, the nationality listed for the client in the SAFE data.

Table 1

Number and percent of clients who fit each matching criterion

Criteria	Description	Number of clients whose final matched proceeding fits criteria	% of clients whose final matched proceeding fits criteria
HEARINGS_SUP	The list of hearing dates for the proceeding in the EOIR data included all the hearing dates of the client in the Chicago immigration court data.	238	98.8
HEARINGS_SUB	The list of hearings of the client in the Chicago immigration court data included all the hearing dates for that proceeding in the EOIR data.	103	42.7
CASE_1	IJ_CODE in the EOIR data matches Judge Code in the SAFE data, if the latter is not missing; COMP_DATE in the EOIR data matches Date of IJ Disposition in the SAFE data, if the latter is not missing; and CASE_TYPE in the EOIR data matches Case Type Code in the SAFE data.	190	78.8
CASE_2	The proceeding completion date in the EOIR data matches the date of IJ disposition in the	210	87.1

	SAFE data, if the latter is not missing.		
CASE_3	The judge matches between the EOIR and SAFE data, if the latter is not missing, and case type matches between the EOIR and SAFE data.	213	88.4
CASE_4	The proceeding completion date in the EOIR data is within the period of study, if it exists.	240	99.6
BIRTHDATE	C_BIRTHDATE in the EOIR data matches the Date of Birth in the SAFE data in both month and year. If no such proceedings existed, Vera considered all proceedings which did not have a C_BIRTHDATE given.	147	61.0
NATIONALITY	NAT in the EOIR data corresponds to the Country of Origin in the SAFE data.	218	90.5
LANGUAGE	LANG in the EOIR data corresponds to the Primary Language in the SAFE data.	182	75.5
REPRESENTATION_1	E_28_DATE in the EOIR data is on or after the Representation Acceptance Date in the SAFE data.	222	92.1
REPRESENTATION_2	COMP_DATE in the EOIR data is on or after the Representation Acceptance Date in the SAFE data. This also includes proceedings without a COMP_DATE.	239	99.2
REPRESENTATION_3	OSC_DATE (NTA date) in the EOIR data is on or before the Representation Acceptance Date in the SAFE data.	237	98.3

Source: Vera's analysis of Vera Institute of Justice, "Safety and Fairness for Everyone Database," on file at Vera (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, July 16, 2025); Chicago Immigration Court, "IJ Hearing Calendar - Redacted - Detained," spreadsheets (Chicago: Chicago Immigration Court, April 25, 2022, through April 4, 2025); National Immigrant Justice Center, "MIDA A# Tracking" private spreadsheet (Chicago: National Immigrant Justice Center, June 15, 2025); and

Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

Table 2 shows the "maximum proceeding score" for MIDA clients. For a given MIDA client, the maximum proceeding score is the maximum number of criteria—out of the 12 matching criteria—that were true for that MIDA client together with any EOIR proceeding. For example, for 32 MIDA clients there was a proceeding in the EOIR data which matched the individual person on every criterion.

Table 2
Number of MIDA clients by maximum proceeding score

Max proceeding score	Number of MIDA clients	% of MIDA clients
< 9	23	9.5
9	40	16.6
10	64	26.6
11	82	34.0
12	32	13.3
Total	**241**	**100.0**

Source: Vera's analysis of Vera Institute of Justice, "Safety and Fairness for Everyone Database," on file at Vera (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, July 16, 2025); Chicago Immigration Court, "IJ Hearing Calendar - Redacted - Detained," spreadsheets (Chicago: Chicago Immigration Court, April 25, 2022, through April 4, 2025); National Immigrant Justice Center, "MIDA A# Tracking" private spreadsheet (Chicago: National Immigrant Justice Center, June 15, 2025); and Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

For every MIDA client, a maximum proceeding score was achieved by a group of one or more proceedings in the EOIR data. Table 3 shows the distribution of the size of these groups. For example, for 220 of the 241 MIDA clients, the matching algorithm yielded a single highest-scoring proceeding. This highest-scoring EOIR proceeding was matched to the MIDA client. For the remaining 21 MIDA clients, two or more proceedings achieved a maximum score for that client. In these cases of a tie in the score, the top-scoring proceedings were re-scored according to the following subset of the criteria: HEARINGS_SUP, HEARINGS_SUB, CASE_1, CASE_2, CASE_4, REPRESENTATION_2, REPRESENTATION_3. This yielded a unique match for all but three people, who Vera matched manually into the EOIR data.[51]

Table 3
Number of MIDA clients by size of match group

Size of highest-scoring match group	Number of MIDA clients	% of MIDA clients
1	220	91.3
2	12	5.0
3	3	1.2
4	6	2.5
Total	**241**	**100.0**

Source: Vera's analysis of Vera Institute of Justice, "Safety and Fairness for Everyone Database," on file at Vera (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, July 16, 2025); Chicago Immigration Court, "IJ Hearing Calendar - Redacted - Detained," spreadsheets (Chicago: Chicago Immigration Court, April 25, 2022, through April 4, 2025); National Immigrant Justice Center, "MIDA A# Tracking" private spreadsheet (Chicago: National Immigrant Justice Center, June 15, 2025); and Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

3. Sample construction and Variable Coding

Due to capacity constraints, MIDA could not offer their services to everyone on the Chicago detained docket; therefore, some people were offered services and others were not. MIDA attorneys attended court on certain days of the week when they had capacity to take on new clients and offered MIDA screenings to all detained, unrepresented people with initial master calendar hearings scheduled on those days. MIDA's court observation days were set based on attorney capacity and occurred on different weekdays, independent of immigration judge, docket composition, or the distribution of case characteristics or the demographics of respondents with hearings scheduled on that day. MIDA providers set up this intake model for programmatic—rather than research—reasons to ensure they were offering legal representation equitably and without discrimination.

In this unique setup, treatment assignment was as good as random, without ethical concerns. Partial compliance with treatment was only based on immigrants' willingness to participate, rather than MIDA attorneys choosing of clients.

Vera conducted two sets of analyses—described below and in greater detail in Section 4—which quantified:

1. What is the impact of *having a MIDA attorney present to offer representation* at one's initial master calendar hearing, among those eligible? (The intention-to-treat effect.)
2. What is the impact of *having* MIDA representation, among those eligible, for those who take it up? (The treatment effect on the treated.)

Intention to treat: These analyses sought to compare the outcomes of eligible people who were offered MIDA representation due to their initial master calendar hearings falling on a MIDA observation day, regardless of whether they accepted MIDA representation or not (the treatment group), against the outcomes of similarly situated people who would have been eligible for MIDA

representation, but were not able to participate solely because their initial master calendar hearing fell on a non-MIDA observation day (the comparison group). The results of these analyses show the *causal* impacts of having access to the MIDA program (or to similar programs that offer services equitably). These analyses take into account that some people will choose to opt out, showing the program's effects overall and at scale.

Treatment effect on the treated: These analyses sought to compare the outcomes of people who were represented by MIDA attorneys for at least part of their case (the treatment group) against the outcomes of similarly situated eligible people who were not MIDA clients. The results of these analyses show the *causal* impacts of MIDA attorneys on the outcomes of the clients they represent. Although MIDA attorneys offered services on a merits-blind basis—that is, they did not select certain types of cases only—potential clients were still free to accept or decline this offer, and it is possible that certain case characteristics or circumstances made them more likely to accept. These analyses took into account that personal choice. The results from these analyses are the *causal* impacts of having a MIDA attorney as legal counsel.

To understand the results, it is first imperative to define and explain how Vera: (1) determined program eligibility, (2) constructed treatment and comparison groups, (3) measured outcome variables, and (4) measured control variables.

3.1. Determining program eligibility among people on the detained docket

To construct the treatment and comparison samples, it was necessary for Vera to identify all people within the EOIR data who would have been eligible for MIDA services, whether or not they received them. First, Vera limited the sample pool to the 3,590 people with initial master calendar hearings scheduled on the Chicago immigration court's detained docket from the beginning of March 2022 through the end of March 2025, as listed in the EOIR data. Vera followed their case outcomes through the end of May 2025. To ensure all people in the sample had a comparable set of possible outcomes, Vera limited the sample to people in 240 proceedings only, or cases labeled as case type "RMV" (indicating removal proceedings) in the EOIR data.[52] Vera excluded people in other types of proceedings, such as withholding-only proceedings, as they are only eligible for certain types of protection from removal, but not necessarily a grant of relief. This further limited the sample to 3,438 people. Vera also limited the sample to all people who were eligible to participate in the MIDA program. MIDA attorneys determine whether someone is eligible for their services based on two key criteria, in addition to being on the detained docket: they are unrepresented at their initial master calendar hearing and they earn below 200 percent of the poverty line.

Vera had data on the income of MIDA clients (which was collected by MIDA attorneys) but had no data on nonclients' income in the master data, which would have allowed Vera to analyze the program's income-eligibility requirement. However, it is likely that most people offered representation through the program would meet the income eligibility requirement. Vera came to this conclusion for the following reasons: First, everybody offered treatment was held in immigration detention at the time of offer, and thus likely unable to earn an income while detained. Second, Figure 1 presents a detailed view of the 3,438 people in 240 proceedings on the Chicago detained docket during the period of study (March 1, 2022, to March 30, 2025) and how they interacted with the MIDA program. It shows that, among the 248 people with whom MIDA conducted a screening for program eligibility, only six (2 percent) were found ineligible for reasons other than having secured counsel (e.g., the income ineligibility requirement).[53] Therefore, although there is no income data for the full sample, Vera believes it is plausible that nearly everyone who meets the eligibility

requirements of being in detention and unrepresented at initial master calendar hearing would also meet the income-eligibility requirement. Vera therefore deemed people as eligible to participate in the MIDA program based on the other key criteria—they did not have an attorney of record present at their initial master calendar hearing. When determining MIDA eligibility, Vera relied on the EOIR data Tbl_Schedule table—the data table of all scheduled hearings in a person's cases—specifically, the *EOIRattorneyid* field to see whether a person had an attorney of record present at their master calendar hearing.

Figure 1 shows that, of the 3,438 people in detained 240 proceedings during the study period, roughly two-thirds (2,329 of the 3,438 people) had their initial master calendar hearings on days that MIDA was *not* present for observation, of which 2,067 would have been eligible for MIDA services. One-third (1,109 of the 3,438 people) had their initial master calendar hearing on MIDA observation days, of which 1,008 were eligible for—and hence offered a screening for—MIDA services. Overall, Vera used the group of 3,075 MIDA-eligible people (2,067 from non-observation days and 1,008 from observation days) as the sample for its causal analyses.

Figure 1

Pathways of people on the Chicago detained docket, March 2022 to March 2025



Note: This figure includes people in 240 proceedings only. *MIDA attorneys explained that they did not proceed with screening for these 583 people as the person or their family told them that they had formalized another attorney-client relationship after initial master calendar hearing but before the MIDA screening could take place.
Source: Vera Institute of Justice, "Safety and Fairness for Everyone Database," private database on file at Vera (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, July 16, 2025); Chicago Immigration Court, "IJ Hearing Calendar - Redacted - Detained," spreadsheets (Chicago: Chicago Immigration Court, April 25, 2022, through April 4, 2025); National Immigrant Justice Center, "MIDA A# Tracking" private spreadsheet (Chicago: National Immigrant Justice Center, June 15, 2025); and Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

3.2. Treatment and comparison group construction

Creating the "intention-to-treat" treatment and comparison groups. Vera considered people to have been "offered treatment" through an encouragement model if their initial master calendar hearings

were scheduled on MIDA observation days and they met the eligibility criteria described in Section 3.1 (that is, they were on the detained docket and did not appear to have representation at their initial hearing). Accordingly, Vera considered any person whose initial master calendar hearing was not scheduled on one of these observation days and who also met the eligibility criteria as "not offered treatment."

Figure 1 shows that, among the 1,008 people who were offered MIDA services, there were 583 people who accepted the offer of a screening but whom MIDA attorneys subsequently did not screen. MIDA attorneys explained that these 583 people were unrepresented at their initial master calendar hearing—and hence were eligible for MIDA representation. However, it later materialized that the person or their family was in the process of seeking out other legal counsel but had not formalized a relationship by the time of the initial master calendar hearing. Often, the detained person was not able to communicate with their family from immigration detention and therefore did not know either that a search was happening or the status of that search when they accepted the offer for a MIDA screening. When MIDA attorneys—upon reaching out to schedule a screening—learned that the potential client had formalized a different attorney-client relationship, they were ethically obligated not to proceed with an intake screening.

In constructing the comparison group for the intention-to-treat analyses, Vera included these 583 people in the "treatment group" as they were eligible for and were offered MIDA services at the time of initial master calendar hearing; they only formalized an alternate attorney-client relationship later on.

In other words, for the intention-to-treat analyses, Vera compared the outcomes of MIDA-eligible people whose initial master calendar hearing fell on MIDA observation days (1,008 people) to the outcomes of MIDA-eligible people whose initial master calendar hearing fell on days MIDA attorneys were not present (2,067 people). Vera acknowledges that this means that some people in the comparison group go on to find other counsel post-initial master calendar hearing. In fact, Vera found that, of the 2,850 people eligible for MIDA who did not become MIDA clients, 30 percent found other counsel later in their proceedings.[54] Vera's results, therefore, should not be interpreted as comparing people offered or having MIDA representation to only unrepresented people, and therefore can be considered conservative effects for the impact of representation generally; the categorical error that Vera's sample construction decision risks introducing would likely understate, rather than overstate, any positive effect size found.

Creating the "treatment-effect-on-the-treated" treatment and comparison groups. Vera identified 441 people who received an offer for a MIDA intake screening (excluding the 583 people for whom a screening was deemed inappropriate after that offer was made). Of these, 248 people (56 percent) accepted and received a screening, and 193 people (44 percent) declined the offer, choosing not to adjourn their case. Among the 248 people whom MIDA screened, seven potential clients declined to participate in MIDA and 10 were found to be ineligible due to already having an attorney of record at initial master calendar hearing (the referral to MIDA being an error on the part of the judge). Only six were found to be otherwise ineligible for MIDA services; this means that nearly everyone who received a MIDA screening met the income requirement for MIDA services. Post screening, 225 people became MIDA clients. These 225 people comprise the treatment group for the treatment-effect-on-the-treated analyses. The comparison group contains 2,850 people: people with initial master calendar hearings *not* on MIDA observation days (n=2,067); people for whom MIDA attorneys deemed a screening was inappropriate because they secured counsel after their initial master

calendar hearing but before intake (n=583); people who refused a screening (n=193); and people for whom MIDA attorneys conducted a screening, but who did not become a MIDA client (n=7).

For the purposes of the treatment-effect-on-the-treated analyses, Vera considered a person to be a MIDA client regardless of whether they were represented for the entirety or for only part of their case. In the majority of cases, due to funding restrictions and capacity constraints, MIDA attorneys represented their clients through their time in immigration detention but ceased doing so after they were released. Among the 225 MIDA clients in Vera's treatment-effect-on-the-treated sample, 61 were released from immigration detention before the completion of their immigration court cases; nine of these people continued to receive representation from MIDA post release.[55] Therefore, the results from Vera's analyses show the impacts of representation from the start of a person's proceedings through the detained portion of their case.

3.3. Outcome variables

Vera measured impact in several ways. Vera analyzed whether the program affected individual peoples' case outcomes and bond outcomes. Furthermore, Vera examined how the program may have affected due process by impacting court procedures, including the number of motions and applications, as well as court efficiency. Vera studied the same outcomes for both research questions. The following four sections outline how Vera defined its outcome variables of interest in each of these categories.

3.3.1. Case outcomes

To study the effects of the MIDA program on case outcomes, Vera analyzed the impact on both being granted relief and being allowed to remain in the United States. For each of the following outcomes studied, Vera considered the person's initial case disposition by an immigration judge as coded in the EOIR data before any appeals. Vera limited the case outcome analysis to cases with an initial decision by an immigration judge, or 1,973 people.

To define the case outcome variables, Vera used the categories of outcomes defined in Section 1.2:

- Category 1 – full protection;
- Category 2 – case closure with partial protection;
- Category 3 – case closure without protection;
- Category 4 – case pause without protection; and
- Category 5 – case closure with required departure from the United States.

Vera considered category 4 case outcomes—administrative closure and DHS failure to prosecute--as equivalent to pending cases for the quantitative analyses. Vera made this decision because, in both of these case outcomes, the person's case does not effectively close; rather, the outcome just removes the person's case from the docket and indefinitely pauses their removal proceeding. In other words, cases with this outcome do not reach a substantive case adjudication that cannot be re-calendared. With administrative closure, DHS, the person in proceedings, or the person's legal counsel can re-open the case without the re-issuance of an NTA. With DHS failure to prosecute, where DHS fails to prosecute due to an administrative error of the court hearing being scheduled before the NTA is properly filed, the person's case will proceed as soon as DHS properly files the NTA. Vera removed people with category 4 case outcomes for the final outcomes analyses, resulting in a sub-sample of closed cases for the outcomes analyses of 1,873 people (61 percent of the sample).

However, Vera still used these category 4 cases (together with other pending cases) in the case outcomes analyses for the purposes of the initial reweighting of the data, as explained in Section 4.3.

Case outcome: Relief

- **Granted relief:** Using the categories detailed in Section 1.2, Vera counted a person as being granted relief—and coded this variable as 1—if their case reached an initial outcome of full protection (category 1).
- **Not granted relief**: Vera counted a person as not being granted relief—and coded this variable as 0—if their case reached an initial outcome of partial protection, case closure without protection, or case closure and required departure from the United States (categories 2, 3, and 5). This includes decisions of withholding, deferral, dismissal, termination, the withdrawal of an application for relief, voluntary departure, and order of removal.
- **Still pending:** Vera classified cases that reached an initial outcome of a case pause without protection (category 4) as still pending. This includes cases that have reached a decision of administrative closure or DHS failure to prosecute, in addition to cases that had not reached a decision. Therefore, Vera excluded their cases from this analysis except for the purpose of creating censoring weights, described in Section 4.3.

Case outcome: Permission to remain

- **Allowed to remain in the United States:** Using the categories in Section 1.2, Vera counted a person as being allowed to remain in the United States—and coded the variable as 1—if their case reached an initial outcome of full protection, partial protection, or case closure without protection (categories 1, 2, and 3). This includes cases that had reached a decision of withholding, deferral, dismissal, and termination, in addition to cases in which people were granted relief.
- **Not allowed to remain in the United States**: Vera counted people as not being allowed to remain in the United States—and coded the variable as 0—if their case reached an initial outcome of closure and required departure from the United States (category 5). This includes cases that resulted in a withdrawal of application for relief, voluntary departure, or an order of removal.
- **Still pending:** Vera classified cases that reached an initial outcome of a case pause without protection (category 4) as still pending. This includes cases that had reached a decision of administrative closure or DHS failure to prosecute, in addition to cases that had not reached a decision. Therefore, Vera again excluded these cases from this analysis, except for the purpose of creating censoring weights, described in Section 4.3.

Therefore, "people allowed to remain in the United States" includes—in addition to people granted relief—those who were allowed to remain in the United States at least temporarily, though not necessarily permanently.

Table 4 shows an overall summary of the case outcomes—as defined above—reached in the final sample of analysis.

Table 4
Summary of case outcomes

Outcome	N	%
Reached a decision	1,873	60.9
Allowed to remain in the United States	245	8.0
Granted relief (Category 1)	*88*	*2.9*
Dismissed (Category 3)	*20*	*0.7*
Terminated (Category 3)	*57*	*1.9*
*Other (Category 2)**	*79*	*2.7*
Required to depart from the United States	1,629	52.9
Voluntary departure (Category 5)	*399*	*13.0*
Withdrawal (Category 5)	*1*	<0.1
Removal order (Category 5)	*1,229*	40.0
Pending a decision (Category 4)**	1,202	39.1
Total	**3,075**	**100.0**

Note: *Cases in the "Allowed to remain in the United States – Other" category include protection under CAT and withholding of removal. **Administrative closure or DHS failure to prosecute.
Source: Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

3.3.2. Bond outcomes

Vera analyzed the impact of the MIDA program on several bond outcomes. To ensure the bond process was not still ongoing, Vera limited the analysis to people whose cases reached a decision on at least the detained portion of the case (i.e., the person had been released or their case had reached a conclusion while in detention)—2,660 people (87 percent of the sample). As in the final case outcomes analyses, Vera removed people with category 4 case outcomes from the final bond analyses, counting these outcomes as "pending." Again, Vera still used these category 4 cases (together with other pending cases) in the bond outcomes analyses for the purposes of the initial reweighting of the data, as explained in Section 4.3. These analyses explored the impact of representation on the following outcomes:

- **Had a bond hearing:** Vera counted a person as having a bond hearing—and coded this variable as 1—if they had at least one bond hearing before an immigration judge and as *not* having a bond hearing—and coded this variable as 0—if they had no bond hearings.
- **Released on bond set by an immigration judge:** Vera counted a person as "released on bond set by an immigration judge"—and coded this variable as 1—if the person was released and had at least one bond set by an immigration judge. Vera assumed the person was released after having paid the final bond set. If a person was never released, or was released but

never had a bond set by an immigration judge, Vera counted this person as *not* released on bond set by an immigration judge and coded this variable as 0.

- **Released by ICE without a bond hearing:** Vera counted a person as "released by ICE without a bond hearing" (through a mechanism such as on parole, release on recognizance, or if the person paid a bond set by ICE)—and coded this variable as 1—if, if a person was released but never had a bond set by an immigration judge. If a person was never released, or was released on bond set by an immigration judge, Vera counted this person as "*not* released by ICE without a bond hearing."

Table 5 shows an overall summary of the bond outcomes reached in the final sample of analysis.

Table 5
Summary of bond outcomes

Outcome	N	%
Had at least one bond hearing before an immigration judge	1,713	55.7
Was released on bond by an immigration judge	*695*	*22.7*
Was not released on bond set by an immigration judge	*1,018*	*33.1*
Had no bond hearings	947	30.8
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	*299*	*9.7*
Not released at all	*648*	*21.1*
Pending proceeding decision*	415	13.5
Total	**3,075**	**100.0**

Note: *Cases "Pending proceeding decision" include cases that resulted in outcomes in Category 4 (administrative closure or DHS failure to prosecute).
Source: Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

3.3.3. Due process outcomes

Within immigration court, two legal mechanisms can help shape the course of an immigration case: motions and applications. To understand the impact of MIDA on upholding due process, Vera analyzed the impact of the MIDA program on the following measures:

- **Total number of motions:** Motions are a type of procedural request in which a party in a legal matter asks the court to take a specific action. A broad range of motions can be filed in immigration court, varying in complexity and in potential impact on the case outcome. Motion practice is a routine component of a legal case, and it can enhance due process by ensuring the law is properly applied and by promoting the meaningful participation of all parties to the case. Vera counted the total number of motions, excluding those that can only be initiated by DHS or exclusively apply to people with counsel.[56] Vera assigned motions into two broad categories: procedural and substantive.[57] Appendix A shows the list of different motions that were filed by people on the Chicago detained docket during the evaluation period and which

were included in the total motion count, procedural motion count, and substantive motion count. In Vera's sample, a mean of 0.39 motions were filed per case—by people or by their attorneys on their behalf—between initial master calendar hearing and initial decision by an immigration judge. Twenty-eight percent of people in the sample had at least one motion filed on their case.[58]

  - **Total number of procedural motions:** Procedural motions include motions that impact the participation or presence of the respondent in court and motions that impact scheduling or docketing. They may include, for example, a motion for a telephonic or in-person hearing, a continuance (postponement) of a hearing, an interpreter, or a filing extension. In many instances, procedural motions may be simpler than substantive motions, requiring a recitation of facts and basic information, rather than complex legal arguments. Despite being considered procedural, many of these motions can significantly impact the outcome of a case by enhancing a person's meaningful participation in their proceedings or their ability to gather evidence in support of their case. Vera counted the total number of procedural motions filed.[59] Vera counted the total number of procedural motions filed. In the sample, a mean of 0.19 procedural motions were filed by people or their attorneys on their behalf between master calendar hearing and initial decision by an immigration judge.[60] Eighteen percent of people in the sample had at least one procedural motion filed on their case.[61]
  - **Total number of substantive motions:** Substantive motions are more complex, requiring an application of relevant facts to the law, typically requiring lengthy filings and legal expertise to complete. They are more likely to impact core legal issues that can determine the outcome of the case. For example, substantive motions may seek safeguards for children or people suffering from mental illness, establish the proper legal burden for the government and respondent, suppress evidence acquired in violation of the law, seek a subpoena for evidence, or ask the court to reconsider a ruling or terminate the case altogether. Because substantive motions require legal expertise and are often accompanied by legal briefs, the assistance of an attorney is particularly important. Vera counted the total number of substantive motions filed. [62] Vera counted the total number of substantive motions filed. In the sample, a mean of 0.17 substantive motions were filed by people or their attorneys on their behalf between master calendar hearing and initial decision by an immigration judge.[63] Fifteen percent of people in the sample had at least one substantive motion filed on their case.[64]

- **Total number of applications:** Applications for relief are filed by respondents in immigration court naming the legal basis for them to remain in the United States. Attorney expertise is especially critical to properly applying the unique facts of a person's life history to the applicable areas of the law. Some avenues for relief, like asylum or other fear-based applications, are well known and apply broadly to many people with cases in immigration court. Others are far more narrow, are available to fewer people, and may require legal expertise to know of their existence or understand eligibility. In addition to helping clients determine their eligibility for relief, attorneys counsel their clients on the strength of their claims, the relevant parts of their life history to support their claims, and possible obstacles to succeeding in their cases. Vera counted the total number of applications filed.[65] In the sample, a mean of 0.88 applications were filed by people or their attorneys on their behalf

between master calendar hearing and initial decision by an immigration judge.[66] Fifty-five percent of people in the sample had at least one application filed on their case.[67]

3.3.4. Court efficiency outcomes

Politicians, scholars, and advocates have pointed to the size of the immigration court backlog—and policies that have been implemented to manage it—as points of concern.[68] Some administrations have responded to the increasing backlog by expanding the use of forms of returns and removals that do not go through the courts; however, many advocates and scholars have shown that this approach presents concerns for due process.[69] Therefore, while studying the impact of MIDA, Vera also examined the impact of the program on certain measures of court efficiency; hindering court efficiency, and thereby increasing the court backlog, may lead the government to enact policy directives that change immigration enforcement or court processes. To study how the MIDA program impacted the length of a case, and hence total volume of pending cases, Vera studied whether the MIDA program impacted any of the following:

- **Total number of hearings:** Vera counted the number of hearings between a person's initial master calendar hearing and initial decision by an immigration judge. Given neither a person nor their attorney has control over the scheduling of immigration court hearings—DHS schedules them—Vera used the number of hearings as a better measure of case length than the length of a case measured in days, which can vary substantially solely based on when a person's hearings are scheduled. The mean number of hearings per person in the sample was 4.27.[70]
- **Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel:** A person can request that the presiding immigration judge adjourn and reschedule their current hearing to allow them to seek legal counsel for their case—a process that elongates the duration of a case. When MIDA offers a screening for services, the person must adjourn their initial master calendar hearing and postpone their case in this way. Vera counted the number of hearings in which a person adjourned and postponed their hearing for this reason. This measure may capture whether MIDA is creating delays through its program design or, on the other hand, expediting cases by removing the need for people to postpone their cases beyond their initial master calendar hearing to seek out counsel for themselves. The mean number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel per person in the sample was 0.75.[71]

3.4. Control variables

In all of its analyses, Vera controlled for other factors that may have impacted a person's outcomes, including their region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, and removal charges; whether the person's country of origin made them more likely to be asylum seeker or eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS); the timing of the case; and the immigration judge. The results show that the positive impacts of the MIDA legal representation program persisted:

- even as the presidential administration in power shifted,
- across judges of different levels of leniency or strictness,
- amid broader federal policy changes that affected the entire court, and
- independently of personal or case characteristics or charges.

However, one limitation of this study is that it focused exclusively on cases that were initially scheduled on the Chicago immigration court's detained docket (though many of the cases were eventually moved to other hearing locations). Because all of the detained proceedings were initially docketed at one immigration court, it was not possible to include court fixed effects in the study; using the immigration court of the initial disposition would be downstream of treatment. Inasmuch as the operational practices in the Chicago immigration court differ substantially from other courts—in ways that cannot be attributed to the immigration judges within those courts, or larger policies implemented during Vera's study period—Vera's analyses could not have captured any effects that court-specific factors might have had on people's outcomes. Examples of such court-specific factors may include the presence of other legal assistance programs—such as the Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and the Immigration Court Helpdesk (ICH)—in detention centers where people in this study were held. The results of this study therefore can be considered internally valid when considering scaling up to reach the entire Chicago detained docket. They are also likely externally valid beyond this one location when certain conditions are met: Vera would expect the same impacts to be found if a program similar to MIDA were to be implemented at a court with characteristics similar to the Chicago immigration court—even if the people in proceedings or immigration judges at that court had different characteristics. However, applying these findings to immigration courts with vastly different protocols or policies relating to detained proceedings should be done with caution. Future research can assess how these effects translate to immigration courts with different court practices or infrastructure.

Vera defined the controls it included in its analyses as follows:

Region of origin: Vera bulked nationalities into the following regions of origin: Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Canada, Mexico, the Middle East and North Africa, South America, and South Asia. Table B.1 in Appendix B shows the distribution of the countries of origin for the final sample and the categorization of those countries into the regions of origin used in the main analyses. More than half (51 percent) of the people in the final sample came from Mexico.

Language of immigration proceedings: Vera included categorical variables for the language in which people's proceedings were conducted. Table B.2 in Appendix B shows the distribution of languages for the final sample. Vera bulked all languages other than English and Spanish into an "other language" category for the causal analyses. Seventy-five percent of people's proceedings were conducted in Spanish, 16 percent in English, and the remaining 9 percent in other languages.

Immigration judge at master calendar hearing: Vera included categorical variables for the immigration judge presiding over people's initial master calendar hearing. For part of the duration of the MIDA program, there was only one immigration judge, Judge Samuel Cole, primarily adjudicating cases on the Chicago detained docket. However, in May 2023, EOIR appointed a second judge, Judge Maria T. Baldini-Potermin, to also hear cases before the Chicago detained docket.[72] Both Judge Cole and Judge Baldini-Potermin presided over cases of people offered MIDA representation and people who were not offered MIDA representation. Two additional judges, Judge Saltzman and Judge Espinoza, slowly transitioned into long-term roles on the detained docket during the period of study.

Several other judges not generally assigned to the detained docketed rotated in for various periods, adjudicating detained initial master calendar hearings occasionally as needed—while colleagues were on leave and while EOIR went through numerous transitions, including the departure of several judges previously on the detained docket. These other judges included Judge Ana Mencini, Judge

Gina Reynolds, Assistant Chief Immigration Judge Jennifer I. Peyton, Judge Lori Yokoyama, Judge Michael Klosowsky, and Judge Robin Rosche. Vera bulked judges other than Judge Cole and Judge Baldini-Potermin into an "other judge" category, as they presided over a relatively small share of cases overall.

Table B.3 in Appendix B shows that Judge Cole and Judge Baldini-Potermin heard the vast majority of cases during the evaluation period. In Vera's final sample of analysis, 73 percent of cases were assigned to Judge Cole, 12 percent of cases were assigned to Judge Baldini-Potermin, and the remaining 15 percent of cases were assigned to other judges combined, with no single judge in this group adjudicating more than 5.1 percent of cases.

Charges on the Notice to Appear (NTA): Every person in removal proceedings receives an NTA in immigration court, which lists the grounds for deportability or inadmissibility. These charges are listed as statute codes provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[73] These statue codes reflect the nested structure of the INA, where each nested level provides more granular specificity on the grounds for deportation. For example, INA § 212 provides all the grounds for inadmissibility of immigrants.[74] INA § 212(a) provides the grounds for inadmissibility of immigrants for "classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission."[75] INA § 212(a)1 provides the grounds for inadmissibility for "classes of aliens ineligible for visa or admission" on "health-related grounds."[76] The nesting structure continues deeper.

To control for the different reasons for deportation and inadmissibility for which people's cases are being brought before the court, Vera created binary variables for all the INA codes, nested three levels deep—that is, for all codes with the structure ###(letter)##, for example, INA 212(a)06. Vera coded each INA binary variable as 1 if that INA statue code appeared on a person's NTA and 0 otherwise. Vera up-coded any statute codes more granular than three levels deep to the higher level that encompasses them. For example, INA § 212(a)06(A) falls under INA § 212(a)06, so if a person had statute code INA § 212(a)06(A) listed on their NTA, Vera coded the binary variable INA(a)06 as 1. People with multiple statute codes listed on their NTA could have values equal to 1 for multiple INA binary variables, essentially controlling for all of the reasons they were in removal proceedings, as opposed to just controlling for a single statute code. If a person had no statute codes listed, Vera coded all of the INA code variables as missing. Vera's approach differed from other papers, which categorized NTA codes into binary variables by criminality or severity, which required researchers to make judgment calls about the severity or criminality of different statute codes—many of which do not map directly on to criminal law or which bear different gravity. Vera included the following INA code variables in the main specification, according to INA text (though certain codes were dropped from the models for certain outcome variables if they were perfect predictors):

- **INA § 212(a)02:** Inadmissible on "criminal and related grounds";
- **INA § 212(a)04:** Inadmissible – "public charge" (the government believes the person is or is likely to be a fiscal burden on the country);
- **INA § 212(a)06**: Inadmissible – "illegal entrants and immigration violators";
- **INA § 212(a)07:** Inadmissible – "document requirements";
- **INA § 212(a)09**: Inadmissible – "aliens previously removed";
- **INA § 237(a)01:** Deportable – "inadmissible at time of entry or at time of adjustment of status or violates status";
- **INA § 237(a)02:** Deportable – "criminal offenses";
- **INA § 237(a)03:** Deportable – "failure to register and falsification of documents"; and
- **INA § 237(a)04**: Deportable – "security and related grounds."

Quarter-year of initial master calendar hearing: Vera controlled for the quarter (three-month period) and year of a person's master calendar hearing. This captured any potential cohort effects, including anything that affected people's cases that began around the same time, such as the volume of cases before the court or any current case law interpretation policies. Vera used quarter-year as opposed to month-year fixed effects, because using month-year would result in a loss of 14 percent of the observations in the logit models due to perfect multicollinearity. Table B.4 in Appendix B shows the breakdown of initial master calendar hearings by year in the final sample.

Likely an asylum seeker: Vera identified people in the sample who could be considered more likely to be an asylum seeker using country population data from the World Bank and data on the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[77] If the number of forcibly displaced people outside of a country—as measured by the sum of the number of refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, other people in need of international protection, and others of concern in the UNCHR data—equaled 10 percent or more of a country's population according to the World Bank population data in a given year, then Vera marked people from those countries whose initial master calendar hearings were scheduled that year as "likely an asylum seeker." Because these data points were not available for 2025 at the time of analysis, Vera carried over the 2024 definitions of "likely an asylum seeker" into 2025. At the 10 percent threshold, the variable categorized people from Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine in all evaluation years, and people from Venezuela prior to 2024.[78]

In alternative robustness specifications, Vera tested the sensitivity of the final results to this control with a threshold cutoff that was less strict—in which Vera defined people from a country as "likely an asylum seeker" if the international forcibly displaced population from a country was at least 5 percent of that country's population in a given year. At the 5 percent threshold, the variable categorized people as "likely an asylum seeker' who were from Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela in all evaluation years; people from Nicaragua whose initial master calendar hearings were in 2022, 2024, or 2025; and people from El Salvador whose initial master calendar hearings were in 2023.

Likely eligible for TPS: When conditions in a foreign country temporarily prevent immigrants from that country who are living in the United States from returning safely, or if—in some instances—the foreign country cannot adequately manage the return of people from the United States to that country, the Secretary of Homeland Security may designate that country for TPS for a certain length of time, generally no longer than 18 months at a time.[79] When USCIS designates or re-designates a country for TPS, in order to be eligible for the status, a person from that country needs to have already resided in the United States before a specific date, determined at the time of the designation. Vera pulled from the USCIS website all of the TPS country designations and re-designations that were active during the period of study and compiled the corresponding "must have resided in the United States by" dates for each country that could be relevant for the nationalities in the sample.[80] If a country was re-designated, there may be multiple relevant "resided by" dates for that country. Next, to construct this variable, Vera needed to determine whether people of each nationality were present in the United States before that designation date.

However, while the data does not contain information on the exact date a person arrived in the United States, Vera knows that the people in the sample were—at the latest—present in the United States on the day they were detained (and assumed they were present for at least some time before that). In the main specification, Vera assumed that a person resided in the United States for at least 180 days before they were detained by ICE. Vera therefore calculated each person's estimated

"arrival date" (solely for the purposes of constructing this variable) as "detained date" minus 180 days. If the person's calculated arrival date fell before the required "resided by" date—which would make that person eligible for TPS from their country of origin—Vera considered them "likely TPS-eligible." Because the assumption that each person arrived at least 180 days before their detained date was somewhat arbitrarily determined, for robustness, Vera tested the sensitivity of the results to this 180-day delta; more details of this and other robustness specifications can be found in Section 7.

Age: Vera did not include age in the main specification due to missingness in the data. Thirty-three percent of people in Vera's sample were missing a date of birth in the EOIR data. However, Vera included age in a robustness specification, which reduced the sample size significantly. Vera used a person's age in years at the hearing the immigration judge reached an initial decision, as calculated by subtracting the person's date of birth from the date of immigration judge decision and dividing by 365. For bond outcomes, Vera included age at the time of detained proceeding decision by an immigration judge as opposed to initial decision by an immigration judge, as not all cases in the bond analyses need have reached a case decision.

Sex: The EOIR data includes data on sex as opposed to gender. Vera did not include sex in the main specification due to missingness in the data. In the main sample, roughly a third (32 percent) of people were missing data on sex. Among those with sex data available, less than 3 percent were female. However, Vera did include sex in a robustness specification, which reduced the sample size significantly. Vera included this variable as a binary variable for being female.

4. Methodology

This section describes the quantitative methodologies that Vera used to answer the following questions:

1. Section 4.1: What would the impact of programs like MIDA be at scale? That is to say, what is the impact of having a MIDA attorney present to offer representation at initial master calendar hearings, among those who are eligible (the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect)?
2. Section 4.2: What is the impact of being represented through programs like MIDA on individual clients' outcomes? (the treatment effect on the treated (ATT))?

Again, for these analyses, Vera limited the sample to people in removal proceedings who were eligible for the MIDA program as described in Section 3.1. Section 4.3 details how Vera reweighted the data to account for censoring.

4.1. Intention-to-treat (ITT) model

As described, having a MIDA attorney present to offer "treatment" (representation by a MIDA attorney) is as good as random, because the days on which MIDA attorneys observed court to offer treatment were set independently of immigration judge, docket composition, or respondents' case or demographic characteristics. Therefore, treatment assignment can be considered exogenous. Vera reports covariate balance in Appendix C Tables C.1 to C.6 across people in the offered-treatment group and control group, confirming that the offer of MIDA services was effectively random. The only statistically significant differences between people offered MIDA and people not offered MIDA across baseline characteristics were that people offered MIDA were 16 percentage points more likely to be assigned to one particular judge (Appendix C, Table C.4). However, Vera included judge fixed effects to mitigate any bias coming from this imbalance. For the binary outcome variables of interest Y_i

(case outcomes and bond outcomes), Vera employed a logit model as shown in Equation (1). For the continuous outcome variables of interest Y_i (due process outcomes and court efficiency outcomes), Vera employed a basic ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model as shown in Equation (2).

Logit model:

$$\text{logit}(\Pr(Y_i = 1)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{observationDay}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta \quad (1)$$

OLS model:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{observationDay}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $\text{observationDay}_i = 0$ if person *i*'s initial master calendar hearing was not scheduled on a day when MIDA attorneys were observing court to offer services, and $\text{observationDay}_i = 1$ if MIDA attorneys were observing court to offer a screening for legal representation to person *i*. Therefore, β_1 is the intention to treat effect (ITT). Included in $\mathbf{X}_i$ are the following case and demographic controls, as described Section 3.4:

- nationality,
- language of immigration proceedings,
- immigration judge at master calendar hearing,
- NTA charges,
- quarter-year of master calendar hearing,
- likely an asylum seeker,
- likely TPS-eligible,
- age (robustness specifications only), and
- sex (robustness specifications only).

Both models used cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at the immigration judge x date of initial master calendar hearing level. As the "randomization" was done at this day rather than individual level, this clustering accounts for any correlation in the errors among people on the same day who were assigned to the same immigration judge.

4.2. Average treatment-effect-on-the-treated (ATT) model

As noted, the MIDA program is based on an "encouragement" design—or offer of treatment—in which people have the possibility to opt in or opt out of participation. As a result, there is partial compliance, not full take up of treatment. Vera therefore estimated the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in addition to the ITT estimates. To estimate the ATT, Vera instrumented for being a MIDA client with having been offered MIDA in a first-stage regression, as shown in Equation (3). For the binary outcome variables of interest Y_i, Vera then incorporated these first-stage residuals $\hat{v}_i$ from Equation (3) into a second stage using a two-stage control function (residual inclusion) approach, as shown in Equation (4). For the continuous outcome variables, Vera instead employed a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model as shown in Equation (5).

First stage:

$$\text{MIDAClient}_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 \cdot \text{observationDay}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\pi + \nu_i \quad (3)$$

Second stage (logit with residual-inclusion):

$$\text{logit}(\Pr(Y_i = 1)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{MIDAClient}_i + \beta_2 \hat{v}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta \quad (4)$$

Second stage (least squares):

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{\text{MIDAClient}}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta + \varepsilon_i \quad (5)$$

where $\text{MIDAClient}_i = 0$ if person i was not a MIDA client, and $\text{MIDAClient}_i = 1$ if person i was a MIDA client. The predicted $\widehat{\text{MIDAClient}}_i$ is the part of MIDAClient_i that is explainable by the instrument and the controls, β_1 is the ATT, and the controls $\mathbf{X}_i$ are as described above. Because people cannot receive MIDA representation unless they are offered it through the court observation intake model, there are no "defiers" or "always takers." In other words, the instrumented β_1 estimand—which identifies the causal effect of MIDA representation for those induced to take up MIDA representation based on the offer—can also be considered the ATT (as opposed to only the local average treatment effect). Both models again use cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level.

4.3. Inverse-probability censoring weighting

Not everyone's case in the sample reached an outcome by the time of the data cutoff (end of May 2025).[81] Sixty-one percent (1,873 of the 3,075 cases in the sample) had reached an initial outcome by an immigration judge on their immigration case, and 87 percent (2,664 of the 3,075 cases) had reached a decision on at least the detained portion of their case (either a final decision while detained or a release on bond). The likelihood that a person's case was still pending, or "right-censored" from the dataset, at the time of data cutoff is not necessarily random. One reason this potentially non-random "right-censoring" may arise is because detained and released cases progress through the immigration court system at different speeds. Once a person is released from immigration detention, their case is transferred to the non-detained docket, which has substantially larger backlogs and longer average case processing times. In other words, people who were released from immigration detention mid-case may be more likely to have their cases still pending at the time of data cutoff. The reason a person is released from custody may be informed by the same factors that influence their final case outcome (e.g. demographic characteristics and case merits). Having an attorney may also impact right-censoring—either directly, if lawyers prolong cases through exploring more legal options, or indirectly, if people with lawyers are more likely to be released from ICE custody. Analyzing the final outcomes without accounting for this "informative" right-censoring would overrepresent the outcomes of cases that closed quickly and underrepresent those more likely to remain pending, biasing the final estimates.

To account and correct for this potentially informative right-censoring in the above models and still preserve the causal estimates in the main analyses, Vera reweighted the data using inverse-probability censoring weights. Before limiting the sample to cases that had reached an initial case decision (or detained proceeding decision when studying bond outcomes), Vera first generated these person weights using the sample of all people in removal proceedings who were eligible for MIDA, including people whose cases were still pending. Vera then used these inverse-probability censoring weights as person weights in the main OLS, logit, 2SLS, and two-stage residual inclusion logit models explained in Equations (1) through (5). These weights gave higher weight to observations (people whose cases had reached an outcome by the data cutoff) that were more similar to the observations that were censored (people whose cases had not reached an outcome at the time of data cutoff).

Put differently, resolved cases that look similar to unresolved cases "stood in" for them in the main analyses to recover the estimand that would be obtained if everyone's outcomes were observed.

As described in Section 3.3.3, Vera considered certain case outcomes—administrative closure and DHS failure to prosecute—as equivalent to pending cases (right-censored). Because these cases do not reach a "conclusion" per se, Vera considered them as pending for the purposes of creating these inverse-probability censoring weights and excluded them from the final analyses.

Vera created the inverse probability censoring weights following methodology from Robins and Finkelstein (2000), Cain and Cole (2009), and Yu, Zhang, and Mukherjee (2023).[82] Vera created these weights longitudinally, reflecting the inverse probability that a person's case remained open for the entire time horizon from the initial master calendar hearing until that time period *t*.

To create these weights, Vera first used a logit model to estimate the probability of being "uncensored" from the data (i.e., having a case outcome) at time *t*, based on the person's demographic and baseline case characteristics, a time trend, and whether they were offered MIDA representation. The logit model is defined as follows:

$$\text{logit}(\Pr(\text{uncensored}_{it} = 1)) = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{observationDay}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta + \tau_t \quad (6)$$

To estimate this logit model, Vera reshaped the sample data to be long by month-year *t*, including all people eligible for MIDA in removal proceedings, regardless of whether they had reached an initial decision or not. If person *i* had already had their master calendar hearing but their case was still pending in month-year *t*, then $\text{uncensored}_{it} = 0$. If person *i*'s case reached a decision in month-year *t*, then $\text{uncensored}_{it} = 1$ only in the period that the case reached an initial decision. For every time period after person *i*'s case reached a decision, or before their master calendar hearing, uncensored_{it} is null/missing. Because the outcome of interest is having ever reached an outcome (i.e. ever granted relief), as opposed to time to reach that outcome, Vera modeled the discrete-time hazard of a case reaching a decision and then constructed the inverse-probability weights from that implied survival probability.

Vera excluded realized treatment status (whether or not someone was actually a MIDA client) from the censoring model because treatment take-up is endogenous with respect to case outcomes; including it would risk inducing selection bias by conditioning on a post-instrument, post-baseline variable on the causal pathway. To permit censoring probabilities to vary by initial treatment assignment (the randomized offer of MIDA services), Vera instead included the exogenous instrument observationDay_i, which stratified the censoring model but preserved the exclusion restriction and therefore did not compromise the identification of the causal estimand.

Vera included in $\mathbf{X}_i$ the baseline controls that were included in the main analysis: region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at master calendar hearing, NTA charges, the timing of master calendar hearing, likely an asylum seeker, and likely TPS-eligible. For the weighting, Vera used the more granular month-year of master calendar hearing (as opposed to quarter-year of master calendar hearing used in the main analyses), since monthly fixed-effects did not suffer from the same collinearity problems that arose in the main outcome models. Vera also included month-year fixed-effects τ_t, which capture underlying time trends in case resolution, reflecting the fact that cases become less likely to remain open as time progresses. Vera obtained the following predicted probabilities from the logit model above:

$$\hat{p}_{it} = \Pr(\text{uncensored}_{it} = 1 \mid \text{observationDay}_i, X_i, \tau_t) \quad (7)$$

To stabilize the weights and reduce variance inflation, Vera fit a marginal logit model to predict the probability of being uncensored based solely on a person's demographic and baseline case characteristics and a time trend, omitting the treatment offer from the censoring model,.

$$\text{logit}(\Pr(\text{uncensored}_{it} = 1)) = \alpha + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta + \tau_t \quad (8)$$

yielding marginal predicted probabilities:

$$\hat{p}_{it}^{\text{marginal}} = \Pr(\text{uncensored}_{it} = 1 \mid \mathbf{X_i}, \tau_t) \quad (9)$$

The per-period stabilized inverse probability censoring weights were then defined as:

$$sw_{it} = \frac{\hat{p}_{it}^{\text{marginal}}}{\hat{p}_{it}} \quad (10)$$

Vera used these period-specific stabilized weights to generate cumulative weights over every time period the person is in the dataset up until they are censored. These cumulative product weights reweighted the data to account for the probability that the person not only was uncensored *in* period *t*, but for every period from initial master calendar hearing *up until* period *t*. For example, for people with an observed case outcome (or bond outcome if that was the analysis at hand), this reweighted the data to account for the probability that a person's case was pending for each period prior to the period in which their case was decided (or was just 1 if the person's case was decided in the same period it began). The denominator sw_{it} removes the case decision-period stabilization weight, so that the weight ipcw_{it} reflects the probability of remaining uncensored *up until* period *t*, but excluding the period in which the case reached an initial decision.

$$\text{ipcw}_{it} = \frac{\prod_{s=1}^{t} sw_{is}}{sw_{it}} \quad (11)$$

To mitigate the influence of extreme outliers in the weights on the final results, Vera trimmed the weights at the first and 99th percentiles:

$$\text{ipcw}_{it}^{\text{trimmed}} = \begin{cases} p1, & \text{if ipcw}_{it} < p1 \\ p99, & \text{if ipcw}_{it} > p99 \\ \text{ipcw}_{it} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

Where p1 and p99 denote the first and 99th percentiles of the distribution of stabilized inverse-probabilities weights.

Substantively, the question Vera sought to answer was whether the outcomes of interest (e.g., granted relief, allowed to remain in the United States) *ever* occurred, rather than *when or how quickly* a person achieved one of these outcomes. Therefore, rather than conducing a time-to-event model for the main analyses—like Robins and Finkelstein (2000) and Cain and Cole (2009)—Vera instead limited the sample to a cross-section of data for its main analyses, following the approach used by Yu, Zhang, and Mukherjee (2023).[83] This cross-section included one observation per person for people with an observed outcome (i.e. were "uncensored" from the data), from the time period in which that decision was reached. Accordingly, in the main OLS, logit, 2SLS, and two-stage residual inclusion logit models, Vera applied the final trimmed cumulative inverse-probability weights $\text{ipcw}_{it}^{\text{trimmed}}$ from when uncensored_{it}=1—that is, the weight that reflects the inverse probability of remaining uncensored through that period *up until* a decision was reached.

5. Results

In this section, Vera presents the results from the methods described in Section 4. The results include both (1) the ITT effect—capturing the impact of being offered MIDA representation—and (2) the ATT effect—capturing the impact of representation among those who accepted the offer (which, as stated, coincides with everyone who had MIDA representation, as no one can receive services without an initial treatment offer through the court observation intake model). The section is divided into four subsections, presenting both the ITT and ATT results for: (1) case outcomes, (2) bond outcomes, (3) due process outcomes, and (4) court efficiency outcomes. Standard errors are clustered at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level, as the setting of MIDA observation days (e.g., treatment assignment randomization) is done at the day level, not the individual level. Table 6 shows the mean and standard deviation of each of the outcome variables analyzed.

Table 6
Summary statistics of all outcome variables

Outcome	N	Mean	SD
Case outcomes			
Granted relief	1,873	0.05	0.21
Allowed to remain in the United States	1,873	0.13	0.34
Bond outcomes			
Had a bond hearing	2,664	0.64	0.48
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	2,664	0.26	0.44
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	2,664	0.11	0.32
Due process outcomes			
Number of motions	1,873	0.39	0.86
Number of applications	1,873	0.88	1.11
Number of procedural motions	1,873	0.19	0.60
Number of substantive motions	1,873	0.17	0.42
Court efficiency outcomes			
Number of hearings	1,873	4.27	3.65
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	1,873	0.75	1.27

Note: Summary statistics used are weighted by the inverse-probability censoring weights.
Source: Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

5.1. Case outcomes

This subsection presents the results for Vera's analysis of how being offered MIDA representation and, separately, receiving MIDA representation affected people's case outcomes. Vera derived the ITT estimates using the logit model specified in Equation (1) and derived the ATT estimates using the two-stage residual inclusion model described in Equations (3) and (4)—with Equation (3) representing the first stage and Equation (4) representing the second stage control function logit. The outcomes of interest analyzed were the binary indicator variables described in Section 3.3.1:

1. granted relief, and
2. allowed to remain in the United States.

Tables 7 through 10 show the ITT and ATT results for these two outcome variables. Tables 7 and 9 show the ITT effect for the two outcome variables above, respectively, or the impact of being offered MIDA treatment, regardless of having taken it up. These two tables present the results from the basic logit model without instrumentation in Equation (1). If this program were scaled up to reach everyone in detained removal proceedings, considering the fact that some people would opt out, this would be the total causal effect at scale.[84]

Tables 8 and 10 show the ATT results for the same two outcome variables, respectively, or the impact of being a MIDA client. In other words, these tables show the causal impact of the program for people who took up MIDA representation. These tables present the instrumented two-stage logit model results from Equations (3) and (4).

The first-stage results from the instrumented analysis can be found in Appendix D Table D.1. The results show that the instrument (being offered representation) is strongly correlated with take up, with a Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of 215, well above the accepted threshold of 10, indicating a strong first stage.

In these four tables, column (1) shows the odds ratio (OR) with the corresponding cluster-robust standard errors, followed by the corresponding *p*-value in column (2). *Odds* refer to the ratio of the probability that an event occurs to the probability that it does not. The odds ratio coefficient reflects how the offer of treatment (for ITT) or the receipt of treatment (for ATT) alters the odds of the outcome occurring. An OR greater than one indicates that the treatment increases the odds of the outcome, whereas an OR less than one indicates that it decreases them, relative to the comparison group.

Across these same four tables, column (3) reports the average marginal effect (AME) and cluster-robust standard errors, with the corresponding *p*-value in column (4). The AME represents the change—in percentage points—among similarly situated people in the probability of an outcome occurring driven by the independent variable (being offered MIDA or being a MIDA client, depending on the table). In these results, a positive AME indicates that MIDA increases the probability of having that outcome, and a negative AME indicates the opposite.

Finally, in these four tables, column (5) shows the risk ratio (RR), or the relative risk. Unlike the odds ratio, which compares odds, this value compares the probabilities of an outcome occurring between treatment and control groups. It can be interpreted as how many times more likely the outcome is for people offered or receiving treatment (depending on the table) relative to similarly situated people in the comparison group. A RR greater than one indicates that the treatment increases the probability of the outcome occurring, and a RR less than one indicates a decrease in probability.

Again, in these analyses, the comparison group was not necessarily composed exclusively of unrepresented people, as people who were unrepresented at their initial master calendar hearing (and hence eligible for MIDA) could have sought counsel later in their proceedings.

Table 7 shows the ITT effect for the impact of being offered a MIDA attorney on being granted relief, and 8 shows the ATT for the impact of taking up MIDA services on that same outcome. The definition of "being granted relief" follows from Section 3.3.1.

Table 7

The impact of being offered treatment on being granted relief (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA observation day	1.726** (0.403)	0.019	0.022** (0.010)	0.024	1.568** (0.297)	0.018
N	1,830					
Pseudo R^2	0.20					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.1.

Table 7 shows the overall impact of the program—regardless of take up—on being granted relief. Column (1) of Table 7 shows the OR for this analysis is 1.726. In other words, being offered MIDA services increased the overall relative odds of being granted relief by approximately 1.7 times compared with similarly situated eligible people who were not offered MIDA services.[85] Table E.1 in Appendix E shows the full results from this analysis with the coefficients from all control variables displayed.

Table 8

The impact of being a MIDA client on being granted relief (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA client	7.771** (7.078)	0.024	0.081** (0.037)	0.029	4.662*** (2.738)	0.009
N	1,830					
Pseudo R^2	0.20					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.2.

Table 8 presents the ATT, that is, the effect of having a MIDA attorney on being granted relief among eligible people who took up representation, relative to similarly situated eligible people who did not

take up treatment or were not offered services. Column (1) reports an estimated OR of 7.771, indicating that MIDA clients had approximately 7.8 times the odds of being granted relief than people who did not participate in the program.[86]

Table E.2 in Appendix E displays the full results from the ATT regression for the impact of receiving MIDA representation on being granted relief, including the control variables and the first-stage residual term. Appendix E Table E.2 column (3) shows that the effect of the first-stage residual term enters the second-stage logit model with a negative and statistically significant coefficient, indicating negative selection. In other words, unobservable characteristics that decrease the probability of relief (e.g., characteristics that make a case more complex or less straightforward) were associated with a lower take-up of MIDA services. This provided evidence that MIDA representation is endogenous with respect to unobservables and motivated Vera's choice to instrument the offer of MIDA services for having a MIDA attorney. Without such instrumentation, a single-equation logit model would produce downward-biased results for the impact of being a MIDA client, understating the effects of representation.

Table 9 shows the results for the impact of the being offered MIDA representation, among people eligible for services, on being allowed to remain in the United States, as defined in Section 3.3.1.

Table 9

The impact of being offered treatment on being allowed to remain in the United States (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA observation day	1.329* (0.230)	0.100	0.025* (0.015)	0.099	1.216* (0.143)	0.097
N	1,858					
Pseudo R^2	0.21					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, primary language, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.3.

Table 9 column (1) shows the OR for the ITT of the MIDA program is 1.329. People who were offered MIDA services—including people who opted out of the program—had an odds of remaining in the United States approximately 1.3 times higher than similarly situated people who were not offered MIDA services.[87] The RR in column (5) of 1.216 indicates that that people who were offered MIDA representation had an approximately 22 percent higher relative probability of being allowed to remain in the United States. In other words, were the MIDA program offered to every person on the Chicago detained docket, one would expect roughly 22 percent more people being allowed to remain in the country than if the program were not available at all. Table E.3 in Appendix E displays the full results from this analysis including the coefficients for all control variables.

Table 10

The impact of being a MIDA client on being allowed to remain in the United States (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA client	1.971 (1.410)	0.343	0.060 (0.063)	0.343	1.571 (0.727)	0.328
N	1,858					
Pseudo R^2	0.22					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.4.

Table 10 presents the results for the impact of being a MIDA client on being allowed to remain in the United States. The ATT effects for MIDA representation, while larger in magnitude than the ITT effect for being offered MIDA representation, are imprecisely estimated, showing no discernable effect. Table E.4 in Appendix E presents the full results from this analysis with the coefficients from all control variables and the first-stage residual term displayed.

Taken together, the results from these four tables indicate that, although being offered legal representation increases the likelihood of outcomes permitting people to remain in the United States temporarily, its strongest effect is in enabling people to obtain relief and thereby establish a durable right to remain, creating a pathway to lawful permanent residence and eventual citizenship.

5.2. Bond outcomes

This subsection presents the results of Vera's analysis of how being offered MIDA representation and, separately, receiving MIDA representation affected people's bond outcomes. The outcomes of interest analyzed were the binary indicator variables described in Section 3.3.2:

1. having a bond hearing,
2. being released on bond set by an immigration judge, and
3. being released by ICE without a bond hearing (on parole, release on recognizance, on ICE discretion, paying an ICE bond, or another release mechanism).

As these variables are binary, for these analyses Vera again employed the logit model in Equation (1) to analyze ITT effect and the two-stage residual inclusion model shown in Equations (3) and (4) to analyze ATT effect.

Tables 11, 13, and 15 show the ITT effect for the three outcome variables above, respectively, or the impact of being offered MIDA treatment, regardless of having taken it up.[88] Tables 12, 14, and 16 show the ATT for the same three outcome variables, respectively, or the impact of being a MIDA client. The tables present the OR, AME, and RR in the same structure as the case outcomes tables.

Tables 11 and 12 show that MIDA had no statistically significant impact on whether people had a bond hearing at all, regardless of take up of the program. The full results from these analyses—presented in Tables E.5 and E.6 in Appendix E—show that immigration judge, region of origin, NTA charge, language, and being likely an asylum seeker were the main predictors of who had a bond hearing. As shown in Table E.5, people who navigated their removal proceedings in Spanish with an interpreter were notably less likely to have a bond hearing than people who navigated their proceedings in English.

Table 13 likewise shows that there was no statistically significant ITT effect of the MIDA program on being released on bond. However, Table 14 shows that being a MIDA client impacted people's likelihood of being released on bond set by an immigration judge, though the effects were marginally significant. Column (5) of Table 14 shows that the RR for this analysis is 1.464. In other words, MIDA clients had a 46 percent higher likelihood of being released on bond set by an immigration judge compared to nonclients. The full results for these analyses are displayed in Tables E.7 and E.8 in Appendix E. These full results show that NTA charge and immigration judge were the main predictors of who ultimately was released on bond set by an immigration judge.

Table 11

The impact of being offered treatment on having a bond hearing (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA observation day	1.049 (0.109)	0.642	0.010 (0.021)	0.642	1.015 (0.033)	0.641
N	2,639					
Pseudo R^2	0.08					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached a decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.5.

Table 12

The impact of being a MIDA client on having a bond hearing (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA client	1.272 (0.521)	0.557	0.049 (0.083)	0.557	1.075 (0.125)	0.534
N	2,639					
Pseudo R^2	0.09					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached a decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.6.

Table 13

The impact of being offered treatment on being released on bond set by an immigration judge (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA observation day	1.179 (0.128)	0.131	0.027 (0.018)	0.131	1.107 (0.074)	0.128
N	2,641					
Pseudo R^2	0.15					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached a decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.7.

Table 14

The impact of being a MIDA client on being released on bond set by an immigration judge (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA client	1.960 (0.836)	0.114	0.110 (0.070)	0.114	1.464* (0.315)	0.077
N	2,641					
Pseudo R^2	0.15					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached a decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.8.

Tables 15 and 16 show that the MIDA program, with respect to both the overall ITT effect and ATT effect, decreased the likelihood of being released by ICE without a bond hearing. Tables E.9 and E.10 in Appendix E show the full results from these same analyses, including all controls and, for the instrumented analysis, the residual term. The full results show that region of origin, NTA charge, and being likely an asylum seeker were the primary determinants of who was released by ICE without a bond hearing, with likely refugees and asylum seekers strongly more likely to be released, reflecting ICE's internal guidance and policies during the study period. The region-of-origin effects were stronger for being released by ICE than for being released on a bond set by an immigration judge, indicating that ICE is likely factoring region-of-origin into its decision-making more than judges when choosing who to release.

Table 15

The impact of being offered MIDA on being released by ICE without a bond hearing (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA observation day	0.750** (0.108)	0.046	-0.023** (0.012)	0.049	0.815** (0.085)	0.049
N	2,639					
Pseudo R^2	0.23					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached a decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.9.

Table 16

The impact of being a MIDA client on being released by ICE without a bond hearing (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
MIDA client	0.118*** (0.084)	0.003	-0.167*** (0.056)	0.003	0.182*** (0.116)	0.007
N	2,639					
Pseudo R^2	0.24					

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached a decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.10.

5.3. Due process outcomes

This subsection presents the results of Vera's analysis of how being offered MIDA representation and, separately, receiving MIDA representation affected due process outcomes. The outcomes of interest analyzed were the continuous variables described in Section 3.3.3:

1. the total number of motions,
2. the total number of applications,
3. the number of procedural motions, and
4. the number of substantive motions.

Table 17 presents the ITT results from Equation (2) for the total number of motions and the total number of applications a person files (or that are filed on their behalf by an attorney or representative). Table 18 presents the ATT results from the 2SLS model in Equations (3) and (5)—

with Equation (3) the first stage and Equation (5) the linear instrumented second stage—for these same two outcome variables. In these two tables, column (3) reveals that the MIDA program, both when analyzing the impact of the initial offer and the impact of taking up services, did not have an impact on the number of applications people filed. However, the same was not true for motions.

Table 17 column (1) shows that people eligible for MIDA who were offered services, on average, had 0.12 more motions filed throughout their cases (from master calendar hearing up until initial disposition by an immigration judge) than other similarly situated eligible people who were not offered MIDA services. Table 18 column (1) shows people who chose to take up MIDA services had 0.48 more motions filed in their cases than comparable nonclients. In other words, for every 100 MIDA clients and 100 comparable nonclients, there were approximately 48 additional motions filed on behalf of MIDA clients than nonclients.

Table 17

The impact of being offered treatment on people's total number of motions and applications (ITT)

Variable	Number of motions		Number of applications	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	0.122*** (0.045)	0.007	-0.001 (0.058)	0.982
N	1,863		1,863	
R^2	0.103		0.099	

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.11.

Table 18

The impact of being a MIDA client on people's total number of motions and applications (ATT)

Variable	Number of motions		Number of applications	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	0.480*** (0.177)	0.007	-0.005 (0.227)	0.982
N	1,863		1,863	
R^2	0.105		0.099	

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar

hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.12.

Tables 19 and 20 present the heterogenous results for the impact of MIDA on motion filings, separated out by type of motion: procedural and substantive. As shown in Table 19 column (3), people who were offered MIDA services had, on average, 0.05 more substantive motions than people who were not offered MIDA services. Furthermore, as shown in Table 20 column (3), MIDA clients had 0.20 more substantive motions filed than nonclients. The ITT and ATT results for procedural motions were not statistically significant. Substantive motions are more complex, requiring an application of relevant facts to the law and typically requiring lengthy filings and legal expertise to complete. They are more likely to impact core legal issues that can determine the outcome of the case. For example, substantive motions may seek safeguards for children or people suffering from mental illness, establish the proper legal burden for the government and respondent, suppress evidence acquired in violation of the law, seek a subpoena for evidence, or ask the court to reconsider a ruling or to terminate the case altogether. They often impact core legal issues that can determine the outcome of the case, ensuring due process is upheld.

Table 19

The impact of being offered treatment on the number of motions, by type (ITT)

Variable	Procedural motions		Substantive motions	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	0.040 (0.029)	0.162	0.051** (0.023)	0.025
N	1,863		1,863	
R^2	0.075		0.078	

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.13.

Table 20

The impact of being a MIDA client on the number of motions, by type (ATT)

Variable	Procedural motions		Substantive motions	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	0.157 (0.111)	0.158	0.200** (0.088)	0.023
N	1,863		1,863	
R^2	0.074		0.078	

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least

an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.14.

5.4. Court efficiency outcomes

This section presents results of Vera's analysis of the impact of the MIDA program on court efficiency outcomes, namely the total number of hearings and the total number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel. Because the lawyers and people in proceedings cannot decide when their hearings are scheduled, Vera measured the number of hearings—as opposed to the duration of cases in days—as a measure of case length.

Table 21 presents the ITT results from Equation (2) for the total number of hearings and the total number of hearings a person adjourns to seek counsel. Table 22 presents the ATT results from the 2SLS model in Equations (3) and (5) for these same two outcome variables. Vera found that both the ITT and ATT results for both outcome variables were not statistically significant. In other words, there was no evidence to suggest that the initial offer of MIDA representation or taking up services prolonged a person's case (as counted by total number of hearings) or created additional delays due to people adjourning hearings to seek counsel.

Table 21
The impact of being offered treatment on court efficiency outcomes (ITT)

	Number of Hearings			
	Total		Adjourned to seek counsel	
Variable	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	0.075 (0.187)	0.688	-0.031 (0.072)	0.663
N	1,863		1,863	
R^2	0.147		0.086	

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.15.

Table 22
The impact of being a MIDA client on court efficiency outcomes (ATT)

Variable	Number of Hearings: Total Coef. (SE)	Total p-value	Adjourned to seek counsel Coef. (SE)	Adjourned to seek counsel p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	0.295 (0.721)	0.682	-0.124 (0.283)	0.663
N	1,863		1,863	
R^2	0.151		0.080	

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. Full results are displayed in Appendix E Table E.16.

6. Heterogenous Effects

Both DHS, which is responsible for placing people in removal proceedings and oversees immigration detention, and DOJ, which encompasses the immigration courts, are federal agencies within the executive branch. The guidance, directives, and policies these agencies receive may change vastly across presidential administrations regarding who to prioritize for enforcement, when immigration judges should exercise discretion, and more. Action by the federal government may also change the composition of the immigration courts themselves. For example, the Trump administration has fired or replaced many of the immigration judges within EOIR.[89]

6.1. Differential results by presidential administration

Executive shifts in guidance, directives, and policies for DHS and DOJ raise the question: to what degree do the effects of programs like MIDA persist across different presidential administrations? The cases in this study span the Biden administration and the beginning of the second Trump administration, which implemented vastly different immigration policies.[90] To explore whether the effects of the MIDA program differed across administrations, Vera conducted a secondary, exploratory exercise.

To explore whether the estimated effects of the MIDA program differed across administrations, Vera constructed the variable Trump_i, which equals 1 if a person's case reached an initial decision during the second Trump administration and 0 if the person's case reached a decision under the Biden administration. Vera used date of initial case decision to assign cases to administrations, rather than the date of initial master calendar hearing, as any changes to policy, adjudicatory guidance, or practices administered by a new administration would likely affect all cases decided under that administration, including those that began under a previous administration.

Table 23 shows the distribution of completed cases across presidential administrations, including how many had their master calendar hearing scheduled on MIDA observation days and how many subsequently became MIDA clients.

Table 23

Distribution of completed cases across presidential administrations

Group	Biden	%	Trump	%	Total	%
Master calendar hearing on MIDA observation days	553	29.5	72	3.9	625	33.4
MIDA client	*141*	*7.5*	*19*	*1.0*	*160*	*8.5*
*Not a MIDA client**	*412*	*22.0*	*53*	*2.8*	*465*	*24.8*
Not on MIDA observation days	968	51.7	280	14.9	1,248	66.6
Total	1,521	81.2	352	18.8	1,873	100.0

Note: "Not a MIDA client" includes people who could not be offered a screening because they appeared to have a person who may be a representative present with them.

Vera did not include the administration variable Trump_i directly as a predictor in the main specification. Vera chose not to because this variable is defined based on a post-treatment outcome on the causal pathway (i.e. case completion date) and therefore including it in the model may have introduced some collider bias if the MIDA program elongated or shortened people's cases.

Nevertheless, as a secondary exploratory exercise, Vera assessed whether the ITT effects of the MIDA program differed across administrations by interacting the constructed variable Trump_i with the treatment assignment indicator observationDay_i in the non-instrumented logit and OLS models in Equations 13 and 14, respectively. All controls $\mathbf{X_i}$ that were included in the main specification were included here.

Logit model:

$$\text{logit}(\Pr(Y_i = 1)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{observationDay}_i + \beta_2 \text{Trump}_i + \beta_3 \text{observationDay}_i \times \text{Trump}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta \quad (13)$$

OLS model:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{observationDay}_i + \beta_2 \text{Trump}_i + \beta_3 \text{observationDay}_i \times \text{Trump}_i + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta + \varepsilon_i \quad (14)$$

Because of the potential for post-treatment collider bias, the results from these analyses should not be interpreted as causal ITT effects, but rather they provide suggestive evidence of whether the direction or magnitude of the ITT effects differed substantially across administrations. Due to sparseness of data, Vera could not conduct this exercise in a way that would have avoided post-treatment bias by defining the administration variable based on the date of one's initial master calendar hearing. For similar reasons, Vera could not estimate interaction effects for the ATT models. Table 24 presents the results of Equation 13 and 14 for all binary and continuous outcome variables, showing average marginal effects for the different presidential administrations and the difference between administrations.

Table 24

Differential results of being offered treatment, by presidential administration

Outcome	Biden		Trump		Trump - Biden	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Case outcomes						
Granted relief	0.046 (0.041)	0.271	0.046 (0.041)	0.271	0.03 (0.044)	0.534
Bond outcomes						
Having a bond hearing	-0.020 (0.058)	0.734	-0.020 (0.058)	0.734	0.02 (0.064)	0.767
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	0.080 (0.079)	0.313	0.080 (0.079)	0.313	0.09 (0.081)	0.293
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	-0.067 (0.050)	0.186	-0.067 (0.050)	0.186	-0.08 (0.052)	0.124
Due process outcomes						
Number of motions	0.603** (0.259)	0.020	0.603** (0.259)	0.020	0.55** (0.263)	0.037
Number of procedural motions	0.367* (0.202)	0.069	0.367* (0.202)	0.069	0.37* (0.207)	0.072
Number of substantive motions	0.087 (0.071)	0.226	0.087 (0.071)	0.226	0.03 (0.043)	0.526
Number of applications	-0.082 (0.232)	0.724	-0.082 (0.232)	0.724	0.03 (0.043)	0.526
Court efficiency outcomes						
Number of hearings	0.912 (0.678)	0.179	0.912 (0.678)	0.179	0.03 (0.043)	0.526
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	0.026 (0.170)	0.879	0.026 (0.170)	0.879	0.03 (0.043)	0.526

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible.

While these tests were too underpowered to detect smaller differences across administrations, the results do not suggest that there were meaningfully large differences in the program's impacts across administrations. This is reflected by the lack of a statistically significant difference in the average marginal effects for all case outcomes and bond outcomes in Table 24 column (5). However, the results do indicate the estimated effects of the MIDA program on the number of motions filed—particularly procedural motions, or those which affect the participation or presence of the

respondent in court, and/or scheduling or docketing—were higher under the second Trump administration than under the Biden administration.

6.2. Differential effects by immigration judge

Vera conducted analyses to assess whether the observed effects of the MIDA program were judge-dependent; one might argue for example, that representation programs such as MIDA are only effective if working with a more lenient judge. Vera first examined whether the judges in the sample differed meaningfully in regard to their leniency or strictness, even after controlling for case and demographic characteristics and treatment assignment. Second, Vera analyzed whether the effects of the MIDA program differed substantially across immigration judges.

For this analysis, Vera interacted the treatment assignment (ITT) and treatment take-up (ATT) variables with immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing. Again, the immigration judges in the sample are Judge Samuel Cole, Judge Maria Baldini-Potermin, and all the other immigration judges combined, as described in Section 3.4. The distribution of immigration judges assigned to the cases of people in the sample is displayed in Appendix B, Table B.3.

Vera explored whether the ITT effects of the MIDA program substantially differed across immigration judges by interacting the judge indicators with the treatment assignment indicator $\text{observationDay}_\text{i}$ in the non-instrumented logit and OLS models in Equations 15 and 16, respectively, where β_1 is the overall treatment effect, and the δ_j coefficients capture the heterogenous judge-specific treatment effects. In the model below, J = {Judge Samuel Cole, Judge Maria Baldini-Potermin, all other judges}, and D_ij is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the person was assigned to judge j and equal to 0 otherwise. Vera included all controls $\mathbf{X_i}$ that were included in the main specification, including the immigration judge at person *i*'s initial master calendar hearing.

Logit model:

$$\text{logit}(\Pr(\text{Y}_\text{i} = 1)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{observationDay}_\text{i} + \sum_{j=2}^{J} \delta_\text{j}(\text{observationDay}_\text{i} \text{ x } \text{D}_{ij}) + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta \quad (15)$$

OLS model:

$$\text{Y}_\text{i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{observationDay}_\text{i} + \sum_{j=2}^{J} \delta_\text{j}(\text{observationDay}_\text{i} \text{ x } \text{D}_{ij})\ \mathbf{X_i}'\beta + \varepsilon_\text{i} \quad (16)$$

Second, Vera explored whether the ATT effects of having MIDA representation differed across immigration judges by interacting the judge indicators with the treatment take-up indicator $\text{MIDAClient}_\text{i}$ in the 2SLS and two-stage residual inclusion models, as shown in Equations 17 through 19, where again β_1 is the overall treatment effect, and the δ_j coefficients capture the heterogenous judge-specific treatment effects. J and D_ij are as defined above. Again, $\mathbf{X_i}$ includes all the same controls as the main specification, including the immigration judge at person *i*'s initial master calendar hearing.

First Stage:

$$\text{MIDAClient}_\text{i} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 \cdot \text{observationDay}_\text{i} + \sum_{j=2}^{J} \kappa_\text{j}(\text{observationDay}_\text{i} \text{ x } \text{D}_{ij}) + \mathbf{X_i}'\pi + \nu_\text{i} \quad (17)$$

Second Stage (logit with residual-inclusion):

$$\text{logit}\big(\Pr(\text{Y}_\text{i} = 1)\big) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{MIDAClient}_\text{i} + \sum_{j=2}^{J} \delta_\text{j}(\text{MIDAClient}_\text{i} \text{ x } \text{D}_{ij}) + \beta_2 \hat{\nu}_\text{i} + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta \quad (18)$$

Second Stage (least squares):

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widehat{\text{MIDACClient}}_i + \sum_{j=2}^{J} \delta_j (\widehat{\text{MIDACClient}}_i \times D_{ij}) + \mathbf{X_i}'\beta + \varepsilon_i \quad (19)$$

Tables F.1 and F.2 in Appendix F first present the differences in immigration judge effects across administrations for the ITT and ATT analyses respectively. Vera found that the immigration judges differed substantially in their levels of leniency or strictness, even after accounting for the demographic and case characteristics and legal representation of the cases they heard. These differences were most pronounced for bond decisions, the filings of motions, and court efficiency measures. Tables F.3 and F.4 in Appendix F show the judge-specific treatment effects, and Tables F.5 and F.6 show the differences in treatment effects across judges for the intention-to-treat and treatment-effect-on-the-treated analyses respectively. Tables F.3 and F.4 show that the treatment effects are mostly non-negative across all the judges in the sample, and Tables F.5 and F.6 show little evidence of systematic differences in the treatment effects across judges. The differences in treatment effects across judges were generally small and/or imprecise, indicating that observed variation in the impacts of the program across judges is capturing differences in magnitude and precision of how much the program is working, rather than substantively distinct responses to representation.

The lack of significant negative treatment effects for any judge (with the exception of being released by ICE outside of the bond hearing process—an outcome that involved judges to a much lesser degree), combined with the lack of substantial differences across judges, rules out meaningful differences in the way treatment works across judges, even if the analyses are underpowered to detect smaller differences. These findings suggest that, although judicial assignment shapes baseline outcomes, MIDA was broadly effective, even across judges of different baseline leniency or strictness.

7. Robustness

Vera conducted several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the results to the inverse-probability censoring weights and how certain control variables were defined. Vera reran the analyses with several different model specifications and compared the results.

Specifications 1 to 3: Sensitivity to definitions of protection-seeker control variables

Vera tried three specifications to test how sensitive the results were to how Vera defined the control variables "likely an asylum seeker" and "likely TPS-eligible." In robustness Specification 1, Vera estimated the model without these two variables. In robustness Specification 2, Vera used a less restrictive definition of these two variables. In Specification 3, Vera kept the asylum seeker variable as defined in the main specification but used a more restrictive version of “likely TPS-eligible.” The paragraphs below describe how Vera redefined these two variables as “more restrictive” or “less restrictive.”

In the main specification, Vera flagged a person as "likely an asylum seeker" if their country of origin was one where, according to UNHCR data, the number of people who were forcibly displaced outside of the country in a given year equaled at least 10 percent of that country's population. In the main specification, Vera defined a person as likely TPS-eligible if their estimated arrival date in the United States was before the “resided by” date necessary to be eligible for TPS in designated countries. As described in Section 3.4, Vera, in determining TPS eligibility, assumed a person’s “arrival date” was at least 180 days before the day they were detained by ICE.

In robustness Specification 2—a version of the model with less restrictive parameters for the two variables—Vera defined a person as "likely an asylum seeker" if their country of origin was one where, according to UNHCR data, the number of people who were forcibly displaced outside of the country in a given year equaled at least 5 percent of that country's population (effectively including more counties in the definition). For the less restrictive definition of "likely TPS-eligible," Vera assumed that people in the sample had lived in the United States for at least one year prior to detention, which effectively made more people in the sample data meet the criteria for being likely TPS-eligible.

In robustness Specification 3, Vera kept the asylum seeker definition as used in the main specification but used a more restrictive definition of "likely TPS-eligible." In this model, Vera did not assume people had resided in the United States for any amount of time prior to their detained date, and only counted a person as TPS-eligible if they were certainly in the United States by the TPS-eligible date, as evidenced by the fact that they were detained in the United States on that date.

Specification 4: Inclusion of age and sex controls

As mentioned in Section 3.4, Vera did not include age and sex variables in the main specification due to missingness. However, Vera included them as controls in robustness Specification 4, which reduced the sample size and power.

Specifications 5 and 6: Sensitivity to outlier inverse-probability censoring weights

In the main specifications, Vera trimmed the cumulative inverse-probability censoring weights at the first and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of high-weight outliers. However, in robustness checks, Vera estimated two other specifications to test the sensitivity of the results to the censoring weights. In Specification 5, Vera applied fewer restrictions to the censoring weights than in the main specification and included the cumulative censoring weights directly without trimming the distribution of weights at all. In Specification 6, Vera restricted the weights further than in the main specification. Instead of trimming the final weights, Vera capped the unstabilized predicted probabilities in Equation (7) at a lower bound of 0.01, which would in turn cap the censoring weights.

Results

Tables in Appendix G display the side-by-side ITT and ATT results for all of the outcome variables of interest for the main specification and Specifications 1 through 6. Tables G.1 to G.16 show that there is no reason to believe that the results were driven by misspecification of the control variables, the exclusion of age and sex controls, or issues with outliers in the censoring weights. The results that differed the most from the main specification were the results from Specification 4, when age and sex controls were included. However, due to missingness in that variable, the sample size and power were reduced heavily. The results for Specification 4 differ most largely for court efficiency outcomes, but as all the other specifications produced similar results, it is likely that these differences in results were driven by the age and sex data missingness.

Endnotes

[1] Jacquelyn Pavilon and Neil Agarwal, *The Impact of Legal Representation on Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Evidence from the MIDA Program*, (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2026), https://www.vera.org/publications/the-impact-of-legal-representation-on-detained-immigrants-facing-deportation.
[2] American Immigration Council, *The Removal System of the United States: An Overview*, (Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, 2022), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/removal_system_of_the_united_states_an_overview.pdf.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Immigration and Nationality Act, H.R. 5678, 82d Cong. (1952), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.
[5] Immigration Reform and Control Act, S. 1200, 99th Cong. (1985); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1995); REAL ID Act, H.R. 418, 109th Cong. (2005).
[6] Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A); Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A); Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2); Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2); Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3); Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4); Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
[7] *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893), *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 365-6 (2010).
[8] Immigration and Nationality Act § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2026); Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2025).
[9] Ibid.
[10] Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a); Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
[11] Withholding-only proceedings are limited proceedings in which a judge may consider the applications for withholding of removal (or restriction on removal) from the United States for people subject to expedited removal under Immigration and Nationality Act § 238(b) or reinstatement of a prior order of removal under Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), who have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), *Immigration Court Practice Manual,* (2025), 114, https://resources.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/immigration_court_practice_manual_jan-2025.pdf.
[12] This policy was previously applied to people who were encountered by immigration authorities both within two weeks of their arrival and within 100 miles of the border. In January 2025, the Trump administration sought to expand the policy to people apprehended anywhere in the United States who could not demonstrate that they had been present for more than two years. This expansion is currently being challenged. Muzaffar Chishti and Kathleen Bush-Joseph, "Trump Administration's Expansion of Fast-Track Deportation Powers Is Transforming Immigration Enforcement," Migration Policy Institute, September 25, 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-expedited-removal.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), *Immigration Court Practice Manual,* (2025), 107-114, https://resources.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/immigration_court_practice_manual_jan-2025.pdf.
[15] U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), "Executive Office for Immigration Review," https://www.justice.gov/eoir.
[16] Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), *Immigration Court Practice Manual,* (2025), 61-62, https://resources.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/immigration_court_practice_manual_jan-2025.pdf.
[17] Ibid., 61-62.
[18] Ibid., 69-78.
[19] Ibid., 69-78.

[20] Ibid., 69-78.
[21] Ibid., 69-78.
[22] Ibid., 69-78.
[23] Ibid., 78-80.
[24] Ibid., 78-80.
[25] Ibid., 101-102, 130
[26] American Immigration Council, "Practice Advisory: How to File a Petition for Review," November 2015, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/how_to_file_a_petition_for_review_2015_update.pdf.
[27] Code of Federal Regulations 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)–(c)(9).
[28] Ibid.; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Detention Management." https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management.
[29] Code of Federal Regulations 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)–(c)(11).
[30] Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), *Immigration Court Practice Manual,* (January 2025), 123-128, https://resources.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/immigration_court_practice_manual_jan-2025.pdf.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Executive Office for Immigration Review, *Immigration Court Practice Manual*, (January 2025), 78-80, https://resources.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/immigration_court_practice_manual_jan-2025.pdf.
[34] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Immigration Benefits in EOIR Proceedings," accessed October 14, 2025, https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-resources/immigration-benefits-in-eoir-proceedings#:~:text=Certain%20people%20in%20proceedings%20before,and%20certain%20waivers%20of%20inadmissibility.
[35] 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17 (2024); Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018).
[36] Ibid.
[37] American Bar Association Children's Immigration Law Academy, "Termination v. Dismissal in Removal Proceedings," April 2, 2024, https://cilacademy.org/2024/04/02/termination-v-dismissal-in-removal-proceedings/; 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a).
[38] American Bar Association Children's Immigration Law Academy, "Termination v. Dismissal in Removal Proceedings," April 2, 2024, https://cilacademy.org/2024/04/02/termination-v-dismissal-in-removal-proceedings/; 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c).
[39] American Bar Association Children's Immigration Law Academy, "Termination v. Dismissal in Removal Proceedings," April 2, 2024, https://cilacademy.org/2024/04/02/termination-v-dismissal-in-removal-proceedings/; 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c); 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a).
[40] National Immigration Project, "Practice Alert: Protecting Noncitizens from Expedited Removal and Immigration Court Arrests," May 30, 2025, https://nipnlg.org/sites/default/files/2025-05/alert-protecting-noncitizens-er.pdf.
[41] *Matter of Bavakan AVETISYAN*, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012); *Matter of W-Y-U-*, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2023) (as amended through Jun 25, 2025).
[42] Executive Office for Immigration Review, "Notice: No Case Currently Pending Before the Executive Office for Immigration Review," https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1348901/dl?inline.
[43] *Matter of Bavakan AVETISYAN*, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012); *Matter of W-Y-U-*, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2023) (as amended through Jun 25, 2025); Executive Office for Immigration Review, "Notice: No Case Currently Pending Before the Executive Office for Immigration Review," https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1348901/dl?inline.
[44] Ibid.
[45] *Matter of Bavakan AVETISYAN*, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012); *Matter of W-Y-U-*, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2023) (as amended through Jun 25, 2025).
[46] Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(1); Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(3); Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(d).
[47] Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(b)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5).
[48] Immigration and Nationality Act § 240B; 8 U.S.C. § 1229c.

[49] 8 C.F.R. 1240.1(d).
[50] Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.
[51] Vera matched the remaining three clients by re-scoring according to different subsets of the criteria. These matches are considered to have been done "manually" because the particular choice of criteria was specific to the given client in each case.
[52] There is no codebook in the EOIR data that explains the codes for case types. Vera interpreted "RMV" to mean 240 removal proceedings.
[53] Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.
[54] Vera calculated 2,850 people eligible for MIDA who were nonclients by taking the 3,075 MIDA-eligible people and subtracting the 225 MIDA clients.
[55] Vera Institute of Justice, "Safety and Fairness for Everyone Database," on file at Vera on file at Vera (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, July 16, 2025); Chicago Immigration Court, "IJ Hearing Calendar - Redacted - Detained," spreadsheets (Chicago: Chicago Immigration Court, April 25, 2022, through April 4, 2025); National Immigrant Justice Center, "MIDA A# Tracking" private spreadsheet (Chicago: National Immigrant Justice Center, June 15, 2025); and Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.
[56] Appendix A provides a full list of the motions Vera included in the total motion count. Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), *Immigration Court Practice Manual,* (January 2025), 87-100, https://resources.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/immigration_court_practice_manual_jan-2025.pdf.
[57] Appendix A provides a full list of the motions Vera included in the total, procedural, and substantive motion counts.
[58] Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Vera included requests for waivers in the count of applications. Waivers are a form of discretionary relief that a person can file asking the judge to forgive a violation of immigration law or avoid being denied relief.
[66] Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Diana G. Li, "Due Process in Removal Proceedings After *Thuraissigiam*," *Stanford Law Review* 74 no. 793 (2022), 793-850, https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/04/Li-74-Stan.-L.-Rev.-793.pdf.
[70] Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), "EOIR Announces 19 New Immigration Judges," May 12, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1583531/dl?inline.
[73] Immigration and Nationality Act, H.R. 5678, 82d Cong. (1952), codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.
[74] Immigration and Nationality Act § 212; 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
[75] Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
[76] Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1).
[77] The World Bank, "Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL),." accessed March 1, 2025, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR), "UNHCR Refugee Data Finder," accessed March 1, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download.
[78] Asylum seekers and refugees can originate from any country. This binary variable is only a proxy to add an additional control which may not be captured in the region-of-origin effects.
[79] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Temporary Protected Status," accessed June 1, 2025, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status.
[80] Ibid.
[81] "Outcome" here means initial case outcome by an immigration judge when studying case outcomes, due process outcomes, and court efficiency outcomes. "Outcome" instead means detained proceeding decision when studying the bond outcome variables.
[82] Lauren E. Cain and Stephen R. Cole, "Inverse Probability-of-censoring Weights for the Correction of Time-varying Noncompliance in the Effect of Randomized Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy on Incident AIDS or Death," *Statistics in Medicine*, 28 no. 12 (2009), 1,725-1,738, https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.3585; Youfei Yu, Min Zhang, and Bhramar Mukherjee, "An Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Method that Accounts for Right-Censoring for Causal Inference with Multiple Treatments and a Binary Outcome," *Statistics in Medicine* 42, no. 20 (2023), 3,699-3,715, https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.9826; James M. Robins and Dianne M. Finkelstein, "Correcting for Noncompliance and Dependent Censoring in an AIDS Clinical Trial with Inverse Probability of Censoring Weighted (IPCW) Log-Rank Tests," *Biometrics*, 56 no. 3 (2000), 779-788, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0006-341x.2000.00779.x.
[83] Ibid.
[84] See "3.4 Control variables," at page 18, for a discussion of considerations that should be made when seeking to generalize the findings of this study to other immigration courts.
[85] Table 7 column (3) shows the AME of being offered MIDA representation on being granted relief in absolute terms is 0.022, or a 2.2 percentage-point increase, significant at the 5 percent level.
[86] Table 8 column (3) shows the AME of being a MIDA client on being granted relief in absolute terms is 0.081, or an 8.1 percentage-point increase, significant at the 5 percent level.
[87] Table 9 column (3) shows the average marginal effect of being offered MIDA representation on being allowed to remain in the United States in absolute terms is 0.025, or a 2.5 percentage-point increase, significant at the 10 percent level.
[88] See "3.4 Control variables," at page 18, for a discussion of considerations that should be made when seeking to generalize the findings of this study to other immigration courts.
[89] Ximena Bustillo and Scott Simon, "The Trump Administration Fired Nearly 100 Immigration Judges in 2025. What's Next?" NPR, January 10, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/01/10/nx-s1-5672386/the-trump-administration-fired-nearly-100-immigration-judges-in-2025-whats-next.
[90] Laurence Benenson and Nicci Mattey, "The First 100 Days of the Second Trump Administration: Key Immigration-Related Actions and Developments," *National Immigration Forum,* April 28, 2025, https://forumtogether.org/article/the-first-100-days-of-the-second-trump-administration-key-immigration-related-actions-and-developments.

Appendix A: Motion Types and Categories

Categorization of motions for outcome variables

Motion type	Included in total motion count?	Included in procedural motion count?	Included in substantive motion count?
Motion for continuance	Yes	Yes	No
Motion for video appearance	Yes	Yes	No
Motion to accept late filed documents	Yes	Yes	No
Motion for change of venue	Yes	Yes	No
Motion to advance for earlier hearing date	Yes	Yes	No
Motion for telephonic appearance	Yes	Yes	No
Motion for in-person hearing	Yes	Yes	No
Motion for extension of time to file a document	Yes	Yes	No
Motion to set an individual/merits hearing	Yes	Yes	No
Motion (unspecified)	Yes	No	No
Motion to terminate	Yes	No	Yes
Motion for fee waiver	Yes	No	Yes
Motion for voluntary departure	Yes	No	Yes
Motion to dismiss	Yes	No	Yes
Motion for competency safeguards	Yes	No	Yes
Motion for subpoena	Yes	No	Yes
Motion to reopen	Yes	No	Yes
Motion to pretermit	No	No	No
Motion to withdraw as counsel	No	No	No
Motion to substitute counsel	No	No	No

Source: Vera's interpretation of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

Appendix B: Summary Tables

Table B.1

Distribution of nationalities in final sample and categorization into regions of origin

Region/Country of Origin	Count	%
Africa	109	**3.54**
Angola	*2*	*0.07*
Benin	*1*	*0.03*
Cameroon	*3*	*0.10*
Congo	*3*	*0.10*
Democratic Republic of Congo	*15*	*0.49*
Equatorial Guinea	*3*	*0.10*
Ethiopia	*5*	*0.16*
Gambia	*2*	*0.07*
Ghana	*7*	*0.23*
Guinea	*1*	*0.03*
Kenya	*6*	*0.20*
Liberia	*1*	*0.03*
Malawi	*2*	*0.07*
Mauritania	*4*	*0.13*
Niger	*1*	*0.03*
Nigeria	*23*	*0.75*
Rwanda	*3*	*0.10*
Senegal	*4*	*0.13*
Sierra Leone	*1*	*0.03*
Somalia	*8*	*0.26*
South Africa	*2*	*0.07*
South Sudan	*1*	*0.03*
Sudan	*4*	*0.13*
Tanzania	*2*	*0.07*
Togo	*1*	*0.03*
Uganda	*1*	*0.03*
Zaire	*1*	*0.03*
Zambia	*1*	*0.03*
Zimbabwe	*1*	*0.03*
Caribbean	76	**2.47**
Bahamas	*3*	*0.10*
Cuba	*20*	*0.65*
Dominican Republic	*26*	*0.85*
Haiti	*16*	*0.52*
Jamaica	*9*	*0.29*
Trinidad And Tobago	*2*	*0.07*
Central America	**752**	**24.46**
Belize	*4*	*0.13*

Costa Rica	*1*	*0.03*
El Salvador	*60*	*1.95*
Guatemala	*288*	*9.37*
Honduras	*219*	*7.12*
Nicaragua	*176*	*5.72*
Panama	*4*	*0.13*
Central Asia	**75**	**2.44**
Afghanistan	*1*	*0.03*
Georgia	*4*	*0.13*
Kazakhstan	*2*	*0.07*
Kirghizia (Kyrgyzstan)	*5*	*0.16*
Russia	*6*	*0.20*
Tajikistan (Tadzhik)	*4*	*0.13*
Turkey	*45*	*1.46*
Turkmenistan	*2*	*0.07*
Uzbekistan	*6*	*0.20*
East Asia and Pacific	**74**	**2.41**
Australia	*1*	*0.03*
Burma (Myanmar)	*28*	*0.91*
China	*10*	*0.33*
Federated States of Micronesia	*3*	*0.10*
Hong Kong	*1*	*0.03*
Japan	*1*	*0.03*
Laos	*7*	*0.23*
Malaysia	*1*	*0.03*
Midway Islands	*1*	*0.03*
North Korea	*1*	*0.03*
Philippines	*6*	*0.20*
Singapore	*1*	*0.03*
South Korea	*1*	*0.03*
Thailand	*6*	*0.20*
The Republic of The Marshall Islands	*1*	*0.03*
Vietnam	*5*	*0.16*
Europe and Canada	**80**	**2.60**
Albania	*1*	*0.03*
Bosnia-Herzegovina	*13*	*0.42*
Bulgaria	*1*	*0.03*
Canada	*4*	*0.13*
Czech Republic	*1*	*0.03*
Germany	*1*	*0.03*
Guadeloupe	*1*	*0.03*
Ireland	*1*	*0.03*
Italy	*2*	*0.07*
Kosovo	*2*	*0.07*

Lithuania	*2*	*0.07*
Luxembourg	*1*	*0.03*
Macedonia	*2*	*0.07*
Moldavia (Moldova)	*3*	*0.10*
Poland	*12*	*0.39*
Romania	*21*	*0.68*
Spain	*1*	*0.03*
Ukraine	*7*	*0.23*
United Kingdom	*4*	*0.13*
Mexico	**1,562**	**50.80**
Middle East and North Africa	**43**	**1.40**
Egypt	*4*	*0.13*
Iran	*3*	*0.10*
Iraq	*8*	*0.26*
Israel	*3*	*0.10*
Jordan	*16*	*0.52*
Lebanon	*2*	*0.07*
Libya	*1*	*0.03*
Morocco	*2*	*0.07*
Saudi Arabia	*1*	*0.03*
Syria	*1*	*0.03*
Yemen	*2*	*0.07*
South America	**212**	**6.89**
Argentina	*3*	*0.10*
Bolivia	*1*	*0.03*
Brazil	*3*	*0.10*
Chile	*3*	*0.10*
Colombia	*54*	*1.76*
Ecuador	*22*	*0.72*
Peru	*12*	*0.39*
Venezuela	*114*	*3.71*
South Asia	**74**	**2.41**
Bhutan	*2*	*0.07*
Brunei	*1*	*0.03*
India	*56*	*1.82*
Nepal	*8*	*0.26*
Pakistan	*5*	*0.16*
Sri Lanka	*2*	*0.07*
Unknown	**18**	**0.59**
Stateless - Alien Unable to Name a Country	*1*	*.03*
Unknown	*10*	*.33*
Unknown Nationality	*7*	*.23*
Total	3,075	100.00

Note: *The country names are listed as in the nationality field of the EOIR Data.

Source: Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

Table B.2
Distribution of languages of immigration proceedings in the final sample

Language*	N	%
Spanish	**2,291**	**74.53**
English	**486**	**15.81**
Other Language	**297**	**9.66**
Arabic	*17*	*0.55*
Arabic, Egyptian	*1*	*0.03*
Arabic, Sanaani Spoken	*1*	*0.03*
Bosnian	*1*	*0.03*
Burmese	*19*	*0.62*
Chatino, Tataltepec	*1*	*0.03*
Chin, Haka	*4*	*0.13*
Chinanteco	*1*	*0.03*
Chuj, San Mateo Ixtatan	*3*	*0.10*
Chuj, San Sebastian Coatan	*11*	*0.36*
Creole	*12*	*0.39*
Czech	*1*	*0.03*
Farsi-Iranian-Persian	*1*	*0.03*
French	*8*	*0.26*
Georgian	*1*	*0.03*
Gujarati	*5*	*0.16*
Haryanvi	*2*	*0.07*
Hassaniya	*2*	*0.07*
Hebrew	*1*	*0.03*
Hindi	*7*	*0.23*
Hmong	*1*	*0.03*
Ixil	*1*	*0.03*
Karen, S'Gaw	*2*	*0.07*
Kekchi	*3*	*0.10*
Kinyarwanda	*3*	*0.10*
Kirghiz	*2*	*0.07*
Konjobal, Western (Akateko)	*3*	*0.10*
Korean	*1*	*0.03*
Lao	*2*	*0.07*
Lingala	*2*	*0.07*
Lithuanian	*1*	*0.03*
Mam	*4*	*0.13*
Mandarin	*8*	*0.26*
Mixe, Tlahuitoltepec	*1*	*0.03*
More-Moshey	*1*	*0.03*

Nepali	*8*	*0.26*
Polish	*3*	*0.10*
Portuguese	*1*	*0.03*
Pulaar	*1*	*0.03*
Punjabi	*15*	*0.49*
Quiche	*5*	*0.16*
Rohingya	*3*	*0.10*
Romani, Balkan	*1*	*0.03*
Romanian, Macedo	*3*	*0.10*
Romanian-Moldovan	*9*	*0.29*
Romany (Gypsy)	*1*	*0.03*
Russian	*16*	*0.52*
Serbian	*3*	*0.10*
Sinhalese	*2*	*0.07*
Somali	*5*	*0.16*
Soninke	*1*	*0.03*
Spanish--Sign Language	*1*	*0.03*
Swahili - English	*6*	*0.20*
Swahili-French	*1*	*0.03*
Tamil	*1*	*0.03*
Tarasco	*1*	*0.03*
Tharu, Kathariya	*1*	*0.03*
Tigre	*1*	*0.03*
Trukese	*2*	*0.07*
Turkish	*41*	*1.33*
Turkmen	*2*	*0.07*
Tzotzil	*2*	*0.07*
Ukrainian	*3*	*0.10*
Urdu	*2*	*0.07*
Uzbek	*7*	*0.23*
Vietnamese	*5*	*0.16*
Wolof	*3*	*0.10*
Yoruba	*5*	*0.16*
Unknown (missing data)	*1*	*0.03*
Total	**3,075**	**100.00**

Note: *The languages are listed as are in the language field of the EOIR Data.
Source: Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

Table B.3

Distribution of assigned immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing in the final sample

Immigration Judge	N	%
Samuel Cole	**2,249**	**73.10**
Maria Baldini-Potermin	**371**	**12.1**
Other Judge	**455**	**14.80**
Ana Mencini	1	0.03
Carla Espinoza	157	5.11
Eva Saltzman	152	4.94
Gina Reynolds	2	0.07
Joshua Luskin	14	0.46
Jennifer I. Peyton	19	0.62
Lori Yokoyama	4	0.13
Michael Klosowsky	98	3.19
Robin Rosche	8	0.26
Total	**3,075**	**100.0**

Source: Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

Table B.4

Distribution of initial master calendar hearings by year in the final sample

Year	N	%
2022*	628	20.4
2023	838	27.2
2024	1,174	38.2
2025**	435	14.2
Total	**3,075**	**100.00**

Notes: * The figure for year 2022 only reflects a partial year (March through December) as MIDA began taking clients in March 2022, so that is when the evaluation period began. ** The figure for year 2025 only reflects a partial year (January through March), as that was the cutoff period for initial master calendar hearings for this evaluation.

Source: Executive Office for Immigration Review, "FOIA Library," EOIR Case Data, June 2025, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/foia-library-0.

Appendix C: Balance Tests

Table C.1

Balance Tests - Demographic Characteristics

Variable	Spanish		English		Likely refugee or asylum seeker		Likely TPS eligible	
	(SE)	p-value	(SE)	p-value	(SE)	p-value	(SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Observation day	-0.013 (0.017)	0.470	0.938 (0.015)	0.938	0.001 (0.004)	0.854	-0.001	0.853
Mean	0.745		0.158		0.008		0.011	
SD	0.436		0.365		0.092		0.106	

Note: Robust standard errors are used.
The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.2

Balance Tests - Region of Origin (1)

Variable	Africa		Caribbean		Central America		Central Asia		East Asia and Pacific	
	(SE)	p-value	(SE)	p-value	(SE)	p-value	(SE)	p-value	(SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Observation day	0.007 (0.019)	0.697	0.705 (0.007)	0.705	0.007 (0.006)	0.215	-0.001 (0.016)	0.929	-0.007 (0.008)	0.366
Mean	0.511		0.036		0.025		0.246		0.025	
SD	0.500		0.185		0.156		0.431		0.155	

Note: Robust standard errors are used.
The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.3
Balance Tests - Region of Origin (2)

Variable	Europe and Canada (SE)	p-value	Mexico (SE)	p-value	Middle East and north Africa (SE)	p-value	South America (SE)	p-value	South Asia (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Observation day	0.008 (0.006)	0.183	0.281 (0.006)	0.281	0.003 (0.005)	0.543	-0.019 (0.011)	0.101	-0.003 (0.007)	0.607
Mean	0.024		0.026		0.014		0.069		0.024	
SD	0.154		0.160		0.118		0.254		0.154	

Note: Robust standard errors are used.
The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.4
Balance Tests - Immigration Judge at Master Calendar Hearing

Variable	Judge Baldini-Potermin (SE)	p-value	Judge Cole (SE)	p-value	Other judge (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Observation day	-0.017 (0.032)	0.591	0.163*** (0.042)	0.000	0.000 (0.030)	0.000
Mean	0.121		0.148		0.731	
SD	0.326		0.355		0.443	

Note: Robust standard errors are used.
The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.5
Balance Tests - NTA Charges (1)

	Inadmissibility Charges:							
Variable	**Documentation requirements**		**Criminal and related grounds**		**Public charge**		**Previously removed**	
	(SE)	**p-value**	**(SE)**	**p-value**	**(SE)**	**p-value**	**(SE)**	**p-value**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Observation day	-0.023 (0.018)	0.211	0.536 (0.014)	0.536	-0.004 (0.012)	0.733	0.001	0.645
Mean	0.727		0.120		0.114		0.001	
SD	0.446		0.325		0.318		0.025	

Note: Robust standard errors are used.
The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table C.6
Balance Tests - NTA Charges (2)

	Deportability Charges:							
Variable	**Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment**		**Criminal offenses**		**Security and related grounds**		**Failure to register or falsification of documents**	
	(SE)	**p-value**	**(SE)**	**p-value**	**(SE)**	**p-value**	**(SE)**	**p-value**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Observation day	0.008 (0.012)	0.489	0.319 (0.014)	0.319	0.001 (0.001)	0.645	-0.001	0.156
Mean	0.103		0.120		0.001		0.001	
SD	0.305		0.325		0.025		0.025	

Note: Robust standard errors are used.
The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Appendix D: First-stage Results

This appendix displays the first-stage results for regression of being a MIDA client on having one's initial master calendar hearing on a MIDA observation day and the full set of controls from the main specification. In the table, cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge.

Table D.1
First stage results

Variable	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)
MIDA observation day	0.255*** (0.019)	0.000
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing		
Maria Baldini-Potermin	-0.020 (0.031)	0.523
Samuel Cole	-0.036 (0.023)	0.115
Region of origin		
Africa	0.040 (0.052)	0.443
Caribbean	0.041 (0.044)	0.343
Central America	0.024* (0.014)	0.098
Central Asia	-0.101** (0.045)	0.026
East Asia and Pacific	0.067 (0.053)	0.207
Europe and Canada	-0.081** (0.039)	0.037
Middle East and North Africa	-0.072 (0.057)	0.210
South America	0.029 (0.024)	0.213
South Asia	-0.043 (0.053)	0.414

(Table D.1 continued on next page)

(Table D.1 continued)

Variable	Coef. (SE)	p-value
Language of immigration proceedings		
Spanish	-0.034 (0.022)	0.117
Other language	0.057 (0.037)	0.123
NTA charges		
Inadmissible		
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	-0.078*** (0.025)	0.002
Documentation requirements	-0.058** (0.023)	0.011
Criminal and related grounds	0.038** (0.018)	0.041
Previously removed	0.338 (0.268)	0.206
Deportable		
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	-0.076*** (0.024)	0.002
Criminal offenses	-0.028 (0.024)	0.252
Security and related grounds	-0.305*** (0.094)	0.001
Failure to register or falsification of documents	0.217** (0.099)	0.028
Political situation		
Likely an asylum seeker	-0.064 (0.064)	0.317
Likely TPS-eligible	-0.072 (0.062)	0.242
Constant	0.140*** (0.043)	0.001
N	1,863	
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat	177.647	

Appendix E: Full Results

This appendix displays the full results for each outcome variable for the main specification. In all of the tables, cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA as described in the INA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. In tables that display case outcomes (E.1 to E.4), due process outcomes (E.11 to E.14), and court efficiency outcomes (E.15 and E.16), the population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. In the tables that display bond outcomes (E.5 to E.10), the population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings.

Table E.1
The impact of being offered treatment on being granted relief (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	1.726** (0.403)	0.019	0.022** (0.010)	0.024
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	1.685 (1.120)	0.432	0.024 (0.029)	0.409
Samuel Cole	1.016 (0.578)	0.978	0.001 (0.021)	0.977
Region of origin				
Africa	4.333*** (2.259)	0.005	0.092** (0.046)	0.045
Caribbean	2.106 (1.218)	0.198	0.035 (0.034)	0.299
Central America	0.641 (0.265)	0.282	-0.013 (0.011)	0.237
Central Asia	3.243 (2.763)	0.167	0.066 (0.068)	0.334
East Asia and Pacific	1.954 (1.133)	0.248	0.030 (0.031)	0.331
Europe and Canada	0.933 (0.689)	0.925	-0.002 (0.024)	0.924

(Table E.1 continued on next page)

(Table E.1 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
Middle East and North Africa	2.662 (1.700)	0.125	0.051 (0.043)	0.244
South America	1.101 (0.638)	0.868	0.003 (0.021)	0.872
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.634 (0.243)	0.235	-0.018 (0.015)	0.238
Other language	0.831 (0.377)	0.683	-0.007 (0.018)	0.683
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	0.186** (0.129)	0.015	-0.067** (0.028)	0.018
Documentation requirements	1.160 (0.798)	0.830	0.006 (0.027)	0.829
Criminal and related grounds	0.556 (0.238)	0.171	-0.023 (0.017)	0.166
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	0.100*** (0.079)	0.003	-0.091*** (0.032)	0.004
Criminal offenses	0.563 (0.411)	0.432	-0.023 (0.029)	0.434
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.251 (0.297)	0.243	-0.055 (0.047)	0.243
Likely TPS-eligible	2.084 (1.392)	0.272	0.029 (0.026)	0.270
Constant	0.310 (0.263)	0.168	-	-
N	1,830		1,830	
Mean	0.322		0.322	
Pseudo R^2	0.20		0.20	

Table E.2

The impact of being a MIDA client on being granted relief (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	7.771** (7.078)	0.024	0.081** (0.037)	0.029
Residuals	0.160* (0.159)	0.065	-0.072* (0.040)	0.071
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	1.764 (1.175)	0.394	0.025 (0.028)	0.369
Samuel Cole	1.106 (0.633)	0.860	0.004 (0.020)	0.856
Region of origin				
Africa	3.990*** (2.056)	0.007	0.085* (0.044)	0.052
Caribbean	1.944 (1.125)	0.250	0.030 (0.032)	0.343
Central America	0.612 (0.253)	0.234	-0.014 (0.011)	0.187
Central Asia	4.017 (3.527)	0.113	0.086 (0.081)	0.292
East Asia and Pacific	1.690 (0.983)	0.367	0.023 (0.029)	0.431
Europe and Canada	1.100 (0.829)	0.899	0.003 (0.028)	0.902
Middle East and North Africa	3.095* (2.022)	0.084	0.063 (0.050)	0.207
South America	1.045 (0.601)	0.939	0.002 (0.021)	0.940
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.679 (0.263)	0.318	-0.015 (0.015)	0.319
Other language	0.739 (0.340)	0.511	-0.012 (0.018)	0.511

(Table E.2 continued on next page)

(Table E.2 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	0.220** (0.153)	0.030	-0.060** (0.028)	0.032
Documentation requirements	1.303 (0.892)	0.699	0.010 (0.027)	0.698
Criminal and related grounds	0.520 (0.221)	0.124	-0.026 (0.017)	0.119
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	0.118*** (0.093)	0.007	-0.084*** (0.032)	0.008
Criminal offenses	0.597 (0.435)	0.479	-0.020 (0.029)	0.480
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.290 (0.346)	0.299	-0.049 (0.047)	0.299
Likely TPS-eligible	2.437 (1.652)	0.189	0.035 (0.027)	0.188
Constant	0.229* (0.199)	0.089	- -	-
N	1,830		1,830	
Mean	0.082		0.082	
Pseudo R^2	0.20		0.20	

Table E.3

The impact of being offered treatment on being allowed to remain in the United States (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	1.329* (0.230)	0.100	0.025* (0.015)	0.099
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	1.945 (0.793)	0.103	0.062 (0.038)	0.100
Samuel Cole	1.236 (0.407)	0.520	0.018 (0.026)	0.503
Region of origin				
Africa	5.202*** (1.925)	0.000	0.203*** (0.061)	0.001
Caribbean	2.323** (0.866)	0.024	0.082* (0.045)	0.064
Central America	1.537* (0.345)	0.055	0.037* (0.020)	0.068
Central Asia	1.398 (0.899)	0.603	0.028 (0.059)	0.635
East Asia and Pacific	1.807 (0.715)	0.135	0.053 (0.041)	0.193
Europe and Canada	1.429 (0.601)	0.397	0.030 (0.038)	0.436
Middle East and North Africa	4.911*** (2.735)	0.004	0.193** (0.093)	0.037
South America	2.475** (0.933)	0.016	0.090** (0.045)	0.045
South Asia	1.859 (0.922)	0.212	0.057 (0.053)	0.283
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.523*** (0.118)	0.004	-0.058*** (0.020)	0.005
Other language	1.048 (0.275)	0.858	0.004 (0.023)	0.858

(Table E.3 continued on next page)

(Table E.3 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	0.632 (0.245)	0.236	-0.041 (0.035)	0.239
Documentation requirements	1.903* (0.721)	0.089	0.057* (0.033)	0.086
Criminal and related grounds	1.510 (0.381)	0.103	0.037 (0.022)	0.102
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	0.325*** (0.126)	0.004	-0.100*** (0.034)	0.003
Criminal offenses	3.183*** (1.327)	0.005	0.103*** (0.037)	0.005
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.808 (0.701)	0.806	-0.019 (0.077)	0.806
Likely TPS-eligible	3.301** (1.960)	0.044	0.107** (0.053)	0.043
Constant	0.202*** (0.120)	0.007	- -	-
N	1,858		1,858	
Mean	0.322		0.322	
Pseudo R^2	0.21		0.21	

Table E.4

The impact of being a MIDA client on being allowed to remain in the United States (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	1.971 (1.410)	0.343	0.060 (0.063)	0.343
Residuals	1.423 (1.179)	0.670	0.031 (0.073)	0.670
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	2.041* (0.831)	0.080	0.065* (0.037)	0.078
Samuel Cole	1.319 (0.432)	0.397	0.022 (0.025)	0.373
Region of origin				
Africa	5.261*** (1.978)	0.000	0.201*** (0.061)	0.001
Caribbean	2.277** (0.854)	0.028	0.079* (0.044)	0.071
Central America	1.527* (0.342)	0.059	0.036* (0.020)	0.072
Central Asia	1.509 (0.997)	0.534	0.035 (0.062)	0.578
East Asia and Pacific	1.755 (0.714)	0.167	0.050 (0.041)	0.226
Europe and Canada	1.552 (0.654)	0.297	0.037 (0.040)	0.347
Middle East and North Africa	5.328*** (2.950)	0.003	0.203** (0.093)	0.029
South America	2.467** (0.913)	0.015	0.088** (0.043)	0.041
South Asia	1.945 (1.004)	0.198	0.061 (0.055)	0.272
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.538*** (0.125)	0.007	-0.055*** (0.021)	0.008
Other language	1.018 (0.271)	0.948	0.002 (0.023)	0.948

(Table E.4 continued on next page)

(Table E.4 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	0.668 (0.257)	0.296	-0.035 (0.034)	0.299
Documentation requirements	2.001* (0.755)	0.066	0.061* (0.033)	0.062
Criminal and related grounds	1.492 (0.376)	0.112	0.035 (0.022)	0.111
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	0.346*** (0.134)	0.006	-0.094*** (0.034)	0.006
Criminal offenses	3.311*** (1.356)	0.003	0.105*** (0.035)	0.003
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.874 (0.748)	0.875	-0.012 (0.075)	0.875
Likely TPS-eligible	3.417** (2.022)	0.038	0.108** (0.052)	0.037
Constant	0.174*** (0.105)	0.004	-	-
N	1,858		1,858	
Mean	0.082		0.082	
Pseudo R^2	0.22		0.22	

Table E.5

The impact of being offered treatment on having a bond hearing (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	1.049 (0.109)	0.642	0.010 (0.021)	0.642
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	1.939** (0.525)	0.015	0.141** (0.058)	0.015
Samuel Cole	1.718** (0.361)	0.010	0.117** (0.047)	0.013
Region of origin				
Africa	0.685 (0.183)	0.156	-0.083 (0.060)	0.166
Caribbean	0.827 (0.227)	0.487	-0.041 (0.060)	0.495
Central America	1.335*** (0.148)	0.009	0.059*** (0.022)	0.008
Central Asia	0.336*** (0.133)	0.006	-0.244*** (0.087)	0.005
East Asia and Pacific	0.999 (0.356)	0.998	-0.000 (0.075)	0.998
Europe and Canada	1.162 (0.399)	0.662	0.031 (0.070)	0.657
Middle East and North Africa	1.234 (0.581)	0.655	0.043 (0.094)	0.646
South America	1.819*** (0.345)	0.002	0.115*** (0.034)	0.001
South Asia	0.943 (0.317)	0.862	-0.012 (0.072)	0.863
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.735* (0.116)	0.051	-0.063* (0.032)	0.050
Other language	0.976 (0.209)	0.909	-0.005 (0.044)	0.909

(Table E.5 continued on next page)

(Table E.5 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	1.777*** (0.336)	0.002	0.117*** (0.038)	0.002
Documentation requirements	0.322*** (0.060)	0.000	-0.232*** (0.037)	0.000
Criminal and related grounds	0.680*** (0.089)	0.003	-0.079*** (0.027)	0.003
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	1.399 (0.287)	0.102	0.069 (0.042)	0.101
Criminal offenses	1.009 (0.207)	0.963	0.002 (0.042)	0.963
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.319*** (0.135)	0.007	-0.233*** (0.086)	0.007
Likely TPS-eligible	1.378 (0.535)	0.409	0.065 (0.079)	0.409
Constant	2.577*** (0.752)	0.001	- -	-
N	2,639		2,639	
Mean	0.363		0.363	
Pseudo R^2	0.08		0.08	

Table E.6

The impact of being a MIDA client on having a bond hearing (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	1.272 (0.521)	0.557	0.049 (0.083)	0.557
Residuals	1.411 (0.606)	0.423	0.070 (0.087)	0.422
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	1.946** (0.524)	0.014	0.142** (0.057)	0.014
Samuel Cole	1.723*** (0.358)	0.009	0.117** (0.046)	0.011
Region of origin				
Africa	0.682 (0.185)	0.158	-0.083 (0.060)	0.168
Caribbean	0.818 (0.223)	0.462	-0.043 (0.059)	0.469
Central America	1.327** (0.150)	0.012	0.057** (0.022)	0.011
Central Asia	0.342*** (0.137)	0.007	-0.238*** (0.088)	0.007
East Asia and Pacific	0.994 (0.370)	0.986	-0.001 (0.078)	0.986
Europe and Canada	1.187 (0.408)	0.619	0.035 (0.069)	0.612
Middle East and North Africa	1.263 (0.606)	0.626	0.048 (0.095)	0.615
South America	1.816*** (0.347)	0.002	0.115*** (0.034)	0.001
South Asia	0.964 (0.329)	0.915	-0.008 (0.072)	0.916
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.738* (0.117)	0.054	-0.062* (0.032)	0.053
Other language	0.960 (0.211)	0.855	-0.008 (0.045)	0.855

(Table E.6 continued on next page)

(Table E.6 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	1.809*** (0.349)	0.002	0.121*** (0.039)	0.002
Documentation requirements	0.323*** (0.061)	0.000	-0.230*** (0.037)	0.000
Criminal and related grounds	0.672*** (0.089)	0.003	-0.081*** (0.027)	0.003
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	1.425* (0.299)	0.091	0.072* (0.043)	0.091
Criminal offenses	1.008 (0.210)	0.968	0.002 (0.042)	0.968
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.321*** (0.137)	0.008	-0.231*** (0.086)	0.007
Likely TPS-eligible	1.420 (0.558)	0.373	0.071 (0.080)	0.373
Constant	2.497*** (0.748)	0.002	-	-
N	2,639		2,639	
Mean	0.090		0.090	
Pseudo R^2	0.09		0.09	

Table E.7

The impact of being offered treatment on being released on bond set by an immigration judge (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	1.179 (0.128)	0.131	0.027 (0.018)	0.131
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	0.846 (0.266)	0.595	-0.023 (0.044)	0.596
Samuel Cole	1.610** (0.388)	0.049	0.075** (0.035)	0.034
Region of origin				
Africa	1.078 (0.391)	0.836	0.012 (0.059)	0.837
Caribbean	0.774 (0.328)	0.546	-0.039 (0.062)	0.527
Central America	1.326** (0.150)	0.013	0.047** (0.019)	0.014
Central Asia	0.721 (0.319)	0.460	-0.049 (0.063)	0.434
East Asia and Pacific	1.508 (0.763)	0.417	0.070 (0.090)	0.437
Europe and Canada	1.161 (0.425)	0.684	0.024 (0.061)	0.690
Middle East and North Africa	0.769 (0.433)	0.641	-0.040 (0.081)	0.625
South America	1.634** (0.369)	0.030	0.084** (0.040)	0.037
South Asia	0.720 (0.325)	0.467	-0.049 (0.064)	0.439
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.855 (0.159)	0.398	-0.026 (0.030)	0.399
Other language	0.900 (0.251)	0.706	-0.017 (0.046)	0.706

(Table E.7 continued on next page)

(Table E.7 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	2.623*** (0.803)	0.002	0.158*** (0.050)	0.002
Documentation requirements	0.704 (0.163)	0.130	-0.058 (0.038)	0.131
Criminal and related grounds	0.110*** (0.030)	0.000	-0.361*** (0.043)	0.000
Previously removed	1.687 (2.130)	0.679	0.086 (0.207)	0.679
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	2.220** (0.731)	0.015	0.131** (0.054)	0.015
Criminal offenses	0.147*** (0.051)	0.000	-0.314*** (0.057)	0.000
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.805 (0.426)	0.683	-0.035 (0.087)	0.683
Likely TPS-eligible	1.553 (0.914)	0.455	0.072 (0.096)	0.455
Constant	0.376** (0.152)	0.016	-	-
N	2,641		2,641	
Mean	0.363		0.363	
Pseudo R^2	0.15		0.15	

Table E.8

The impact of being a MIDA client on being released on bond set by an immigration judge (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	1.960 (0.836)	0.114	0.110 (0.070)	0.114
Residuals	0.698 (0.341)	0.462	-0.059 (0.080)	0.462
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	0.857 (0.269)	0.622	-0.021 (0.043)	0.623
Samuel Cole	1.644** (0.395)	0.038	0.078** (0.035)	0.025
Region of origin				
Africa	1.088 (0.395)	0.817	0.014 (0.059)	0.819
Caribbean	0.753 (0.318)	0.502	-0.043 (0.061)	0.480
Central America	1.301** (0.148)	0.021	0.044** (0.019)	0.022
Central Asia	0.762 (0.337)	0.539	-0.041 (0.064)	0.520
East Asia and Pacific	1.489 (0.757)	0.433	0.067 (0.090)	0.453
Europe and Canada	1.243 (0.464)	0.560	0.036 (0.063)	0.570
Middle East and North Africa	0.804 (0.450)	0.696	-0.034 (0.082)	0.685
South America	1.578** (0.357)	0.044	0.078* (0.040)	0.052
South Asia	0.758 (0.348)	0.546	-0.042 (0.066)	0.525
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	0.875 (0.163)	0.474	-0.022 (0.031)	0.474
Other language	0.873 (0.242)	0.624	-0.022 (0.045)	0.624

(Table E.8 continued on next page)

(Table E.8 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	2.732*** (0.848)	0.001	0.165*** (0.050)	0.001
Documentation requirements	0.719 (0.166)	0.154	-0.054 (0.038)	0.155
Criminal and related grounds	0.106*** (0.029)	0.000	-0.367*** (0.043)	0.000
Previously removed	1.333 (1.813)	0.833	0.047 (0.223)	0.833
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	2.332** (0.778)	0.011	0.139** (0.054)	0.011
Criminal offenses	0.144*** (0.051)	0.000	-0.317*** (0.057)	0.000
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.843 (0.449)	0.748	-0.028 (0.087)	0.748
Likely TPS-eligible	1.625 (0.982)	0.422	0.080 (0.099)	0.422
Constant	0.344** (0.143)	0.010	-	-
N	2,641		2,641	
Mean	0.090		0.090	
Pseudo R^2	0.15		0.15	

Table E.9

The impact of being offered treatment on being released by ICE without a bond hearing (ITT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	0.750** (0.108)	0.046	-0.023** (0.012)	0.049
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	0.676 (0.313)	0.398	-0.026 (0.032)	0.414
Samuel Cole	1.188 (0.449)	0.648	0.014 (0.028)	0.635
Region of origin				
Africa	6.853*** (3.267)	0.000	0.244*** (0.077)	0.001
Caribbean	1.298 (0.806)	0.675	0.021 (0.054)	0.697
Central America	0.997 (0.189)	0.989	-0.000 (0.014)	0.989
Central Asia	5.898*** (2.965)	0.000	0.219*** (0.079)	0.006
East Asia and Pacific	3.459 (3.120)	0.169	0.135 (0.128)	0.290
Europe and Canada	0.986 (0.573)	0.980	-0.001 (0.043)	0.980
Middle East and North Africa	1.658 (1.153)	0.467	0.044 (0.070)	0.526
South America	1.005 (0.336)	0.988	0.000 (0.025)	0.988
South Asia	7.954*** (3.636)	0.000	0.269*** (0.075)	0.000
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	1.447 (0.490)	0.275	0.029 (0.027)	0.276
Other language	1.038 (0.310)	0.900	0.003 (0.024)	0.900

(Table E.9 continued on next page)

(Table E.9 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	1.148 (0.334)	0.636	0.011 (0.023)	0.636
Documentation requirements	3.480*** (0.911)	0.000	0.098*** (0.020)	0.000
Criminal and related grounds	0.018*** (0.018)	0.000	-0.319*** (0.081)	0.000
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	1.045 (0.426)	0.915	0.003 (0.032)	0.915
Criminal offenses	0.013*** (0.014)	0.000	-0.341*** (0.084)	0.000
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	4.465** (2.609)	0.010	0.118*** (0.046)	0.010
Likely TPS-eligible	1.125 (0.603)	0.826	0.009 (0.042)	0.826
Constant	0.040*** (0.022)	0.000	-	-
N	2,639		2,639	
Mean	0.363		0.363	
Pseudo R^2	0.23		0.23	

Table E.10

The impact of being a MIDA client on being released by ICE without a bond hearing (ATT)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	0.118*** (0.084)	0.003	-0.167*** (0.056)	0.003
Residuals	1.276 (0.742)	0.675	0.019 (0.046)	0.676
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	0.658 (0.306)	0.368	-0.028 (0.032)	0.384
Samuel Cole	1.148 (0.428)	0.712	0.011 (0.028)	0.703
Region of origin				
Africa	6.797*** (3.178)	0.000	0.236*** (0.073)	0.001
Caribbean	1.323 (0.834)	0.657	0.022 (0.055)	0.682
Central America	1.041 (0.197)	0.830	0.003 (0.014)	0.831
Central Asia	5.525*** (2.851)	0.001	0.203*** (0.078)	0.009
East Asia and Pacific	3.072 (2.732)	0.207	0.116 (0.117)	0.323
Europe and Canada	0.916 (0.538)	0.882	-0.006 (0.041)	0.879
Middle East and North Africa	1.516 (1.102)	0.567	0.035 (0.068)	0.609
South America	1.081 (0.365)	0.817	0.006 (0.026)	0.820
South Asia	7.301*** (3.403)	0.000	0.248*** (0.074)	0.001
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	1.387 (0.472)	0.337	0.026 (0.027)	0.338
Other language	1.077 (0.332)	0.810	0.006 (0.024)	0.810

(Table E.10 continued on next page)

(Table E.10 continued)

Variable	OR (SE)	p-value	Avg. ME (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	1.097 (0.329)	0.759	0.007 (0.023)	0.758
Documentation requirements	3.409*** (0.929)	0.000	0.096*** (0.021)	0.000
Criminal and related grounds	0.018*** (0.019)	0.000	-0.313*** (0.080)	0.000
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	0.987 (0.409)	0.975	-0.001 (0.032)	0.975
Criminal offenses	0.014*** (0.015)	0.000	-0.333*** (0.083)	0.000
Political situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	3.925** (2.304)	0.020	0.107** (0.046)	0.019
Likely TPS-eligible	1.132 (0.612)	0.818	0.010 (0.042)	0.818
Constant	0.045*** (0.025)	0.000	-	-
N	2,639		2,639	
Mean	0.090		0.090	
Pseudo R^2	0.24		0.24	

Table E.11

The impact of being offered treatment on due process outcomes (ITT)

Variable	Number of Motions		Number of Applications	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	0.122*** (0.045)	0.007	-0.001 (0.058)	0.982
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	0.148* (0.089)	0.096	0.046 (0.139)	0.740
Samuel Cole	0.005 (0.068)	0.942	0.035 (0.107)	0.745
Region of origin				
Africa	0.470** (0.186)	0.012	0.755*** (0.222)	0.001
Caribbean	-0.097 (0.137)	0.479	0.001 (0.218)	0.998
Central America	0.039 (0.049)	0.430	0.064 (0.065)	0.330
Central Asia	0.021 (0.163)	0.898	-0.812*** (0.249)	0.001
East Asia and Pacific	-0.046 (0.230)	0.842	0.451* (0.263)	0.087
Europe and Canada	0.215 (0.189)	0.256	-0.086 (0.195)	0.658
Middle East and North Africa	0.351 (0.269)	0.193	0.323 (0.322)	0.317
South America	0.036 (0.072)	0.614	0.449*** (0.149)	0.003
South Asia	0.353 (0.223)	0.115	0.178 (0.261)	0.496
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	-0.083 (0.082)	0.308	-0.078 (0.087)	0.365
Other Language	0.150 (0.122)	0.221	0.421*** (0.160)	0.009

(Table E.11 continued on next page)

(Table E.11 continued)

Variable	Number of Motions Coef. (SE)	p-value	Number of Applications Coef. (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	-0.226** (0.090)	0.013	0.199 (0.137)	0.146
Documentation requirements	-0.058 (0.095)	0.544	0.124 (0.141)	0.380
Criminal and related grounds	-0.066 (0.044)	0.135	0.122** (0.061)	0.045
Previously removed	-0.370*** (0.066)	0.000	-0.338 (0.470)	0.473
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	-0.270*** (0.090)	0.003	0.025 (0.144)	0.860
Criminal offenses	0.193* (0.114)	0.091	0.397*** (0.134)	0.003
Security and related grounds	-0.610*** (0.217)	0.005	-1.094*** (0.271)	0.000
Failure to register or falsification of documents	0.599*** (0.195)	0.002	-0.141 (0.250)	0.573
Political Situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	-0.068 (0.404)	0.865	-0.222 (0.513)	0.665
Likely TPS-eligible	0.081 (0.283)	0.775	0.123 (0.419)	0.770
Constant	0.577*** (0.146)	0.000	0.410** (0.194)	0.036
N	1,863		1,863	
Mean	0.322		0.322	
R^2	0.103		0.099	

Table E.12

The impact of being a MIDA client on due process outcomes (ATT)

Variable	Number of Motions		Number of Applications	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	0.480*** (0.177)	0.007	-0.005 (0.227)	0.982
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	0.158* (0.088)	0.074	0.046 (0.138)	0.738
Samuel Cole	0.022 (0.068)	0.743	0.035 (0.106)	0.744
Region of origin				
Africa	0.451** (0.182)	0.013	0.755*** (0.218)	0.001
Caribbean	-0.117 (0.136)	0.391	0.001 (0.215)	0.997
Central America	0.027 (0.047)	0.561	0.064 (0.064)	0.321
Central Asia	0.070 (0.164)	0.671	-0.812*** (0.250)	0.001
East Asia and Pacific	-0.078 (0.233)	0.738	0.452* (0.260)	0.083
Europe and Canada	0.254 (0.182)	0.163	-0.087 (0.193)	0.654
Middle East and North Africa	0.385 (0.272)	0.156	0.322 (0.319)	0.313
South America	0.022 (0.071)	0.755	0.449*** (0.147)	0.002
South Asia	0.373* (0.224)	0.095	0.178 (0.259)	0.493
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	-0.067 (0.079)	0.400	-0.079 (0.085)	0.357
Other Language	0.122 (0.123)	0.321	0.422*** (0.160)	0.008

(Table E.12 continued on next page)

(Table E.12 continued)

Variable	Number of Motions		Number of Applications	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	-0.189** (0.089)	0.033	0.198 (0.137)	0.146
Documentation requirements	-0.030 (0.092)	0.749	0.124 (0.140)	0.376
Criminal and related grounds	-0.084* (0.043)	0.052	0.123** (0.060)	0.041
Previously removed	-0.533*** (0.183)	0.004	-0.336 (0.482)	0.486
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	-0.234*** (0.088)	0.008	0.025 (0.144)	0.862
Criminal offenses	0.207* (0.114)	0.070	0.397*** (0.132)	0.003
Security and related grounds	-0.464** (0.235)	0.049	-1.096*** (0.268)	0.000
Failure to register or falsification of documents	0.494** (0.209)	0.018	-0.140 (0.242)	0.563
Political Situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	-0.038 (0.389)	0.923	-0.223 (0.507)	0.660
Likely TPS-eligible	0.116 (0.285)	0.685	0.122 (0.415)	0.769
Constant	0.510*** (0.146)	0.000	0.410** (0.197)	0.037
N	1,863		1,863	
Mean	0.082		0.082	
R^2	0.105		0.099	

Table E.13

The impact of being offered treatment on the number of motions, by type (ITT)

Variable	Procedural Motions		Substantive Motions	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	0.040 (0.029)	0.162	0.051** (0.023)	0.025
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	-0.017 (0.064)	0.788	0.148*** (0.048)	0.002
Samuel Cole	-0.098** (0.047)	0.037	0.108*** (0.040)	0.008
Region of origin				
Africa	0.155 (0.153)	0.313	0.220* (0.117)	0.060
Caribbean	0.011 (0.108)	0.921	-0.069 (0.064)	0.279
Central America	0.040 (0.031)	0.202	-0.019 (0.025)	0.437
Central Asia	0.212 (0.134)	0.113	-0.127* (0.072)	0.077
East Asia and Pacific	-0.061 (0.141)	0.663	-0.006 (0.100)	0.955
Europe and Canada	0.064 (0.126)	0.612	0.125* (0.068)	0.068
Middle East and North Africa	0.291 (0.208)	0.162	0.099 (0.105)	0.349
South America	0.068 (0.054)	0.211	-0.048 (0.031)	0.125
South Asia	0.221 (0.190)	0.246	0.183* (0.105)	0.084
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	-0.046 (0.060)	0.441	-0.050 (0.032)	0.120
Other Language	0.131 (0.084)	0.118	-0.030 (0.061)	0.628

(Table E.13 continued on next page)

(Table E.13 continued)

Variable	Procedural Motions Coef. (SE)	p-value	Substantive Motions Coef. (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	-0.111* (0.067)	0.099	-0.073 (0.053)	0.170
Documentation requirements	-0.001 (0.070)	0.990	-0.076 (0.048)	0.110
Criminal and related grounds	-0.033 (0.030)	0.269	-0.049** (0.023)	0.037
Previously removed	-0.157*** (0.039)	0.000	-0.195*** (0.047)	0.000
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	-0.142** (0.067)	0.033	-0.088 (0.062)	0.157
Criminal offenses	0.061 (0.068)	0.373	0.091 (0.059)	0.127
Security and related grounds	-0.598* (0.334)	0.074	0.029 (0.273)	0.914
Failure to register or falsification of documents	0.404 (0.365)	0.268	0.184 (0.294)	0.532
Political Situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.237 (0.330)	0.472	-0.169 (0.110)	0.125
Likely TPS-eligible	0.005 (0.191)	0.981	0.007 (0.107)	0.947
Constant	0.349*** (0.115)	0.003	0.189*** (0.072)	0.009
N	1,863		1,863	
Mean	0.322		0.322	
R^2	0.075		0.078	

Table E.14

The impact of being a MIDA client on the number of motions, by type (ATT)

Variable	Procedural Motions		Substantive Motions	
	Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	0.157 (0.111)	0.158	0.200** (0.088)	0.023
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	-0.014 (0.062)	0.823	0.152*** (0.048)	0.002
Samuel Cole	-0.092** (0.046)	0.045	0.115*** (0.040)	0.004
Region of origin				
Africa	0.149 (0.153)	0.332	0.212* (0.113)	0.059
Caribbean	0.004 (0.107)	0.969	-0.077 (0.063)	0.219
Central America	0.037 (0.031)	0.237	-0.024 (0.024)	0.319
Central Asia	0.228* (0.133)	0.087	-0.107 (0.073)	0.142
East Asia and Pacific	-0.072 (0.143)	0.614	-0.019 (0.099)	0.848
Europe and Canada	0.077 (0.122)	0.530	0.142** (0.067)	0.034
Middle East and North Africa	0.303 (0.206)	0.142	0.113 (0.107)	0.290
South America	0.063 (0.053)	0.235	-0.054* (0.031)	0.081
South Asia	0.227 (0.188)	0.225	0.191* (0.107)	0.073
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	-0.041 (0.058)	0.481	-0.043 (0.033)	0.182
Other Language	0.123 (0.084)	0.147	-0.041 (0.062)	0.504

(Table E.14 continued on next page)

(Table E.14 continued)

Variable	Procedural Motions Coef. (SE)	p-value	Substantive Motions Coef. (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	-0.099 (0.065)	0.132	-0.058 (0.054)	0.283
Documentation requirements	0.008 (0.068)	0.904	-0.064 (0.047)	0.171
Criminal and related grounds	-0.039 (0.030)	0.190	-0.056** (0.023)	0.013
Previously removed	-0.211*** (0.077)	0.006	-0.263*** (0.099)	0.008
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	-0.130** (0.064)	0.043	-0.072 (0.063)	0.249
Criminal offenses	0.065 (0.068)	0.338	0.096 (0.059)	0.103
Security and related grounds	-0.550 (0.340)	0.106	0.090 (0.259)	0.727
Failure to register or falsification of documents	0.370 (0.373)	0.321	0.141 (0.275)	0.609
Political Situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	0.247 (0.323)	0.444	-0.157 (0.103)	0.129
Likely TPS-eligible	0.016 (0.191)	0.933	0.022 (0.104)	0.835
Constant	0.327*** (0.112)	0.004	0.161** (0.075)	0.032
N	1,863		1,863	
Mean	0.082		0.082	
R^2	0.074		0.078	

Table E.15

The impact of being offered treatment on court efficiency outcomes (ITT)

Variable	Number of Hearings: Total Coef. (SE)	p-value	Adjourned to Seek Counsel Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA observation day	0.075 (0.187)	0.688	-0.031 (0.072)	0.663
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	0.997** (0.433)	0.022	0.559*** (0.169)	0.001
Samuel Cole	-0.312 (0.335)	0.353	-0.009 (0.098)	0.930
Region of origin				
Africa	2.493*** (0.596)	0.000	0.137 (0.175)	0.437
Caribbean	-0.203 (0.529)	0.701	-0.002 (0.157)	0.990
Central America	0.715*** (0.227)	0.002	0.240*** (0.079)	0.002
Central Asia	-2.875*** (0.633)	0.000	-0.601*** (0.205)	0.004
East Asia and Pacific	-0.063 (0.680)	0.926	0.147 (0.200)	0.463
Europe and Canada	0.580 (0.708)	0.413	0.156 (0.243)	0.522
Middle East and North Africa	1.331 (0.989)	0.179	0.070 (0.218)	0.749
South America	1.253*** (0.394)	0.002	0.262 (0.161)	0.104
South Asia	1.558** (0.717)	0.030	-0.052 (0.248)	0.835
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	-0.565* (0.289)	0.051	-0.092 (0.093)	0.324
Other Language	1.227*** (0.414)	0.003	0.335** (0.135)	0.013

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(Table E.15 continued)

Variable	Number of Hearings: Total Coef. (SE)	p-value	Number of Hearings: Adjourned to Seek Counsel Coef. (SE)	p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	0.457 (0.377)	0.226	0.232* (0.136)	0.089
Documentation requirements	-0.379 (0.410)	0.356	-0.131 (0.159)	0.411
Criminal and related grounds	-0.320 (0.214)	0.135	-0.001 (0.083)	0.989
Previously removed	0.921 (1.481)	0.534	-0.107 (0.105)	0.312
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	-0.480 (0.420)	0.255	-0.016 (0.164)	0.923
Criminal offenses	1.620*** (0.421)	0.000	0.341** (0.162)	0.036
Security and related grounds	-5.078* (2.796)	0.070	-1.260 (1.330)	0.344
Failure to register or falsification of documents	2.264 (3.072)	0.462	1.912 (1.483)	0.198
Political Situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	-2.007 (1.225)	0.102	-0.820*** (0.291)	0.005
Likely TPS-eligible	0.668 (0.813)	0.411	0.412 (0.285)	0.149
Constant	4.261*** (0.619)	0.000	0.719*** (0.223)	0.001
N	1,863		1,863	
Mean	0.322		0.322	
R^2	0.147		0.086	

Table E.16

The impact of being a MIDA client on court efficiency outcomes (ATT)

Variable	Number of Hearings: Total Coef. (SE)	p-value	Number of Hearings: Adjourned to Seek Counsel Coef. (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MIDA client	0.295 (0.721)	0.682	-0.124 (0.283)	0.663
Immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing				
Maria Baldini-Potermin	1.003** (0.427)	0.019	0.556*** (0.168)	0.001
Samuel Cole	-0.301 (0.327)	0.357	-0.013 (0.096)	0.892
Region of origin				
Africa	2.482*** (0.587)	0.000	0.141 (0.174)	0.416
Caribbean	-0.215 (0.523)	0.681	0.003 (0.157)	0.984
Central America	0.708*** (0.224)	0.002	0.243*** (0.078)	0.002
Central Asia	-2.845*** (0.634)	0.000	-0.613*** (0.208)	0.003
East Asia and Pacific	-0.082 (0.685)	0.904	0.155 (0.199)	0.436
Europe and Canada	0.604 (0.693)	0.384	0.146 (0.242)	0.547
Middle East and North Africa	1.353 (0.981)	0.168	0.061 (0.217)	0.778
South America	1.244*** (0.389)	0.001	0.266* (0.158)	0.093
South Asia	1.571** (0.713)	0.028	-0.057 (0.251)	0.820
Language of immigration proceedings				
Spanish	-0.555* (0.288)	0.054	-0.096 (0.093)	0.301
Other Language	1.210*** (0.409)	0.003	0.342** (0.136)	0.012

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(Table E.16 continued)

Variable	Number of Hearings: Total Coef. (SE)	Total p-value	Adjourned to Seek Counsel Coef. (SE)	Adjourned to Seek Counsel p-value
NTA charges				
Inadmissible				
Illegal entrants and immigration violators	0.480 (0.377)	0.203	0.222* (0.135)	0.100
Documentation requirements	-0.361 (0.407)	0.374	-0.138 (0.158)	0.381
Criminal and related grounds	-0.331 (0.210)	0.115	0.004 (0.085)	0.967
Previously removed	0.821 (1.582)	0.604	-0.065 (0.154)	0.674
Deportable				
Inadmissible at time of entry or status adjustment	-0.457 (0.420)	0.277	-0.025 (0.164)	0.877
Criminal offenses	1.628*** (0.415)	0.000	0.338** (0.159)	0.034
Security and related grounds	-4.988* (2.794)	0.074	-1.298 (1.307)	0.321
Failure to register or falsification of documents	2.200 (3.060)	0.472	1.939 (1.456)	0.183
Political Situation				
Likely an asylum seeker	-1.988 (1.210)	0.101	-0.828*** (0.291)	0.005
Likely TPS-eligible	0.690 (0.816)	0.398	0.403 (0.284)	0.155
Constant	4.219*** (0.624)	0.000	0.737*** (0.224)	0.001
N	1,863		1,863	
Mean	0.082		0.082	
R^2	0.151		0.080	

Appendix F: Heterogeneous Results by Immigration Judge

This appendix shows the tables with the heterogeneous results for all outcomes using the main specification, disaggregated by immigration judge, as described in the MIDA Technical Report section 6.2. Tables F.1 and F.2 first present the pairwise differences in immigration judge effects, for the ITT and ATT analyses respectively. Tables F.3 and F.4 present the immigration judge-specific treatment effects, and finally Tables F.5 and F.6 present the pairwise differences in treatment effects across immigration judges.

In all of the tables, cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA as described in the INA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible.

Table F.1
Pairwise differences in immigration judge effects (ITT)

Outcome	Baldini-Potermin - Other judges		Cole - Other judges		Cole - Baldini-Potermin	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Case outcomes						
Granted relief	. (.)	.	. (.)	.	-0.023 (0.019)	0.208
Allowed to remain in the United States	0.06 (0.041)	0.135	0.012 (0.030)	0.686	-0.049 (0.030)	0.101
Bond outcomes						
Having a bond hearing	0.13** (0.059)	0.023	0.110** (0.049)	0.025	-0.024 (0.035)	0.483
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	-0.02 (0.048)	0.703	0.081** (0.040)	0.046	0.099*** (0.030)	0.001
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	-0.05 (0.035)	0.170	-0.007 (0.032)	0.823	0.041** (0.017)	0.019

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(Table F.1 continued)

Outcome	Baldini-Potermin - Other judges		Cole - Other judges		Cole - Baldini-Potermin	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Difference (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Due process outcomes						
Number of motions	0.16* (0.089)	0.077	0.011 (0.068)	0.874	-0.147** (0.062)	0.018
Number of procedural motions	0.01 (0.060)	0.824	-0.070 (0.043)	0.107	-0.083* (0.045)	0.064
Number of substantive motions	0.13*** (0.049)	0.010	0.086** (0.040)	0.034	-0.039 (0.029)	0.180
Number of applications	0.04 (0.138)	0.786	0.028 (0.105)	0.787	-0.009 (0.099)	0.928
Court efficiency outcomes						
Number of hearings	0.95** (0.464)	0.042	-0.399 (0.362)	0.271	-1.345*** (0.313)	0.000
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	0.54*** (0.172)	0.002	-0.035 (0.097)	0.721	-0.575*** (0.154)	0.000

Table F.2

Pairwise differences in immigration judge effects (ATT)

Outcome	Baldini-Potermin - Other judges		Cole - Other judges		Cole - Baldini-Potermin	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Case outcomes						
Granted relief	. (.)	.	. (.)	.	-0.019 (0.018)	0.269
Allowed to remain in the United States	0.06* (0.037)	0.094	0.019 (0.026)	0.472	-0.043 (0.028)	0.121
Bond outcomes						
Having a bond hearing	0.14** (0.058)	0.016	0.116** (0.048)	0.015	-0.024 (0.035)	0.482
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	-0.01 (0.042)	0.727	0.085** (0.034)	0.012	0.100*** (0.030)	0.001
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	. (.)	.	. (.)	.	. (.)	.
Due process outcomes						
Number of motions	0.17* (0.087)	0.054	0.030 (0.067)	0.656	-0.138** (0.061)	0.023
Number of procedural motions	0.00 (0.060)	0.940	-0.075* (0.044)	0.089	-0.080* (0.045)	0.078
Number of substantive motions	0.14*** (0.049)	0.004	0.105*** (0.041)	0.010	-0.036 (0.029)	0.215
Number of applications	0.04 (0.136)	0.759	0.032 (0.103)	0.754	-0.010 (0.098)	0.922
Court efficiency outcomes						
Number of hearings	0.96** (0.434)	0.026	-0.368 (0.337)	0.274	-1.332*** (0.298)	0.000
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	0.54*** (0.167)	0.001	-0.034 (0.095)	0.717	-0.576*** (0.149)	0.000

Table F.3

Heterogeneous treatment effects by immigration judge (ITT)

Outcome	Judge Baldini-Potermin		Judge Cole		Other judges	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Case outcomes						
Granted relief	0.054 (0.039)	0.161	0.022** (0.011)	0.050	0.000 (.)	.
Allowed to remain in the United States	0.140** (0.068)	0.039	0.010 (0.016)	0.526	0.047 (0.056)	0.401
Bond outcomes						
Having a bond hearing	-0.016 (0.063)	0.802	0.011 (0.023)	0.633	0.049 (0.085)	0.565
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	0.057 (0.059)	0.332	0.025 (0.020)	0.199	-0.001 (0.080)	0.985
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	0.039 (0.033)	0.231	-0.034*** (0.012)	0.004	0.068 (0.061)	0.262
Due process outcomes						
Number of motions	0.210* (0.113)	0.063	0.112** (0.051)	0.030	0.088 (0.104)	0.394
Number of procedural motions	0.107 (0.075)	0.153	0.039 (0.032)	0.221	-0.106* (0.059)	0.072
Number of substantive motions	0.023 (0.045)	0.614	0.049* (0.026)	0.060	0.160** (0.064)	0.013
Number of applications	-0.070 (0.198)	0.726	0.006 (0.062)	0.920	0.035 (0.202)	0.862
Court efficiency outcomes						
Number of hearings	0.948 (0.688)	0.169	-0.072 (0.196)	0.715	0.468 (0.638)	0.464
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	0.161 (0.343)	0.638	-0.066 (0.071)	0.353	0.089 (0.118)	0.454

Table F.4

Heterogeneous treatment effects by immigration judge (ATT)

Outcome	Judge Baldini-Potermin		Judge Cole		Other judges	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Case outcomes						
Granted relief	0.353* (0.196)	0.072	0.138 (0.108)	0.200	0.000 (.)	.
Allowed to remain in the United States	0.226 (0.153)	0.140	0.039 (0.077)	0.612	0.120 (0.122)	0.325
Bond outcomes						
Having a bond hearing	-0.034 (0.120)	0.774	0.058 (0.079)	0.461	0.084 (0.178)	0.634
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	0.076 (0.128)	0.556	0.138* (0.081)	0.089	-0.050 (0.128)	0.694
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	0.000 (.)	.	-0.098*** (0.021)	0.000	0.000 (.)	.
Due process outcomes						
Number of motions	0.809* (0.416)	0.052	0.453** (0.205)	0.027	0.248 (0.283)	0.381
Number of procedural motions	0.413 (0.299)	0.168	0.160 (0.128)	0.209	-0.292* (0.174)	0.093
Number of substantive motions	0.086 (0.171)	0.614	0.195* (0.103)	0.060	0.442** (0.196)	0.024
Number of applications	-0.268 (0.775)	0.729	0.024 (0.248)	0.923	0.093 (0.552)	0.866
Court efficiency outcomes						
Number of hearings	3.646 (2.558)	0.154	-0.281 (0.791)	0.722	1.351 (1.659)	0.415
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	0.621 (1.289)	0.630	-0.265 (0.291)	0.363	0.259 (0.299)	0.387

Table F.5

Pairwise differences in heterogeneous treatment effects across immigration judges (ITT)

Outcome	Baldini-Potermin - Other judges		Cole - Other judges		Cole - Baldini-Potermin	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Case outcomes						
Granted relief	. (.)	.	. (.)	.	-0.032 (0.040)	0.426
Allowed to remain in the United States	0.093 (0.087)	0.289	-0.037 (0.058)	0.525	-0.130* (0.070)	0.063
Bond outcomes						
Having a bond hearing	-0.064 (0.106)	0.542	-0.038 (0.087)	0.665	0.027 (0.067)	0.690
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	0.059 (0.099)	0.555	0.027 (0.083)	0.745	-0.032 (0.062)	0.611
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	-0.029 (0.069)	0.672	-0.103* (0.062)	0.098	-0.074** (0.035)	0.036
Due process outcomes						
Number of motions	0.122 (0.151)	0.420	0.023 (0.115)	0.838	-0.098 (0.122)	0.422
Number of procedural motions	0.213** (0.093)	0.022	0.145** (0.068)	0.034	-0.068 (0.080)	0.397
Number of substantive motions	-0.137* (0.078)	0.082	-0.111* (0.067)	0.099	0.026 (0.052)	0.622
Number of applications	-0.105 (0.278)	0.707	-0.029 (0.210)	0.891	0.076 (0.207)	0.714
Court efficiency outcomes						
Number of hearings	0.480 (0.928)	0.605	-0.540 (0.663)	0.416	-1.019 (0.714)	0.154
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	0.073 (0.356)	0.838	-0.155 (0.132)	0.244	-0.227 (0.351)	0.517

Table F.6

Pairwise differences in heterogeneous treatment effects by immigration judge (ATT)

Outcome	Baldini-Potermin - Other judges		Cole - Other judges		Cole - Baldini-Potermin	
	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Case outcomes						
Granted relief	. (.)	.	. (.)	.	-0.215 (0.137)	0.117
Allowed to remain in the United States	0.106 (0.142)	0.454	-0.080 (0.101)	0.427	-0.187* (0.104)	0.072
Bond outcomes						
Having a bond hearing	-0.119 (0.190)	0.531	-0.026 (0.166)	0.873	0.092 (0.102)	0.365
Released on bond set by an immigration judge	0.126 (0.165)	0.445	0.189 (0.131)	0.148	0.063 (0.114)	0.585
Released by ICE without a bond hearing	. (.)	.	. (.)	.	. (.)	.
Due process outcomes						
Number of motions	0.561 (0.495)	0.257	0.205 (0.348)	0.555	-0.355 (0.458)	0.437
Number of procedural motions	0.704** (0.337)	0.036	0.452** (0.221)	0.041	-0.252 (0.319)	0.430
Number of substantive motions	-0.355 (0.260)	0.172	-0.247 (0.219)	0.259	0.108 (0.199)	0.586
Number of applications	-0.362 (0.929)	0.697	-0.069 (0.603)	0.909	0.293 (0.808)	0.717
Court efficiency outcomes						
Number of hearings	2.295 (2.989)	0.443	-1.633 (1.829)	0.372	-3.928 (2.667)	0.141
Number of hearings adjourned to seek counsel	0.362 (1.285)	0.778	-0.524 (0.400)	0.190	-0.886 (1.319)	0.502

Appendix G: Robustness Checks, Alternative Specifications

This appendix displays the results for each outcome variable for the main specification and the six robustness specifications as described in the MIDA Technical Report section 7. In all of the tables, cluster-robust standard errors at the immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing x date of initial master calendar hearing level were used. The significance levels are displayed as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

The results control for region of origin, language of immigration proceedings, immigration judge at initial master calendar hearing, all charges on the NTA as described in the INA, quarter-year of master calendar hearing, being likely an asylum seeker, and being likely TPS-eligible. In tables that display case outcomes (G.1 to G.4), due process outcomes (G.11 to G.14), and court efficiency outcomes (G.15 and G.16), the population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge. In the tables that display bond outcomes (G.5 to G.10), the population is people eligible for the MIDA program whose cases had reached at least an initial decision by an immigration judge on at least the detained portion of their proceedings.

Table G.1

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on being granted relief (ITT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	1,830	1.726** (0.412)	0.022	0.022** (0.038)	0.023	1.568** (0.307)	0.021
1	1,830	1.702** (0.408)	0.027	0.021** (0.038)	0.027	1.553** (0.306)	0.026
2	1,830	1.678** (0.401)	0.030	0.020** (0.037)	0.031	1.531** (0.299)	0.030
3	1,830	1.712** (0.412)	0.026	0.021** (0.038)	0.026	1.559** (0.308)	0.025
4	1,123	2.034** (0.726)	0.047	0.027* (0.040)	0.056	1.785** (0.525)	0.049
5	1,830	1.722** (0.411)	0.023	0.021** (0.037)	0.024	1.565** (0.306)	0.022
6	1,830	1.713** (0.415)	0.026	0.021** (0.037)	0.027	1.567** (0.316)	0.026

Table G.2

Robustness checks for the impact of being a MIDA client on being granted relief (ATT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	1,830	7.771** (7.352)	0.030	0.081** (0.038)	0.031	4.662** (2.867)	0.012
1	1,830	7.383** (7.009)	0.035	0.079** (0.038)	0.036	4.527** (2.820)	0.015
2	1,830	6.850** (6.531)	0.044	0.076** (0.037)	0.044	4.278** (2.709)	0.022
3	1,830	7.655** (7.283)	0.032	0.081** (0.038)	0.033	4.631** (2.871)	0.013
4	1,123	6.913* (6.961)	0.055	0.074* (0.040)	0.064	4.292** (2.855)	0.028
5	1,830	7.655** (7.240)	0.031	0.080** (0.037)	0.032	4.622** (2.851)	0.013
6	1,830	7.119** (6.771)	0.039	0.077** (0.037)	0.040	4.474** (2.828)	0.018

Table G.3

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on being allowed to remain in the United States (ITT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	1,858	1.329* (0.225)	0.093	0.025* (0.062)	0.090	1.216* (0.140)	0.090
1	1,858	1.315 (0.222)	0.105	0.025 (0.062)	0.102	1.208 (0.140)	0.102
2	1,858	1.298 (0.221)	0.126	0.023 (0.062)	0.123	1.194 (0.137)	0.123
3	1,858	1.343* (0.228)	0.082	0.026* (0.062)	0.079	1.225* (0.142)	0.079
4	1,166	1.557** (0.346)	0.046	0.039** (0.057)	0.046	1.337** (0.195)	0.047
5	1,858	1.329* (0.225)	0.093	0.025* (0.062)	0.091	1.216* (0.140)	0.091
6	1,858	1.353* (0.230)	0.076	0.027* (0.061)	0.073	1.231* (0.143)	0.073

Table G.4

Robustness checks for the impact of being a MIDA client on being allowed to remain in the United States (ATT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	1,858	1.971 (1.387)	0.335	0.060 (0.062)	0.334	1.571 (0.715)	0.320
1	1,858	1.946 (1.359)	0.340	0.059 (0.062)	0.339	1.562 (0.708)	0.325
2	1,858	1.785 (1.278)	0.418	0.050 (0.062)	0.417	1.467 (0.677)	0.407
3	1,858	2.085 (1.466)	0.296	0.065 (0.062)	0.294	1.631 (0.738)	0.279
4	1,166	2.454 (1.631)	0.177	0.077 (0.057)	0.179	1.778 (0.746)	0.170
5	1,858	1.963 (1.382)	0.338	0.059 (0.062)	0.337	1.567 (0.714)	0.324
6	1,858	2.037 (1.427)	0.310	0.062 (0.061)	0.308	1.607 (0.728)	0.295

Table G.5

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on having a bond hearing (ITT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	Δ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	2,639	1.049 (0.101)	0.616	0.010 (0.078)	0.616	1.015 (0.031)	0.615
1	2,639	1.053 (0.102)	0.592	0.011 (0.078)	0.592	1.017 (0.031)	0.590
2	2,639	1.051 (0.101)	0.608	0.010 (0.078)	0.608	1.016 (0.031)	0.607
3	2,639	1.049 (0.101)	0.617	0.010 (0.078)	0.616	1.015 (0.031)	0.615
4	1,612	1.062 (0.132)	0.630	0.012 (0.069)	0.630	1.019 (0.039)	0.629
5	2,639	1.056 (0.102)	0.575	0.011 (0.078)	0.574	1.017 (0.031)	0.573
6	2,639	1.055 (0.102)	0.578	0.011 (0.078)	0.578	1.017 (0.031)	0.576

Table G.6

Robustness checks for the impact of being a MIDA client on having a bond hearing (ATT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	2,639	1.272 (0.488)	0.530	0.049 (0.078)	0.530	1.075 (0.116)	0.506
1	2,639	1.289 (0.495)	0.508	0.052 (0.078)	0.508	1.079 (0.116)	0.482
2	2,639	1.277 (0.490)	0.523	0.050 (0.078)	0.523	1.076 (0.116)	0.498
3	2,639	1.270 (0.488)	0.534	0.049 (0.078)	0.534	1.074 (0.117)	0.510
4	1,612	1.234 (0.425)	0.542	0.042 (0.069)	0.542	1.064 (0.104)	0.525
5	2,639	1.305 (0.502)	0.489	0.054 (0.078)	0.489	1.082 (0.116)	0.460
6	2,639	1.303 (0.502)	0.493	0.054 (0.078)	0.492	1.082 (0.116)	0.464

Table G.7

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on being released on bond set by an immigration judge (ITT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	2,641	1.179 (0.124)	0.118	0.027 (0.068)	0.117	1.107 (0.072)	0.115
1	2,641	1.182 (0.124)	0.112	0.027 (0.068)	0.112	1.109 (0.072)	0.109
2	2,641	1.186 (0.125)	0.105	0.028 (0.068)	0.105	1.111 (0.072)	0.102
3	2,641	1.181 (0.124)	0.113	0.027 (0.068)	0.113	1.108 (0.072)	0.111
4	1,612	1.375** (0.191)	0.022	0.049** (0.058)	0.021	1.219** (0.104)	0.020
5	2,641	1.195* (0.126)	0.092	0.029* (0.068)	0.091	1.116* (0.072)	0.089
6	2,641	1.194* (0.126)	0.093	0.029* (0.068)	0.093	1.116* (0.072)	0.090

Table G.8

Robustness checks for the impact of being a MIDA client on being released on bond set by an immigration judge (ATT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	2,641	1.960 (0.812)	0.104	0.110 (0.068)	0.104	1.464* (0.307)	0.069
1	2,641	1.977* (0.818)	0.100	0.112* (0.068)	0.099	1.470* (0.307)	0.065
2	2,641	2.004* (0.829)	0.093	0.114* (0.068)	0.093	1.480* (0.307)	0.059
3	2,641	1.974 (0.818)	0.101	0.111 (0.068)	0.100	1.469* (0.307)	0.066
4	1,612	2.430** (0.928)	0.020	0.135** (0.058)	0.019	1.652*** (0.313)	0.008
5	2,641	2.067* (0.860)	0.081	0.119* (0.068)	0.081	1.503** (0.310)	0.048
6	2,641	2.063* (0.859)	0.082	0.119* (0.068)	0.082	1.501** (0.310)	0.049

Table G.9

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on being released by ICE without a bond hearing (ITT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	2,639	0.750* (0.116)	0.063	-0.023* (0.058)	0.062	0.815* (0.090)	0.065
1	2,639	0.744* (0.114)	0.055	-0.023* (0.058)	0.054	0.809* (0.090)	0.057
2	2,639	0.757* (0.117)	0.073	-0.022* (0.058)	0.072	0.820* (0.092)	0.076
3	2,639	0.754* (0.116)	0.067	-0.022* (0.057)	0.066	0.819* (0.090)	0.070
4	1,562	0.745 (0.158)	0.167	-0.020 (0.047)	0.164	0.804 (0.128)	0.170
5	2,639	0.748* (0.116)	0.061	-0.023* (0.058)	0.060	0.814* (0.090)	0.063
6	2,639	0.748* (0.116)	0.061	-0.023* (0.058)	0.060	0.814* (0.090)	0.063

Table G.10

Robustness checks for the impact of being a MIDA client on being released by ICE without a bond hearing (ATT)

Spec. #	N	OR (SE)	p-value	△ ME (SE)	p-value	RR (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Main	2,639	0.118*** (0.088)	0.004	-0.167*** (0.058)	0.004	0.182*** (0.120)	0.010
1	2,639	0.114*** (0.084)	0.003	-0.171*** (0.058)	0.003	0.175*** (0.115)	0.008
2	2,639	0.122*** (0.091)	0.005	-0.165*** (0.058)	0.004	0.186** (0.123)	0.011
3	2,639	0.122*** (0.090)	0.004	-0.164*** (0.057)	0.004	0.192** (0.123)	0.010
4	1,562	0.220** (0.156)	0.033	-0.100** (0.047)	0.032	0.296** (0.181)	0.047
5	2,639	0.117*** (0.087)	0.004	-0.167*** (0.058)	0.004	0.181*** (0.119)	0.010
6	2,639	0.117*** (0.087)	0.004	-0.167*** (0.058)	0.004	0.180*** (0.119)	0.010

Table G.11

Robustness Checks for the Impact of Being Offered Treatment on Due Process Outcomes (ITT)

Spec. #	N	Number of motions		Number of applications	
		Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Main	1,863	0.122*** (0.045)	0.007	-0.001 (0.055)	0.981
1	1,863	0.120*** (0.045)	0.008	-0.001 (0.055)	0.980
2	1,863	0.118*** (0.045)	0.009	-0.004 (0.055)	0.946
3	1,863	0.123*** (0.046)	0.007	-0 (0.055)	0.998
4	1,173	0.191*** (0.069)	0.006	-0.043 (0.072)	0.548
5	1,861	0.123*** (0.045)	0.007	0.002 (0.055)	0.966
6	1,861	0.130*** (0.046)	0.004	-0.006 (0.055)	0.913

Table G.12

Robustness checks for the impact of being a MIDA client on due process outcomes (ATT)

Spec. #	N	Number of motions		Number of applications	
		Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Main	1,863	0.480*** (0.177)	0.007	-0.005 (0.212)	0.981
1	1,863	0.472*** (0.176)	0.007	-0.005 (0.213)	0.980
2	1,863	0.465*** (0.175)	0.008	-0.014 (0.212)	0.946
3	1,863	0.483*** (0.179)	0.007	-0.001 (0.212)	0.998
4	1,173	0.536*** (0.188)	0.004	-0.121 (0.199)	0.544
5	1,861	0.482*** (0.177)	0.006	0.009 (0.212)	0.966
6	1,861	0.504*** (0.176)	0.004	-0.023 (0.211)	0.912

Table G.13

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on the number of motions, by type (ITT)

Spec. #	N	Procedural motions		Substantive motions	
		Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Main	1,863	0.040 (0.030)	0.189	0.051** (0.022)	0.023
1	1,863	0.039 (0.030)	0.197	0.051** (0.022)	0.024
2	1,863	0.037 (0.030)	0.214	0.051** (0.022)	0.023
3	1,863	0.040 (0.031)	0.189	0.050** (0.022)	0.026
4	1,173	0.081* (0.047)	0.086	0.059** (0.029)	0.044
5	1,861	0.040 (0.030)	0.194	0.052** (0.022)	0.021
6	1,861	0.044 (0.031)	0.152	0.053** (0.023)	0.019

Table G.14

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on the number of motions, by type (ATT)

Spec. #	N	Procedural motions		Substantive motions	
		Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Main	1,863	0.157 (0.119)	0.186	0.200** (0.087)	0.022
1	1,863	0.153 (0.118)	0.194	0.199** (0.087)	0.023
2	1,863	0.147 (0.118)	0.210	0.200** (0.087)	0.022
3	1,863	0.158 (0.119)	0.186	0.197** (0.088)	0.025
4	1,173	0.227* (0.130)	0.081	0.165** (0.080)	0.040
5	1,861	0.155 (0.119)	0.191	0.203** (0.087)	0.020
6	1,861	0.170 (0.118)	0.149	0.207** (0.088)	0.018

Table G.15

Robustness checks for the impact of being offered treatment on court efficiency outcomes (ITT)

Spec. #	N	Total hearings		Hearings adj. to seek counsel	
		Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Main	1,863	0.075 (0.181)	0.677	-0.031 (0.064)	0.623
1	1,863	0.054 (0.180)	0.764	-0.037 (0.064)	0.561
2	1,863	0.040 (0.180)	0.823	-0.038 (0.064)	0.547
3	1,863	0.083 (0.181)	0.648	-0.029 (0.064)	0.646
4	1,173	0.641*** (0.232)	0.006	0.105 (0.083)	0.205
5	1,861	0.075 (0.181)	0.676	-0.032 (0.064)	0.613
6	1,861	0.110 (0.181)	0.543	-0.029 (0.065)	0.659

Table G.16

Robustness checks for the impact of being a MIDA client on court efficiency outcomes (ATT)

Spec. #	N	Hearings		Adj. to Seek Counsel	
		Coef. (SE)	p-value	Coef. (SE)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Main	1,863	0.295 (0.700)	0.673	-0.124 (0.250)	0.621
1	1,863	0.213 (0.700)	0.761	-0.146 (0.251)	0.560
2	1,863	0.158 (0.699)	0.821	-0.151 (0.251)	0.546
3	1,863	0.325 (0.702)	0.643	-0.115 (0.250)	0.644
4	1,173	1.795*** (0.629)	0.004	0.295 (0.227)	0.193
5	1,861	0.296 (0.699)	0.672	-0.127 (0.250)	0.612
6	1,861	0.427 (0.691)	0.537	-0.112 (0.252)	0.657

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