ISSUES IN COMMUNITY POLICING: PROBLEMS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EIGHT INNOVATIVE NEIGHBORHOOD-ORIENTED POLICING PROGRAMS

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Susan Sadd
Randolph M. Grinc

Vera Institute of Justice
377 Broadway
New York, New York 10013
(212) 334-1300

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"There is risk in refusing to act till the facts are all in; but is there not greater risk in abandoning the conditions of all rational inquiry?"

-- Learned Hand -- American Jurist

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is an exciting time for the study of policing in the United States. Major changes are taking place as both large and small police departments across the country make transitions to community policing. The Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing projects have provided the Vera Institute with a unique opportunity to study these sweeping changes. We would like to thank the many people who made the research possible.

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efforts to implement community policing where it counts the most -- on the streets of their cities. We hope this report will be shared with them.

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Our thanks to all.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

During the 1980s, as street crimes increased, especially crimes of violence and a growing and openly competitive drug market, there was much concern and discussion about the crises of our cities and how the police address them. Community policing has become an increasingly popular alternative to what many police administrators see as the failure of traditional policing to deal with these issues, and jurisdictions throughout the country have established efforts designed to focus on a wide variety of problems that arise in specific neighborhood settings (McElroy, Cosgrove & Sadd, 1993; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Moore & Kelling, 1983; Trojanowicz, 1983; Police Foundation, 1981).

In fact, in cities with populations of 50,000 or more, 50% of the police officials responding to a recent survey by the FBI and the National Center for Community Policing indicated they had already implemented community policing, and another 20% had plans to do so within the next year (Trojanowicz, 1993). In many of these police departments, community policing is viewed as the last, best hope, and some administrators have expressed the notion that, "If this doesn't work, I don't know what we'll do." Yet the concept of community policing has been neither well defined nor tested. While the popularity of community policing (whatever its local form) may be attested to by the attention it is receiving in the popular literature, even here there is the recognition that the ability of community policing to meet its goals as yet remains largely untested. An editorial in a recent *New Yorker* magazine (7/5/93: 6) described the problem as follows:

> Although community policing is many things to many people, one element on which everyone seems to agree is the idea of recognizing the discretion of police officers and turning them into creative problem-solvers -- people who, instead of simply responding after the fact (and writing a report), try to address the patterns of crime that put whole neighborhoods on edge. The catch is that community policing has barely begun to move out of the realm of theory and public relations.

Similarly, a recent article in *U.S. News and World Report* (8/2/93) described both the allure of community policing and the difficulties experienced by many jurisdictions when they try to implement it. The hope is that community policing will reduce fear and increase citizen

satisfaction with police services, but cities around the country are experiencing implementation problems that include failure to recruit appropriate candidates for the new style of policing; lack of training in the skills necessary for community policing; overwhelming demands of 911 calls for service; inadequate resources; lack of "buy-in" by line officers; and a failure to train, educate and involve other government agencies and the community. And, finally, ". . . there is no clear verdict on whether community policing makes a difference. . . . hard evidence of actual reductions in crime is hazy, and the most rigorous evaluations are only now being conducted (Witkin & McGraw, 1993: 30)."

While the specific approaches vary widely, in general community policing contrasts with traditional policing in its emphasis on order maintenance rather than solely upon crime fighting, on proactive problem-solving rather than reactive response to crime reports, and on developing working relationships with the community rather than rapid response to calls for service (Sparrow, Moore & Kennedy, 1990; Sparrow, 1988). Community policing efforts are generally based on the theory that disorder and incivility are strongly linked to fear of crime at the community level and that escalating fear can reduce participation in community activities and lead to increasing erosion of the quality of life (Skogan, 1990, 1986; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Community policing efforts often attempt to involve neighborhood residents in the identification of local problems and in the development of solutions to those problems.

While the police initiatives that are typically called "community policing" take many forms, according to David Bayley (1988: 226), they share four principal elements:

(1) community-based crime prevention;
(2) proactive servicing as opposed to emergency response;
(3) public participation in the planning and supervision of police operations; and
(4) shifting of command responsibility to lower rank levels.

To make progress toward assessing the success (or failure) of community policing, it is necessary to consider whether community policing is properly conceived as representing a radical break with the era of "professionalism" that has dominated American policing for the last fifty

years, or whether it is simply a tactical refinement of the same model (Goldstein, 1990; Sparrow *et al.*, 1990; Greene, 1989; Hartmann, 1988; Kelling, 1988; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988b). In addition, the meaning of the changes for minority groups and immigrants in the United States may be quite different than for white middle-class citizens (Williams & Murphy, 1990). And, finally, it is not clear whether community policing actually represents a meaningful change in police operations and organization, or as Peter Manning (1988) has said, "a contrapuntal theme: harmony for the old melody. It now seeks control of the public by a reduction in social distance, a merging of communal and police interests, and a service and crime control isomorphism."

Carl Klockars (1988:257), reflecting on the work of Egon Bittner (1967), described community policing as simply the latest in a series of societal "circumlocutions" developed to help us accept that the police have a "monopoly on a general right to use force." Klockars says that the disturbing nature of that fact requires that society "wrap it in concealments and circumlocutions that sponsor the appearance that police are either something other than what they are or are principally engaged in doing something else." He suggests that community policing may serve the same function as did the rhetoric of legalization, militarization and professionalization in earlier periods to make the role of the police more palatable.

There is agreement in the literature that the concept of "community" as used in the rhetoric of community policing is imprecise, and often used interchangeably with the concepts of neighborhood, district, or beat. The implications of this imprecision for how operational boundaries are drawn by police agencies; the assumptions they make about order and consensus in the areas in which they work; the social processes and structures to which the police relate; the kinds of problems to which they give their attention; the objectives they establish and the variables and methods used to measure accomplishments are important in assessing the outcomes of the new policing strategies (Skogan, 1990; Williams & Murphy, 1990; Greene, 1989; Kelling & Stewart, 1989; Bayley, 1988; Greene & Taylor, 1988; Hartmann, 1988; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Klockars, 1988; Mastrofski, 1988).

Community policing seeks to reduce the levels of reported crime; the extent and nature of public disorder problems on the neighborhood level; the level of citizen fear of crime; and the volume of calls for service received by the police agency. These are ambitious goals and are generally based on a theoretical scheme by Wilson & Kelling (1982), "Broken Windows," which links disorder to both fear and crime. But, as was pointed out in the recent *US News* article, empirical research on the impact of community policing is sparse, and the results are inconsistent (Skogan, 1990; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988a; Moore, Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988; Trojanowicz, 1983).

Greene and Taylor (1988:202) tested Wilson and Kelling's hypothesized linkages between disorder, fear, and crime using data from a variety of studies. The results of this work failed to support the hypothesized link between incivilities and a weakening of informal social controls. While there was some evidence of an independent linkage between incivilities and fear, this linkage appears to be conditional, "obtaining only for particular types of neighborhoods." Furthermore, they found evidence indicating that the apparent linkage between incivilities and crime is "largely driven by the linkage of both concepts with social class and does not exist independently."

Skogan's (1990: 75) research leads him to a somewhat different conclusion regarding the relationship between disorder and crime, and the viability of Wilson and Kelling's hypothesis. He summarizes his findings as on the effects of disorder on crime as follows:

> The evidence suggests that poverty, instability and the racial composition of neighborhoods are strongly linked to area crime, but a substantial portion of that linkage is through disorder: their link to area crime virtually disappears when disorder is brought into the picture. This too is consistent with Wilson and Kelling's original proposition, and further evidence that direct action against disorder could have substantial payoffs.

Despite the great hopes practitioners have for community policing, commentators have expressed some reservations about its potential effects. Among those that should be considered are:

- the rhetoric espoused by proponents of community policing will create expectations that are impossible to meet (Klockars, 1988; Manning, 1988);

- the crime control mission of the police could get lost in the context of community policing's multiple goals (Bayley, 1988; Hartmann, 1988; Klockars, 1988);
- community organizing efforts of the police could produce nothing more than a political action group sustained and directed by the police themselves (Bayley, 1988; Klockars, 1988);
- the police could themselves be co-opted by the community and lose the will to maintain public order (Bayley, 1988);
- the police could extend their reach undesirably far into the social and cultural life of the community (Bayley, 1988);
- the interests of minorities in the neighborhoods could go unprotected by the police because of their desire to be responsive to the wishes of the majority (Skogan, 1990; Williams & Murphy, 1990; Bayley, 1988; Manning, 1988; Mastrofski, 1988);

In linking community policing to the problem of demand reduction, and in using police-community partnerships in an attempt to address neighborhood drug problems, the INOP approach draws upon both the principles of problem-solving and those of community policing (Goldstein, 1990; Hartmann, 1988; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988; Spelman & Eck, 1987; Goldstein, 1979). What is unusual about the INOP programs is that they use community and problem-solving policing to target a *single, specific issue* (*i.e.*, drug demand reduction).

Strategies for community-centered demand reduction, the issue upon which the INOP projects focus, have gained increasing support among policy commentators in recent years. Some argue that anti-drug funds can be spent more usefully in the streets of neighborhoods plagued by drug problems than in either international interdiction efforts or national efforts aimed at large-scale distributors (Kleiman & Smith, 1990; Moore, 1990). Kleiman (1986) argues that the benefits of intensive local street enforcement, designed to reduce the demand for drugs, might "outlast the drives themselves" by increasing the difficulties of connecting buyers and sellers -- the so-called "hassles," or non-financial costs associated with buying drugs.[1] Such an approach is seen as potentially valuable in dissuading new users from escalating drug use.

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[1]Recent research on drug "crackdowns" has not supported this argument. In the Vera Institute's study of the New York City Police Department's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT), the effects of TNT on drug trafficking were transitory at best. In some neighborhoods, TNT was believed to have had no effect on drug trafficking, while in others it was seen to have had only a temporary effect, with drug dealing returning to normal as soon as TNT had left (Sviridoff, Sadd, Curtis & Grinc, 1992).

Demand reduction efforts can entail far more than intensive enforcement efforts. Wilson (1990:534) points to two primary components of demand reduction:

> There are . . . two ways of reducing demand: altering the subjective state of potential drug users (through prevention and treatment programs) or altering the objective conditions of potential drug users (by increasing the costs of drug use).

Police initiatives have generally focused far more intensively on increasing the costs of drug use -- the risk of arrest and incarceration and the difficulties of making drug purchases -- than on either drug prevention or treatment.

Many of the INOP projects represent a departure from the more "usual" police "demand reduction" strategies in their effort to supplement traditional enforcement approaches (*e.g.*, sweeps, street-level buy-and-busts, periodic intensive drug enforcement in target areas) with long-term community-based prevention, education and treatment referral. Although a number of school-based prevention programs have employed police resources, these approaches have generally not been coordinated with a community-oriented demand reduction effort. For example:

> . . . school systems around the country have welcomed uniformed officers as drug educators. The most widely publicized and emulated program is DARE [Drug Abuse Resistance Education] which has spread out from Los Angeles. . . Drug Abuse Resistance Education officers work full time on drug education . . . (Kleiman & Smith, 1990:95)

Recent research suggests, however, that public information campaigns and drug education initiatives, although intuitively appealing, have little demonstrated effectiveness. In a review of research on substance abuse prevention, Botvin (1990) found that the majority of such prevention strategies employed for the past two decades have had no effect on substance-use behavior. The single exception involves "resistance-skills training," an approach focused on psychosocial factors that promote adolescent drug use, that according to a number of studies, has had significant effects in a variety of settings. Botvin points to the need for "a comprehensive prevention strategy that combines school-based interventions with those effecting (*sic*) the family, social institutions and the larger community." (p. 461)

In their *proposed* combination of community policing strategies, focused drug enforcement, interagency cooperation, referral to treatment and community-based prevention initiatives, the INOP projects would appear to represent a relatively comprehensive approach to demand reduction. Yet, for future policy-making at the local, state and federal levels, much remains to be learned about how best to structure these various components, particularly in settings characterized by widespread drug use and drug trafficking.

The INOP Projects. When the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) awarded funds to eight urban and suburban jurisdictions in November 1990 under the Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing (INOP) program, their central objectives were to foster both community policing initiatives and drug demand reduction efforts at the neighborhood level. Although both community policing and drug demand reduction have been central aspects of emerging police agendas in many jurisdictions throughout the country, the linking of these features under the BJA INOP program was unique.

The eight jurisdictions that received INOP funds -- Hayward, California; Houston, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky; New York, New York; Norfolk, Virginia; Portland, Oregon; Prince George's County, Maryland; and Tempe, Arizona -- developed a variety of initiatives. Among the few components that these various programs had in common were a police enforcement component, a focus on neighborhoods and an emphasis on drug demand reduction. In addition, all eight INOP programs either implemented or attempted to implement a broad array of partnerships with various state and local agencies and community organizations within their respective jurisdictions.

Yet in many respects, the differences among the eight initiatives were more striking than their commonalities. The eight INOP projects varied greatly in terms of the size of the locality in which they were developed -- ranging from a population of under 200,000 in Hayward and Tempe to over 7,000,000 in New York City. They also differed in terms of the size of the police departments that designed them -- ranging from under 200 sworn officers in Hayward to over 25,000 in New York City.

The projects differed substantially in their historical relationship to other neighborhood- or community-oriented policing initiatives within the departments that designed them. In several sites (Tempe, Prince George's County, Louisville, Portland), the INOP project represented the department's first effort at implementing a neighborhood-oriented style of policing. In other sites (Norfolk, Hayward), the INOP project represented a relatively small component of a larger, new city-wide neighborhood-oriented policing initiative. Finally, in still other sites (New York and Houston), the INOP projects represented small, new efforts in departments with extensive, established community policing agendas of long standing.

There were also differences among the INOP projects in terms of their approach to the drug-demand reduction effort. In some sites (*e.g.*, Houston, Norfolk), the primary emphasis was on drug enforcement, supplemented by secondary drug prevention activities. In other sites (*e.g.*, Hayward, Portland, New York), there was substantially more emphasis on the provision of a broad array of community-based services, including drug prevention, education and treatment.

The various INOP projects also featured several additional components encouraged by BJA -- an extensive public advertising campaign in Louisville; programmatic reliance upon volunteers in New York City; satellite offices in Prince George's County, Norfolk, Portland and Tempe; and the exploration and adaptation of new data processing resources (*e.g.*, Portland, Louisville).

Vera's Research on the INOP Projects. In June, 1991, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) awarded funds to the Vera Institute of Justice to conduct research on the implementation and impacts of the BJA-funded INOP projects. The Vera research includes both a process analysis and an assessment of program impacts and relies primarily on qualitative methods.

Vera's process analysis provided detailed site descriptions and cross-site comparisons of program structure and operations; assessed factors that appear to have facilitated or impeded implementation within each site; identified common implementation issues among the INOP projects; and provided qualitative information on the expectations for and assessments of the INOP projects held by local project staff, police personnel, municipal officials and community

leaders over the course of the project. Because of its length, the descriptions of the projects are provided in a separate volume of this report, entitled *Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing: Descriptions of Programs in Eight Cities.*

The impact analysis, which is the focus of this volume, examined project effects on demand reduction, public safety and quality of life both within and across sites; examined which project characteristics contributed to program effectiveness; and developed an overview of project implementation and impact, based on across-site comparisons. The research employed a variety of methods: semi-structured interviews; focus groups; observations; review of project documents; and review of local evaluation products.

The research design called for three week-long site visits to each of the INOP sites -- a preliminary site visit, designed to provide a full description of the project and its implementation; and two additional site visits over the course of the following year. The last two visits provided both evaluative and explanatory data, including systematic observations of program operations; semi-structured interviews with project managers, staff and selected participants; and focus groups.

After the first set of research site visits (conducted between June and August of 1991), it became clear that the eight programs were so highly differentiated that it would be impossible to compare them directly. Although each represented an attempt to implement some form of community policing, about the only features they shared were the goal to reduce the demand for drugs and their funding source (BJA).

There were, however, common threads running through all eight programs; these commonalities were the problems of implementing community policing. This was true regardless of whether the jurisdiction was a city with extensive experience with community policing, in which INOP was only a small piece of the effort (*e.g.*, Houston or New York), or the INOP project represented a pilot community policing effort (*e.g.*, Tempe). The researchers concluded that the results of the current study might be more useful to planners, policy makers, and community groups in jurisdictions around the country that intend to implement community policing in the

near future, if they could use the information to deal with these problems *before* implementing community policing. In this way, the transition to community policing would be accomplished more smoothly and productively.

This is especially important in light of the fact that these problems appear to be universal in community policing. For example, all the INOP sites experienced problems in getting police officers to accept the new roles and behaviors required by community policing; a lack of interest on the part of the community in becoming involved with community policing, despite acknowledgment by residents that they thought community policing was a valuable approach; a failure to train officers adequately in problem-solving techniques; and problems in obtaining interagency cooperation. It is hoped that these issues will be considered by jurisdictions planning to implement community policing, not to influence them to abandon those plans, but to improve the outcomes of the process.

While the report may at first glance appear highly critical of the eight sites, it is not intended to be so. The reader must keep in mind that these sites, many of which were attempting to implement community policing for the first time, were attempting to do so with very little money and in a relatively short time. These represent genuine attempts to address the crime and quality-of-life problems plaguing these cities, while trying to improve police/community relations.

The reader must also be aware that throughout the report, implementation problems are generously illustrated through examples. While events or quotes from police officers or residents in a particular city may have been chosen to illustrate a problem, this does *not* mean that the problem was unique to that city. On the contrary, each of the problems was experienced by all the cities to one degree or another. The lesson to be learned from the INOP experience is that these problems are inherent in *any* attempt to implement community policing and should be considered *before* cities expend scarce resources on all-out community policing efforts.

Thus, rather than present a site-by-site evaluation of the INOP programs, the chapters that follow are organized around common issues or problems they experienced. To provide the

reader with an understanding of how the researchers discovered these common threads, the research methods are discussed in Chapter 2. The discussion of implementation problems or "issues" is presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5; those chapters address, respectively, police issues, interagency involvement and community involvement. The eight programs shared common goals (regarding drug-demand reduction, crime, quality-of-life problems, police/community relations, *etc.*); the outcomes of the INOP programs on these dimensions are discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, the conclusions drawn by the researchers about these outcomes and issues are presented in Chapter 7. We hope the following discussion will prove useful to police officials, policy makers and community groups in *planning* their community policing efforts and that, by being aware of the problems experienced by others, they can avoid some of these pitfalls.

CHAPTER 2

Research Methods

Introduction. Vera's research on the INOP projects includes both a description of the process of project implementation and an assessment of program impact. Although most evaluations employ quantitative methods, the nature of the INOP programs and the timing of the research precluded the use of these methods, so the research relied on qualitative methods.[1]

The results of the process analysis were used to produce detailed site descriptions that are presented in Volume I of this report. Each INOP project is described within the context of the local police department; the characteristics of the target areas; the specific types of demand reduction strategies employed; other program components, including interagency approaches, training, community outreach and the role of volunteers; and the nature of local evaluation efforts. The assessment of program implementation and impact has been addressed only briefly, at INOP cluster meetings sponsored by BJA and through papers delivered at conferences (Sadd, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c).[2] These issues are addressed in greater detail in the later chapters of this

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[1]The Vera research on INOP was funded for a period of 18 months, from June 1, 1991 through November 30, 1992. Because most of the INOP projects had been funded in the fall of 1990, it was not possible to collect any "pre-test" data in the sites, which would have enabled the research to assess conditions in the sites prior to the start of the INOP projects. In addition, at the time of the final research site visit, during the summer of 1992, most of the INOP sites were operating on second-year funding, which is still continuing for some of them. Therefore, the research period falls in the "middle" of many of the INOP projects. Additional complications arose in assessing the INOP experience of those sites that experienced considerable delay in start-up, either because of problems with the grant process (*i.e.*, Norfolk) or because of delays in procuring hardware (*e.g.*, Hayward, Houston and New York).

[2]To facilitate communication among the INOP sites and provide training and technical assistance, BJA sponsored a series of "cluster meetings." The first such meeting was held in Washington very early in the INOP process (December, 1990) and well before the start of the research; the four subsequent meetings were held in INOP sites (Houston, Tempe, Norfolk and Louisville) and spaced approximately six to nine months apart. These cluster meetings were attended by representatives from all the INOP sites; BJA staff involved in the INOP projects; staff from the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), who provided training and technical assistance to the INOP sites; Vera's INOP research staff (attended those cluster meetings that occurred during the research funding period); NIJ staff; and other invited guests. The role of the Vera research staff in these meetings was primarily observation and information-gathering. However, at the June 1991 meeting, research staff presented an overview of what demands the research would make on the sites and how research data would be used. At the December 1991 meeting, Vera staff were available to discuss the interim report and the continuing research effort with anyone who wished to do so. At the July 1992 cluster meeting, research staff met with staff from NCPC, PERF and BJA to present some of the research findings that might help in identifying (or at least, confirming) areas in which the sites needed training and technical assistance.

report. Although the original research design called for a site-by-site assessment of factors that facilitated or hampered project implementation, the actual experiences of the research led to an alteration in this part of the design. These assessments were made; however, they are discussed in the context of issues for community policing in general (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5).

Because the eight sites varied considerably in both their approaches and their expected impacts, and because of a severe lack of *measurable* impact indicators, the assessment of effects across sites was extremely difficult. Quantitative measures of impact were virtually unavailable in almost every site. As a result, the impact analysis was based on respondents' reports of their perceptions of program effects on drug trafficking and use, drug-related crime, fear of crime, community organization and police/community relationships.

Data Collection Strategies and Methods. The data collection strategies were designed to fit the scope of the research -- an evaluation of eight programs spread across the country, to be completed within 18 months. Thus, the data were collected through a series of three week-long visits to each of the eight cities, by teams of two Vera researchers. To maximize rapport-building and accrued knowledge about the programs, personnel and cities, whenever possible teams were kept consistent across the three visits. Before the first set of visits and between site visits, research staff maintained contact with the sites through telephone calls and mailings and by attending the BJA-sponsored cluster meetings. Before each site visit, the research staff contacted individual INOP project administrators and community members to make arrangements for the individual interviews, focus group interviews and observational sessions that would be conducted during the visit.

Site Visits. The first set of research site visits, dubbed the "implementation site visits," provided research staff with a comprehensive overview of the projects. Prior to the first visit, project administrators at each site were asked to set up an itinerary for the visit that would include a tour of target areas; individual and/or focus group interviews with police personnel, including administrators, officers involved in the INOP project, and officers not involved in the project; interviews with staff of other city (and private) agencies that were involved in the

project; and interviews with community members. In those sites in which local project evaluators had been identified, interviews were arranged with them as well.[3] These visits were conducted during June, July and early August of 1991, and the data were used to produce the descriptions of the programs that appear in Volume I.

Two additional sets of visits were conducted to collect evaluative and explanatory data. While the structure of these visits (observation and interviews with key project participants) was very similar to the implementation site visits, there was one critical difference. Interviewees in the implementation visits were selected by INOP project administrators (police managers in each site); by the time of the second visit, research staff were familiar enough with the programs to identify for themselves those individuals they wished to interview. Wherever possible, lists of names (of police officers or community residents) were obtained from the sites by the research staff and then random samples were drawn to select potential interviewees. The second set of research site visits were conducted in January, February and early March of 1992 and the final set of visits in June, July and early August of that year. During the third set of visits, the researchers felt that they had a thorough understanding of the structure of the INOP projects and shifted their emphasis almost entirely from police agency staff to community residents.

Both the individual and the focus group interviews were semi-structured, meaning that they were formal, in-depth interviews, but were not rigidly structured around an absolutely fixed schedule of questions. William Foote Whyte (1984:97) has referred to this as the "non-directive" interview because it is loosely organized around a number of predetermined areas of inquiry and

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[3]Although BJA's description of the requirements for INOP grantees included that they have a local evaluation, the extent to which such evaluations were implemented was highly variable. For example, some sites hired outside agencies to conduct the evaluation (*i.e.*, Louisville, Tempe and Hayward), while others did their own evaluations (*i.e.*, Portland), and yet others had plans for a local evaluation but did not implement these plans during the research period (Norfolk, New York, and Houston). Furthermore, regardless of whether the evaluation was to be done in-house or by an outside contractor, the scope of these evaluations also varied across sites, including citizen surveys in some sites, police officer surveys in some, and collection of crime statistics in others. The plans for New York City's INOP evaluation not only included collection of crime statistics in the target areas, but also foresaw collecting data regarding hospital admissions, drug treatment, *etc.* Unfortunately, the evaluation was not done during the research period, and as a result, no local evaluation data from New York was available.

questions, but also allows the respondent some degree of freedom in introducing unanticipated commentary and data. This commentary and data, in turn, give rise to new, spontaneous questions by the interviewer. These questions may then be added to the interview schedule for subsequent interviews.

The interviews were tape-recorded.[4] Recorded interviews were then transcribed or, at the discretion of the researcher, copious notes were taken on the interview.[5] Field observation data were recorded through written field notes at times that such recording would not interfere with or bias field operations. In addition, when possible, observational notes were made on tape recorders (while researchers were in the field) and later transcribed.

Research Issues. The goals of the INOP study were to describe each project's structure and operation within the context of the local police department and community; to describe the street-level enforcement operations and any prevention or treatment programs designed to effect drug-demand reduction; and to measure the program participants' (including police and other agency personnel and community residents) perceptions of the project's effectiveness with regard to drug trafficking, drug-related crime, fear, quality of life, community organization and community involvement. In addition, the research focused on some broader issues for community policing. What is the definition of success for community policing? Is it less crime, safer streets, more visible police, *etc.*? Respondents were also asked what changes they would like to see made in their police departments. These are issues for the INOP programs in particular and for community policing in general.

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[4]All tape-recorded interviews were made with the knowledge and permission of the respondent(s). An interview protocol was used that explained the purpose of the research and the confidential nature of the interview data. In those instances in which one or more respondents did not agree to tape recording, written notes were made during the interview. It is notable that the respondents in the INOP sites, whether police or agency personnel or community residents were generally amenable to tape recording, with the understanding that the data were confidential and for research purposes only. The only site in which any respondents refused to be recorded was New York, and in every case, the refusals came from NYPD personnel.

[5]It has been the experience of Vera researchers that not all interviews require verbatim transcription. Often, for example, a respondent has only limited knowledge about the subject of the interview. In other cases, a reluctant or hostile respondent will provide only extremely terse responses in an effort to end the interview.

Variables Measured. The INOP impact evaluation was designed to provide information regarding the effects of the various demand reduction strategies implemented in the INOP sites on drug trafficking and use, drug-related crime, and other crime. In addition, data were collected on the impacts of these community policing experiments on fear of crime in the target communities, citizen mobilization, and police/community relations.

To adequately assess the effects of a program, it is necessary to document the extent to which the program is actually implemented (*i.e.*, conduct a process analysis). This is an especially important issue for community policing, which remains largely ill-defined and yet is very popular among police administrators across the country. As Skolnick and Bayley (1988) have argued, "The variety of programs that are described as 'community policing' is truly bewildering." The process analysis generated descriptions of the eight INOP programs (see Volume I of this report) and some insight into the factors affecting implementation and effectiveness.

Types of Data Collected. Because of the design limitations discussed above, it was not possible to collect pre-post, quantitative data. The INOP projects differed in the specificity of the interventions and in the scope of their focus. The timing of the research (dictated by NIJ), relative to INOP program operation, resulted in a "snapshot" of these programs at varying stages of implementation. In addition, even the quantitative data that one would normally expect to be available from all police departments (*i.e.*, crime statistics) were unavailable in some sites. Thus, the data collected for the INOP project were strictly qualitative.

Data were collected in a series of three week-long visits to each site over the course of 13 months. While much of the implementation site visit was spent observing the projects and interviewing police administrators about program structure, the second and third visits were devoted to collecting data for the impact evaluation. A set of open-ended, semi-structured interview schedules was prepared and tailored to the type of respondent(s) being interviewed. That is, specific protocols were developed for use with each of the following categories of respondent: (1) individual interviews with police administrators and officers; (2) focus groups of officers involved in the INOP program; (3) focus groups of officers not involved in the INOP program;

(4) individual interviews with personnel from other city and private agencies; (5) focus groups with agency personnel; (6) individual interviews with community residents; and (7) focus groups with community residents. While many of the questions contained in these interview schedules were identical across groups, care was taken to keep the interviews of manageable length and not to ask questions that were clearly inappropriate for the interviewee (*e.g.*, there was no reason to ask citizens about training received by officers). The same protocols were used in all INOP sites.

To assess respondents' knowledge of the structure and goals of the INOP project, each respondent (or group of respondents) was asked to describe his/her role in the INOP project; when the program when into effect; and the goals of the program. In addition, police department personnel were asked how many officers participated in the program and how they were deployed, selected and trained. All respondents were asked to describe any problems the program had experienced and also to describe "facilitating factors." They were also asked to list any city, state or private agencies that were involved in the program and to describe the role these agencies played. Similarly, they were asked to describe the role of the community in the INOP program. Residents of the target area were asked how they learned about the INOP project; to describe what the project had done in their community; about their own involvement and that of other members of the community with the program; to describe any outreach efforts made by the police to the community; and to identify the major problem in the community. Responses to these questions were used first, to develop the program descriptions and second, to assess the levels of knowledge and involvement of the various groups of respondents.

Data Analysis. The large volume of observational and field data necessitated a sophisticated and systematic approach to recording and analyzing a very large quantity of data. Using personal computers and appropriate software for the recording and storage of data enabled the research staff to manage the data efficiently and analyze the data systematically. Both observational (field notes) and interview data were entered into personal computers using a free-form text database manager (*askSam*®). This approach made the data accessible for coding and analysis.

As indicated above, the observational and interview data from the implementation site visits were used to produce descriptions of the programs (see Volume I of this report). The data from the second and third sets of visits were the basis of the analyses presented in this report. Using the methods described above, data were collected and analyzed from a total of 522 interviewees across the eight sites. Table 1 below provides a breakdown by site and visit of the number of respondents.

TABLE 1
Total Respondents by Site and Visit

SITE	Visit 2	Visit 3	Total
Tempe	40	18	58
Norfolk	51	21	72
New York	14	18	32
Hayward	31	23	54
Portland	65	26	91
Prince Geo	45	28	73
Houston	32	25	57
Louisville	53	32	85
TOTAL	**331**	**191**	**522**

CHAPTER 3

Police Understanding of and Support for Community Policing and INOP

Introduction. Over the past decade, community policing has grown from an experimental reform movement into the new orthodoxy of contemporary policing. Part of the reason for its success as a reform concept is community policing's combined appeal as a "new old" idea, invoking a nostalgic return to the "beat cop" while implementing a progressive, shop-floor management style appropriate for "policing for the year 2000," as one department description puts it.

The considerable public appeal of community policing, while going a long way to explaining its rapid adoption by so many jurisdictions, has actually led this reform into a crisis of meaning. Many police professionals and policy experts have come to feel that, in their rush to capture what are thought to be the operational and political advantages of community policing, police departments have implemented a management reform that is not fully understood or sufficiently defined.

The inadequate definition and understanding of its goals and means has complicated the implementation of community policing by eroding the credibility of reformers and police managers among the two groups whose confidence and cooperation they need most: patrol officers and the communities they serve. If police managers do not bring the rhetoric and reality of community policing into closer agreement, these reform concepts will be further devalued among these groups, and community policing runs the risk of being relegated to the ever-expanding scrap-heap of unsuccessful reform movements.

The difficulty of implementing community policing is largely a product of the ambitious nature of its mission. Community policing seeks to create a new role for the patrol officer and forge new working relationships (termed "partnerships") with the public. Because restructuring these fundamental elements of policing will have important ramifications for virtually every aspect of police work, community policing requires that personnel at all levels of the police bureaucracy support or "buy into" its goals and means. Similarly, police departments must elicit support from community residents with whom they hope to form "partnerships."

Implementing community policing, while partly a management and administrative task, is therefore more fundamentally a fight for the "hearts and minds" of patrol officers and the public. Data collected for the present research show that police managers and policy researchers may have gravely underestimated the difficulty of gaining the support of these groups. This problem stems from the inherent difficulty of executing a management-led reform with such radical consequences for the grass-roots level of the police bureaucracy, and from the considerable resistance of patrol officers to change.

Patrol officers are particularly resistant because community policing changes their job description, and because the paramilitary structure of police bureaucracies has, over time, produced a well-documented antagonism between the officers and police management. Communication between these "two cultures" of the police bureaucracy is thus complicated by a history of resentment and distrust (Ianni & Ianni, 1983). Community policing is a management restructuring instituted, in true paramilitary style, from the top down, and since its success is dependent on the support of patrol officers, the resistance of patrol officers to management-mandated change is a major stumbling block to its implementation. Managers thus meet heavy resistance precisely where they most need cooperation.

This profound skepticism of community policing among patrol officers has in many cases compromised its implementation to the point where the very concept of community policing has become devalued. Unless community policing is properly implemented early in its history within a department, police managers will not be able to demonstrate to patrol officers the benefits which they promise will follow (such as the reduction of 911 calls for service and improved police-community relations), thus increasing the very skepticism and resistance they need to overcome. This negative feedback loop may have already gained a footing in many police departments claiming to have successfully implemented community policing.

The issues of police management's credibility and institutional resistance to community policing were fundamental problems common among the INOP projects. These issues are explored below.

Knowledge about Community Policing and INOP Projects within Police Departments. The first task in describing the lack of support for community policing among police officers is to assess the overall level of knowledge about INOP project goals and operations. Because the majority of the INOP projects consisted of pilot or experimental community policing units, which were distinct from the rest of the patrol force, the level of knowledge about the projects themselves was generally very low among officers not involved in the projects. This lack of understanding of the INOP projects among officers not involved in project activities was a considerable problem for project implementation, for reasons that are discussed below. The level of knowledge about community policing was higher among officers participating in the INOP projects, but even among these officers there were very few who demonstrated a good understanding of community policing methods and goals.

The lack of knowledge about the INOP project goals can be traced to inadequate efforts in communicating those goals at the outset. In an extreme case for example, officers in Houston, even those involved in project activities funded under the BJA grant, had a minimal understanding of its goals and saw the project simply as a means to increased overtime pay. When asked if they had received any briefing on the purpose of the overtime project one officer, reflecting a consensus, replied: "No. At least I wasn't. I remember them just saying that they had money for overtime."

Most INOP projects expended considerable effort in explaining project goals and operations as part of their training program for INOP officers. The bulk of this training was, however, focused only on those officers who were to participate in the projects, and often did not reach non-project personnel. But even those officers who received training in community policing as a

result of their involvement in the INOP projects often displayed only a rudimentary understanding of community policing.[1]

In part, this lack of understanding can be attributed to the complexity and novelty of community policing; another reason is a lack of training in the principles of community policing and problem-solving. Officers in the majority of the INOP sites had not, by their own accounts, received any special training in community policing. After more than a year of regular involvement in problem-solving activities, for example, an officer involved in Louisville's INOP project expressed his confusion over the goals of the project and of community policing generally. Asked how he viewed his present role in the INOP project he replied:

> I'm not sure. I thought when I came into the community-oriented police program that I understood what it was about, where we were going, what we wanted to do. Now, I'm more confused than ever.

More commonly, officers (both those involved in the INOP projects and those not involved) when asked about the INOP project goals or for their definition of community policing, would focus on its emphasis on community outreach and the new relationship community policing hopes to forge between police and community residents. Only occasionally did officers mention problem-solving activities or interagency cooperation as elements of community policing or the INOP projects.[2]

When asked to explain what "community policing" means, one officer from Louisville (who was not involved in the INOP project) gave a typical response: "[Better] interaction with the public." While it might be logical to expect a lower level of knowledge about the project

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[1]This is not to imply that there is a single agreed-upon definition of "community policing." All definitions of community policing, however, contain certain common elements and it is these that we refer to when assessing officers' knowledge of community policing. In addition, researchers used each individual police department's definition as found in their INOP proposals to BJA, or other relevant department literature discussing community policing.

[2]This is not surprising, however, given that the majority of INOP sites did not do problem solving; nor did these projects generally incorporate other local government agencies (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of Norfolk's exemplary inclusion of other city agencies in its PACE program).

from officers who were not directly involved in it, the above statement is not very different from the formulation of one project administrator in Norfolk:

> To me it's (*i.e.*, community policing) just simply working very close with your citizens, with your community. You're not out there, like I said, to take the hard approach with folks. You enforce the law as you're supposed to, but you also have to be sensitive. That seems to be a key word . . . So it's just working hand in hand with the folks and knowing you're out there to be their friend.

However, by failing to identify community policing with problem-solving, for example, or with a proactive, interagency approach to crime and quality-of-life problems, resistant officers set themselves up to reject the "soft" part of community policing's agenda: community outreach and partnerships. Asked how community policing's emphasis on interaction with the community was viewed in his department, an officer involved in Louisville's INOP project replied, "We look at it as social workers instead of police officers."

Community policing's outreach and partnership components (commonly described as "social work," "smile and wave," or "Officer Friendly" policing) were typically the most rejected components of the INOP projects. Because most officers had little knowledge of community policing beyond this category of "social work," those bent on pursuing traditional law enforcement had no qualms about rejecting community policing in its entirety.

Officers who were knowledgeable and supportive of the INOP projects and of community policing in general often connected what they saw as a widespread lack of respect for project goals with an equally widespread lack of knowledge of those goals. For example, when the Prince George's County INOP unit's activities were associated with a drop in the number of violent crimes in a particular sector, many patrol officers expressed doubts that community policing was in fact responsible for the decline, especially in violent crimes. This attitude was explained by INOP officers as the result of the widespread perception that community-oriented police officers don't do any "real" work.

Most police officers defined "real" police work as work involving crime-related tasks. It is the apprehension of an armed felon or a burglar, for example, that constitutes the "good job" for the majority of police officers. It is, after all, these jobs which attract the attention of their

colleagues, the press, and the public, and which earn officers command citations. Most of the time spent on patrol by the typical police officer, however, produces few, if any, situations in which s/he is presented with the opportunity to arrest a suspect. It is, rather, the non-enforcement functions, "peace-keeping" or service functions that occupy the officer's time and effort (Rumbaut & Bittner, 1979; Banton, 1964; Cummings *et al.*, 1965; Niederhoffer, 1967). Although community policing proponents take great pains to assure both the police and the public that community policing is not "soft" on crime (*i.e.*, officers will still play the crime-fighter role), it is clear that police departments must do more to train officers to adopt the role of problem-solver.

Many INOP officers attributed the perception that INOP officers do not do any "real" police work to the widespread ignorance of community policing. One officer from Louisville, for example, said:

> . . . They [patrol officers] don't understand what actually we're [INOP officers] doing, so of course they're going to say, "They [INOP officers] couldn't have done it [reduced 911 calls] because . . . all they do is have office hours; all they do is attend meetings, and that's it." But it goes well beyond that; it's not just office hours and meetings and things like that, and they just don't know it. So they say, "What I know about community policing, they can't reduce anything, you know, the only thing they can do is reduce the IQ level when they walk into the room," you know, that kind of thing. . . .

An INOP officer in Norfolk felt that this kind of ignorance of and lack of support for community policing was common not only among patrol officers, but also among many supervisors working with project officers:

> Now with the sergeants and stuff, they still make their little comments [about the INOP project], and they still don't understand [the INOP project] . . . I have one corporal saying: "Yeah, I want to transfer to PACE because you all [PACE officers] don't do anything. I want to hang around not doing anything." People actually think we don't do anything, and, from the sergeants and the corporals, I -- my observation is they're not totally understanding of what we're doing. They're not actually doing anything to undermine us, but by the same time they are all saying things that don't help. It's the morale of the officers on the street, when they make their comments about we're just out there slacking off.

Despite years of experimentation with and careful expansion of community policing, the general feeling about community policing and the INOP project in New York City and Houston did not differ significantly from that in cities where community policing is a relatively new

concept.[3] A supervisor of one of New York City's community policing units (CPU), for example, who was only indirectly involved in the INOP project there, felt indignant about what he perceived to be a lack of support for community policing among most officers. Again, the officers who discounted community policing as a "waste of time" justified their attitudes by describing the CPU as a unit in which little or no real police work gets done. Asked how community policing was perceived by most other officers, the CPU supervisor volunteered:

> They think it's a joke. I go to one precinct where I used to work and they say, "Oh, you're the supervisor of CPOP [the old community policing acronym] now?" I go, "Oh yeah, but it's CPU." I always correct them . . . They say, "Oh, they're a bunch of do-nothings!" And I defended my guys, I said, "No. You may do that in your precinct, it may be true [of the CPU] in your precinct. But my guys are happy to be in the conditions unit. They're into making arrests."[4]

In failing to provide adequate education for patrol officers, supervisors and administrators not involved in the INOP projects about community policing and the INOP project goals (and, in some cases, failing to explain adequately these to officers involved in the INOP projects), police managers have made it easier for resistant officers to see only those parts of the projects which they are most apt to dislike.

Even officers who eventually "bought into" the idea of community policing enough to volunteer for duty in the INOP projects often possessed a lack of understanding of project goals. These officers generally felt that the INOP projects needed not just to be described by management, but to be actively "sold" to patrol officers because of the non-traditional nature of community policing and the INOP projects. One officer in Portland, for example, said:

> It was hard for a lot of people to buy into it [community policing]. Way too new, the concepts were way too new. When I first applied, they [regular patrol officers] had names for us already: the "Hap-, Hap-, Happy Police." So there was a lot of bad perceptions on what this program was going to be.

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[3]Many officers in Houston, however, dispute the assertion that Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) has ever been implemented department-wide.

[4]Even here, the supervisor defensively attempts to define community policing as "real police work" by saying that his officers are "into making arrests," rather than into "solving problems."

However, rather than actively "selling" them, most departments merely solicited volunteers for the INOP projects by issuing a department-wide announcement with only a rudimentary description of its operational details and goals.[5] The lack of any real "selling" of the projects led even officers volunteering for the projects to expect that community policing wouldn't be very different from the kind of traditional police work they had done in the past. One project officer in Portland said:

> Originally, when I started, I thought I was just going to be out [in the community], solidly there and nothing more. Enforcing heavily the trespass rules and regulations, kicking a lot of people out, basically doing traditional law enforcement that we have always done: finding and ferrying out the people who are selling drugs, serving search warrants, arresting people left and right, throwing them out and making sure that they don't come back.

Officers who were very supportive of community policing in general confessed to having initial doubts about the value of the INOP projects when they signed up for them. These officers attributed this early skepticism to the inability of their departments to describe adequately and "sell" the concepts of community policing.

While most of the INOP projects did not invest much effort initially in explaining community policing to officers who were not going to be involved in them, preferring instead to concentrate their efforts on training the INOP personnel for their new jobs, even those departments that consciously attempted to explain community policing ran into difficulties. One project administrator in Louisville described the failure of roll-call briefings and department-wide announcements, even when delivered by the Chief and the Mayor, to communicate the community policing mission and the INOP projects' part in that mission:

> I think that the officers have got to be bombarded [with explanations of community policing] on sort of a constant basis, like water torture. And that was the reason for giving a statement about what community policing is, for the Chief. I mean, the Mayor's been there, the Chief has been there. He's been to roll call. He's come back a couple of times and still you get this: "Well I don't know what this shit [community policing] is," you know? So I said . . . look, we've got to come up with a statement about what this is, you know, in the department as we transition [to community

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[5]In fact, selection of INOP officers was crude at best, the criteria bearing little relation to community-policing principles. This lack of formalized selection criteria is a function of the lack of experience with community-policing philosophy and implementation. In some sites, selection of INOP officers was further hampered by a severe shortage of applicants for available positions.

> policing], if you are really going to do this. Because there's a lot of rumor, there's a lot of mythology out there.[6]

As seems to be the case generally, the early inability of police departments to describe adequately their community policing projects contributed to the lack of patrol officer "buy in" to the community policing concept, which, in turn, produced widespread institutional skepticism of and resistance to the INOP projects. This skepticism and resistance are described in more depth below.

Special Unit Status of INOP Projects. Because the INOP projects constituted the first experience with community policing for most of the participating police departments, they were usually constituted as distinct units within the patrol force. While some degree of conflict between community policing's reform agenda and the traditional, para-military structures of most police departments seems almost inevitable, the introduction, through INOP, of community policing as distinct, special units often exacerbated the scale of this conflict. Of the departments involved in the INOP program, only New York City and Houston have a substantial history of community policing as a department-wide approach to crime and quality-of-life problems, and even these two departments continue to experience heavy resistance to community policing from patrol officers. Given its claims to "empower" the patrol officer and to place a new value on careers in patrol, the goals of the INOP community policing units consistently clashed with the institutional expectations of the specialized, traditionally structured police departments. These clashes typically coalesced around long-standing issues in policing and patrol deployment, such as police productivity, resource allocation, career paths and shift assignment.

The "special unit status" of the INOP projects was a major factor perpetuating distrust between police management and patrol officers, and provided fertile ground for the growth of resentment and bitterness between traditional patrol officers and community-oriented officers.[7]

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[6]At the time of the second research site visit to Louisville, the Chief had prepared and was about to release both a Mission Statement for the department and a description of their community policing approach.

[7]For a discussion of traditional styles of policing *(i.e.*, "crime fighting"), see Brown (1981) and Muir (1977).

One project administrator from Louisville attributed the tendency to experiment with community policing as a special unit to a larger trend toward specialization within police management:

> Look at all the police chiefs. You'll never find a one that is a patrolman, or spent any time in patrol. And you look at all the police chiefs being chosen around the country, you'll find the vast majority of them have been specialists as to their career. So they take that mentality into the chief's job and they try to build a specialist's police department. And they end up dividing their police force, you know, into the people who just handle the [911] calls and the people who do the real police work.

This statement describes precisely the kind of schism between patrol and special units that community policing is meant to close, empowering and valuing the patrol officer as the most important agent for police work. This administrator felt that the value community policing places on the patrol officer, and the power and responsibility it places on his/her shoulders, was the perfect solution to the problems he associated with a department structured around special units:

> And where I guess I see [community policing] fitting in is, I see it just being integrated and actually changing police departments . . . placing emphasis on what the patrolman is doing out there, and changing all of that specialist area.

A high-level administrator in Norfolk also thought that the special unit status of this community-policing project was the single most important problem in its implementation and the greatest threat to its future success.

> I'm studying a lot of programs throughout the country. Any community policing project that has ever come out of a designated unit, and differentiated between specialized uniformed officers and regular uniform officers has not worked, throughout the country. That is the biggest problem that I see with PACE.

A certain amount of the intra-departmental resentment toward the fledgling INOP projects is generalized, and might exist to one degree or another between patrol and any other special unit, or indeed even between any two special units within a department. "Turf" battles and rivalries among special units are common in most police departments large enough to have them. Thus while the INOP projects, due to their innovative and non-traditional activities, come up for a special kind of criticism and resentment, there is also evidence to suggest that these police departments were generally plagued by institutional conflicts and resentments and turf battles between different units and divisions. INOP officers in Prince George's County, for

example, summed up the police subculture of intolerance in response to a question about patrol's attitude toward the INOP unit:

> I: Is that sort of the general perception of patrol, that you guys [INOP unit] don't do much of anything?
>
> R1: Exactly. I think the basic perception of most of the police officers in the department is that the work force is all the guys out there in the trenches, the guys out there just responding to domestic calls, the guys just the first ones responding to shootings and stabbings, the guys out there putting hands on people and getting hands put on them. And that was my perception [when I was a patrol officer], that I'm doing all the work and everybody else in CID [Criminal Investigations Division], they're just like support for us, they come out here after we do the dirty work, they go out and clean it up. And that's what the consensus is.
>
> R2: That would be true if we were working in CID, it's the same thing: "You know they don't do as much work as I do." And they would say, "You're not doing as much work as we do in investigations and follow-ups," and things like that. So it's just a revolving point of concern saying, "I'm the better guy than you are."

This institutional context of intra-departmental rivalry created special difficulties for the implementation of those INOP projects which introduced community policing in the form of a special patrol unit. These difficulties most commonly took the form of a generalized resentment of and resistance to community policing and the INOP projects from patrol officers. This resistance and resentment, in turn, tended to focus on the recurring issues in policing discussed below.

Patrol Resentment of INOP Units: Resources and Productivity. Regular patrol officers generally felt some degree of resentment or animosity toward the INOP project officers, or towards community policing in general. These objections to the community policing projects often stemmed from the belief that community policing is a less productive, and less labor-intensive, form of policing than traditional patrol. Within the context of strained police resources, these supposedly "less productive" units come up for special criticism. The issue of community policing and police resources surfaced regularly in conversations about how the INOP projects were viewed by patrol officers. One administrator involved in Norfolk's PACE project described his discomfort with any criticism of the project that focused on the issue of scant police resources:

> The community police officer seems like a selective unit; they are a special unit in the department. The other officers resent that; they have a problem with that and, "How do we reconcile that [with the fact that] we have resource problems?" That sort of thing. We hear a lot of that.

Many patrol officers in the INOP sites felt that the community policing projects were safe havens for officers who didn't want to work very hard. A regular patrol officer in Prince George's County described INOP project officers as not wanting to be as "active" in making arrests as regular patrol officers. This perception seems to stem from the fact that community police officers there are not required to answer 911 calls:

> I think a lot of it is because they have a lot more freedom. I mean, they don't take calls, they're probably not going to be doing very many reports. They're kind of on their own. If they [dispatchers] run out of cars because we're [patrol officers] all tied up in court, they're not going to give them [911 calls] to the COPS officer.

Patrol officers generally felt that community police officers should respond to calls in their beats, if only to serve as back up for regular patrol. This was an issue even in Tempe's INOP project, where officers involved in the Beat 16 Project responded to roughly half of all emergency calls. It was a big enough issue for patrol morale and the morale of INOP project officers that at the time of the last site visit, Beat 16 administrators were lobbying their Chief for an increase in manpower which, coupled with a reorganization of the work shifts, they hoped would allow Beat 16 personnel to answer all emergency calls in the beat.

There is some evidence that the perception of community policing as a less productive deployment of police resources, and one where officers are liberated from the radio and, therefore, unwilling or unable to provide back up to patrol officers on emergency calls, causes some discomfort to officers involved in the INOP projects. An officer involved in the Prince George's County community policing unit funded under BJA's first year INOP grant wondered whether members of the newer community policing unit, created from second-year funding, weren't perhaps making a concerted effort to take emergency calls to gain acceptance from the larger patrol force:

> R: I get a general feeling that they're [the new INOP unit] not going in quite the same direction as we [the old INOP unit] are. And I don't know if this is right or not, but it seems like they're trying to . . . I don't know if they're trying to be accepted because they take all these calls.
>
> I: You mean to be accepted by the other officers?
>
> R: That's what I'm wondering.

Just as officers in Prince George's County sought the approval of their peers by continuing to handle 911 calls in their beats, officers who were skeptical of the value of the INOP projects expressed a grudging willingness to change their minds if community policing could achieve traditional law-enforcement goals. The key to community policing's credibility, according to these officers, was its ability to reduce 911 calls, reduce criminal activity and produce arrests.[8]

Special Unit Status and Resentment: Career Paths. The perception that special units are elite assignments where "hand-picked" officers work toward promotion and advancement within the department's command structure was an important source of the resentment of the INOP projects among patrol officers. In traditionally-structured departments where patrol assignments and special-unit assignments are distinct and mutually exclusive categories, the INOP projects, seen by many officers as special units within patrol, represent a puzzling incursion of elitism and specialization into the patrol force.

Police managers and academic proponents of community policing are quick to point out that their mission is to reverse the trend toward increased police specialization by encouraging patrol officers to become generalists and problem-solvers rather than simply 911 call-takers. These changes in the patrol function are loosely termed "empowerment" in the community policing literature. By "empowering" the patrol officer (changing the role of patrol to include problem identification, strategy design and community outreach while at the same time including a new element of accountability through fixed beat assignments), police managers hope to make patrol a more attractive career path for talented officers, rather than "lose" that talent to special units. While there is evidence that integrating community policing into the career path for ambitious officers may be a long-term process (McElroy *et al.,* 1993), the mere appearance of the INOP

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[8]Community residents also believed that the ultimate measure of community policing's success would be its ability to achieve the "traditional" goal of crime prevention.

community-policing projects as distinct units within patrol has elicited a kind of defensive skepticism from patrol officers not involved in them.

The issues of promotion, advancement, pay-for-performance[9] and the special unit structure of most municipal police departments are critical for any department considering the adoption of community policing (Moore & Stephens, 1991). A project administrator in Louisville, committed to neighborhood-oriented and problem-solving policing, felt that the absence of larger departmental changes, especially concerning the special-unit structure of his department, had eroded the credibility of the INOP project's notion of officer empowerment:

> They [police management] were trying to take a traditional organization and make it participatory without going through the steps. And at the same time, they were trying to implement a community policing program. Now, empowering the patrol officer was their gimmick. Yeah, that was the gimmick to get officer involvement and to get them to buy in and then to claim that you have this entire community policing department because, "Anybody can do problem solving." And by empowering them to be able to contact [other city agencies directly], that was another gimmick.

This same INOP project administrator explained community policing's dilemma in terms of the failure of the special-unit system, which typically weakens the patrol officer, favoring instead those who are picked for duties in special units:

> What community policing has pointed out is that by emphasizing the role of the police officers in fighting crime, lets say, that they [police managers] have to change their entire organizations to make that possible. And our organization is not one that has traditionally been designed to do that. It seems to be -- to take everything away from these guys [patrol officers]. You know, strip them to the bone. And what we've got, we give to the special units, because we hand pick those people, and we think they're the best people. They're the cream of the crop in the police department, and we try to give them the best resources that we have available, to have an impact. And in my opinion, they have not had an impact at all. But because all these people were hand-picked, you don't want to confess to that, you know.

Similarly, a community police officer in Norfolk viewed the widespread resentment of PACE as the result of a larger institutional rivalry between patrol and the detective bureau, the prototypical special unit:

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[9]Pay-for-performance policies link an officer's salary not only to rank and seniority, but also to the quality of that officer's performance, as measured by departmental evaluation. Of the police departments participating in the BJA INOP-grant, only Prince George's County had a pay-for-performance policy.

> It's the Haves and Have-nots. Detectives are Haves, and the patrol officers are Have-nots. We've got that kind of philosophy or kind of mentality, I guess, throughout the police department. And it's just kind of carried over here (*i.e.*, PACE).

These long-standing institutional rifts and rivalries have serious implications for the success of the INOP projects and for community policing in general. Officers and administrators in many sites identified senior officers with a significant number of years in the department as the most resistant to the changes brought by the INOP projects and community policing. Presumably, officers who had become thoroughly socialized to a department in which the path to advancement included assignment to a special unit and promotion would be most resistant to any new structure brought on by the advent of community policing. An officer involved in Norfolk's community policing project, for example, said:

> I was a field training officer before . . . and I don't think the problem is with the new officers coming on. I think they've been trained properly; they know what to do. I think it's a lot of the older officers that are set in their own ways and don't want to change.

Senior patrol officers seemed to make up the backbone of the resistance to the INOP projects and the reforms they represent, largely because of long-standing working styles gained from performing years of traditional patrol work, but also because they feel disenfranchised by a management system which takes the best and brightest out of patrol, and which has left them behind. This is precisely the point made by one officer in Norfolk in reaction to the above comment made by his colleague:

> . . . I don't think it's the old officers *per se* [who are resistant to the INOP projects], I think it's that specific officers that have been stepped on so long that they don't care wherever you put them at. You understand? The majority of the good, older officers are highly specialized in all their fields. You get them in the detective bureau, you know, you got the good ones already gone to special units, where they want to be. They're not in patrol anymore, they're where they want to be and they're doing their job at those particular areas. So you've got [senior officers] down in patrol and their objective is retirement . . . They got the knowledge, but I mean, they just are set to the point of where they're saying, "Hey, all I want to do is do my eight hours and go home."

While the intrusion of the INOP projects and their community policing agenda into the long-standing promotional structure of departments which rely on the distinctions between patrol and specialized units has caused many senior patrol officers to become embittered and resistant to reforms, it has also inspired some officers to become involved in community policing. This is particularly the case in departments which have expressed intentions to expand their community

policing initiatives. An officer in Prince George's County, for example, described how the department's plans for expanding the INOP project and adopting community policing as an important element of their patrol force deployment had led some officers to believe that the INOP projects were the new career path to promotion:

> Recently, it was in the past couple of months, there's been a lot, a lot more interest in community policing from patrol officers. You get a lot more people putting in for it because they see, you know, "Hey, this is where this department's going, and I'm going to get into this and learn while I can."

Officers involved in the INOP projects often expressed their belief that community policing would gain widespread acceptance in their department only after a generation of younger officers, trained in community policing from the beginning of their careers, had filled the ranks. While training plays an important role in the future success or failure of community policing, new officers will not invest their energies in it unless community policing is integrated into a department's career path.

Regular Hours. One group of patrol officers described the lure of community-oriented police work entirely in terms of the regular weekends off they could expect as members of the INOP unit.[10] Regular weekends, originally designed to draw more senior officers into the program, have made community policing a "plum" job in many of the sites, available only to those who have "got some strings to pull." Patrol officers in Houston described the INOP officers as trying to protect their coveted assignments by seeming to expend considerable energy in what they saw as a relatively undemanding assignment:

> And now it's the type of thing where, they got a nice, cushy job -- they only got to run their little calls, and their little projects, and they go to make a few meetings and so forth. Okay, granted, some shifts might work heavier than others, but they don't want to lose their little job right now, so they turn around and put as much as they can on their work cards to make it look good, "Whew! We really did a lot of community work that day!"

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[10]A regular schedule of steady tours and fixed days off was found to be the single most compelling factor leading officers in New York City to volunteer for the NYPD's early community-policing project, the Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP). See McElroy *et al.*, 1993.

Officers assigned to the project in Portland had a similar story of the evolving popularity of the community policing unit, with similar justifications for this change. As in Houston, when the Portland project initially solicited for volunteers, it was unpopular. As one officer reported, ". . . Quite honestly, when this job [as an officer in the INOP project] opened up it was like three people that applied." Even officers who volunteered for the Portland INOP project reported having serious doubts about joining the new unit:

> R1: I had to twist this guy's arm to drag him in [to the unit].
>
> R2: I waffled several times: "Day shift, weekends off . . . that would be nice! Community meetings? Forget it, I want to drive fast at night!" I went back and forth. Finally decided, "Well, give it a shot."

Ultimately, the lure of consistent day shifts with regular weekends off tilted the scales for this particular officer. These are the same perquisites which officers in Houston described as contributing to the current reputation of community policing as a "nice little job," the kind of assignment that comes only with connections. The officer in Portland for whom the work schedule of the fledgling INOP project proved the decisive factor in the decision to volunteer for duty also reported that these same considerations are now contributing to a certain popularity of community policing among many patrol officers. An officer in Portland reported that, ". . . officers are now scheming on ways to try to get into the [INOP] unit if, and when it ever expands full-time."

Overestimating INOP's Potential Effects. Another factor affecting the legitimacy of the INOP projects among patrol officers was overestimates of the potential effects of the projects. In trying to "sell" the new projects to resistant officers, police managers in many INOP sites described community policing's potential benefits too broadly and optimistically, and thus helped to create a crisis of credibility among police officers. By inculcating unreasonable expectations for its success in the process of describing its goals, police managers gave naysayers an open opportunity for criticism if the project failed to deliver the promised effects (a potential problem identified by Klockars (1988) and Manning (1988)).

INOP officers in all sites felt that, just as community policing needs time to overcome the label of "management reorganization of the week," so too it needs time to demonstrate the effects and efficiencies which it claims to produce. These officers felt that critics of the projects were pointing prematurely to failures which had not had sufficient time to mature into successes. (This phenomenon was also observed in community policing's crisis of credibility among community residents.) One INOP officer in Portland felt that he had to defend the project against its detractors, and that the institutional expectations for community policing were so high as to cause a general misunderstanding of it goals:

> I don't think that people should teach that community policing is going to fix everything. Community policing is just another way of addressing a continuing problem that has been around since we have had to live together in a community, and that is crime. And it is not something we are going to look at in five years and say, "I told you it wasn't going to fix our neighborhood." It was never designed to do that, it was designed to . . . address these many problems that are going to happen instead of slapping everyone in jail all the time. I think a lot of officers and people are looking at it as, "That will fix the whole problem."

The low level of credibility accorded the INOP projects within their respective police departments is often expressed by officers through the use of pejorative labels. Labeling of the projects involves concretizing a range of judgments about them in a single name or phrase, often a corruption of the acronyms given to the INOP projects. For example, when asked if they had heard of the INOP acronym, officers in Houston recognized only the last three letters, which represent their community policing initiative ("Neighborhood-Oriented Policing" or NOP):

> I: Is that a familiar acronym, INOP?
>
> R1: Just N-O-P is what we call it. Amongst other things! (Laughter.)
>
> R2: Yeah. We on patrol heard that: "Not Our Problem," "Nobody On Patrol." (More laughter.)

One chief in Houston felt that by not using the community policing acronym, he could overcome a great deal of the institutional resistance to community policing:

> The words NOP [Neighborhood-Oriented Policing] are no longer used in the Houston Police Department because they became a curse word to the officers, or to a good many of them . . . we don't use NOP, as everyone in the United States knows that it came to mean here "Never On Patrol." And so I don't use the word, I don't use the word at all and we don't use it in our documents . . .

Such derogatory labels are a manifestation of the conflictual relationship between police management and line officers who feel that community policing is already a failure. The Houston chief quoted above went on to describe how the community policing "curse word" was used by officers as a way of expressing their dislike of police management:

> . . . The concept [of community policing] itself became, I guess a trigger word for mistreatment that they [line officers] feel from the city government and from the management of the police department. And it became one of the things that contributed to the polarization between the working officers and the management of the department.

The persistent labeling of the INOP projects by officers who were not involved in them thus reflects the difficulties of implementing a management reform like community policing within an environment which is characterized by a "polarization between the working officers and the management of the department." This polarization, what Ianni and Ianni (1983) describe as a fixture of the "two cultures of policing," is a major issue for the credibility of the community policing reforms which the INOP projects represent.

Community Policing as "New-Old" Idea. There was another pattern of behavior, related to the labeling phenomenon, observed across sites, and that was only marginally less harmful to the INOP project innovations. In virtually every site, most officers would describe the kind of community policing implemented through the INOP projects as nothing new, but rather as just "good, old-fashioned policing." As one officer said:

> . . . I think a lot of officers have got the same feeling I do. It [community policing] is not really a program. I mean, it's not something that you can bring in and say, "This is the way we're going to be doing things." It's just on how you deal with people, and if you dealt with people on a human standpoint before this, you were being a community-based police officer . . . Some officers that have been around for a while, I speculate that they may balk at the idea of having to change their style. But if they're been successful in the past in dealing with people, they're not really going to have to change their style. They're just going to have to call it community-based policing as opposed to whatever they called it before.

By arguing that the INOP projects are essentially asking officers to engage in the kind of "good policing" that many of them have been doing for years, officers resistant to community policing reform make a case for the continuation of the status quo.

Officers in all sites routinely described the community policing of the INOP project as a return to the "beat cop" of the past. One officer in Louisville felt that the basic ideas of community policing were as old as policing itself.

> I think it [community policing] is an old concept of policing. Because if you go back to the history of police departments, the old English policemen when they came to this country, an [INOP] program existed then. So what we're seeing is the old policing revised for the nineties . . .

While different officers chose to anchor their views of the present-day INOP projects in different moments of history, they always described the beat cop as a fixture of some period when police and citizens, according to these officers, enjoyed a better, more trusting relationship.

Although the historical placement of community policing was occasionally espoused by officers making a case for the validity of the INOP projects, it was more often used by officers who were skeptical of the value of the INOP reforms as a way of distancing themselves from institutional changes while still claiming to be good police officers. This attitude was common among officers who expressed resistance to the INOP projects and community policing in general, and demonstrates that the distrust of police management (and their "projects") lies at the heart of their resistance to change. One officer in Houston spoke of community policing as a basic part of traditional police work, and so resented being told to do it by police managers. Indeed, officers in all eight sites often argued that much of the rank and file resentment to community policing was grounded in the philosophy "being shoved down their throats" by superiors:

> Well, it [community policing] is something that we've been doing since day one as police officers: go out and talk to people wherever you're working. But whenever they [management] start ramming it down your throat with a battering ram, it gets kind of old.

Officers who espoused this particular view of community policing invariably pointed out that, unlike the INOP projects, "good policing" has had no need for a management-devised acronym, label, or special unit, and that it used to be done on the initiative of dedicated patrol officers, not on that of police managers and academics. They also implied that the INOP projects and community policing are merely a management fad, and that "good policing" will still be done by good cops long after INOP has been replaced by another new program. However, this particular view of community policing was made possible largely by the general lack of knowledge of

community policing among officers espousing it. As the officer quoted above who attributed to community policing only a mandate to "go out and talk to people," so most of those who felt that community policing was an old idea seemed to be referring almost exclusively to its community outreach component.

Perceived Loss of Enforcement Abilities. Those officers who laid claim to the "get-out-and-talk-to-people" definition of community policing by saying it was what good cops had been doing for years, later claimed that community policing was simultaneously hamstringing officers by putting too many restraints on police powers. For example, one INOP officer in Houston described how a new concern for the community had compromised traditional policing's aggressive enforcement tactics:

> When we all came out on the street, we were taught this is what policemen do: you can't let the crooks take over the area. *You* have to take over the area. If there was something you didn't like or you saw something suspicious, go out put your hands on it. But so many of the younger people were trained in the later part of the seventies and early eighties, they weren't trained to get out and aggressively go after these people, they were trained, "Well, you have liabilities, you've got to be careful if you unlawfully detain this person, even if you are just talking to them."

In all the sites, community policing's perceived lack of an aggressive enforcement component was shown to be the biggest single stumbling block to the acceptance of the INOP projects by non-project officers.[11] Asked about morale in their department, one group of patrol officers in Houston felt that the loss of certain discretionary enforcement powers, which they associated with the rise of community policing, was having a deleterious effect:

> Why will the upper echelon and what-not, why will they not allow the street officers, the trench officers to be out there fighting crimes? You get burnt out because you see the crime going on, but yet they tell you to smile and wave at people.

For these officers, community policing's "smile and wave" directives are hated not simply because they come from the "upper echelons," but because they are perceived as eroding the traditional crime-fighting mandate of police.

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[11]Many community residents also expressed some concern that community policing might be too "soft" on crime and criminals (see Chapter 5).

The Fleeting Nature of Police Programs. The perception that the changes in their job description have a political rather than law-enforcement origin provides another point of resistance to community policing among patrol officers. By turning project acronyms into pejoratives (*e.g.*, N.O.P. into "Nobody On Patrol"), officers distance themselves from institutional change, taking comfort that a long list of "new projects" and "restructurings," each with its own acronym, have come and gone without significantly changing the way policing gets done. Despite his support for Norfolk's INOP project, an administrator described his officers' frustration with the pace of this renaming of supposedly "new" police projects:

> . . . And even since we started this [INOP project] we've changed the names several times. You all come in as INOP and now that acronym's out. Last week or the week before we went to some training called POPS or Problem-Oriented Policing, so already the officers and the supervisors are saying, "Gee, we have INOP, we have POPS, we had PACE, so is there any difference between the three and what we had prior to that? You know, years ago?"

The quick succession of repackagings which has taken place since the current round of police reforms began in the '70s has convinced many officers that all "new" police projects are driven by political pressures put on police and city management, and are thus inherently of dubious value.[12]

Much of the resistance patrol officers display towards community policing is therefore generic, the result of the low credibility of any management-instituted change or reform. The typical justification for this low credibility is the perception that each new political administration and each new police chief institutes reforms, renaming old services and developing "innovative" projects without fundamentally changing police work. The high turnover in police administrators makes for a high turnover of new police programs, none of which have the time to prove their merits. As one officer in Portland said:

> As a police department, we don't trust . . . every time we get a new chief or something, we have had a lot of them recently, and they always come up with a new program, got to change everything. So there is a certain amount of credibility community policing needs to be credible. It has to stick around a while and not be somebody else's new idea.

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[12]This perception of police projects is also common among community residents. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this issue.

Management's Failure to Include Officers in Planning. Within this context of skepticism for "new" programs and of strained relations between patrol officers and police managers, most officers felt that community policing was happening to them, not with them.[13] The perceived lack of any good-faith effort to explain the new INOP project or community policing unit, or to communicate the department's future plans for community policing created another problem for officer "buy in." As management reacts to political realities, patrol officers feel disoriented and abandoned. An officer in Houston, for example, reported:

> Nobody's in charge any more, you know? That's the biggest problem [with community policing]. They come to us and they tell us something in roll call, and the next thing they say is "Well, we're going to restructure the whole deal, and it's going to take place by so-and-so a date." Wait around. By this time, everybody just thinks to themselves, "I'll believe it when I see it." Because they tell us so many things.

Many officers thus believe that directives come down from the "bosses" without any form of consultation, or any attempt to bring patrol officers into the decision-making process. Patrol officers in Hayward felt that the widespread resistance to community policing was a reaction to the way management had implemented it, rather than the result of the goals or methods of community policing:

> I don't think [there is] a problem with the concept or the philosophy of COPPS [Hayward's INOP project acronym]. In your job, if your boss comes in and says, "I'm going to cram this up your nose or down your throat -- you're going to accept it!" that's where you're going to have problems. And that's where we're having problems internally.

This general acceptance of the "philosophy" of community policing expressed by the Hayward officer quoted above was not as common in other sites or among other police respondents as was the resentment of the manner of implementation of community policing and the INOP projects. While officers across sites often expressed their distaste for certain aspects of the community policing "philosophy," they were almost unanimous in their criticism of what they considered the heavy-handed style of its implementation. This is an especially interesting critique of community policing in light of its claims to "empower" the patrol officer. This officer

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[13]Officers in most of the sites objected to the official inclusion of community residents in the planning for transitions to community policing, while ignoring patrol officer input.

empowerment is roughly parallel to the community empowerment, which is also an objective of community policing. But whereas community policing emphasizes bringing community residents into the police decision-making process and into the process of identifying community problems, management often does not seem concerned to do the same for its patrol officers.[14] Consider this description of the new efforts community policing is making in regard to including community residents in police operations and decisions, a reaction against the "professional era" of policing:

> It's building trust, and that's something that we didn't do in this profession prior to the '80s when we started looking at neighborhood-oriented policing or community-based policing. Because basically people, the citizens, didn't know how we operated. And we basically operated in a vacuum. We implemented our policies ourselves. We told the citizens, "We know what's best for you, so we'll give you what's best for you." We didn't take out the time to hear what their concerns were. And basically, I don't think we created an environment that they could come and talk to us.

The desire for this kind of openness with the community is directly at odds with the kind of relationship that community policing seems to foster between management and the majority of patrol officers.[15] For example, when asked why most officers in Houston don't understand, and therefore don't support community policing, one officer traced patrol officers' general resistance to precisely this issue in management relations:

> I think it has to do with the officers' ability to change. Change is a big issue, no matter what it is. Beat integrity was frightening to us. "How dare you say stay in my beat! Are you kidding me?" Well, that's change. Inevitably, it happened, and it took a lot of lumps and bruises, some officers getting suspended. I mean, we're serious about this [beat integrity]. There's a reason why we need to do it. But they never told us why: shorter response time, you get to familiarize yourself with the areas, you get to know the community people, who's in your area, both the crooks and the good citizens. That wasn't explained to us, it was rammed down our throats. So management had a major influence on how we initially were introduced to community-oriented policing . . . I don't think the police department, as far as management, took into account the resistance to change, no matter what concept they were going to initiate. And I don't see that officers' aptitude is the issue;

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[14]Despite the emphasis on community outreach in the community policing literature, there is evidence that police departments are equally unsuccessful in their efforts to communicate the value of community policing to community residents. See Chapter 5 for a more complete discussion of these issues.

[15]Indeed, in New York, many officers would not allow researchers to tape record interviews for fear it would "be used against them" if they "said the wrong thing." In Houston, a number of officers were disciplined by their commanding officer after they told other precinct personnel what they had told researchers in a closed interview. The commanding officer was displeased with some of the officers' less than enthusiastic remarks about INOP and NOP.

> it's the attitude that's the issue. The management was not willing to accept that the officers' attitude just wasn't ready for that type of philosophy.

By failing to take as much care to include their own personnel in community policing as they do to include the general public, police managers have begun to further distance their already alienated patrol officers.

INOP Projects and Individual Officers. The new role that the INOP projects set out to create for the police officer, with its emphasis on community outreach and interaction, problem-solving, and leading other service providers to attack problems, requires a new outlook and a new set of skills from officers. The very notion of "empowering the patrol officer" to complete this new set of tasks demonstrates the extent to which community policing, unlike some other policing reforms, concerns itself primarily with the individual officer. Indeed, much of the resistance to the INOP projects among regular patrol officers can be traced to the scale of change in the police officer's basic job description and therefore in his/her occupational identity.

Officers involved in the INOP projects and those not involved both thought that certain personalities and abilities were more suited than others to the new community policing role. The introduction of questions of individual temperament into community policing underscores the importance of the individual officer in the successful implementation of the INOP projects. INOP officers in Louisville described community policing as more of a state of mind, a question of an individual officer's motivation, than an institutional mandate. They felt that individual officers could implement community policing by themselves, irrespective of their participation in a special program:

> . . . Yeah, we've got people who utilize the concept of the COP program who are not involved in it. That's just an individual who will take his job a step further and get on the phone, come in here to do an investigation and call the different agencies and people they know can best help them get from point A to point B . . . It's really a matter of the individual's motivation. We've got officers doing COP stuff all the time.

The critical importance of certain police personnel for the success of the INOP projects was a fixture of the projects in all sites, and manifested itself in several ways. For example, community policing's concern with the individual patrol officer, when combined with the failure of officers to "buy into" the INOP project commonly produced a situation in which a few

dedicated and knowledgeable police personnel essentially carried the entire INOP effort. The problems of institutional credibility common to all the INOP projects thus placed an increased responsibility for their success on a small, core-group of officers, supervisors and project administrators involved with the projects.[16]

In some of the INOP sites, the project relied on one or two specific individuals. Officer and resident respondents argued that the projects would falter without those individuals. In one INOP site, where broader departmental support for the project seemed contingent on continued federal funding, an administrator felt that in his absence, his district would go back to "business as usual":

> I: Are all the other captains in favor of community policing?
>
> R: No, not necessarily.
>
> I: So what happens when you get somebody in here who is -- [not supportive of the INOP project and community policing]?
>
> R: Well, it becomes less of a priority, the whole program will be less of a priority. We'll probably go back to business as usual.

The importance of individual supervisors was more commonly demonstrated by the variation in the "styles" of different supervisors. This variation, which is common in traditional departments and units, is more pronounced in the INOP setting where the newness of, complexity of and resistance to community policing increases the latitude for individual interpretation of its goals. This was the situation described by an administrator in Norfolk:

> Each individual supervisor, being a human being, may interpret this [INOP project goals] one way or another. And of course we can't be out there with them. . . I'm sure that there are some supervisors who, just like any other police department, would say: "I don't agree with A, B and C, so we're going to do E, F, G'. . . And the same thing occurs with individual officers.

While for Norfolk's PACE program, the influence of individual supervisors could lead to different definitions of community policing from shift to shift, in Prince George's County, the

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[16]This is not unlike the situation in the INOP target sites in which a small core group of residents are responsible for the well-being of community groups.

importance of INOP supervisors was underscored by the differences between the two INOP units themselves. An officer from one of the INOP squads, when questioned about the relationship between his squad and the other squad, said, "I get a general feeling that they're not going in quite the same direction as we are." Here two definitions of community policing, held by the two supervising sergeants of the two INOP project units, resulted in a lack of interaction and useful cooperation between the officers from those units:

> R: We unfortunately don't have the greatest working relationship with the other squad, and I think it's more so because of the sergeant, or the sergeants, I should say.
>
> I: There are two?
>
> R: Well, our sergeant and their sergeant. They don't see -- She has her perception of the way things should be going from what she's read. He's got his perception of the way it should be from what he's actually done. . . . So he knows from actually doing it [community policing] and she just assumes from reading, and they just seem to be bumping heads and it's affecting us . . .

The ability of individual supervisors to influence the type of community policing that gets done in a particular unit or during a particular shift is an important issue for Prince George's County's INOP project, just as it is for Norfolk's. While a few of the INOP projects used only one supervisor, the increased importance of these individuals is a serious concern for any proposed expansion of the INOP projects.

Individual Officers and their Effect on the Projects. Each INOP project is heavily influenced by the "working styles" of its officers and their supervisors. Michael Brown (1981:221) has suggested that the formation of highly individualized styles of policing are developed by police officers, based on solidarity among officers in concert with an ethos of individualism and the "debureaucratizing" effects of limited formal administrative controls over officers in the field. Thus, police behavior is guided by an officer's subjective assessment of a given situation based upon his/her values and beliefs -- these values and beliefs are translated into a consistent pattern of behavior and constitute an officer's working style. The basic components of a working style, according to Brown (1981:223) are:

> . . . style initially derives from the choices a patrolman must make about how to work the street. . . . Patrolmen could be differentiated in terms of two characteristics: how *aggressive* they were in the pursuit of the goal of crime control, and how *selective* they were in the enforcement of the law.

> Beliefs toward aggressiveness and selectivity are the core elements of a patrolman's operational style.

A problem affecting the implementation of community policing is that traditional policing has emphasized and rewarded officers who are highly aggressive in the enforcement of the law and who are highly selective (*i.e.*, who make felony arrests a priority), what Brown refers to as the "crime fighter" style of policing. Community policing, by contrast, seeks officers who are problem-solvers and who treat criminal and non-criminal quality-of-life problems as equally worthy of their attention. Community policing thus seeks, to use Brown's term, a "professional" officer -- such officers approach cases involving criminal misconduct and calls involving less serious quality-of-life problems in the same thorough manner.

Because of its emphasis on interaction with the community, community policing can stand or fall on the public perception of an individual officer and of the work s/he does. This increased importance of the individual officer is demonstrated in the emphasis placed by community policing on the continuity of the beat officer. By maintaining stable assignments to specific areas, community policing hopes to foster partnerships between the beat officer and community residents. Reacting to what they perceived as the reassignment of the original INOP officers, agency representatives in Portland criticized any police policy which led to officer turnover in the INOP project, stating that, "it gets more difficult as time goes on to have to re-establish that trust relationship over and over and over with different people, with officers from different shifts as well."

Public perceptions of the INOP projects therefore rested almost entirely on the performance of individual officers. The following statement comes from an INOP project officer who had recently taken over a particular beat from an INOP officer whom the residents felt had not been doing a good job. The officer feels that his community's perception of the INOP project in general rested almost entirely on their perception of him:

> That was the biggest problem I had was the transition from taking over where he left off. Some of the community perception about him wasn't as favorable for him and the job that he did, and some of the community members kind of had a stigma that that's the way I was going to be also. Since then I've managed to swing everybody's opinion about me and about the program very well.

While this demonstrates that the public perception of the projects rested on the performance of specific INOP officers, it had little effect on the public perception of police officers generally. Thus while the negative perception of a single officer had a negative effect on the public perception of the INOP project, the good reputation of a particular INOP officer did not generally translate into a more positive public perception of other police officers. A project supervisor in Tempe described how the good relationship between a few young community residents and certain INOP officers seemed to exacerbate their dislike of other officers:

> For a while we were having problems, and we still do every once in a while, with the kids [who live in the INOP target area]. They know all the officers on the beat [INOP officers]; they may not be crazy about all of them, but if an outside cop comes in to try to arrest them, they get awfully ticked off. And . . . they don't like the other officers' approach sometimes. We had a problem not long ago and I asked them, "Well, if you had to be arrested, who would you want to arrest you?" And they named almost everybody on the [INOP] team. They said the other people don't respect them and don't treat them right, and you know, they sometimes have a point.

By excluding beat officers from other shifts in whatever training INOP officers may have received for their projects, the police departments made the distinction between the "good" officers (usually project officers) and "everyone else" (non-project officers).

Resources. Officers in the INOP sites reported that community policing was more time-consuming and required more police resources than traditional policing. In particular, community outreach and problem-solving were the two specific activities that officers identified as being the most labor-intensive, the most time-consuming, and the most difficult to integrate with their more traditional police duties.

Most police officers (and many community residents) felt that their police departments were understaffed and overworked. Officers in Houston were very concerned about the shrinking of the Houston Police Department in the late 1980s, for example. Officers in Prince George's County, Portland and Louisville expressed concern over the way the fiscal crises in their local government budgets would affect staffing levels in their departments. Indeed, these fiscal and manpower issues played an important part in the way the INOP projects were viewed by police officers. Many officers in Houston, who had faced a wage freeze for several years and had seen the closing of their police academy and the shrinking of their police force through attrition,

viewed the INOP project as merely a way to collect extra money through overtime. One officer familiar with the INOP project implementation gave this account of the part that grant funds played in this larger issue of police resources:

> Federal money was spent to boost morale on people that were underpaid. This was just a way for them [patrol officers] to make a little extra money without busting their ass, so the federal money went to boost morale.

This kind of resources-oriented approach to community policing was not uncommon. Officers and supervisors who were unfamiliar with community policing often considered the INOP project in light of the likelihood it would ease or exacerbate perceived police resource problems. A project administrator in Norfolk described the general police perception that most crime conditions require additional police resources, and how this perception turned an exercise in problem-solving into a bid for a traditional, manpower-intensive strategy:

> R: Everybody's solution is, "More police officers patrolling the area." I mean, that's everybody's solution. They want more cops. If you tell them, "We'll put more people in there," then they're happy. We just did the thing with -- the problem-solving thing. So I had everybody submit cards about their problems in their car districts, because I was going to have them pick some problems and work on them. We know how things get twisted around. And the lieutenants send me a letter, each one from each sector, and it lists the problem and it lists the solution.
>
> I: More cars?
>
> R: Yeah! "High intensity patrol." And I said, "This is crap! You ain't getting no high-intensity patrol!" You know, got forty problems and the solution to each one of them is to put more police there! And we're just kind of keeping afloat now. "You're not getting that. You're all going to have to do better than that. You're going to have to select one problem, and the solution ain't no high-intensity patrol."

Since police staffing levels and resources are perennial issues for police departments, the interaction between community policing and concerns over police resources will be crucial for the future of community policing. Within the general context of scarce police resources, community policing either can hold out the promise of 911 call reduction or threaten to stretch existing resources even thinner by adding time-consuming tasks to the list of police duties. Even officers who believed that community policing would eventually lead to a reduction in 911 calls for service and an easing of manpower constraints, felt that it would require additional investments in manpower initially.

Concerns about community policing's impact on police resources were reported as a major factor in the lack of support for the INOP projects, and for community policing generally, among police unions in at least two INOP sites (Portland and Houston). Portland's Police Bureau, which is making a department-wide transition to community policing, did not have support from its police union for this very reason:

> In this Bureau . . . we have had a union that takes a negative view of the community policing program for a number of reasons: they say it is a manpower shortage, and we can't do it because we're are not equipped to do it. We need money and manpower, and until we do have that, we shouldn't be talking about it [making the transition to community policing].

Officers interviewed in all eight INOP sites all raised concerns about community policing and police resources. Their concerns fall into two basic categories: concerns having to do with 911 calls for service and problem-solving and community outreach activities; and concerns having to do with the size of the areas community-oriented officers are assigned to work.

Resources and 911 Calls for Service. Officers who felt that community policing was too resource-intensive to be successful in today's budgetary climate often cited the overwhelming demands of 911 calls for service as the main reason for the conflict between traditional policing and community policing activities.[17] These officers found it difficult to reconcile their new role as problem-solvers and leaders of an interagency consortium of public service providers with the fact that they must still answer calls about such things as barking dogs and loud music:

> R1: That's where the resources are out of our hands.
>
> R2: Well, that's what I mean. That's where the confusion is, is that for us to take on this greater leadership role and get involved in the causes of problems and long term . . . We can't do [traditional] police work. We can't, after all the loud music calls, we can't . . .

The question of resources becomes confused with what police officers see as the incompatibility of their role as long-term problem solver with that of the "radio cop" answering "junk calls" like loud music complaints. INOP officers generally felt that the demands of community outreach and problem-solving were such that they prohibited answering 911 dispatches. One

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[17]In addition, the fact that in many sites community policing officers were not required to respond to 911 calls caused tensions between patrol officers and community-oriented officers.

INOP officer in Tempe described the tension between answering calls for service and working closely with community residents in terms of the different kinds of demands these two activities made on her time:

> One of the problems I've run into is I was supposed to kind of work with the schools as much as I could. Yet we're supposed to handle all the calls of Beat 16. It can't be done if you're the only person out there mostly. I mean, you can't go to the school and tell the people you're going to be there and then 10 minutes later have a burglary come out and you've got to run off. . . I just don't think there's really enough [manpower] to do what we're supposed to be able to do.

Officers in Louisville expressed a similar frustration with institutional expectations that they felt were pulling them in opposite directions, and that therefore were stretching already minimal resources too thin. This is another illustration of the perceived difficulty surrounding the incompatibility of answering 911 calls and working closely with the community:

> In the old days, a policeman, he knew his businesses, he knew his beat, he knew his area and the people. He knew the thieves. We're spread so thin now that you can't do that . . . We get out and talk to people, but you're constantly on calls . . . We don't have enough police officers to handle this program. We need more, see, if you're going to take people off the street and get them doing this [community outreach] and walking [the beat] . . .

While most officers felt that interacting with community residents was an extra duty which necessarily would consume extra time, there was also a general consensus that community policing activities required a different kind of time from that required to perform traditional police functions. Just as the officer in Tempe felt that she needed large blocks of uncommitted time to develop a relationship with schoolchildren in her beat, so too officers in Norfolk felt that working with community residents demanded a new work flexibility which was directly at odds with responding to 911 calls. For these officers, the issue was maintaining credibility with community residents by appearing responsive to their needs while still answering some portion of the 911 dispatches in their beats:

> . . . We are supposed to be able to, if a citizen sees something and wants to call us, that we're not supposed to tell them, "Well, we're doing something else. I've got to go." You know, can't do that. . . So we have to be able to, if this person comes up to me and wants to either give me information or wants to tell me something, or if he needs me to address a problem for him, I'm supposed to be able to do it, and I need that freedom and that time. I can't be worrying about handling an accident that's going to tie me up for two hours.

The tension between answering 911 calls and conducting problem-solving and outreach was a crucial issue for the INOP project in Tempe. INOP officers working in the project's target area were able to answer roughly 50% of the 911 calls dispatched there. Project administrators and supervisors estimated that, depending on which shift they worked, officers could expect to spend between 50% and 80% of their time just answering calls. Because officers working nights tended to spend closer to 80% of their time answering 911 calls, the opportunity to do community-policing activities fell disproportionately to day-shift workers, who were invariably the officers with seniority. In the words of one project supervisor, the staffing-levels for the INOP project led to a situation in which, "We've got some officers doing all the community-oriented stuff and some officers so busy they don't have time." An administrator in Tempe's INOP project felt that, because of the demands made on the officers to answer 911 calls, much of the project's community-policing agenda was given short shrift:

> The one problem that I have is we never really had a chance to give this [the INOP project] a fair shake. We're given half the manpower to handle the calls for service, and as a result the [non-INOP] officers don't think about the administrative things, all they know is that time after time they're being called into Beat 16 to take their paper, and they're like "Where the hell are the Beat 16 guys?" What they don't realize, even though they've been told and they don't think about it, is that we're not given enough people to do it [answer all the calls for service]. I would really like to have five or six more people to give it [INOP project goals] a fair shake.

In this case, the staffing levels of the INOP project also contributed to strained relations between the INOP project staff and regular patrol officers, who were forced to enter the project's target area to answer roughly half the calls for service. These strained relations were a great concern to Tempe's INOP project officers, who reported that they were consequently wary of becoming involved in community-policing activities for fear of being unable to answer incoming calls for service:

> I hate to say it, but . . . I don't want to do things that are going to take me away from answering the calls in the beat because if I was working the other beats, hey, I'd probably feel just like they do: "We come into your beat, have to take stuff [calls for service], but you never leave your beat." And it's just, the problem is shortage of manpower or ladypower -- personpower.

Resources and Beat Size. One of the features of community policing common to all of the INOP sites is the assignment of community policing officers to a fixed geographic area. In

contrast to common patrol work schedules, which have officers rotating out of one sector or district and into another on some kind of schedule, community policing underscores the importance of a police officer's relationship with and accountability to the community s/he works by stressing the importance of the stability of geographic assignments. Community policing "beats" are typically smaller than the geographic designations that apply to radio motor patrol, often allowing the community-oriented officer the opportunity to walk the beat and to become a recognizable figure in that area. This is the case with community policing in New York City and in Prince George's County.

However, most of the INOP projects did not subdivide their pre-existing system of geographical deployment to accommodate the community policing agenda of the INOP projects. INOP sites like Tempe, Hayward and Houston instead assured the continuity of the community policing officer in a particular area by "permanently" assigning certain officers to pre-existing patrol sectors. INOP officers in all the INOP sites described the size of the area they were responsible for as a resource issue for community policing. In Louisville, officers volunteering for problem-solving were given no specific area as a target for their efforts, and consequently felt that the INOP project stretched their resources too thin:

> . . . With the manpower we have now, it [community policing] is not real feasible because so much crime is spread out, and we're scattered so thin that you have to pretty much stay in your car and get from one run to another. And when you do get out and take time to stop and talk to somebody, then you've got a fender-bender over here that you've got to rush over to. . . You get another run and you're across town again, and you may not see this guy for a whole 'nother week after that. You may not even be in his area. We need more police on the street and get back to the neighborhood.

For Louisville's INOP project officers, the sheer size of the area in which they focused their problem-solving presented difficulties. This was also the case in Prince George's County, where a single INOP officer might be assigned a beat with a population of 70,000. Some INOP officers in Norfolk also felt that the areas for which they were responsible were too large. Several officers worked beats that consisted of as many as three distinct, non-contiguous areas. This issue of beat size had serious implications for the community orientation of the INOP projects, as individual officers felt that they were assigned to police a number of different "communities."

One officer in Norfolk's PACE project described the difficulties of being assigned a large beat area in just these terms. "We cover too much of an area. Too big of an area. And that is, that it's hard to address three different communities that have three different problems."

Concerns about police resources thus touch on several important issues for community policing, ranging from the temporal and geographic deployment of community-oriented police officers to officer morale and relations between INOP project officers and those engaged in regular patrol activities. Any proposed expansion of the INOP projects will necessarily propel these concerns about police resources to the fore in any discussion of community policing.

CHAPTER 4

Interagency Involvement in the INOP Programs

Interagency involvement is probably the least discussed and perhaps the least well-implemented component of community policing in the INOP sites and in other cities around the country. As was discussed in Chapter 3, many of the INOP projects were perceived to rest on just one individual, and that person was usually a police administrator or a beat officer. Even in those cities where the INOP project was well-integrated into the department or sector in which the project was implemented (*e.g.*, Prince George's County), involvement of other city agencies or private agencies was minimal. The only site that was an exception was Norfolk; in fact, it is the involvement of all city agencies that makes Norfolk's PACE program notable. But for community policing to be successful, it must incorporate problem-solving policing into its design, and no police department can do effective and efficient problem-solving without the active involvement of other city agencies.

Traditionally, police are reactive and respond to calls for service with the tools in their arsenal; these are primarily enforcement -- file a report, make an arrest, issue a summons, *etc.* But problem-solving policing requires police officers to be proactive, to identify problems (with the help of the community), analyze the problems, devise strategies and implement them (Goldstein, 1977; 1979; 1990). In the absence of comprehensive training on problem-solving methods, the strategies police officers choose tend to be the methods they are most familiar with, *e.g.*, conduct high visibility patrol, issue summonses, make arrests. (See for example, McElroy *et al.*, 1993.) These strategies do not involve other city agencies and often do not involve other units from within the police department. But many problems cannot be solved through traditional means alone and require the involvement of other agencies (and residents of the community). This is especially true of quality-of-life problems, for which traditionally structured police departments have not taken responsibility.

Most police officers are not experienced in dealing with other agencies; nor do effective mechanisms exist to make such interactions work smoothly and predictably. If an officer deems

another city agency could be helpful in dealing with a particular problem, the officer most often relies upon the one person he or she knows at that agency (if the officer knows anyone at all). If that contact should leave the agency, the officer will be lost and have no quick and effective means of dealing with the next problem of a similar nature. An officer in Houston described the process as follows:

> It's not a network. We just talk to whoever we can get on the phone. If they don't give us any satisfaction, then we ask for their supervisor, and we go up until we can find somebody to help us with our problem.

This is the "business as usual" approach that was observed in most of the INOP sites. Despite the fact that the INOP programs were "innovative neighborhood-oriented policing" programs, with the exception of Norfolk, none had active involvement of all city agencies.[1] In addition, in some sites there was little support for the program from the city government. Community policing for these cities and most other cities around the country is *de facto* a police department phenomenon. It begins as a police department pilot program or in some, such as Hayward, it is sold as a philosophical change, but is always confined to the police department.

The data that are accruing from community policing experiments around the country suggest that if community policing is an isolated change within the police department, it will not work. Police in a number of the INOP sites complained that residents do not distinguish police work from issues that should be the responsibility of other city agencies. (This is not unique to INOP. See also Sparrow *et al.*, 1990.) Residents call the police to report abandoned vehicles, barking dogs, overgrown lots, health hazards, as well as crime and disorder problems. If the change to community policing involves the entire city government *from the beginning*, then police and citizens alike can be educated regarding how to deal with quality-of-life conditions that do not fall within the purview of the police department. Furthermore, if all city agencies make the transition to what might be thought of as "community governing," then they too can

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[1]In fact, Vera researchers requested that each city provide them with names, if any, of other city agency personnel actively involved in INOP. The majority of the sites set up appointments with city workers who had no role in the project, and in many cases, had never even heard of it.

work together, with the police and with the public to ensure that the appropriate agencies are involved in the problem-solving process from the beginning.

Agency involvement in the INOP sites. While most of the INOP sites made some attempts to involve city agencies in addition to the police, none had *formal* interagency agreements. And only in Norfolk was the support from the city government strong enough to, in fact, be a mandate that every city agency be involved.

When the funds for the PACE program were approved by the voters, the mayor of the city of Norfolk made clear to every department head within his government that all city departments were part of PACE. Not only is there support from the mayor, but also from the city manager. The Assistant City Manager for Public Safety plays a very active role in the PACE program, promoting it at every opportunity and was an active participant in the BJA cluster meetings. In addition, training in the PACE program was not only provided to all police department personnel, but also to administrative personnel from every city agency. It is apparent from the experiences in some of the other INOP sites that this type of support from the city government is the only way to ensure participation by all city agencies.

Central to the design of the interagency component of the PACE program is the PACE Support Services Committee, which meets at least monthly and which has representatives from every city agency (including the police department). There are also two subcommittees of the Support Services Committee -- the Family Assessment Services Team, known as the FAST team, and the Neighborhood Environmental Assessment Team, known as the NEAT team. In the original design of the PACE program, there was to be a FAST team and a NEAT team for each neighborhood designated as a PACE target area. As is described in Volume I of this report, the FAST team is made up of representatives from the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA), the Public Health Department, Social Services, Community Services, Norfolk Police Department, Norfolk Juvenile Court, Department of Parks and Recreation, and the school system. It is designed to provide a neighborhood-focused approach to family assessment and services whose purpose is "to enhance family and individual functioning through team assess-

ment of service needs, action planning and follow-up" (PACE Support Services notebook). The FAST team provides interagency staffing for multi-problem families and adults; information, referral and advocacy; and community involvement, needs identification, and problem-solving. Identified service needs are reported to the Support Services Committee.

The purpose of the NEAT team is to address environmental problems in the neighborhood such as, abandoned vehicles, vacant lots, houses in disrepair, improper storage of trash, *etc.* This team has members from the Police Department, Bureau of Environmental Health, Department of Public Works, Division of Existing Structures, Parks and Forestry, and NRHA.

As the PACE program expanded to more and more target areas, however, it became clear that there would not be enough staff in the agencies to have a separate team for each neighborhood. Eventually the structure was modified to have only one NEAT team for the entire city. While the FAST teams continued to be neighborhood-specific, the rapid expansion of PACE made some agency representatives feel that, like the police, they were being spread too thin. To reduce the strain on the agencies, some Teams would serve more than one neighborhood; this was more efficient for the staff because many of them (*e.g.*, the public health nurse) served both areas anyway. But the residents of each community wanted their own FAST team. An administrator from a city agency, who was very actively involved in the FAST teams described the problem as follows:

> The Huntersville team used to be Huntersville-Calvert Square combined, one team because many of the same people were serving both areas, like public health nurse, same one on both teams, serving both areas. Social service, sometimes same person serving both areas. The police. But what we found was that when we had an activity in Calvert Square, nobody from Huntersville came. We had the activity in Huntersville, nobody from Calvert Square came. And plus, their issues were very different: one was a housing area; one was a private area. It just didn't work, so we ended up splitting that team in January this year. So now that gave us even more teams, which is kind of a nightmare, and they're going, "No, no, no more teams." We don't have the staff for any more teams.

Even with this formal structure (of the Support Services Committee and FAST and NEAT teams), at least one police administrator in Norfolk believed that there was not enough involvement of other city agencies. While he attributed this to the fact that the police are the ones who attend civic league meetings, and are therefore known to the residents, it is also likely

that this is an example of what happens when a city fails to integrate all three components of the city -- police, agencies and community residents -- into its program:

> Getting back on the conversation about why the police department is looked upon with the signal lights, the garbage and so forth and so on, we are at, we're the ones that are represented at the civic league meetings. We're the one that, you know, that they've become, become to know. Where PACE is supposed to be a city-wide effort, all the departments within the city are supposed to be, but the only time that you ever see anybody from any other department is when they're invited in as a guest speaker, not to come in and listen to the problems of the neighbors. You know, that's our focus in being there; we want to know where, we want to make ourselves readily available. "What is your problem?" we even ask them. "Put us at the top of the agendas so that we can find out; we can address your problems, and then we can get back out on the street to patrol and protect your belongings while you're in this meeting conducting the rest of the business." But you don't see any other representation. And those who do come are case workers and they're not, they're not . . . administrators, or yeah, at least mid-management.

As will be seen in Chapter 5 (on Community Involvement) below, with the exception of community leaders, most residents of Norfolk, including those in PACE areas, were unfamiliar with the structure of the program. Thus, they would not know which agency to call to repair a street light or clear a vacant lot of trash, and therefore, continue to rely on the police to handle such problems for them.

The problem was substantially worse in the other INOP sites, where interagency involvement was minimal and much more informal than that in Norfolk. The approach tried in Prince George's County was to establish a COPS Planning Committee; this committee was supposed to serve as an advisory group to review COPS strategies and provide interagency and community support. It was composed of four community representatives and five agency liaisons, representing the Department of Environmental Resources (DER), the Health Department, Child Protective Services, the Department of Public Works and the Apartment and Office Building Association. During the early months of the COPS program, officers complained that other agencies were not responsive to the problems referred to them. These complaints led the County Executive to hold a meeting with all the agency heads in the county and have a "symbolic cutting of red tape." At that time the County Executive indicated that requests from COPS officers were to be treated as if they had come from the office of the County Executive and be given top priority. However, unlike the situation in Norfolk, the "mandate" from the County Executive did not have

the desired effect. At least one police administrator identified the problem as resulting from the lack of specific demands being made of agencies. He thought that this lack of clarity about their role led them to become apathetic:

> . . . The one thing that we really fell down on was having planning committee meetings. For a lot of reasons. Probably the most prevalent was, we really didn't know what to do with it. What kind of problems do we bring to them? What are we really looking for in the Planning Committee? And so we said that that somewhat large, unwieldy committee, we think that something that's more appropriate would be mini-planning committees. That's why we came up with the idea of mini-planning committees. They meet monthly . . . We're now back on board with our planning committee, and hopefully we will continue, and it will become a more successful and a more viable part of the overall project.

This problem is not unique to Prince George's County. Police agencies around the country are jumping on the community policing bandwagon without having a clear conception of community policing. This is reflected in failures to mobilize the community, lack of interagency involvement and a lack of understanding among police officers regarding their own roles.

Tempe's approach was similar to that tried in Prince George's County, but with a less positive outcome. At the beginning of the project, the Beat 16 Coordinating Committee was established. This committee was made up of representatives of community groups, representatives of city government, and local service providers. While the committee initially met monthly, by the time of the third research site visit (approximately one year later), the committee had been dissolved. One representative from a city agency blamed this failure on a combination of lack of commitment from the community members and problems with BJA.

> . . . There was really nobody from the community portion who wanted to take the ball and go. Everybody seemed to be sitting there waiting for someone else. And I think the biggest problem was, everybody who was from the community, and even the City themselves, were looking at money. Any time you're on a committee, you're looking at dollars, and you want to know how much is allocated. Well, zero was allocated. So all the time that was spent thinking, well what are some of the things we can do, and almost anything you want to do costs money, nothing was able to be done because whomever from BJA, never freed up any money. And there was nothing more that the committee, nobody on the committee would stand forward and say, "Well, I'm going to go ahead and take this committee." And without any money there's nothing you can do anyway. So rather than screw around and meet, we just dissolved. . . . I think the way we left it was if an issue would come up, we would reconvene, if there was a need to.

One problem common to all of the INOP sites was that the police had to take the lead and other agencies *might* follow along. In some of the cities, such as Tempe, at least some police

administrators saw the program as primarily a police effort, requiring little input from other agencies:

> It's pretty much just a police function; what we're trying to do is, he's been taking city managers, deputy managers and council people to these different clusters and meeting and stuff to try to introduce them to the idea, because it's his feeling that we're in a crossroads. Either the police department goes and does the community policing alone or the whole city jumps on board. The city of Tempe has always been a very responsive city; the quality of life is pretty good and that has to do with the fact that sanitation, places like that, have been very responsive and met the needs of the people. . . . This whole project, it's police initiated and basically we have to be real careful in that arena. I know that we're going through some major changes and we're having to change the way that we do business. And that's real important, but we can't spread ourselves too thin. We can't be all things to all people.

This was also true in Hayward where, according to most respondents, city government paid little attention to the COPPS project. Interagency involvement was fragmented, and this was attributed by at least one police administrator to a lack of buy-in from the other city agencies. There were no regular meetings of all the agencies together, rather representatives from the police department would meet with representatives of each agency individually. Some agency representatives expressed concern that the city government did not play a big enough role:

> Well, I also like to think that it's the responsibility of the City Council. I really think that . . . it's the city government needs to pay attention and encourage and empower the community to get the things that they need. Each community is slightly different.

> Well, I think peoples' perception of municipal government is what they see and what they see most frequently in the cities are particularly police departments, maybe some public works, but for the most part, it's the police department, the most visible part of what people see. I really don't know what the level (there's no participation) of participation of the City Council.

> I think they need to do more. I mean, I'll say that straight out. I mean, I like all of them; they all care. I think they all try, *etc., etc.*, but I mean, they need to even maybe do City Council. I mean, wouldn't it be nice . . . if they did the same thing that each one of the seven councilmen each year had a different part of the community and they rotated every year. It would be their responsibility to go to the meetings and get to know the homeowners and be involved.

The situation in Louisville's Fourth District was similar. While the Captain was able to identify a group of agency representatives as his "Support Committee," these representatives seemed to be unaware of the existence of such a committee. Rather, the agency representatives were quite willing to provide services to the COP program, upon request. There were no regular meetings of the group, and no one saw a need for such meetings. As one police administrator put it:

> In our system . . . concept, and I guess in our program, this full committee which is on the department head level more or less, is a reactive group. We're not asking them to be proactive while we're developing this program. . . . I wonder if we can maintain that for a period of time. And at what point will they want it to be proactive, and want a direct interchange. And actually start filtering things back down to us. I see what we've done though is work out a two-way relationship with each of the agencies, and by them being primarily reactive, they wait until they have a problem, or if we have a problem, we take it to them.

As late as the third research site visit, the "Support Committee" remained a reactive group of departments, with no regular meetings. While none of the participants saw this as a problem, there is almost certainly a link between the isolation of the COP program in the police department and the lack of non-traditional approaches to problem-solving. As may be seen from the discussion of Police Issues above (Chapter 3), there was no real problem-solving in Louisville, only the use of "task forces" to deal with drug problems.

Interagency involvement in the remaining INOP sites -- Houston, New York, Portland -- was either non-existent or so similar in nature to the models already discussed, that it would not be illuminating to discuss them in any detail.[2] What is clear from a review of interagency involvement across the eight INOP sites, is that the interagency involvement is informal, and business is conducted the way it always has been. When the police encounter a problem for which they need the help of another city agency, they call the person in that department with whom they have a *personal* relationship. If that person leaves the agency, a new relationship must be cultivated with his/her replacement.

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[2]The Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) was heavily involved in the Iris Court project. But all other involved agencies were private service providers which met on an *ad hoc* basis only.

CHAPTER 5

"Angels in Marble": Community Involvement in the INOP Projects

Introduction. While there is little agreement among theorists and practitioners on the precise definition of "community policing," common elements are found in all definitions. Among these is the idea that the police and the community must work in concert both to define and develop solutions to problems affecting the community. Increasing contact between police officers, individual community residents, and existing community organizations to enlist their aid in this task is thus central to all definitions of community policing. Indeed, where formal community organizations do not exist, the police ought to help develop and support them (Goldstein, 1987; 1990:21). Although there may be some controversy over the precise role of the "community" in community policing, few theorists or practitioners would deny that the community is of central importance to its success. It is therefore surprising that many police departments have paid so little attention to the education and inclusion of the community in their transitions to community policing.

In a radical departure from the era of "professionalism" in policing, in which the police claimed a monopoly on the responsibility for crime control, police now argue that they can do little about crime, social disorder, or the myriad of other quality-of-life problems that affect communities, without the active assistance of the community (Kelling & Moore, 1988:21). Indeed, in describing community policing as the "new professionalism," Skolnick and Bayley (1986:212-213) write, "the new professionalism implies that the police serve, learn from, and are accountable to the community. Behind the new professionalism is a governing notion: that the police and the public are co-producers of crime prevention." Thus, what the police can accomplish in reducing the incidence of criminal activity, social disorder, and levels of fear, is dependent on the types and numbers of "partnerships" that they form with members of the community. The police are a powerful resource, willing to provide guidance and assistance, but they cannot

create a safer environment without the active involvement of the community (Goldstein, 1990; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990:293).

Community policing's emphasis on the new role of the community as "partner" and "co-producer" of neighborhood safety, is a key element separating it from "traditional" or "professional" policing in which communities were given little, if any, formal role in policing their own neighborhoods. Indeed, the era of "professional" or "bureaucratic" policing, actively emphasized and encouraged the police officer's detachment from the community (Greene & Taylor, 1988:196). In light of the failure of professional policing, police administrators and theorists of community policing, like the English statesman Disraeli, look out on the "community" as a vast, inchoate mass and see an "angel in marble." The "community" represents a vast, untapped resource in the fight against crime, disorder, and fear. *How* to unleash the potential for effective organization lying dormant in the community will perhaps prove itself to be the greatest challenge facing community policing. As one police administrator in Norfolk, for example, observed:

> Our biggest problem is community partnerships . . . [We institute community policing] in mostly low-income areas where they have a high incidence of crime, and a lot of the residents are not well-educated . . . We have to *teach* those civic leaders and those residents, those concerned residents, how to become empowered, how to seek out resources that are available . . . the [law enforcement] stages of PACE [Norfolk's community policing] are easy . . . the community partnership stage is the most difficult, time consuming, and resource draining.

Norfolk's problem in stimulating community involvement and building partnerships is not unique; all eight INOP sites continue to experience great difficulty in establishing a solid community infrastructure upon which to build their community policing programs. The following discussion will address a number of issues and problems related to generating community involvement that police departments must consider in their efforts to establish community policing.[1]

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[1]It is significant that even the two INOP sites with the greatest experience with community policing, Houston and New York, experienced difficulty in stimulating and maintaining community involvement. Houston, however, made extensive use of existing community groups (the BOND group in the Northeast target area, and the Frenchtown Neighborhood Association in the Fifth Ward target site).

Levels of Knowledge about INOP Project Structure and Goals. In all eight INOP sites, respondents' knowledge of a project's existence, goals, and tactics varied greatly. Interviews strongly suggest that the level of understanding people have about INOP, or community policing in general, is closely linked to their status in the community.[2] Thus, community leaders with close and frequent interaction with the police had a higher level of knowledge about INOP or community policing, than did ordinary residents who did not belong to any organized community group. Even the most enlightened community leaders in all eight sites, however, had only a limited understanding of INOP project goals and tactics.

Interview data show that the first and highest level of knowledge about INOP and community policing was found among local community leaders. Neighborhood Alert *leaders* in Hayward, BOND *board* members in Houston (both "block watch" groups), or residents' *council* members in Portland's target area, for example, knew a great deal more about project goals, strategies and tactics than did their membership, and a great deal more than the average citizen not associated with a community group. A well-informed residents' council member in Portland, for example, said:

> I think the police are trying to do community policing through the residents. You police your own neighborhood and [the police] are here to assist us. [The police] will teach us how to do this. The goal of the project is to make this a drug-free and a crime-free zone.

However, even among community leaders, few knew many details about the INOP projects. For example, all the INOP projects were designed to include an interagency component that would secure the cooperation and participation of other city and private agencies in the INOP effort. Few community leaders in any of the sites knew of other agencies involved in their projects.[3]

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[2]Similarly, the status of police officers was related to level of knowledge about the projects. For a discussion of this point, see Chapter 3.

[3]This is not surprising given that the interagency component of the INOP projects (where it existed at all) was weak. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of interagency agreements in the sites.

A second level of knowledge exists among "ordinary" area residents (*i.e.*, those not members of any formal community organizations such as a block watch or residents' council), members of community groups, and employees of city agencies other than the police. These people know that there is a "program" present in specific neighborhoods (or, more frequently, that there was an increased police presence in their area), but few of them could specify much detail about the INOP projects or community policing in general. In Norfolk, for example, a community leader thought that residents in PACE-targeted neighborhoods who were *actively* involved in the community would know more about PACE than people who lived in non-targeted areas of the city (*i.e.*, non-public housing communities). Information about PACE had been "disseminated pretty well" in PACE target areas. However, the "average person" in the target areas, while aware of an increased police presence, probably knew little about the project:

> I think the average person, if you said "PACE," they'd say, "Yeah, that's some kind of program that the police department has to get the community involved." But when you start getting more specific than that in your questions, I don't think that they [know].

Similarly, in Houston, a member of the Frenchtown Community Association said:

> Well, . . . people might have seen what was happening when more policemen had come through and got the [drug dealers] off of the street. But [I don't think] that they knew why that was happening . . . . My aunt likes to sit on her front porch -- a lot of the older people like to sit on the front porch -- so she told me, "Yes, I noticed it (*i.e.*, more police activity). . . . But when I was listening to her this morning, asking her about the name of it and everything, she didn't [know] -- just wasn't knowledgeable.

The final, and lowest, level of knowledge was found among respondents (usually "ordinary" community residents with no community group affiliation) who had no idea that any police program was operating in their neighborhood. In all the sites, these people were most likely to be senior citizens (who present an especially difficult challenge for officers engaged in community outreach).

Similarly, *within* police departments, the lowest level of knowledge was generally found among officers not involved in the projects. This was not always the case, however. In Houston, for example, officers *involved* in implementing the INOP program at the street-level knew nothing about the nature or goals of the project. Rather, they were informed by their immediate

superiors that "there was federal money available for overtime," and that interested officers should "sign up" if they wished to participate.[4] It is clear from data presented earlier, that line-level officers in most of the INOP sites (especially those sites where community policing is a totally new approach) had a limited level of knowledge of community policing philosophy, problem-solving, and community outreach.[5] Given this finding, it would be unreasonable expect that members of the community would know as much as these officers do.

Data from Chapter 3 indicate a need for increased training for officers in the philosophy and implementation of community policing (including the importance and necessity of community outreach). Observations and interviews with officers responsible for the implementation of INOP in all eight sites, however, revealed that a number of officers in each site appeared to be relatively well-trained in many aspects of community policing. Such officers were clearly an asset to their respective projects because they actively communicated the idea of community policing to individual residents and community groups. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 3, such officers often embodied the program for many residents -- without these few officers involved, the projects would suffer serious setbacks.

According to most community leaders and individual residents in all the INOP sites, their respective police departments did not adequately inform or *educate* the general population affected by the project in the goals and objectives of the projects or the role of the community resident. Indeed, when asked if they thought that the larger community was aware of the INOP project, or community policing in general, most community leaders and members of community groups familiar with the INOP projects answered that they did not think either was known to the communities affected by the projects. For example, a resident in Norfolk argued:

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[4]For a more detailed examination of the levels of knowledge regarding INOP among police officers, see Chapter 3.

[5]Many members of the community do not endeavor to learn more about community policing or participate in community policing efforts because they view them as "just another program" that will ultimately fail. Many police officers hold a similar opinion. Such officers tended to know little about either INOP or community policing in general (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the problem of getting police officers to "buy into" community policing philosophy).

> I don't think the [average] residents [know about PACE]. . . . There are people out here who own their own homes and . . . if you go around and ask them what they thought about the PACE program, they would say, "PACE? What?" They don't know what it is. That's one of the things PACE has got to do -- is to get out there and let them know what they got.

Similarly, a PACE officer responsible for patrolling several public housing projects, found that ordinary residents on his beat were unaware of PACE *per se*:

> In talking to the people when I first went into the PACE neighborhood . . . people in the community know the PACE officers and they still don't know about [the substance of] PACE. We've got to get past the [community] leaders [in making information available]. . . . we're not telling people, educating people (*i.e.*, "ordinary residents") . . .

This difficult problem manifested itself in all INOP sites to one degree or another. Even in Portland's Iris Court Community Policing Demonstration project, a project directly affecting only 159 residents (many of these only children), project staff experienced great difficulty in community outreach. As in all sites, Portland staff had enormous difficulty in getting senior citizens aware of and involved in the project.

The lack of education on the INOP projects (or community policing in general) also extended to other city agencies (see Chapter 4). As a rule, employees of other city and private agencies that were supposed to be "involved" in the INOP projects, often knew very little. Police officials in nearly every city scheduled appointments for Vera research staff to interview city officials whose departments were "actively involved" in the INOP projects. In fact, however, many such officials openly admitted that they had never heard of the projects but that they "routinely" interacted with the police. During an interview with a large group of INOP project officers in Tempe, for example, one officer angrily argued that other city agency officials and workers did not understand the Beat 16 project or the principles of community policing underlying it. Later, a second officer complained that most officers within the police department did not understand the project or the philosophy of community policing.[6] It is difficult to imagine how workers in other city agencies should be expected to understand the tenets of community policing if, as these officers agreed, most members of the police department do not understand them.

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[6]A common complaint of officers involved in the INOP projects was that officers not assigned to the projects did not understand the principles of community policing. If they did, INOP officers argued, they would be more supportive.

In sum, community residents affected by the INOP projects, even those with close and frequent contact with the police (block watch captains, residents' council members, *etc.*), had limited knowledge about INOP project structure, goals or their police department's efforts to make the transition to community policing. More importantly (to be discussed further below), residents were most confused about *their* role in community policing. In addition, personnel from other city agencies tended to know little about the INOP efforts or community policing. Such findings point to the need (discussed in greater detail below) for police departments to commit significant resources to outreach and education efforts.

Sources of Knowledge and the Relationship between Status and Level of Knowledge. Very active community leaders who have frequent contact with the police knew a great deal about the INOP projects and community policing relative to "ordinary residents" or, especially, senior citizens.[7] While community leaders often knew a great deal about the structure and goals of INOP projects, ordinary residents in public housing or other poor neighborhoods that were the targets of INOP projects would often *define* community policing or specific INOP projects only in terms of picnics, block parties, shows for youngsters, *etc.*, that were so often used as vehicles for community outreach. Unfortunately, they knew little of the substance of community policing or the INOP projects.

Whereas community leaders often heard about the INOP projects directly from officers involved in the projects (in community meetings), sources of knowledge among many of the poorest of area residents were social functions such as parties, barbecues, and neighborhood "fairs" of one sort or another. Although these events may serve the positive social function of getting neighbors together (with the hope that this will help create solidarity in the community), they constitute "outreach" in only the broadest sense of the term. Indeed, when asked to tell interviewers about the INOP projects, many people responded by *first* talking about the parties,

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[7]Senior citizens would appear to be the most difficult target for outreach because of the high levels of fear among members of this group.

barbecues, PAL events, and *then* whatever services might be provided by the project. When asked about the structure of the Portland project, for example, a resident said:

> After the block party, it was nice. . . . They have ASK OMSI (an after school science class for children), . . . the Boys' and Girls' Club. We have PAL, and we have the Saturday School for the kids, and we have women's self-defense classes.

The problem with social events such as block parties is that they do virtually nothing to inform or educate community residents about community policing and their role in it. One community leader in Portland, for example, described the annual block party/job fair as a great success in which "everybody" from Iris Court would turn out. Even people from outside the community would come to the fair. However, as a form of outreach and a vehicle for stimulating interest and involvement in community policing, such events produce poor results:

> Whenever we have a free event, the whole complex will show up. When something requires work or when we need to raise money for the [residents'] council, *nobody* shows up. We might have an event where you have to pay a dollar or two for an event, to raise money for a bus trip for the kids, and nobody shows up. . . . They [police] have these projects going on so people will become involved. . . . When you throw a block party or any kind of party, they show up. But when we knock on doors [for a meeting] they say, "Okay, I'm coming." But when we start working, they are not there. But let the food come up and everybody's up here, not only [from Iris Court], but from outside [the neighborhood] too! . . . There's more people who show up for the parties than who get involved in organizing. There's really just a handful of us that always show up to organize things and there's a large group that comes for the fun part. That hasn't changed much over the last year -- the same people who plan and do the work stays the same.

When asked if the projects had any effect on the level of community organization, many residents across the eight INOP sites answered that the projects had positive impacts on the level of community organization and involvement (see Chapter 6). However, in many instances, residents tended to associate large turnouts for barbecues and picnics as manifestations of community organization and solidarity. Larger turnouts for community meetings or significant increases in the number of people volunteering to help the community policing effort would, of course, be better indicators of increased solidarity and community organization. When questioned further, residents made it clear that community organization and involvement in the projects had not changed significantly since the projects began. In nearly every instance, residents reported that only a small core group of residents were involved in the INOP projects.

Putting the "Community" into Community Policing: Issues in Stimulating Community Involvement. One of the most frequently observed cross-site patterns was that police administrators, officers involved in the INOP projects, and community leaders alike, argued that their most pressing implementation problem was that community residents were not getting involved in the INOP projects or community policing in general. As a result, during the second and third site visits to the eight INOP sites, the research began to focus on the issue of why efforts to stimulate community involvement had fared so poorly in all the sites. This issue is of critical importance both to theorists of problem-solving and community policing, and to practitioners.

There is often an assumption made, by both practitioners and theorists of community-policing, that because community policing offers such clear benefits to the community, once educated about these benefits, community residents will actively aid community policing efforts. It is often an explicit or implicit assumption that community policing should also actively organize the communities it serves. The experience of the INOP projects, however, suggests that such assumptions largely ignore and underestimate the hostilities that have existed between the police and members of poor and minority communities who have often borne the brunt of police indiscretions. In light of the historical relationship between the police and minority communities that are most often the targets for new community policing initiatives such as the INOP projects, practitioners and theorists alike would be better off asking, "*Why should* community members be willing to involve themselves in community policing?" Among police officers involved in the INOP project, this issue did not completely escape the attention that it deserves. One police officer associated with the New York INOP project said:

> You know, one of the untested assumptions about community policing as a whole is that the community *wants* to be involved in this project, in this grand idea (*i.e.*, community policing). The police department is [officially] behind it, moving full speed ahead towards it, but there is one untested assumption . . . that the community wants to be in partnership [with the police], that they want to be involved.

Data collected from the eight INOP sites strongly suggest that community residents generally may *not* want to become involved in the community policing effort. At the very least,

exploratory data suggest the need for further research on this issue. The following discussion, however, will present some reasons for the lack of community participation in the INOP projects. These reasons may seem all too familiar to experienced police administrators, beat officers, and community leaders, but some may have received little thought. While police officials and project officers may have attempted to address some of the barriers to community participation (especially fear), others are often ignored completely in community outreach efforts. However, because these eight, very different, INOP efforts encountered the same problems in stimulating community involvement, they provide police administrators and community groups interested in instituting community policing in their own cities with valuable information regarding the obstacles to generating community involvement.

Fear of Retaliation from Drug Dealers. Across all eight sites, the most frequently given explanation for lack of community involvement in the INOP projects (and community policing in general), was residents' fear of retaliation from drug dealers. One Neighborhood Alert leader in Hayward, for example, said:

> People on this block will not get more involved because they are afraid. It's difficult for us to even advertise that we're with the Neighborhood Watch or to pass out flyers, because when they (*i.e.*, drug dealers) see us on the street passing out flyers, they automatically harass us, we're automatically labeled . . . as snitches. . . . People are afraid of that, and they don't want to get involved in anything that's going to upset the street anymore than it already is, and they are just afraid of retaliation. . . . The fear is so strong that it's going to take the street being patrolled [by police officers] 24 hours-a-day before the people are actually going to feel better.[8]

Residents in several cities also expressed fear of reprisals from drug dealers because when they would call 911 to make a complaint, responding police officers would come to the resident's door to question them. In Norfolk, for example, a resident explained that:

> I find that most community people are fearful [of reprisals]. A lot of the fear comes from . . . when you call [the police] up on the telephone, your home telephone number pops up [on the dispatcher's computer screen]. Then the officers come to your house, and people would say that you're with the police and they label you [a snitch]. And, you know, with all the drugs and things

[8]This Hayward resident was one of only two residents on her block involved in Neighborhood Alert. By all accounts, her street was one of the worst drug areas in Hayward -- supporting both local and drive-through drug trafficking. By the time researchers returned to Hayward for their third and final site visit, this woman had decided to move out of Hayward. This left the Neighborhood Alert on this block with one member (a senior citizen).

> around here, you hate to be labeled as calling the police. So we in the community when we meet with the [PACE] officers, we say that we did not want this to happen.[9]

Similarly, in Louisville, several residents complained that:

> . . . . you call the police, okay? And then what the police would do, instead of them going and checking out what you said, they would come to your home and knock on your door . . . People are going to see them come there! . . . So people wouldn't call [the police].

All theories guiding community policing make perceptions of "fear" a central concern.[10] Implicitly, or explicitly, most community policing adherents incorporate the theory of "broken windows" (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) into their own programs. According to Wilson and Kelling, the police need to emphasize their order maintenance function (*i.e.,* attending to disorderly behaviors such as people "hanging out" or public drunkenness). Such behavior, if neglected by police, leads to increased incivilities, lessened informal social control, and increased fear among community residents. Such a condition, left unattended to, increases levels of community decay and makes the area ripe for intrusion by outside criminal elements. This, in turn, generates even more fear. The role of the community police officer will hopefully lead residents to feel safer because the officer will concentrate on the incivilities and order-maintenance problems that inspire fear in residents.[11]

It may well be, however, that fear is *so* deeply ingrained among residents in lower-income areas of urban areas (where virtually all community policing programs are targeted initially) that it may not be possible for community policing (through foot-patrol, community organizing, and

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[9]Vera's recently completed study of the New York City Police Department's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) showed that few people in the precincts studied utilized the anonymous drug hotline made available by the police department. It would seem that it is difficult to get the community to provide the police with information regarding drug dealers even if the public is assured that the information will be kept confidential.

[10]Like "community policing" and "community," "fear" is an ill-defined concept in the community policing literature. For the present research, people were simply asked whether the INOP project had, in their opinion, any effect on their level of fear. They were thus permitted to define the concept however they wished. For a more detailed discussion on the projects' impacts on residents' level of fear, see Chapter 6.

[11]Greene and Taylor (1988), in an examination of the "broken windows", find little or no evidence in existing research to support the theory. Indeed, they find that the association between incivility and fear of crime seems to be confined to neighborhoods that are neither exceptionally poor and disorganized, nor those that are particularly well-to-do. Such evidence is disturbing in light of the fact that most police departments implement community policing pilot projects in some of the poorest areas of their cities (as in the case of the INOP projects).

other tactics) to reduce fear to the degree that will allow residents to feel safe enough to "police themselves" and "take back their streets." It may be, therefore, that community policing finds itself confronted by a major contradiction. It appears that for community policing to attain its goal of fear reduction, it must first make the streets safe *from the perspective of community residents*. For this to happen, the level of real crime must drop, according to respondents (see the discussion below on residents' definitions of success for community policing). However, most theory on community policing seems to assert that without the active participation of the community, the police cannot reduce the incidence of crime and disorder and thus reduce fear. An officer in Prince George's County argued that before residents will get involved, they must be less fearful. This will come about as a result of increased enforcement efforts on the part of the police:

> Our initial step was first to show them that we are doing something . . . a lot of these people are scared and they are not going to go out there just because you tell them to go -- "Hey, lets start a march against drugs or a neighborhood crime watch!" . . . We have to go into their neighborhoods and show them that we actually do care . . . make lock ups!

The designers of many of the INOP projects (Houston, Tempe, Portland, and Hayward), realized this and began their projects (or preceded their projects) with intensive traditional law enforcement efforts. To reduce fear in Houston, for example, two districts engaged in "zero tolerance" whereby all crime and disorder become the target of enforcement. In Portland, the police department prefaced its INOP project (consisting almost entirely of social service delivery) with an intensive enforcement effort to evict drug-using or trafficking tenants in the Iris Court public housing target site. The Portland police, in association with the Housing Authority of Portland, also implemented a "trespass" enforcement effort whereby non-residents guilty of engaging in criminal behavior or causing other problems (the "incivilities" discussed by Kelling and Moore) would be "excluded" from the project site. In Tempe, the INOP project included "Sweep 16" in which all major drug dealers in the target area were arrested.

Such efforts, however, may well serve to produce unintended and negative effects. Residents almost unanimously applaud police efforts to increase the level of enforcement in their

neighborhoods (for almost all residents, the more police in their neighborhood, the better). During such "crackdowns" residents report feeling safer. However, many of these heavy enforcement efforts are short-lived and therefore do not have the desired effect of reducing residents' fears in the long run. When this is the case, it may actually create an additional crisis of legitimacy for the police as residents begin to define community policing as "just another program" where services are "here today, gone tomorrow."

The Historically Poor Relationship between the Police and the Community. Common wisdom among police officers holds that, "Ninety-five percent of the community is good and law-abiding. These are the people with whom we must work." However, one of the untested assumptions of community policing is that residents *want* closer contact with the police, and, further, want to work actively with the police to reduce the incidence of crime in their neighborhoods. The assumption is that people who do not routinely violate the law, the 95% of all neighborhood residents who are "good," will eventually come to work cooperatively with the police. These are the people, according to police officers, who will be the logical target audience for the community policing approach. Exploratory data collected in interviews with residents, however, casts some doubt on these assumptions.

According to a large number of community residents interviewed during the second and third visits to the INOP sites, a major reason why residents do not get involved with community policing projects, or are hostile to any police efforts, is the historically poor relationship between the police and the residents of poor communities. This observation was often made during interviews by residents who fall into the category of "good." Such poor relationships, most common in those areas of the city usually chosen as the target sites for community policing demonstration projects, will not be easily changed. One resident in Louisville, for example, explained:

> . . . there has been such a negative view of the police. People don't trust them . . . And most of those who are policing us do not live in our area so, therefore, they don't understand what we're going through. . . . So, there's a lot of misunderstanding -- no communication at all. . . . That's the kind of attitude [distrust of the police] that the community has . . . Attitudes are learned . . . So for 20 years they're taught that the police are no good . . . You know, it's a lot of hard work to get somebody to change their perspective of something like the police department all of a sudden when you've been taught all your life to think a certain way about them.

A community leader in Hayward reported that she had experienced a great deal of difficulty in communicating to her neighbors what the INOP project and community policing were all about because of the extreme level of distrust residents feel toward the police: "In the beginning, they [residents] wouldn't even listen to me. They're (*i.e.*, the police) bad, period! Not that the police even know about this because it's all behind the scenes." Similarly, a residents' council member in Portland argued that even though the police had made outreach efforts at Iris Court, few people utilized the contact office because of their fear and distrust of the police:

> The only people that are willing [to go into the contact office] are the ones that basically be in there all the time (*i.e.*, the core group of resident organizers). The rest of them . . . are scared of it 'cause it's the police. The only time they want to be bothered is if their boyfriend is beating them up, or they've been threatened or something like that. That's the only time they want to be bothered with the police, but other than that they brush them off.

At the very least, these findings call into question the assumption that even "good" people desire a closer relationship with the police and are willing to participate in the community policing process. They also suggest that there is a need for further research into community perceptions of the police and the bases for those perceptions.

"Apathy." During the course of interviews with police administrators and police officers assigned to the INOP projects, it was clear that many police officers had become increasingly hostile toward community residents who, because of a perceived "apathy," or lack of interest in "bettering their own lives," refused to get involved in community policing efforts. Such a perspective, however, fails to appreciate the depth of distrust and fear of the police among residents where community policing projects are often initiated. Such areas are typically poor, disorganized areas of the city where residents have for generations borne the brunt of police abuses. The apparent unwillingness of residents to involve themselves with the police may thus be less a product of apathy than of fear and suspicion grounded in their largely negative experiences with the police in the past. In addition, people in poorer communities also have vast experience with seemingly endless government programs designed to improve their quality of life. It is little wonder then that residents in these communities often label community policing "just another program" that will come and go.

However, police officers across sites sometimes reported *increased* hostility toward community residents who, because of their apparent apathy, refused to involve themselves in the INOP projects. Police officers, many of whom were extremely enthusiastic at the beginning of the INOP project, often found themselves demoralized because of the lack of community enthusiasm and involvement.[12] One administrative officer in Norfolk for example said:

> . . . . there's maybe three or four people in each community involved and the rest are apathetic. They are either hopeless or they have no hope.. They don't think it can work and aren't doing anything to make it work - - maybe because they don't feel safe yet . . . or they feel it's just another scam. And then, some are just bad people. There's a whole bunch of bad people. . . . But the community. I say the community is like a bunch of baby birds, "Gimme, gimme, gimme, gimme!" And they . . . oughta start getting out there and getting their own stuff. Until they do that, this program won't work. The officers will just have disdain for them.

As an illustration of that disdain, officers involved in the Tempe project recalled a community clean-up effort in which almost no community residents participated:

> R1: Well, see, I don't think the community has bought into this yet.
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> R2: Yeah, but what we've been doing [regarding community clean-ups] is getting people from ASU (Arizona State University) who do their fraternity or sorority volunteer work. You know, some of these people (*i.e.*, community residents) are just down right lazy and they won't do anything for themselves.
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> R3: Exactly. I've been to all the clean-ups but one. You've got a handful of people doing it all. Most of them won't do it. And see, they (residents) know our city [sanitation] crew [will clean up] . . . . Everybody just throws trash by the side of the road because they know it's going to get cleaned up by the city free of charge . . . I mean, they don't even want to take it to a dumpster.
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> R4: That can be a little discouraging because you'll have some people who bring all these people in from other agencies to help the community, but the community don't want to help themselves. To give you an example . . . I was cleaning some fields and all of these guys are out and it's 112 degrees. We're sweating to death on a Saturday and we look up, and there's a couple of the homeowners sneering at us, sitting there drinking beers and watching us. And I start thinking, "Wait a minute. What's wrong with this picture?" I'm in this neighborhood on my Saturday, cleaning this guy's yard, and he's sitting there drinking a Budweiser!
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> R5: I look around and there's a couple of ASU fraternity guys and me pulling weeds, _____ had brought his brand new lawn mower the day before and had it chewed up, and there isn't a *single*

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[12]According to community policing theory, officers assigned to regular beats should develop better relationships with the population because of greater one-to-one interaction. This interaction gives the officer an opportunity to develop personal relationships with community residents, and this leads the officer to "care" more about the community. It is possible, however, that if the residents of the community do not respond enthusiastically to community policing, that relations between the community and the police may not improve, leading officers to feel further alienated from residents.

> person from the community participating. I'm going, "Wait a minute! I don't mind doing this, but *where's the neighborhood?* I got weeds at my own house I could be working on if they're no more interested than this!" I have some real concerns about perpetuating sort of our welfare society where all we do is give, give, give, because I really believe that that has led to a lot of the apathy that we're experiencing today.

Indeed, among police officers not involved in the INOP projects, the feeling that the INOP projects constituted "welfare" was a common idea. This was even a concern among some project personnel in some of the sites. Portland's Iris Court project, for example, is almost entirely devoted to the delivery of social services to 159 residents of one housing complex. The project emphasizes education and health services delivery as a means to reduce the demand for drugs. Several officers here, however, asserted that such "welfare" services merely made people more dependent:

> This sounds funny, but we started off giving everybody stuff, giving out badges to the kids. Give them this or that. You can't drive down the street now without giving them a sticker. . . . It seems we are sending the wrong message by doing all these goody give-aways -- there was candy, free parties, free chicken . . . It's true you got to have a party once in a while, but it was getting out of hand here! Everything is kind of like a handout -- "Come along with our program and look at all the goodies you'll get!"

Such perceptions were common among both police officers and community leaders who also argued that many residents were "apathetic or lazy" and believed their lack of involvement was merely a manifestation of these failings. The lack of involvement on the part of poorer residents in the INOP sites, however, may be less a product of apathy or laziness, than a demystification of community policing's perspective on community involvement. As shall be discussed below, from a residents' perspective, there are a large number of rational reasons why it is difficult to inspire the community to trust and help the police in their efforts. It is unlikely that the long history of fear and distrust that exists between the police and communities served by the INOP projects will be bridged soon. A lesson learned from all the INOP projects is that community policing practitioners (whether at the administrative or beat level) must take far more seriously the need to narrow the gap between police and ordinary community residents in poor neighborhoods who have often been the victims of police injustices of the past.

The Fleeting Nature of "Projects" to Help Poor Communities. Another reason for a lack of community involvement was the feeling among many residents that projects (not only

police projects, but others as well) "come and go" all the time in poor communities. Why, they reason, should community policing be any different? There is, in short, a healthy skepticism in poor communities that projects designed to help them are going to be anything but short-lived. Residents of neighborhoods targeted by the INOP projects have empirical experience with projects that are designed to help them, but which disappear when funding for them runs out. One volunteer in the New York INOP project, for example, claimed that outreach efforts had largely failed because:

> . . . what normally happens in the community is that something (*i.e.*, a "project") comes in and you just start to get the feel of it, and then it's pulled out. You know, it's pulled out because it wasn't doing what anyone thought it should be doing. . . . But what normally happens in the East Harlem community is that programs come in and you start to warm up to them, and you start to develop a relationship to them, but they get pulled out. So that creates skepticism in the community, because you don't know if you want to participate or not because you don't know how long it's going to be there.

Because of the fleeting nature of "projects" in poor communities, the credibility of any city or government-sponsored "project" to "help" the community is suspect among residents. In Louisville, a police administrator observed:

> The folks over [in public housing] are used to talking police programs, they have for years and they haven't given the police department a lot of credibility. They know that when there's federal bucks out there, that we'll throw some program in there and then, when the money runs out, the program dies. So when the COP program started getting publicity, I don't think anyone over there [in target site] really cared.

In addition, many respondents felt that the police were "pulling out" of their communities too soon after delivering an initially high level of services. In Portland, for example, several residents' council members argued that at the inception of the INOP project, they had two officers who walked through the housing project every day. Officers often drove through the complex as well. By the time of the third Vera site visit (in the summer of 1992), however, they claimed that the level of police service had declined dramatically. Many residents, they claimed, felt that the police had withdrawn too soon. The level of personal contact with residents had also declined:

> R1: When I see the police now, they drive in and out.
>
> R2: I see the same things. They go [into the contact office], and make their reports. I don't see them doing nothing here. They go inside and then you don't see them no more . . . I've gone in [the contact office] to make a report and they've told me, "Tell the manager." It was about a dope

> dealing car. A car that was selling drugs right on the sidewalk. I took the license plate number. I took it to them and they said, "Take it to the manager. Take it to the Housing Authority." . . . You call the police now and they don't show up.
>
> R3: I'm here every day and I don't see a [police] car come in.
>
> R1: That's what it is [another "project"]. When I was moving in here, I was told that there are always police around here, there was a community policing office right here, you'll always see a cop at night. I never see cops here at night, not once!
>
> R2: . . . I think it's a lot of patrol officers that don't take the time. They'd just as soon sit on Union Ave., one [patrol] car facing one way, one facing the other, and they have their meeting right there, whereas at one time they met here. I don't know. I never get the feeling when I see them driving, they just turn around and drive out [of Iris Court]. I don't know if they just get a call every time they come here, but it's always something. It's just, like, at one time you'd see two or three cars [come through at night] and now you hardly see them at all.

If they remain unchanged, such perceptions on the part of residents in communities targeted by INOP may contribute to a crisis of legitimacy for community policing. These perceptions were most apparent in projects that had strong enforcement efforts at the outset of the project. In theory, such crackdowns (*i.e.,* "sweeps" in Norfolk, "trespass" enforcement in Portland, "zero tolerance" in Houston) are designed to reduce the level of fear in a community to the point where residents can actively organize and "reclaim their streets." In practice, the duration of such crackdowns is generally far too short for fear to be reduced significantly. When a high level of enforcement is provided and then withdrawn suddenly, the general response of most residents is anger. In such instances, the police lose credibility and the project legitimacy in the eyes of the community.[13]

A related problem (to be discussed in more detail below) observed in all sites was one of inadequate training and education of the community in the concepts surrounding community policing and the role of the community in the process. A representative of a city agency in Norfolk, for example, explained:

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[13]The Vera Institute's recent analysis of the New York City Police Department's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) showed that heavy short-term, street-level drug enforcement did not affect significantly the level of fear in three Brooklyn communities. In addition, the level of community organization and community participation did not change. Residents interviewed for the study generally argued that the short duration of TNT (three months in any one target precinct) made little, if any, difference in the level of street-level drug dealing. In addition, residents claimed that as soon as the crackdown ended, drug dealing almost always resumed at its former level.

> Well, when we first started, when I first started working with PACE, I was just like a resident, really foolish. I thought [the police] were going to come in and clean up. And, yeah, they did for a moment . . . they were just so fantastic, it was just unbelievable! . . . They were able to reduce [drug activities] for a short period of time. Well, what happens after this? The police can't stay here forever, and it became apparent to me that the next step would be to help the communities to keep that kind of [drug] activity out. Now, it's up to the community to just say to the dealers, "You will not come back!" And I don't mean it for you to stand out there with guns, but that you start coming out, you start being visible. You start bringing city resources and services back into the community, and that's what I thought PACE would eventually do. I think that they left too soon. . . . And after you get past the police, the community is not quite sure what happens next. I know what is supposed to happen, but I don't know how you make it happen. I think that [the police] left at a key point . . . they should have had a backup unit in there working with the tenant groups, so when the police did pull out, you start having [the community] willing to take charge of something. They followed it up with a "community service day," it was like a celebration. Everybody bought into that and then the resources left . . . [the community] didn't really see anyone in there working to pull them together to make sure that they were able to continue the work after the police left.

While intensive enforcement efforts such as those seen in many of the INOP projects, may make clear and immediate impacts on the levels of crime in any given community, their long-term impacts are highly suspect. It is less clear whether such crackdowns can (either alone or in concert with other agencies) inspire the level of community organization and participation that is necessary to maintain those effects. Without a solid infrastructure of community support and organization, it is unlikely that such enforcement measures can have any enduring value.

Lack of Community Outreach Means that People Do Not Understand Community Policing or Their Role in It. If, as community leaders report, most residents are unfamiliar with the INOP projects specifically, or community policing generally, it is difficult to see how residents could be inspired to organize around and participate in these efforts.

All of the INOP sites were hampered in their attempts to generate community organization and involvement by a lack of fundamental resources and *experience.*[14] While these departments recognize the immediate need to train their officers in the philosophy, strategy and tactics of community policing, none has taken steps to provide the same "training" to members of the community. As Goldstein (1990:114-118) has observed, "conveying sound, accurate information is currently one of the least used, but potentially most effective, means the police have for

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[14]There were two exceptions, both Hayward and Houston had strong block watch community groups in their target sites prior to the implementation of INOP. These groups were helpful in outreach efforts.

responding to a wide range of problems." While meeting with community groups has been the preferred method for conveying information to the public, Goldstein notes, little attention has been given to the *type* of information that is presented or the most effective way to present it.

Certainly, one type of information that members of the community need is training on the fundamental principles of community policing and the role of the community.[15] A major problem encountered in all eight INOP sites was that while community leaders had some notion of what community policing was, ordinary *residents* had limited knowledge about the INOP efforts specifically, and community policing generally. The potential for success of these projects and community policing in general will ultimately be limited if major commitments to community education and training are not forthcoming. Thus far, police departments have *de facto* viewed community policing as a *police department* phenomenon. When police departments make the decision to adopt community policing principles and tactics, they take the logical step of training and educating their officers in the new approach. The education of the organized community is an afterthought. Often, departments rely solely upon the officers who have been trained to pass on information to the community, but the INOP experience indicates that this approach is inadequate. One community leader in Hayward, for example, believed that few people in the city had any knowledge of the COPPS program and argued that, even as a well-informed community activist, she was unsure of what the police meant by "partnership" and what the community's role was in community policing:

> Well, I just think that the average person doesn't have a clue what it (*i.e.*, community policing) means, all they know is that if you call the police, somebody pays attention .... But the one question that never gets answered to my satisfaction by the police department is -- they want this "partnership," right? But I still can't figure out exactly what we are supposed to do in the "partnership." I don't think that question has been thought through ...

This confusion about the role of the community in "community policing" was common across the sites. While most of the INOP projects attempted to involve residents in some manner

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[15]Portland's Landlord Training is an example of how the police department can educate the public on their role in community policing. However, even Landlord Training participants in Portland had little idea about what community policing is and why their participation in it is critical to its success.

(*e.g.*, volunteers in Tempe and New York; helping residents form councils in Portland; allowing residents to take part in interagency problem-solving sessions in Norfolk), even community leaders are unsure about the fundamental role of the community in community policing. All respondents, for example were asked what the police in their city meant when they asked the community for "help" under the new banner of community policing. The most frequent response was that the police wanted residents to be the "eyes and ears" of the police. When the police ask for "help" according to residents, they are asking for information on crimes. As some residents in Houston said:

> R1: We're supposed to be their eyes and ears. . . . That's the way that I understand it. . . . That's the way that we can help them. If we see something going on, we must call them.
>
> R2: It seems that they are asking for our help more often. Not to be more or less doing their work, but they figure that we can help them by letting them know what is going on.

Similarly, police officers involved in the INOP projects generally defined "help" as the community providing information on criminal activity. An officer in New York, for example, said:

> The only way that we can get to know who the players are in drug activity or criminal activity, is by getting members of the community to either phone in that information or write in that information. Then that information is disseminated to the agency or group of police officers who will deal with that particular instance . . . Without the community giving us the information, we just wind up answering 911 emergencies . . .

Some officers, mostly administrators more knowledgeable about the theory of problem-oriented community policing, added that the community needed to actively participate in problem identification and problem solving, and become better organized. A small number of community residents and leaders also recognized the need for the community to become more actively involved in the problem-solving process.

When asked how this was different from the "help" police had requested under "traditional" policing, most respondents were hard-pressed to answer. Those that did answer generally thought that under community policing the police were "nicer" in their request and also seemed more willing to help residents and community groups. However, some community leaders who had a better understanding of community policing thought that "help" went far

beyond being the police department's "eyes and ears." A community resident in Prince George's County, for example, said that "help" meant:

> [Providing] information, involvement [in community policing projects], attending meetings, helping to clean up the streets, educating the police as to the problems [in the community], and cooperating with the police.

At least three of the INOP sites, Tempe, Prince George's County and Hayward have instituted "citizens academies" which can provide at least one avenue for education of the public in community policing. The idea of training the community may at first appear strange, but police departments have offered training to the public in a variety of forms in the past (in CPTED, or crime prevention strategies, for example). Too often, however such citizens' academies focus on introducing the public to the *police role* and thus emphasize "ride alongs" with officers so that the public may develop a better appreciation of that role. Such programs are fine in so far as they go. However, if these academies do not properly instruct residents in the *community role* in community policing, they will not aid in the effort to institutionalize community policing.

It must be remembered that community residents have been conditioned for over a century-and-a-half to view the police officer as crime-fighter. During the era of "professional" policing, the police *actively* discouraged any community participation in order maintenance and problem-solving in their own neighborhoods. The lack of participation and enthusiasm in the INOP projects and community policing in general is thus not so much a manifestation of "apathy" or "laziness" as it is a historical product of the era of professionalism. If the police are genuine in their appeal for help from the public, it will be the responsibility of the police and other city agencies to educate and train the public in their role.

Heterogeneous Populations in Many Target Sites Make Outreach Efforts Difficult. Several of the INOP projects targeted areas where the population is extremely heterogeneous. Hayward, for example, must deal with a large number of ethnic groups that do not welcome police intervention in neighborhood problems. In addition, in several of the sites (Hayward, Houston and Tempe), many residents do not speak English. In Houston, for example, one resident reported that she had stopped attending area BOND (a city-wide block watch organization)

meetings because they are conducted only in English. She also reported that Spanish speaking friends on her block would ask her what had transpired at the BOND meetings, but she could not tell them.[16] According to officers in both Tempe and Houston, an additional problem concerned the lack of Spanish-speaking officers who could communicate with the large numbers of Spanish-speaking residents in the sites.

In several of the sites (particularly, Tempe, Houston and Hayward) many residents also told researchers that there were a considerable number of undocumented aliens living in target areas. Because they fear the police, there was no chance of them becoming involved in any police initiative such as community policing.[17] A community leader in Hayward, for example, explained why her efforts to increase the membership in her branch of Neighborhood Alert had met with failure:

> No, we (*i.e.*, residents of the neighborhood) haven't contributed to [community policing] at all. . . . I would speak about my street. Not involved at all. . . . It's [ethnically] mixed -- Afghans, Iraqi, Guatemalans, American Blacks, Nicaraguans. It's very hard to organize because the Afghans are very suspicious of the police . . . they will not get involved. The Iraqis will help you, but they don't want to be seen getting involved [with the police]. It is perhaps that in some cases, they are not citizens yet; they have green cards, but they do not want to get in trouble. . . . It's hard in our area . . . people are too [ethnically] mixed, the racial conflicts, and so on. . . . For instance, there are lots of black people that live there. So, I would confront them and say, "Would you like to help us?" They say, "Yes, I'm against crime, but I cannot go against my own people." Afghans, for instance, they tell us, "No, we don't trust the police; police is paid off! . . . "

Although not a problem in most of the INOP sites, the great heterogeneity in population found in Hayward presents the police department with yet another outreach challenge.

Areas Targeted by INOP Projects Are Highly Disorganized. Community policing theory argues that the community must become an active partner with the police before crime and

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[16]In an attempt to reach the large Spanish-speaking population in the Operation Siege target site, the Houston Police Department has started publishing its BOND newsletter in English and Spanish.

[17]Vera's recent research on the New York City Police Department's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) revealed that one reason for the lack of community involvement in the TNT effort was the large number of undocumented people living in a TNT target precinct. Because of their legal status, such individuals will understandably avoid contact with the police. In addition, some ethnic groups living in areas targeted by TNT had come from nations where the police were feared for their brutality and discriminatory practices. Because of their experiences with the police in their own country, Haitians, for example, steadfastly refused to involve themselves with the police.

other quality-of-life problems can be effectively addressed. One problem for community policing is that the poorer areas of cities that are generally the testing grounds for community policing projects are highly disorganized. These are the areas of cities characterized by poverty, unemployment, poor educational systems, and high crime rates. In such areas, it is often difficult to find well-organized community groups attempting to address quality-of-life issues.

The question facing the police is, "*Who* will organize the residents of troubled areas so that they can work in "partnership" with the police?" Because the police are asking for the public to assist them in the transition to community policing, it would appear, as Goldstein (1990) has suggested, that the initial responsibility for generating community organization where it does not exist must fall to the police. Such an effort may best be undertaken by the police along with other appropriate city agencies. In Portland, for example, where the Iris Court project serves people living in public housing, the police have asked the Housing Authority of Portland to assist the residents in forming a residents' council. In Hayward, the police have chosen to build on a solid foundation of city-wide "Neighborhood Alert" groups (*i.e.,* a block watch group) in their effort to educate the residents of the city about community policing. Where such groups do not exist, community service officers employed by the police department attempt to create them.[18]

Most residents in the eight INOP target sites reported that the level of community organization in their neighborhoods was only "average" or "low" and that this had been the case for some time. Most attributed the lack of active community groups to fear and, as one resident put it, "People here are just trying to survive day-to-day. That's what life here is all about." According to many respondents, the police had done little to get target communities actively involved in the project or in problem solving efforts.

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[18]In their research on New York's community policing program, McElroy *et al.* (1993) found that CPOs were most successful in working with members of the community in those areas where there were extant community groups. In neighborhoods where the level of community organization was relatively low, however, the CPOs found it extremely difficult to involve members of the community.

Intragroup Conflict among Community Leaders and Residents. According to residents and police officers, a common barrier to organizing residents in the INOP sites was conflict among community leaders and residents about issues to be addressed, delegation of tasks, *etc.* In several of the INOP sites, "personality conflicts" among residents and community leaders was cited as a major reason why more residents refused to become involved with a block watch, residents' council, or other civic association connected with the INOP effort. Indeed, intra-group conflict among community leaders was reportedly a significant problem in Hayward, Houston, Portland and Louisville. It is often forgotten in rhetorical references to *the* "community" in the community policing literature, that the community is often a collection of competing groups. That people live in the same ecological space and possess the same racial and class backgrounds, is by no means an indication that they define values and problems in the same way. Even where the population targeted by an INOP project was highly homogeneous, there were ongoing conflicts among residents regarding the direction they should take.

In Portland, for example, several key respondents reported that a core group of residents, by insisting on controlling each project undertaken by the residents council, kept other Iris Court residents from getting more actively involved in the project:

> Well, some people don't want to get involved because of a certain individual that they cannot get along with that's real bossy. That [issue] has been addressed several times . . . [but] they keep letting that person go on. . . . I don't think that's a good idea. A lot more people would get involved if that certain individual would step down.

In an effort to encourage broader participation among residents at Iris Court, the Housing Authority of Portland has instituted training for the residents council that will offer instruction on resolving intra-group conflict. Because many residents have never been part of a group decision-making process like the council, the training will offer basic instruction on things such as running a meeting effectively. This form of education or training would appear to be essential for residents in areas targeted by community policing projects. If provided by the police in concert with other city agencies, as in Portland, such training can make residents a more productive and enlightened partner in the community policing enterprise. In addition to providing leadership

training for residents, such education should include instruction on the community policing philosophy and the role of the community in the implementation of community policing.

What Does the Community Want? One of the things that distinguishes community policing from "reform era" policing is its recognition that policing must be guided by the values and perceptions of the community. A major task that lies ahead of police departments engaged in a transition to community policing will be *how to determine* the values of the many groups that make up any given community. Some of the INOP sites have used surveys (Portland and Hayward, for example) of residents in an effort to determine their perceptions of quality-of-life problems. As many critics of community policing have argued, however, determining the "will" or "values" of any given "community" will not be easily accomplished (Mastrofski, 1988:64; Weatheritt, 1988) This is particularly true of neighborhoods characterized by a highly heterogeneous population.

For the purposes of the present research, respondents were asked how they would improve the INOP project and, more generally, how they would improve community policing in their city. If the respondent had never heard of their INOP project or community policing in their city (common among "ordinary" residents with no community group affiliation), they were simply asked for their recommendations on how they would improve the quality of policing in their city. Across the eight sites, a number of patterned responses appeared.

Most residents interviewed, for example, told researchers that they did not know their beat officer or, if they did, complained that he/she was rarely assigned to them for a sufficient period of time. Residents said that the police department should assign their community a regular beat officer for an extended period of time. Often, they argued they had been promised a regular beat officer only to see that officer reassigned without explanation. The Portland INOP project, for example, had established a "Neighborhood Response Team" consisting of two officers who spent a great deal of time at the inception of the project walking through the public housing complex to which they were assigned. During this time they were, by most reports, successful in establishing rapport with a large number of residents. However, according to residents

interviewed during the third research site visit, the presence of these officers in the area had declined dramatically, and other patrol officers were seen only in the police contact office -- they did not walk through the complex.[19] As one community leader in the complex said:

> Officers regularly change here. Now, [two officers assigned as Neighborhood Response Team] have stayed here pretty regularly since the [Community Policing] contact office started, but they are also involved in some other community policing sites . . . so we don't see as much of them . . . but the regular beat officers, yes, they do change quite regularly. And that is a problem especially . . . the first two officers [assigned to the housing complex] actually sat down and listened to us as human beings, intelligent human beings . . . They listened to us . . . we gave them information . . . it gets more difficult as time goes by to have to reestablish that trust relationship over and over with [new beat officers] on various shifts . . . It has been brought up as an issue. Sometimes . . . they have to reassign people because of the budget and because of the trouble spots in the community and that's what I hear a lot -- other trouble spots . . . they need to reassign these officers. Now, most [beat officers] come right in, especially at night, most of them are just coming in to have lunch. They might write their reports, but one of the things that I was really hoping is that the officers would be walking and talking among our residents. I think that's one of the biggest differences between Iris Court community policing office and what's going on out at Columbia Villa -- those Multnomah County Sheriffs, whatever shift they work, they're out walking among the residents and getting to know the kids . . . that hasn't happened here. [We've voiced that as an issue, and the police response has been] too much area, too little time, and we seem to have taken care of 90% of the drug and gang-related problems here ourselves, so "Gee, nice job. And our officers will get their lunch, do their report, and get out!'[20]

Many residents in the eight sites had been told that they would have a "regular" beat officer who would be responsible for their community for an extended period of time. Often, however, this was not the case. Officers would be reassigned for a number of reasons, or had beats so large and covering several communities, that residents had no idea who their beat officers were. Such actions on the part of police departments (especially when the explicit promise of regular beat officers has been made) may undermine public trust at a time when community policing needs to encourage it. It must be distinctly understood that, for most community residents, the beat officer is the most visible and accessible symbol of community policing. As was discussed in Chapter 3, residents often define a program on the basis of their relationship with one or two beat officers who, in effect, "become" the program. It was common across sites to hear residents

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[19]Officers in charge of this project argued that a heavy police presence at Iris Court was no longer necessary because crime and civil disorder had declined dramatically. Many residents disagreed.

[20]The need for more resources (especially in the numbers of beat officers) was a concern expressed by many respondents (both residents and police officers).

distinguish between INOP project officers who they defined as the "good" officers (or "our officers") who attempted to open lines of communication, and "other officers" in the police department. When these trusted officers are withdrawn with little explanation, any newly assigned officers will necessarily spend a great deal of time developing working relationships with community residents. It is clear that community residents take the problem of "revolving beat officers" most seriously. If police departments are uncertain of their ability to provide communities with steady beat officers, they must make clear to community leaders and residents the reasons for this at the outset. The failure to do this may result in a further weakening of an already tenuous legitimacy for community policing in the eyes of the community.

Thus, while many residents were happy to see more patrol officers in their areas at the inception of the INOP projects, they were less pleased when those officers disappeared after a number of months. Residents in most of the sites often complained that during the late night and early morning hours when high-visibility patrol would be most welcomed by residents, there would be few, if any, officers seen on patrol. Residents thus argued for increased high-visibility patrol at those times that problems most often occurred.

It is also apparent from interviews that community residents fully expect police officers to be "crime-fighters" above all else. Because they lack sufficient information about what community policing is, residents sometimes expressed concern that a community policing approach would make policing "soft" on crime and criminals. This, they argued, was unacceptable. One community leader in Hayward, for example, while a staunch supporter of community policing, argued that the police department's abandonment of its Tactical Narcotics Team (TNT, a buy-and-bust enforcement tactic) was a mistake and attributed its demise to the new community policing approach:

> R: Another thing was . . . TNT. Okay, that was a wonderful outfit, I'm telling you! I saw them in action! I think that they are necessary in an area like our area.
>
> I: Why did TNT stop operating?

> R: Because the new COPPS program came and they (*i.e.*, the police) got more gentle and so on. TNT -- it's rough! . . . They just jump out of nowhere and all those hoodlums are taken away! . . . If they didn't get them for drugs, nine times out of ten there was stolen property or whatever.
>
> I: If this was so effective, why was it disbanded?
>
> R: . . . because the COPPS program came in. Because TNT was aggressive on the street. The COPPS program, we understand, is supposed to assume that not everybody is a criminal, which is true, but the criminals don't need nice cops!

The importance that community residents place on crime-fighting is found in their responses to the question, "How will we know if community policing has been successful?" In virtually all cases, residents defined the success of community policing in terms of crime and fear reduction. However, a great many residents also pointed to other, and equally important criteria, as a measure of success. One frequently-mentioned measure of the success of community policing was better relationships between community residents and police officers. One resident in Portland, for example, said:

> The police will have a better image for one thing. . . . The hostility towards the police. I would love to see that come down . . . basically, I would love to see a community policing where people can go and talk to the police without being in fear [of the police].

Better relationships between police and community often seemed to hinge on the idea that long-term beat officers would be assigned to communities. Beat officers, many residents thought, would be in the best position to improve relations with the community. As we have already seen, it was common for residents to *define* community policing in terms of the beat officer -- certainly the most visible manifestation of the community policing approach. Indeed, the beat officer represents the community policing ideals of personalized service by providing close face-to-face interaction between police officers and community residents, and the police department's permanent commitment to the community by having officers "permanently" assigned to specific beats (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:5). However, many residents were dismayed that they did not really know their beat officers, or if they did, these officers were often transferred after a relatively short time. Thus, the primary means for reestablishing good police-community relationships -- the beat officer -- was often negated. As several community *leaders* in Hayward argued:

> R1: You know, we're supposed to have the same beat officers [over time]. I don't feel that yet. . . . I don't know who to call! . . . I haven't a clue, and I'm fairly tuned in!
>
> R2: I think that what community policing is about is the opportunity for local policemen to acquire a beat that they feel comfortable with -- to get an opportunity to feel comfortable with the residents of that particular community -- so that they can pretty much get a feel for the neighborhood, the areas that are the potential problems and some of the people that are the problems. And they interact with some of the people that are helping to prevent it and, therefore, put a lid on things. . . . And also, I think, when an officer is responsible for a particular area, he's more prone to go into that area and look it over and check it out. So you get a feeling that you have a presence there . . . he's like, your personal guy. You know, you feel like you have more confidence that way.
>
> R3: What he just said, that's what the program was all about, was to assign an officer in your area for 18 months. But they keep switching them around lately.
>
> R2: And you can't get acquainted!

Another resident from Hayward observed that community policing will be successful only if a current trend -- police education of the public in problem-solving and community involvement -- continues:

> [Community policing] is working now! The police are talking to people and educating them. It's that people are now getting involved in trying to sole problems. I think it's just going to grow!

Another Hayward community leader argued that the level of community organization and communication will be an important indicator of community policing's efficacy:

> [Another measure of success] will be the networking or communications within the community. The last ten years people have spent behind closed doors not wanting to get involved. . . . I think [community policing] is going to bring people back closer together again like we were ten years ago . . .

According to many business people interviewed, another sign of community policing's success will be the establishment of new businesses in depressed areas of the city. As one Norfolk small business owner said: "A higher percentage of [home]owner occupancy and more new businesses along the streets." Such economic indicators would be a sign that crime and fear had declined in the city because of the accomplishments of community policing.

The communities involved in the INOP projects (especially community leaders) also want police departments to provide training on community policing and the community's role in it. Interview data with community residents show that ordinary residents with no community group affiliation know the least about community policing. Even those residents who enjoy well-established relationships with the police are often confused by what is required of them under

community policing. Many community leaders and residents, therefore, argued for a greater commitment on the part of police departments to educate and train the public in community policing. One community resident in Norfolk, for example, observed:

> [The police] came in with some kind of "community services" day and that was a one-shot introduction [to PACE]. If you are talking about understanding all about what PACE is about, that is certainly not adequate enough to make that happen. . . . but I'm really concerned that many residents are still in question [about the meaning of PACE and community policing] because [the community service day] gave them the impression that the police are going to come in to save the day and, in fact, everything *but* that has happened. But that impression is still out there so it costs us . . .

Unquestionably, the education and training of community residents and leaders will be a Herculean undertaking. The transformation of police department structure and the process of educating police officers about community policing will, in contrast, be a relatively simple undertaking. Also, a remaining question is: what *level* of community organization will be necessary to make community policing a "success?" In a community consisting of 5,000 households, will a core group of 20 residents be "enough" to accomplish what community policing sets out to do? At the present time, however, police departments have little choice but to develop effective mechanisms for community education if community policing is to realize its potential.

Toward that end, many residents and police officers believed that the police need to help organize the community in areas where organization was a problem. Because the testing grounds for new community policing programs in urban settings are almost always in those areas where community organization is poor, it is important that the police department, with the help of other appropriate city agencies, assist residents in forming and maintaining community groups.

CHAPTER 6

Effects of the INOP Projects on Drugs, Crime, Fear, Quality of Life and Police-Community Relations

Introduction. As discussed in Chapter 2 (Research Methods), because of both research design problems and problems within the sites, it was not possible to collect quantitative data on the "effects" of the INOP projects. While it would be ideal to be able to report statistical changes in say, drug arrests or arrests for drug-related crimes that could be attributed to the INOP projects, such statistics were not available. For example, the Hayward Police Department was unable to provide any statistics for the entire research period because of computer hardware problems. While the NYPD intended to look at such numbers as part of its local research effort, it is hard to conceive of how such an analysis would be structured (since the van in the 23rd precinct was moved and the vans in all three precincts were often out of service altogether, and most importantly, the NYPD never defined the *area* in which one should expect to find effects of the project). In Norfolk, the INOP project was not really distinguishable from the larger PACE program. In only about half the sites (Houston, Louisville, Portland, Prince George's County, Tempe) would it have been possible to identify a geographical area within which INOP effects could be measured. As a result, the effects of the INOP projects were measured in terms of *perceptions* of residents, police officers and administrators, and other agency personnel, as expressed in individual interviews and focus groups.

The research had planned to measure the effects of the INOP programs in terms of the goals of each INOP project. In reality, however, these effects were measured in terms of the respondents' perceptions of both goals and outcomes. In each instance, interviewees were asked to discuss the effects of the program on drug use and drug trafficking, drug-related crime, fear, quality of life in the area, police-community relations, and level of community organization and involvement.[1]

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[1]This assumes, of course, that the respondent has heard of the program. In many instances, especially among "ordinary" neighborhood residents, respondents had not heard of the INOP program or community policing.

Perceived Effects on Drug Use and Drug Trafficking. It was the intention of the designers of the INOP program that, despite differences in project design and context, all the INOP projects share a common goal, that of drug demand reduction. It was not the intention of BJA, however, that they also share a common problem -- lack of apparent face validity of the intervention. But this was a common flaw in the INOP projects; the approaches taken by the projects to reduce the demand for drugs were often so weak as to make any measurable effect unlikely. This was particularly true for the INOP programs in New York and Hayward where the primary intervention was a motor home. And Hayward had the added problem of being so late in its implementation, that it was virtually impossible for the Vera research to assess the effect of the main component of the project.[2]

Nevertheless, in each city, police administrators and officers, community residents and representatives from other agencies were all asked to discuss the effects of the INOP project (and in some cases the community policing effort of the city) on drugs, crime, fear, quality of life, police-community relations, and community organization and involvement. Some respondents were quite negative, indicating that the program had merely displaced the drug trafficking, either physically, by moving it indoors or to another neighborhood or temporally. Other respondents were quite positive while also citing the same displacement effects. But regardless of whether respondents saw the displacement as a lack of effect on the drug problem or a very positive change, all indicated the change was temporary.

In all INOP sites, the police departments employed a "broken windows" strategy, with heavy enforcement as a first stage, intended to reduce fear, and thereby increase the involvement of community residents. The problem with this approach is that according to residents, once the

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[2]Because of this problem, respondents in Hayward were asked about the effects of the "COPPS" approach adopted by the police department at about the same time as they received their INOP funding. Similarly, because Norfolk's INOP project was indistinguishable from their PACE program, respondents there were asked to assess the effects of PACE.

police leave, things go back to the way they were prior to the intervention.[3] The only type of heavy enforcement effort that seems to work is *sustained* heavy enforcement, for example, the NYPD's Operation Pressure Point (Zimmer, 1987).

While the general impression in all the INOP sites was that drug trafficking had been displaced either from one area to another, from street-level to indoors, or temporally, there were some differences in perceptions among the sites. For example, in Hayward, Houston and New York, there were some people (both community residents and police officers) who said the INOP project had had no effect on drug trafficking. This is not surprising because in these three sites the INOP intervention was minimal. At the other end of the spectrum was the perception in Portland and Tempe, where both residents and police administrators saw the project as extremely effective with regard to drug trafficking. It was also in these two cities that the INOP intervention was concentrated in an extremely small geographic area. An administrator in Portland argued that the lack of drug arrests in Iris Court was not due to lack of attention, but to a reduction in drug trafficking:

> . . . the most dramatic drop off was in the drug arrests cases and the gang activity and certainly that is not generally the trend, because we have been in Iris Court as police officers a lot more because of the different things that are going on there, and there have just not been the people to arrest. So it wasn't like we just ignored an area, and therefore the rest went down. It is like there has been a lot of police activity in there, but there has just not been a lot of drug selling. It was an open market place kind of environment prior to this. We think the [police] presence and the *cul de sac* concept had to do with it too . . .[4]

Even in Tempe, where residents and police alike thought the Beat 16 project had been very effective in reducing drug trafficking, some respondents indicated that the dealing

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[3]This finding is not unique to the INOP sites or to community policing in general. Vera researchers found in a similar effect in their research on New York City's version of crackdowns, the Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT). TNT was a very heavy, short-term (generally 90 days per area) drug enforcement effort which produced very high numbers of arrests on felony drug charges. While court data indicated that these were "good" arrests, likely to result in conviction, the perception of community residents was that once TNT left the area, drug dealers returned to business as usual. Furthermore, even when TNT was in the area, street-level dealing was reduced, but often due to being displaced indoors (Sviridoff *et al.*, 1992).

[4]The one roadway through Iris Court was closed off at one end through the use of concrete barriers. This made the street a dead end and, according to respondents, caused drive-through drug trafficking to diminish significantly.

continued; it just wasn't as blatant as before the project. One agency employee said, "Everybody still gets exactly what they want; nobody is having withdrawal symptoms, but it's not as open. They think twice before they go out in the open to sell. . . . I don't think that this project has stopped anybody, any drug users from thinking twice about continuing drug use."

The predominant view of both the police and community residents in the other INOP sites was that drug dealing had been displaced either to an area receiving less attention from the project, a few blocks within the same area, indoors, or in time. As a PACE officer in Norfolk commented, "If you move it from one area, it just goes across the street and starts something, and basically, you just move it. That's what you're doing, from one area to another." A police administrator there saw this same effect as very positive and indicated that most open-air drug markets had been displaced to other communities and some to other cities.[5]

In Louisville some respondents believed drug trafficking had moved to another police District or to another area in the same District; others said it had been displaced in time from the late shift to the morning; while still others simply said it was less visible. As one administrator said:

> . . . Now I would say that maybe we've impacted drug trafficking . . . patterns. Maybe not necessarily the amount of drug trafficking itself. We made them operate differently. They hardly carry smaller quantities. They don't operate as openly as they had before. Whether we've dried up anything, I would say not. The price of coke hasn't gone up; it's cheap.

An officer involved in the program felt it was simply time displacement:

> Now how much of a dent it's making I don't know, except that I know that they've created so much heat on a certain targeted area that they are running, the drug traffickers from late, the late shift, over to the morning. It's something that we haven't had . . . displacement . . . It's time displacement, yes it is, it's time displacement. And I'm quite sure they probably made it uncomfortable enough for some of the guys that compete over this little strip where they sell a lot of drugs to move elsewhere.

One employee of a city agency saw the goal of the project as displacement and felt the project had been effective in reaching that goal, "I think the primary function or the purpose was

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[5]Brown (1981) refers to such officers as "Clean Beat Crime Fighters." Such officers are concerned only with keeping their beats free of crime. If they merely displace crime to an adjoining beat, they are satisfied with that result.

not necessarily to stop it but to displace it, and they have to an extent displaced it. We see them two blocks away, because they don't want to give it up because it's rich." A resident of the area agreed, "I think you'll never get rid of drugs. I don't care where it is, okay. So has it moved; it went somewhere, you know, and so if it moves out of the Fourth District, and it moves to another District, I hope their District gets COP, you know. But I think that it's moved. It's not as prevalent."

Respondents in Prince George's County had similar impressions, that drug trafficking had been displaced. In a focus group of officers involved in the program, there was a discussion of the claim by the narcotics division that street-level dealing had been eradicated:

> R1: The narcotics section. They said we don't have open air drug markets anymore.
>
> R2: Is that right? Anywhere in the county?
>
> R1: Anywhere in the county. . . .
>
> R3: That's baloney.
>
> R2: Narcotics says we don't have any open air drug markets anymore.
>
> R3: That's baloney.
>
> R4: As a matter of fact, you saw that one when you drove by the other night. You're not going to tell me that you don't have an open-air drug market.
>
> R1: But I had a small amount of displacement, and when I eliminated the open-air drug market, and I allowed the activity to go further back into my beat, which is another affair that I'm working on right now to try to hopefully get these knuckle-heads arrested once and for all so they won't be there anymore. But there is some displacement within my beat.

Residents also felt that drug trafficking had been displaced rather than eradicated. As one resident put it, "Well, you know, it goes and comes. You know, they run them from here and lock them up and they may say from here, you know, leave here and maybe go on to someplace else. And then they put the heat on someplace else and then they come back here."

Perceived Effects on Drug-Related Crime. It was a bit more difficult for respondents to assess whether there had been INOP project effects on drug-related crime. Often they would indicate that they didn't really know which crimes were drug related and which were not.

Hayward respondents appeared equally divided on whether or not the COPPS program had any effect on crime. A police administrator pointed out that because of computer problems, no statistics were available, and even *he* had to rely on the impressions of residents and officers. There were no real differences in the perceptions of residents and officers; as many of each group believed crime had decreased as result of the program as said there had been no change.

At the time of the second research site visit, Houston respondents were about equally divided with respect to the project's effects on crime. But by the third visit, more respondents said there had been no effect on crime than respondents who perceived a positive effect. This change probably reflects the passage of nearly eight months since the end of Operation Siege. Just as respondents perceived the project's effects on drugs to be temporary, returning to normal after the police left, so did they perceive its effects on drug-related crime.

New York is the only INOP site in which respondents reported no effects of the project on crime. Even police administrators were unable to report any effects. One administrator indicated that he intended to do an epidemiological study and look at crime statistics to determine the project's effectiveness, but he did not appear to have high expectations. "And hopefully we'll see some, at worst we'll see some displacement. At best, we'll see a decrease and see a little kind of window open up around the places with the vans." One resident indicated that, while he would need statistical data to answer the question of whether crime had increased or decreased, there was no activity around the van itself:

> I would assure you, though, that this van parked here does have its impact. Local guys are not going to break into a car knowing there's a police vehicle around. I mean, they're just not! Some don't care; some are desperate. But they'll think twice. So that it does have that psychological impact on individuals who want to commit any kind of crime, whether it's a robbery or burglary.[6]

In contrast, nearly all respondents in Portland believed the INOP project had made a tremendous impact on crime in Iris Court. Residents of Iris Court, police officers assigned to the

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[6]In fact, however, when Vera researchers were interviewing volunteers in the motor home in the 23rd precinct in Harlem, a man came into the van to ask whether anyone had seen the people who had broken into his car, which he had parked three cars away from the van, *after* the van had opened for the day.

project, police officers not involved in the project, administrators and other agency personnel all indicated that there had been *dramatic* changes in gang activity, violent crime, robberies, burglaries, *etc.* Residents expressed the decrease as a function of how it changed their lives:

> R1: I've been a victim several times. Now, there's nothing at all.
>
> R2: But with the contact office located here, this place has changed drastically. . . . The kids are outside playing together, whereas two years ago they weren't out there. You were afraid to let them go out there because the drugs were out there and the gang members. There's still gang members that live here, but not as much, not as many either.
>
> R3: . . . I have to give them credit; they really have cleaned it up. And you don't have to worry so much any more about different things like drugs and gangs and . . . noisy neighbors and stuff like that, cause we keep it pretty much under control here. . . .
>
> R4: It has done a lot of good for this community, for this area. The drug traffic has gone way down, and violent crimes have gone down. We still have a few mishaps, but it has made quite a difference.
>
> R5: We don't have violence. There are no gangs here anymore. There used to be a lot of gunshots, but there aren't anymore.

Unlike respondents in Houston, Portland respondents interviewed during the third research site visit did not report a return to pre-project conditions. Of course, the INOP project was ongoing at that time. In fact, the same police administrator reported a 64% decrease in reported crimes in Iris Court (from the baseline data to the second year data).

In Norfolk, the PACE program was perceived by residents, police officers and administrators, and other city employees, to be very effective with regard to drug-related crime. In fact, while the predominant impression of PACE's effect on drug trafficking was that it simply displaced the activity, drug-related crime was believed to be way down. The view of the respondents was fairly uniform across neighborhoods and across the two research site visits. As one administrator put it, "In the neighborhoods where PACE has gone, in the PACE target areas, things are significantly better in all of those areas, and in none of the areas, including the earliest areas . . . have they ever gone back to any degree of illegal activity and crimes of violence that they had . . . prior to PACE." Depending on which types of crimes were perceived to be the biggest problems in the various PACE areas, residents reported decreases in these crimes:

> Oceanview Resident: I particularly noticed a tremendous difference in the prostitution, walking the street, that type of thing.
>
> Huntersville Resident: Before they had the sweep and the PACE officers came in, it was unbelievable. The shooting, you couldn't sit on your porch. They would come by and throw bottles on your sidewalk and your yard, and you're sitting there. . . . Last summer for the first time, I was able to sit on my porch if I wanted to.
>
> Oakleaf Resident: We don't have as many break ins. But a few of them come out here and they're doing that . . . But we know the fellas so we kind of get him lined up for the police, I mean. First we did have a killing. That boy was from another place, but it was a boy out here that killed him. But we haven't had no problems in quite a while, since the first of the year.

Louisville respondents were more doubtful about the effects of their COP program on crime, especially at the time of the second site visit. While some respondents indicated that crime was down, at least one high level police administrator expressed reservations about attributing that change to the COP program:

> Well, you know we have a tendency sometimes to jump on the bandwagon and take credit for things that aren't really ours. We went a whopping two months without a single murder, which was outstanding, and of course, that was one month after the program finally got operational. So of course, we kiddingly said, "Hey, we had a seven or eight hundred percent drop in our murder rate in the last month alone." I'm reluctant to jump in and answer that with any sense of I guess credibility, you know, it's like you take credit for a crime reduction, and crime increases are because people have more confidence in our ability to do it. And it's a double-edged sword that I'd as soon not play that game.

Another administrator echoed these sentiments at the time of the third visit, and an officer involved in the program indicated that nothing had really changed. "We're still getting as many shootings as we ever were. And the day we started the task force, we were locking up people for dope. And the day we ended it, we were still locking up people for dope. Different set of faces, same results in my opinion." Other officers and residents were more positive at the time of the third site visit, indicating that crime was down in the housing projects.

In Tempe, where residents and police thought the project had been very effective with regard to drug trafficking, respondents also were generally positive with regard to the effects of the Beat 16 project on drug-related crime. All but one of the police administrators interviewed by the researchers believed that crime was down in Beat 16. One of them indicated that the project had affected *all* crime; this administrator mentioned specifically graffiti, loitering, and burglary. The other two administrators both mentioned prostitution, burglary and robbery. The

one police administrator who was not positive about the project's effects on crime indicated that he just didn't know. Police officers involved with the program were also enthusiastic about its effects on crime, in particular, prostitution, burglary, random shooting and gang activity. The area residents agreed, but attributed the reduction in prostitution to displacement. They believed that the prostitutes were being displaced to other neighborhoods along with the drug trade. At least one resident thought that one effect of the program was an increase in communication between police and residents, leading to an *increase in reported burglaries*, which did not reflect any increase in actual crime:[7]

> You know, I think you'd have to get your statistics on that from the officers, but again, the officers that I've talked to have said that they have not actually seen a decrease in burglaries, but they're getting more cooperation from the residents. As before the residents would say well, we got burglarized, you know; they can't do anything about it, so they just wouldn't report it. And now people, they get people who would never before talk to them, are calling in and reporting different incidences. So burglaries have actually stayed about the same or the number of reports have actually risen, but I think that's because of the high visibility the officers and the open communication between the residents and Beat 16 officers.

Both police and residents in Prince George's County believed that crime had gone down as a result of the work of the COP program. All three police administrators who responded to this question referred to crime statistics as the basis for their belief that crime had been reduced. This drop in crime in the areas in which the COP program had been implemented also received press coverage and was acclaimed by the County Executive as a major accomplishment. According to a police department press release (dated June 8, 1992), "The statistics show a 40% reduction in drug related calls since its inception in the Seat Pleasant District. And, in the same area, a 15.3% reduction in violent crime in the first quarter of 1992." The County Executive claimed these statistics demonstrated the program to be a "true success," and one police administrator said, "I cannot think of any program, project, or effort in law enforcement in my 23 years that has had such a significant impact on a crime rate in such a short period of time." While residents of the area also perceived that crime had been reduced, none mentioned these statistics.

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[7]One possible, unintended, consequence of the improved police-community relations promised by community policing may be an increase in reported crimes.

Perceived Effects on Fear. Most of the respondents in the INOP sites believed that their INOP projects (or their city's community policing program in general) had had positive effects on drug trafficking and drug-related crimes in the target areas. While many of those interviewed believed that the drug trafficking had been displaced to other areas or indoors, they believed that crime had been reduced in those areas. Theorists in the area of policing suggest that physical and social disorder and crime are linked to fear of crime, which leads residents to withdraw from the community (Kelling, 1992; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988; Skogan, 1986, 1990; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). One would expect, then, that in those areas where residents perceive that drug trafficking and crime have been reduced, they should also be less fearful (and perhaps, more likely to participate in community organizations).

Thus, based on the perceptions that the INOP projects had had little or, at best, temporary effects on drugs and crime in Hayward, Houston, and New York, one would expect there to be little change in residents' fear levels. Most of the respondents to this question in Hayward were community residents, some of whom lived in the area that received most of the attention from the COPPS program and others lived outside the area. At the time of the second research site visit, residents from both inside and outside the target area perceived there to have been very little change in fear levels. The one group of residents (who did not live within the target area) who expressed some positive sentiments attributed this to their own efforts at neighborhood organizing. That is, some older residents were now coming out of their homes to attend the neighborhood meetings, but only because the other residents were willing to walk them from their homes to the meeting. Within the target area, most respondents either said they didn't know whether fear levels had changed or, again, attributed any positive effects to their own efforts at community organizing, which had been ongoing for many years. The most commonly cited reason for lack of involvement with neighborhood groups was fear of retaliation from drug dealers.[8]

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[8]More detailed data on the impact of fear on community organization are presented in Chapter 5.

> People in the areas are fearful to get involved . . . . they still, you can't get them in the Neighborhood Alert program; you lose them because they just don't think anything has changed. That the druggies have the run of our street, and they won't get involved. They just don't want retaliation back on them and by getting involved, this guy is going to know that they did it.

During a research focus group, one resident pointed out that the COPPS program was unlikely to have an effect on fear if the majority of the residents were unaware of its existence, and he (and the others in the group) believed that very few Hayward residents knew about the program:

> I don't think -- maybe I'm new and not aware, but I don't know that there's that many people in Hayward that are aware -- of a population this size, I doubt that maybe more than 10 or 15% of the population is even aware that it exists. . . . Because there's nobody that I have ever talked to, outside of this Neighborhood alert program, that ever heard of it.

By the time of the third research site visit, more residents believed that fear had decreased. One of these, who was very active in community organizing in a drug-infested area, attributed this to a change in police behavior, resulting in more order on the streets. She believed that in the past the police had not treated residents well, "Even with us, they would talk badly. Now they are more human, not that macho stuff. In general, they talk to people . . ." Another area respondent also said that fear was down and based this judgment on the willingness of people to go to neighborhood meetings and visit the INOP van the one day it was on the street. But another area resident believed that this fear reduction was a temporary effect, related to the presence of the van:

> I think initially when the van left, that is the following next morning, people still had a little of that euphoria left, still feeling a little safe. As the day lingered on and it approached night and the van didn't come back, then they, then [an area leader] and I started hearing questions, because we're in charge, and the people know we are on the street. "Well, when's the van coming back? It's not coming back tonight. Is it going to be back tomorrow? Is it going to be back by the weekend?" Anxious, they wanted the van back. . . . I think that's the most uncomfortable feeling is that they don't know when it's coming back. *We* don't even know when it's coming back; we've just been assured that it *will* come back.

In Houston, where effects on drug trafficking and drug-related crime were perceived to be only temporary, there was very little evidence of fear reduction. Police officers and residents alike agreed that fear levels in Houston were high. One officer thought that fear might be "at its highest level since I've been here, or thereabouts, I don't know." The only perceived fear reduction effects of Operation Siege were in relation to the target-hardening hardware that was

installed for elderly and low-income residents. Several residents indicated that they felt more secure in their homes, but were still afraid to go out, especially at night.

As was discussed above, the New York INOP site was different from the rest: its intervention was minimal (vans only), and the vans were parked on non-residential streets. The only "residents" available to talk to the research staff were the volunteers, who lived within the precinct, but would not be directly affected by the presence of the van. Very few respondents addressed the question of project effects on fear, and those who did had very little to say. One administrator declined to answer the question, saying that since he was not in the area, he wouldn't really be able to make such an assessment. An officer who was involved in the program believed that the presence of the van deterred drug activity in front of the school, which allowed people to use the services in the school. One of the volunteers was of a similar opinion:

> Sometimes it's good for them not to know [that the vans are there for information and referral only]; they're thinking they're some paddy wagons and they do something wrong. . . . So the mere presence of the van will sort of give us a feeling of safety in the area. And I think it's needed.

In general, however, there was little evidence that the INOP project had any effect on fear in the neighborhoods in which the vans were located.

As would be expected from their perceptions of the effects of the Iris Court project on drug trafficking and drug-related crime, Portland respondents were overwhelmingly positive about the project's effect on fear in Iris Court. The great majority of respondents in interviews conducted in both the second and third research site visits were residents of Iris Court; respondents in 13 of the interviews (some of which were focus groups) were quite positive about the project's effect on fear (only two respondents expressed reservations). All the other respondents -- police administrators, personnel from other agencies and police officers -- believed that the INOP project had reduced fear among both Iris Court residents and police officers working in the housing project. Residents most frequently expressed their fear reduction in terms of feeling comfortable going out after dark or letting children play outside without fear that they would be hurt:

> Seniors . . . some of them just started getting out since we had this; they feel more safer now than they did. I feel more safer now than I did when I first came over. I wouldn't even let my kids come out, but now because we have the police and things, I be glad. I love to get out this door. Now it is nice to be a family here now instead of, just you stay here and I stay here.
>
> I used to be scared to go out, but not any more. Now you can sit outside and not have to listen to fighting and screaming all night.
>
> Now we can go out and get our seniors and they will come out. We don't have any fear of people bothering us. We used to have fear of the gangs, but that's over. I used to be afraid to let the kids go out front, but now it's not a problem.

A police administrator believed that the project had had a tremendous impact on fear as a direct result of the community policing style. That is, the police had been in Iris Court prior to the INOP project, responding to calls and making arrests, but since the project began, this administrator believed that attitudes toward police officers had changed:

> Well, I think, and I have to really sort of say this because I think this statement is true, and I think that police officers would agree with this too, that it's having as a result of the community and community policing, residents who are not afraid, residents who are participating, because we've had police officers all along and seeing them in a more reactive posture, making arrests. But now that we have them that are getting involved in the community, that attitudes about police officers have changed, and people don't have any problem with approaching them now. And they understand and they get to know them on a first name basis, and that's the beauty I think in community policing as it relates to Iris Court is that we're a small development, and they know the officers by name. They obviously know me, and it's more like family. I see it as an extended family now, people coming together to try to fight a common foe, and that foe is crime.

In Norfolk, where respondents believed drug trafficking had been displaced and crime had been reduced, respondents interviewed at the time of the second research site visit believed that residents were less fearful. At that time police administrators and officers involved in the program and residents of the PACE target areas were generally positive about the program's effects on fear levels. They believed that fear was reduced as a result of the police presence in the area and because the drug traffickers were not there, or at least less visible. As one officer put it:

> Now you come through there now, the juveniles are not hanging like they used to, because I went out there and attacked that problem. I removed their element. So by removing that element, it made it easy for the people to come out more. They're not trapped in their house like they used to be, and this is what they felt was their number one problem: "I can't go to the store; I can't sit on my front porch." They could care less about drugs at night because they're not going to be out there anyway. Their main concern was being able to enjoy their property, be able to sit out on their front porch, be able to walk down the street, and not have to worry about a bunch of guys hanging in there that they're going to snatch my purse, or they're going to knock me down, stuff like that. So there is a positive aspect I have seen, and then I have seen the people are now becom-

> ing more approachable, and we are being more approachable while we're getting more information over this other point.

The residents agreed:

> Well, you know, certain ones don't like the policemen hanging around too much. You have a few of them. Then we have a few that's glad they're around, and this means you can really feel comfortable setting out . . . you can feel so much more comfortable with them riding through every once in a while. To me it's fine, and I have plenty of neighbors that's glad they're out here.

> PACE came out there and knocked hard, and . . . gave us our park back. I'm just going to say that. It really gave us our place back because one time we couldn't sit on the cobbles because we saw buck shots come across our head. And . . . it's quieted down a whole lot.

> Well, I can only speak for myself. As I say, it gives me a little more of a secure feeling by their presence, and I know I can reach some of them. And then I see them passing. So that's the way it makes me feel.

> Put it this way, if you take it on a ten scale, I'll give it a nine. Because you used to not hang out, because you used to couldn't do anything. But you can now. . . . Say for instance, around 3:30 [a.m.] I was out hanging clothes. Yeah, I always get up early. I was hanging out clothes, right? The police rode by. I wave. He wave.

By the time of the third research site visit, however, residents were a little less positive about the effects of PACE on fear. One of the things that changed between the two research site visits was that the PACE program had expanded considerably and added a number of target areas. As seen in the chapters on "Police Issues" and "Community Involvement," both police administrators and officers felt that one of the problems with the program was that their resources were being stretched thin because of the rapid expansion. And residents of the target areas agreed. The same residents who were very positive about the PACE program in January 1992 were angry in July of that year; they no longer saw "their" PACE officers very often, and this made them feel less safe.

In Louisville, police administrators and officers involved in the COP program believed that fear had been reduced in the housing projects that were their target areas. Most of these respondents indicated that their perceptions were based on what the residents told them. As an administrator put it:

> The residents tell us that they feel safer over there at these meetings. They say they just feel safer over now on the street at night than they used to. And that's a common theme at all the meetings we've been to.

An officer assigned to the target area echoed this sentiment:

> And so many adults came up to me, and I'm sure I'm not the only officer, and said, "God, this is great. We feel safer. I can come to the park. I can send my child to the park to play now, and I feel better because I know you all are up here." And that went over big. That went over big.

The residents seemed less certain, however. As one resident of the public housing area said, "I don't think they're more afraid. I think they're a little more relaxed than they used to be, but they're still leery." The residents did seem to like the road blocks (part of the "zero tolerance" activities) and said that those types of activities made them feel a little bit safer, but they did not express the positive feelings heard in some of the other sites (*e.g.*, Portland).

Respondents in Tempe, who were positive with regard to the Beat 16 project's effects on drug trafficking and crime, also believed that fear had decreased since the project began. Police, other agency personnel, and residents interviewed during the second and third research site visits agreed that the area was safer and that residents were now more comfortable using the parks and letting their children play outside. One of the reasons they said they were more comfortable was that there were now lights in the park and people playing baseball. As one resident put it:

> . . . the lights are always there; so me and my husband do a walking at night, and to me it's not scary. I guess if it were dark, like there's times when we come by and the lights are off, and it's scary when the lights are off in the park

Prince George's County respondents were overwhelmingly positive about the COPS program's effects on fear in the target areas. Residents attributed the fear reduction to the reduction in drug dealing and crime. While they recognized that drugs and crime (and fear) would never be completely eliminated, they felt things had improved:

> I don't think we'll ever get completely get it all packed up. But we can walk the streets, thank the Lord. Because, for a while there, we had senior citizens who were afraid to walk to the stores and whatnot.

> Now, they had a drug house on this street, and people were afraid to walk. But now, since it's gone, they take walks here every day. They don't have any fear anymore, and they're coming out now to meetings and expressing their feelings. . . . People are not afraid anymore because in one street there was two drug house, a block from the other, and the people got tired. So now, there's no fear now.

Reported Effects on Police/Community Relations. Proponents of community policing contend that one of the advantages of community policing is improved relationships between the police and the community in which they work. Community police officers (CPOs) in New York

City reported that one of the things that had changed since they had become CPOs was their attitude toward the residents of the community (McElroy *et al.*, 1993) . They attributed this change to being exposed to "the good people" as part of their new role. In traditional policing, officers respond to calls for service and deal with the victims of crime, who are likely to be upset and unhappy, and officers also interact with "the bad guys." But for the first time, as CPOs, these New York City officers reported that from walking their beats, they got to know the community residents as people and not just in crisis situations.

Most of the respondents in the INOP sites also reported improved relationships between the police and community residents. Even in those sites where perceived effects on drugs, crime and fear were minimal (Hayward, Houston and New York), respondents believed that the relationship between the police and the community had improved. Some respondents qualified their responses, however.

One administrator in Hayward said that relations had improved *with that portion of the community that chose to get involved* with the police, but not necessarily with the community as a whole. Other respondents indicated that relationships between the police and the residents had generally improved, but that among some ethnic groups, the barriers were much greater. This was thought to be a function of poor treatment from the police in their country of origin, which led these residents to expect the police in Hayward to behave similarly.[9] One administrator expressed the belief, shared by others, that attitudes were changing among both officers and residents, but that it was a slow process:

> It think that transition's happening with the officers; some are further ahead than others, but with the community it's a lot slower. In fact, I think we've had a little bit of a set-back in the fact that . . . a lot of the neighborhoods we're dealing with, I guess the overall . . . sophistication of the neighborhood is less, and probably just the overall organization here . . . and when we started talking about community policing, I mean to this day, we still go out there; we talk to them. We say it's a change in attitude; it's not something where it's a program where we put it on the table, plug it in, and turn it on and watch it work and all of a sudden, all your problems are going to go

[9]Vera's recent research on New York City's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT) showed that many Caribbean and West Indian immigrants feared the police because of bad experiences with law enforcement in their homelands. This was especially true of Haitian immigrants (Sviridoff *et al.*, 1992).

> away. And we keep harping on that, but we still constantly get the complaints from the community that, well, you guys have been doing this now for six months, and I don't see anything better. Well . . . that's not a realistic expectation, and . . . I think we've lost a few people as far as their enthusiasm because they thought, all of a sudden, boom, everything's going to be better. And it's a slow transition; [but] I think things are starting to improve down there. So, I think those people are starting to say, "Yeah, I do see some improvement." I think people are a lot more comfortable with being involved with the Police Department. I think their rapport with the officers out there is a lot better.

This administrator went on to say that he thought that the community was beginning to understand the role of the police and to have more realistic expectations of what they could do. He also thought that the officers "are having some realistic expectations of the community. And a lot more empathy towards some of the problems down there. And I think that empathy is really key, because, without it, I don't think they're really going to go that extra step." Residents in Hayward were quite positive about the officers and credited the COPPS program with making the officers more available to them:

> You find out that these cops are human beings, they do have families. They do have their own problems. They didn't do nothing for us, and I sure in heck wouldn't have gave them a smile back.
>
> I think its had a real positive effect; I think it makes our police department a little bit more human. Residents realize they're more human, and like I said before, they're a little bit more aware of what their limitations are and what the reality of their situation is.
>
> The nice thing about this is that I've never had a relationship with the Police Department on this level. These guys call on you to say, "Hi." If I have something to say, they're happy to listen.
>
> As far as I'm concerned, the police are more accessible. Relations are better. It's not as if you have to wait until you have a problem and go down to the precinct. They come and see you to exchange information. They communicate with you now.

In Houston, officers and residents from both the BOND area and Frenchtown were generally positive with regard to the effects of Operation Siege on the relationship between the police and the community. Officers involved in the program thought that the program had improved rapport between the two groups because it allowed the police to "get out there and to show them, this is what you wanted; this is what we are doing for you. And they saw that and said, 'Maybe you are for real.' And they started becoming more involved with you." Another officer agreed that it was because the residents found the police to be receptive, willing to change and willing to help them, rather than coming into the neighborhood just to harass them, that their attitude had changed for the better. While residents generally agreed, at the time of the third

research site visit, some complained that they no longer saw the police in the area very much. (See Chapter 5 on community involvement.) Others indicated that knowing their officers helped, increased trust in the police, but that the constant rotation of captains in the precinct was a problem.

One group of residents in the Frenchtown area expressed dissatisfaction with the police and the way they treated area residents. They indicated that there were many Latino residents who were afraid of the police. Some residents felt that the problem was partially attributable to a lack of African American and Latino officers in a predominantly African American and Latino neighborhood. But others were of the opinion that the officers' ethnicity or race wouldn't matter, as long as they were approachable and friendly. But the biggest problem, according to the residents interviewed, appeared to be that the officers just weren't in the area enough:

> I would say like this, on getting along with the people in the community: I wouldn't say they get along bad, and I wouldn't say they get along good. Because in order to know how people get along, you have to associate with the people. And that's not being done. so you can't say, "Me and you get along well" if me and you don't meet . . . So, we never know how the relations are, unless we get together.

Respondents interviewed in New York were generally positive about the effects of the INOP project on police-community relationships, although they were not as certain as in some other cities. One administrator interpreted an increase in the number of people coming to the van as an indication that the residents understood that, although the van was a police vehicle, it was not a "war wagon." An officer (who was not involved with the program) felt that it had improved relationships between the police and a certain group of community residents, but that other segments of the community remained unmoved:

> Well, it's had an effect on like the community council, people who are already volunteers. A volunteer will always be appreciative of something like that, because it's something for them to do. The people that, they go, "Oh, I see the city wasted some more money." There are people walking the street . . . they go, "Eh, what's that supposed to be?" They just look at it like the city's wasting money because they see no one's using it.

The residents who were interviewed (who were all volunteers for the van) believed the project had enhanced relationships between the police and the community, and they attributed this

improvement both to the community patrol officers assigned to the area and to the presence of the van.

Respondents in the Iris Court project in Portland were generally quite positive about the project's effects on relationships between the police and the community, although there were a few residents who had complaints. Most of the residents expressed sentiments similar to those expressed in Hayward (*i.e.*, that the police now seemed more human, more accessible):

> I think you find the policeman is a human being; he has problems too, and he is considerate. And they listen to you and help you if you need help, and you really need them sometime. People talk about the police and . . . but they are the main ones to call upon; you need them sometimes to help you with the situations that are going around. You can't handle it yourself; you don't want to get hurt or anything. Not that you want to get them hurt, but you don't want to get hurt or anything trying to stop something. They are good to have around. . . .

> What I think is nice is that the patrol car can be going through, and if you are standing out on the street, the officers will actually stop and talk to you. They don't stop and hassle you any more; they stop and they talk to you. It is really nice you can stand there and talk to the officer for five or ten minutes, and then they go on their way. . . . it was one time if you talk to the police, you had to be a sneak. You was wild for talking to the police. Now I don't care what people call me; I am trying to better myself, and I am trying to better this community for myself and for the rest of these people's kids around here. . . . This ain't no ghetto no more, because everyone is trying to move out. Ever since the police department done been here, seems like everybody done blew up their self esteem and build up theirselves.

While most residents indicated that the police were more responsive since the inception of the project and believed that this had improved their relationship with the community, not all the residents agreed. One resident complained about an incident in which there had been a shooting in the complex and no police officer responded for 10 minutes. According to this respondent, there was an officer in the contact office, but he claimed not to have heard anything. In addition, some participants in the Landlord Training program felt that they needed more support from the police. One of them said that, even though there were between 20 and 40 cars visiting a particular drug house each day, the police apparently would not take action. As a result, this respondent felt that the police didn't really want to deal with the problem. Some Iris Court residents also complained that the police did not respond to calls regarding speeding cars, drug dealing, gun shots, *etc.* And, like the residents in the Houston target area, they were unhappy with what they perceived to be the constant rotation of officers in and out of the area.

These comments were in direct conflict with the perception of some administrators who thought that the residents knew their officers by name.

Despite the concerns expressed by some Norfolk residents that they no longer saw their PACE officers as often as they had previously, they were generally quite positive about the effects of the program on relationships between the police and the community. One administrator attributed the improvement in relationships between the police and the community to a change from a platoon system to a sector system of deployment of officers. The change was made at the time PACE was implemented in January, 1991, giving a supervisor responsibility for everything that happened in his sector, 24 hours a day. According to this administrator, prior to implementation of the sector system, there was no contact between police administrators (precinct commanders and platoon lieutenants) and the community leaders. Another administrator agreed that increased contact between the police and community residents was responsible for the improvement:

> Well, our officers attend civic leagues; it's a policy that we have. The patrol officer on the district attends civic leagues, and that has built up a relationship between the police officers that work that district and those living in that area. And as they come to know each other, they become more honest with each other, willing to speak and the problems that, in the past used to perhaps lay there and fester until the police became aware of it and tried to do something about it or the civic leagues or the folks living there would get so frustrated they would then call me or have some big problem before we all got a resource of the other and tried to solve the problem. But now the folks in the community talk directly to the officer who's working that district, and many times he'll be at that meeting and go right out to where that problem area is and handle. And then, the next meeting he would meet through them again, and reports back what he has done. And that has enhanced the relationship among the folks living in the area and the police officer.

The residents of PACE areas who were interviewed by the researchers generally agreed with the assessment offered by the police. They indicated that prior to PACE there was no communication between the residents and the police, but that since the program was implemented, the lines of communication had opened. They believed that officers were responsive to problems raised at civic league meetings. Like the residents of Iris Court in Portland, residents of PACE areas liked the fact that the officers would stop and talk, "And it's not that they're making any

arrests or anything like that, just talking." They also indicated that getting to know their police officers increased trust between the police and the residents:[10]

> Because if you get acquainted with them, some policemen, they don't know you and you don't know them, and you go to talk to them, and they don't know if you're a good guy or a bad guy. . . But having a policeman that you can deal with on a daily basis, . . . they know how to deal with you. It's more comfortable then it's a lot of thing that maybe people want to talk to the police about, but policemen are human too, and some of them are scared that they might get hurt or they might say, someone told me this. But when you've got someone that you deal with on a daily basis . . .

Respondents in Louisville generally believed that relationships between the police and the community had improved as a result of the COP program; this included police administrators, officers involved in the program, representatives of other city agencies and residents.[11] At the outset of the COP program, residents of the housing projects were quite hostile to the police. These people felt that the police were not responsive to their needs; that when they came into the project, they harassed the residents; that when they did respond to a resident's call for service, they would come to the door (which would tell the drug dealers who had called the police).[12] There was also a history of racial problems between the predominantly white police officers and the black residents. As a result of these tensions between police and project residents, at the first meeting between the two groups, held to explain the tactics the police planned to use to deal with the drug problem, as one officer put it, "the community attacked the police." The residents were so pleased with the results, however, that at each subsequent meeting the residents expressed more positive feelings toward the police and the COP program. As one administrator put it:

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[10]This observation applies to officers directly involved in the program. As will be seen in Chapter 5, residents often made clear distinctions between those officers in the INOP program (defined as "good") and "everyone else."

[11]There was one exception to this. At the time of the third research site visit, a group of officers involved in the COP program indicated that they saw no change in relationships between the police and the residents. As one officer put it, "If they liked you before this started, they still like you. If they didn't before, they still don't. And then some of them even appreciate what you're doing, but still hate you." It was unclear, however, why these officers felt this way. It is possible that this was a reflection of the generally negative attitude toward the COP program observed among police officers in Louisville at the time of the third visit. This lack of "buy-in" is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, but these officers appeared to see the program as worthless and wanted to get back to "real" police work.

[12]This was a common complaint in Norfolk and Houston, as well.

> The officers were complaining that they couldn't see the community support, so I got kind of mad about it. So I started dragging them to every meeting that I had to go to. And we went over there, and I remember the first meeting we had with the Cotter Homes building captains -- it was a fiery meeting. There was cussing and all kinds of stuff going on. And the officers were upset when we left the meeting, and I'm sure the residents were too. When we had our second meeting was after the roadblocks had gone into effect. And when we had our second meeting, they actually applauded the officers. Yeah, and that applause went all over the district because they couldn't believe it. And the third meeting we had over there, they had a larger group because everybody started questioning, well this was a small group of people. And we had a much larger group, and they were applauded again.

The residents echoed these sentiments, indicating that there was a history of distrust of the police, resulting from what they perceived to be poor treatment and lack of response to their calls. The COP program, they said was beginning to change these feelings:

> The COP program has been nice for the people because they feel like the things they're telling, someone's listening to them. It's like they really understand that the police can do only so much, and they have to do so much. Like getting license numbers and knowing, like if they call and say, "These people are dealing drugs," that's not enough. You're gonna have to say what you see, who you see coming in, where, and where are they putting them. . . . And they feel now like they're not gonna be, you know, they're not gonna let the world know that they told on them, and so it just gives them kind of a secure feeling. More trust.

As would be expected from their perceptions of the Beat 16 project's effects on drugs, crime and fear, respondents in Tempe were quite positive about its effects on relationships between the police and members of the community served by the project. Residents and police alike attributed this change to the fact that the same officer works the area all the time. This increased the trust the residents felt in the police and made the police feel more comfortable about working in the area. As one administrator put it:

> Prior to beginning this project, we the police were not comfortable in that area at all, even going inside the area for anything. Now that the project's been running for six, eight, nine months, the officers are very familiar with the residents, very comfortable. The fear of the officers has been reduced quite a bit in the area. So I think the relationship has been bettered.

Some respondents indicated that although they believed relationships between the police and the community had improved, this change was attributable to the personality of specific officers rather than to the structure of the program (see also, Chapters 3 and 5). A group of employees of city agencies discussed this issue:

> R1: I think a lot of it has to do with, not the police department, but some of the officers who are on the team themselves, because of their own personality and because of how they are approaching their job.

> R2: I think the officers who are out there are the key to it. I know five cops in the city, if you put them out there, you'd have riots in about a month. So you know . . . whoever assigns those people out there have got the right kind of people out there. They're the ones who are making the program. I think that even if you continued the program, and you put the wrong people in, it wouldn't work. You've got to have the program and those kind of people.

Only one respondent, a community resident, reported a lack of positive impact on these relationships. While his own relationship with the police had improved and he had seen other people behaving more positively toward the police, he believed that among Latinos, there was still a general fear of government and a lack of openness to the police. This sentiment is similar to that expressed in the Frenchtown area of Houston.

Prince George's County respondents were also generally positive regarding the effects of the COPS program on police/community relationships. Police officers involved in the program felt that they had become more approachable, "People wave at you. Even if they don't know you personally, they'll wave at you or say hi to you." Officers not involved in the program agreed; although all these officers talked about greater trust and communication between the community and the *COPS officers*; none of them said that they, personally, had experienced greater communication with community residents. And like some of the respondents in Tempe, some people attributed the success of the program to the personal commitment and qualities of specific officers. As one resident said, "They're a very special breed. There's something unique about the COPS officers that makes them COPS officers. But there's a special type of people volunteering."

This perception, that particular officers are responsible for improved relationships between the community and the police, could be a problem for departments that are trying to expand their community policing efforts. As community policing becomes a department-wide phenomenon, involving officers with a variety of personalities and styles, these positive impacts may be less evident. Another potential problem for expanding community policing is that in most cities, residents were most likely to talk about the positive effects of seeing the same officer regularly; if rapid expansion results in residents seeing less of "their officer," as was the case in some neighborhoods in Norfolk, Portland, and others, the result could be an erosion of the

enhanced police/community relationship. These problems are discussed in greater detail in the sections on police and community.

Perceived Effects of the INOP Programs on Community Organization and Community Involvement. Respondents generally had more trouble assessing the effects of the INOP programs on community organization and involvement than they did on drugs, crime or fear. This may be because they were simply not sure if changes in levels of community organization were attributable to the programs; however, most respondents were not that sophisticated in their judgments. In most sites, most respondents who answered the question indicated that levels of community organization and community involvement had increased since the start of the INOP program.

This was certainly true in Hayward, which had the most well-organized citizens' groups of the eight INOP cities. Although the respondents tended to attribute the increased organization to the COPPS program, it appeared to be a grass-roots effort that predated both COPPS and INOP. Nonetheless, police administrators, officers and community residents all indicated that more Neighborhood Alert groups had been formed and attendance in existing groups had improved since the community policing effort had begun.[13] One group of community activists expressed the sentiment that although the driving force behind the increased number of Neighborhood Alert groups was concerned citizens, the attendance of police officers at these meetings made people feel more comfortable about going themselves. However, one factor that was cited as a problem in Hayward was the very ethnically diverse nature of the city. Racial tensions were not the problem with this diversity; rather, respondents mentioned problems with communication because of language barriers and cultural differences.

In Houston, where the effects of Operation Siege on drugs, crime and fear were perceived to be temporary at best, respondents were mixed with regard to its effect on community organi-

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[13]Neighborhood Alert is the name used in Hayward to refer to what is more commonly known as Neighborhood Watch.

zation and involvement. One group of city employees felt that the project had improved attendance at meetings and strengthened networking, but also believed that once the project ended, it's impact would diminish significantly. Officers involved in Operation Siege were less positive and indicated that in the Frenchtown community, most of the residents were renters who had little stake in the area and were not likely to become involved. Residents in the Bond area felt that community involvement had increased, but attributed this effect to the Bond organization itself, rather than to Operation Siege. Members of the Frenchtown community organization felt that the presence of police officers directly increased attendance and participation at their meetings.

There was virtually no response to this question in the New York INOP sites. One administrator indicated that there had been a big recruitment drive for volunteers in one precinct and that the people in that community were beginning to look more favorably on the van. And a community member in another precinct also thought that people were beginning to get more involved. This lack of response to the question regarding community involvement and organization is illustrative of the inability of New York's INOP program to involve the larger community. The few residents who volunteered in the vans in the two research precincts are the same people who are involved in many other precinct activities. Despite some efforts to involve other residents in the project, implementation problems (*e.g.*, the very limited hours of operation and numerous mechanical difficulties) and fear of retaliation by drug dealers or of traveling at night just to get to the volunteer training, limited involvement to a very small group of community activists. In addition, the project seemed unable to attract many people to use the services available on the vans. Indeed, participation by residents was so limited in New York, that the only community residents identified for the research staff to interview were those involved as volunteers.

In contrast, respondents in Portland (who were mostly residents of Iris Court) were very positive about the project's effect on the level of community organization and involvement. According to residents, prior to the start of the Iris Court project, there were no meetings. Now,

the tenants' council meets regularly. While one resident indicated that those not on the residents council are willing to help if asked, most respondents focused on attendance at holiday parties.

In Norfolk, where there was little evidence of community organization or involvement in the PACE project, police officers and administrators were generally quite positive about the project's effects on the community. Residents, on the other hand, had mixed views. One community leader believed he had seen about a 20% increase in civic league attendance since the PACE program began, and he attributed this increase to an increased feeling of safety in the area. In contrast, residents in other PACE areas did not believe attendance had increased at all. One respondent suggested there was a need for two different types of civic leagues -- one that would meet during the day time for senior citizens who were afraid to go out at night and the other that would meet in the evening for people who work during the day.

Police administrators and officers were more likely than residents to respond in terms of *involvement* and mean involvement in fighting crime. Officers involved in the PACE program attributed this increased involvement to the availability of cellular phones; this enabled the residents to call the officer directly, without going through the dispatcher. Residents liked calling the cellular phones because they knew they could do so without having their address displayed (which would put them at risk of having an officer come to their door).

Respondents in Tempe were generally positive about the Beat 16 project's effects on community organization. One administrator saw the function of the project as coordinating and facilitating communication among pre-existing community organizations, and also thought some new organizations had been formed and involvement in existing organizations had increased. Other police administrators and officers mentioned some community involvement in area clean-ups, attendance at parties, and use of the recreation center. One resident also mentioned increased communication on the level of individual residents as a result of the project. One of the few respondents who expressed any negative views about the project's effect was a police administrator who indicated that the design of the Beat 16 project "lumped together" two distinct neighborhoods, with different concerns and different problems. This made it difficult to organize

the community, and he felt that these two neighborhoods should have been treated as individual areas. By the time of the final research site visit to Tempe, however, most respondents agreed that community support and involvement had declined dramatically.

Respondents in Prince George's County were also generally positive about the effects of the COPS program on community organization and involvement. Some of the respondents referred to the Mini Planning committees and how they had increased community involvement in problem solving. As one officer put it:

> We're going to have our meeting at Seat Pleasant Town Hall this time . . . and each member of the committee is going to bring members of their community organizations to this meeting. And what I'm doing now is getting the community more involved in decision making so that decision-making burden or the problem solving will not be my main priority. In other words, I'm getting input from them. I'm getting ideas from them. We're dealing with the SARAs. Now, instead of me doing the SARAs and responding in the assessment, they're providing me with input. They're brainstorming with me. So this is a new approach, and I'm finding it to be very helpful.

Other officers agreed with this assessment, as did some of the residents. One resident of a housing complex said that prior to the program, there were no building meetings in her complex, but that once the officer was assigned to the area, he was able to mobilize the tenants.

Respondents in Louisville also believed their INOP program had increased the involvement of the community. Attendance at tenants meetings was reported to have increased. One police administrator noticed that the number of calls for service had increased in targeted areas, and he attributed this to increased involvement of the residents. Another police administrator said, however, that although community organization had increased, this could not be interpreted as solely due to the COP program. Rather, he believed it was due to a confluence of programs in the district: the Housing Authority had received a HUD Drug Elimination grant and the school system had received money to create family resource centers:

> I'd like to say, "Yes, and it's all to do with the COP program." But a lot of things have been happening that are working together; they seem to be working and helping each other . . . A lot of things seem to be going together at the same time, and that's helping the people in the neighborhood feel like there is some interest in them and that this is the time to be on board and participate.

This Louisville administrator may have identified a critical explanatory factor in the perceptions of respondents in the INOP sites in general. If the nature and extent of the interventions

of the INOP programs are considered objectively, one would expect there to be little effect on drugs and crime in these cities. And to some extent this was the case -- most respondents who perceived any effects on drug dealing saw them as displacement effects or as reductions in *visible* drug trafficking. But most respondents in the INOP sites thought the programs were effective in reducing drug-related crime and fear, had improved relationships between the police and the community, and had increased community organization and involvement. Why? Perhaps it is because, for many of these neighborhoods, this is the first time the police have paid any "attention" to them. And people often feel that *any* intervention is better than no attention at all. In addition, other research conducted by the Vera Institute has shown that community residents often respond positively to police programs and will demand that they stay in the area, even when these same people perceive the programs to be ineffective (McElroy *et al.*, 1993; Sviridoff *et al.*, 1992). Why do the police in these cities perceive their projects to be effective? Part of the reason is probably that they have a vested interest in demonstrating that their programs are effective to continue to receive funding. Additionally, service providers in all fields want to believe that what they are doing is effective and therefore, are more likely to focus on the positive outcomes of their programs than they are on the negative outcomes.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

Given the proliferation of departmental transitions to community policing, it would not be incorrect to call community policing the new orthodoxy of law enforcement in the United States. A recent survey conducted by the FBI and the National Center for Community Policing showed that in cities with populations of 50,000 or more, half of all police officials indicated that they had already implemented community policing, and another 20% reported that they were planning to do so within the next year (Trojanowicz, 1993). Indeed, the allure of community policing and its promise are almost irresistible. Proponents emphasize that under community policing, the community and the police will share the responsibility for improving public safety and the quality of life. In fact, one of the features of community policing that distinguishes it from traditional policing is that it actively encourages community residents to participate in the problem identification and problem solving process. This is in contrast with traditional or professional era policing, which actively sought to exclude the public from such participation.

Community policing is also attractive for other reasons. For example, it promises to shift the responsibility for decision making to patrol officers who are assigned to beats for periods long enough to learn about the concerns of residents, foster trust and engage residents to participate in the problem solving process. Another promise of community policing is that, because officers are assigned to one beat for so long, they become more concerned about the communities they police, and because they are such a visible presence, they are more accountable to the community they serve. The hope is that community policing will reduce fear and increase citizen satisfaction with police services.

This new orthodoxy is being embraced, however, with virtually no systematic research to demonstrate that it is a more effective form of policing than the more traditional approaches. As Skolnick and Bayley (1988) have argued, "Community policing is advancing because it seems to make sense, not because it has been shown to be demonstrably superior." Yet, if community policing is to be granted any legitimacy by the public, its proponents ultimately will have to

demonstrate to community residents that their approach *is* superior. For an impatient public, the face validity of the community policing approach will not be sufficient for long.

The INOP projects have provided Vera researchers with a unique opportunity to help fill this gap in evaluation research by studying the implementation of community policing in eight distinctly different cities. The programs differ greatly in their approach to drug-demand reduction. Portland, for example, relies heavily on social service delivery to 159 residents of one public housing complex, while Houston relies almost exclusively on heavy, traditional law enforcement efforts in two large communities. In addition, the sites vary in their experience with community policing. New York and Houston each have nearly a decade of experience with community policing, and the INOP projects represent only a small portion of their existing community policing base. By contrast, for cities such as Tempe and Hayward, the INOP program represents a pilot project in community policing. The downside to this variability is that because the programs are so highly differentiated, it was impossible to compare them directly.

However, the analysis of observational and interview data revealed that the eight sites had a number of implementation problems in common. The problems of implementation experienced by the eight sites fall into three categories: problems in overcoming patrol officer resistance to the principles of community policing; problems in generating interagency support for and involvement in community policing; and problems in generating active community involvement in community policing. Vera researchers concluded that a description and analysis of these problems would be useful to the many jurisdictions contemplating the implementation of community policing. If these problems are considered *before* the implementation stage, these jurisdictions may make their transitions to community policing more efficient and productive.

Implementation Issues within Police Departments. A major impediment to the successful implementation of community policing is getting patrol officers to accept the principles of the community policing approach (that is, getting them to "buy into" the community policing approach). Patrol officers are particularly resistant to community policing because it promises to alter their role substantially and because the police bureaucracy has produced a well-documented

antagonism between line officers and police management. For example, most of the INOP sites had a very difficult time convincing officers to volunteer for their INOP programs. In most cases, the responses to the posted job vacancies were paltry. This can be attributed, in part, to the lack of adequate understanding of the principles of community policing among patrol officers due to insufficient training (many officers in the INOP projects had not received any training in community policing).

In addition, many officers not participating in the INOP projects defined community policing strictly in terms of its community outreach and partnership components and rejected the concept of community policing on this basis. Many such officers argued that community policing is not "real" police work because it appeared "soft" on crime. The lack of enthusiasm is, in part, the product of insufficient training for officers in the community policing approach. By not providing officers with adequate training in problem-solving community policing, police managers make it easier for officers to reject the approach out of hand. Because it is the *patrol officer* that community policing seeks to elevate to a position of such great importance, it is ironic that so few officers embrace the approach. Police officials who envision the transitions of their own departments to community policing must make a commitment to training. If patrol officers do not understand the principles of community policing, they should not be expected to implement it.

Other jurisdictions contemplating the institutionalization of community policing should also consider that the "special unit status" accorded many of the INOP project officers often serves to exacerbate the conflict between the reform agenda of community policing and the paramilitary structure of police departments. This, in turn, produces resistance to community policing from patrol officers and perpetuates the distrust between management and patrol officers. In addition, it increases the resentment between traditional patrol officers and community police officers, which runs contrary to the goals of community policing. In many of the INOP sites, this intradepartmental rivalry created difficulties in the form of resentment of and resistance to community policing.

Another problem experienced by the INOP sites was the common belief that community policing is a drain on resources and a "do-nothing" assignment and that community policing is unproductive. This perception is partially the result of community police officers (in many cities) not being required to answer 911 calls for service.

Historically, the road to advancement in policing is generally not in patrol, but in special units (*e.g.*, detectives). The effect of this is to take the best stock out of patrol. For community policing to be successful, it must be an exception to this rule. That is, if community policing is to attract the most talented personnel, patrol officers must see it as part of the career path. In the INOP sites (and other community policing programs around the country), the primary incentive for volunteering is not career advancement, but steady hours and weekends off. This too is a source of resentment from other officers.

A very commonly expressed sentiment by patrol officers, both among those involved in the INOP projects and among those not involved, was that community policing is not really new or innovative, just "good old-fashioned" policing. This characterization allows resistant officers to make a case for continuation of the *status quo*. A related source of resistance to community policing among officers is their experience that so-called "new" police programs are short-lived, and come and go with each new police chief. Their perception that community policing will be just another of these fleeting programs results in a lack of credibility for the program.

A major source of resentment among patrol officers is the failure of management to include officers in the planning of the community policing effort. In fact, many officers perceive that police management is more interested in the opinions of the community than in those of their own employees. Some officers expressed the notion that while they had no real problem with the concept of community policing, they resented having it "shoved down their throats."

While officers involved in the INOP programs complained about how the programs were implemented, the biggest stumbling block to acceptance by non-involved officers was the perception that community policing results in a loss of enforcement abilities. These officers, who characterize community policing as "smile and wave" or "social work," rather than "real" polic-

ing, believe that the responsibility to interact with the community, to do problem-solving, precludes them from carrying out aggressive enforcement strategies. This perception was also held by some community residents who worried that community policing might be too "soft" on crime.

For a some of the INOP projects, it appeared that the continued existence of the program rested on a single officer or administrator, and that if that individual were to leave the department or be transferred to another position, the program would cease (or continue in name only). In other sites, the problem was not quite this extreme, but the nature of community policing makes it very susceptible to variations in supervisory style, and in some sites, the extent to which the program was implemented varied by shift. Furthermore, because of community policing's emphasis on interaction between the police and the community, the public's perception of a program may be highly influenced by a single individual. If the officer in a particular beat is especially talented and personable, for example, the residents of that area may become very favorably disposed toward community policing. In contrast, if the only contact area residents have with community policing is with an officer who does not buy into the concept, does not include the residents in his/her problem-solving efforts, *etc.*, the people who live in that area may develop a negative impression of community policing in general. Thus it will be important for police departments to devise new recruitment strategies that will help them select candidates who will be committed to the ideals of working with and for community residents.

Finally, a problem common to virtually all police departments is the overwhelming demands of answering 911 calls, which comes in direct conflict with their desire to do problem-solving. Virtually all the INOP sites experienced (to some degree) the conflict between trying to implement a community policing program, which is inherently resource-intensive, and the need to answer what seem to be an ever-increasing volume of calls for service. This was a sore spot for officers not participating in the program, who felt that the burden on them of running from call to call was increased by the diversion of manpower to community policing.

Issues of Interagency Cooperation. Interagency cooperation may be the least discussed and least well-implemented component of current community policing agendas. This was the case in virtually all the INOP sites. The theory of community policing recognizes that the police cannot do very much about improving the quality of life in neighborhoods without the assistance of residents and other public and private agencies. In addition, problem-solving community policing recognizes that many problems cannot be solved by traditional law enforcement methods and thus require the involvement of other city agencies. However, when officers in the INOP sites did get other city agencies involved in problem solving, they most often relied on *personal contacts* within those agencies. The problem with this approach is that if officers should lose those contacts, they must cultivate new ones.

This is symptomatic of a bigger issue: community policing is almost always implemented as a *police department phenomenon* rather than as a *city agency-wide phenomenon.* Among the INOP sites, only Norfolk mandated that every city agency be involved in the transition to community policing. Thus, in Norfolk, personnel from other city agencies received training along with the police on their roles in the community policing effort. In contrast, in most of the other INOP sites, researchers spoke with representatives from city and county agencies that were supposedly involved in the INOP efforts, only to discover that the agency officials knew virtually nothing about INOP or community policing. In some instances, high-level agency officials had not even *heard* of their city's INOP project.

Because community policing theory acknowledges that the police cannot hope to solve quality-of-life problems without the help of the community and other appropriate city agencies, it is important that other city agencies be incorporated into the transition to community policing *from the beginning.* Such an effort will be difficult as most police departments do not have the resources to train adequately even their own personnel in the principles of community policing. At the very least, employees of other city agencies should understand how they can contribute to problem-solving; in short, they must be instructed in their *role* in community policing, which is no less important than those of beat officers or concerned community residents.

Implementation Issues Surrounding Community Involvement. The final, and most difficult, challenge facing community policing is creating community partnerships. Indeed, INOP project staff in all eight sites argued that building community partnerships was their greatest problem.

Interviews with community residents demonstrated that level of knowledge about the INOP projects or community policing was closely related to the individual's status in the community. Community leaders who had close and frequent interaction with the police had far higher levels of knowledge than did ordinary residents who belonged to no organized community group. Even the most knowledgeable community leaders in most of the sites, however, had only a limited understanding of the goals of the projects or, most importantly, *their role* in community policing. Many community leaders were baffled by the idea of "partnerships" and could not explain what they were expected to do in these partnerships. The most common response to the question, "What do the police mean when they ask for the community's *help*?" was that the police expected residents to call them with information regarding criminal activities. However, this is what the police have always asked the public to do. Only the most enlightened community leaders mentioned the role of the community in the problem identification and problem solving process.

Many community leaders argued that most ordinary residents in their cities were not aware that community policing was being implemented. Community leaders in many of the sites also suggested that the police were not doing enough to educate the public about community policing and the role of the public. Given that police officers in most of the INOP sites had only limited knowledge about problem-solving community policing themselves, it is not surprising that community residents knew little about it.

One common community outreach technique in nearly all the INOP sites was to have "parties," "barbecues," "job fairs," and "picnics." The primary function of such events is to bring residents together in a casual setting with the hopes that they will get to know one another better as a first step in building a sense of solidarity in the community. Such events also allow residents

to meet police officers in a non-threatening situation. The importance of these events is undeniable. In fact, when residents in communities affected by the INOP projects were asked to tell researchers about the project, most would *define* the INOP project in terms of the picnics, parties, *etc.* Unfortunately, however, they knew virtually nothing of the *substance* of community policing or their INOP project. In short, when used as a primary source of outreach, such events do virtually nothing to educate the community about community policing or their role in it.

When questioned about INOP's effect on levels of community organization, residents tended to mistake large turnouts for block parties and barbecues as manifestations of solidarity. Community leaders and residents involved in community organizations, however, reported that in most instances, the INOP projects did not increase the level of community organization.

There are a number of reasons why more community residents did not get involved in the INOP projects. Many respondents argued that fear of retaliation from drug dealers is a major reason that more people do not attempt to help the police. Respondents in some cities indicated that they would not call the police to report drug activity because the police would then appear on their doorsteps to question them while drug dealers looked on. While residents applauded intensive law enforcement efforts to arrest and harass drug dealers and buyers in many of the INOP sites (sweeps in Norfolk and Tempe, for example), they also thought that the effects of such operations were short-lived, at best. Such heavy enforcement tactics do little to reduce the fear of crime in the long term.

Another major reason that community residents were not enthusiastic about getting involved with the INOP projects and community policing in general, is the historically poor relationships between the police and the community. The INOP projects, and community policing projects in general, are almost always implemented in areas of cities inhabited by poor, minority residents. Such areas have historically borne the brunt of police abuses, and these abuses will not soon be forgotten, according to community residents. It is because of the generally negative perception many residents of poor areas have of the police, that effective community outreach and education become so important to the successful implementation of community policing.

"Apathy," according to many police and community respondents, was another major reason that residents were not involved in the INOP projects. Many officers criticized community residents for being apathetic and not acting on an opportunity "to better their own lives" through community policing. This perspective, however, fails to appreciate the depth of the distrust and fear of the police among residents living in minority communities. Taken in an historical perspective, the apparent unwillingness of residents to involve themselves in INOP or any other community policing initiative, may be less a product of "apathy" than of fear and suspicion of the police grounded in the largely negative experiences residents have had with the police in the past. In addition, residents of poor areas have seen a continuous stream of police and other city agency "projects" come and go with little effect on their quality of life. Residents have developed a healthy skepticism about government projects that are designed to "help" them.

The lack of effective outreach also contributed to a lack of knowledge and understanding of the role of the community in the community policing enterprise. Even many community leaders were unsure of what the police want them to do in the "partnerships" that community policing proposes to develop.

Finally, the concept of "community" is itself problematic in the implementation of community policing. The INOP data show that within those areas the police define as "communities," there are often a number of groups competing for scarce resources. Very often, the rivalries between and within community organizations keep many residents from becoming involved in these organizations and, consequently, from becoming involved in community policing.

Recommendations. That the INOP sites were generally unsuccessful in stimulating community organization is not surprising, as the police have little experience in doing this. It is, however, a skill that police departments *must* develop if they hope to stimulate community involvement. If police departments can involve other city agencies in the implementation of community policing from the beginning of the process, rather than as an afterthought, these agencies could be of use in stimulating community involvement through their attempts to educate the

public about community policing. If cities continue to implement their new community policing efforts as isolated police department phenomena, they will surely limit whatever potential community policing may have for improving the quality of life in our cities.

By the same token, police administrators must come to see police training and education and community education and training as equally important. Existing community organizations and community leaders are the logical first target of such education and training, but it must be remembered that in those areas that almost always serve as the sites for community policing projects, very often there are few functioning community groups. The police, in concert with other city and private agencies, must seek to create organization where it does not exist. If cities fail to do this in their community policing efforts they will neglect their most important audience -- the average resident. While it could be argued that a high level of community organization is not necessary for community policing to function effectively, it may also be argued that communities that have high levels of organization and solidarity are far more likely to be able to help "police themselves" -- one of the principle goals of community policing. This is not meant to suggest that the education of the community will be an easy undertaking, for it will prove far more difficult than the training of police officers. It is meant to suggest that if police departments are unwilling or unable to organize and educate ordinary community residents in their role under community policing, the experiment cannot help but fail.

One of the things that police departments must do before instituting community policing is gauge as accurately as possible the resources necessary to do community policing, whether they are planning on implementing community policing city-wide or in smaller areas of the city. The reason this is such an important prerequisite is that almost all INOP sites promised communities regular beat officers who would be there "permanently" (meaning at least 18 months to two years). Yet, in most cases residents complained that beat officers were rotated; they didn't know their officers; they didn't see their beat officers as often as they did when community policing was first introduced in the area; *etc.* If police departments keep making promises that they are unable to keep because of inadequate resources, they will lose all credibility.

For example, even though community policing is so politically popular among community residents and politicians, police departments must be wary of expanding community policing efforts too quickly. When expansion is too rapid, community policing enters an area and makes people feel good for a while; but then the police are withdrawn, laying the burden for the maintenance of whatever gains may have been made on communities that do not have the capacity to maintain those gains. Thus, if police departments choose to make community policing a city-wide effort, they must make certain that the resources needed to implement it are available to them. The other alternative, as was the case in most INOP sites, is to make a concerted effort in a reasonably sized target area. This approach will enable the police department to gauge the amount of resources needed to implement community policing on a larger scale, and will also allow them to test in the future the efficacy of community policing.

Police departments must be very careful not to overestimate the effects of community policing. If they fail to exercise caution, they risk losing credibility with both line officers and the community, two groups that are critical to the success of community policing. Despite the lack of impact on the demand for drugs, community residents in most sites believed that their INOP program had fostered better relationships between the police and the community. This may be because target area residents enjoyed being the focus of police attention and believed that, given time, the program would eventually be more effective. As time passes, however, if these programs do not begin to achieve the goals they set for themselves, the community will lose faith and may become even more alienated from the police than they were prior to the program's inception. Certainly many residents of these neighborhoods look upon community policing programs with a healthy skepticism even from the beginning, and if police departments set unattainable goals for their community policing programs, the community will soon realize it.

In the same vein, cities that are implementing community policing must keep in mind the importance of the community "partnership" aspect of community policing and know that community leaders and residents will quickly discern the difference between a department that wants a genuine partnership with the community and one that pays lip service to the idea. In some of

the INOP sites, the participation of interested community members was limited to "rubber stamping" strategies developed by the police to solve problems identified by the police. If community involvement in the effort is to be maintained, it must include problem identification by the community and community involvement in developing and implementing strategies. This is not to suggest that community members should be part of every decision-making process or that they should have access to sensitive information. However, they certainly can be called upon to suggest strategies and to participate in their implementation (at least to some extent). If "help" means simply providing information on crimes, then community policing does not provide the new role promised for community residents, and they will soon come to recognize this.

Given the monumental nature of the tasks involved, the transition to community policing will take a considerable amount of time. It remains to be seen whether an already impatient public will accept this fact. In large cities with extremely diverse populations and overwhelming police bureaucracies, the process will undoubtedly take far longer. However, the transition may be made faster and more productive if *cities* make a commitment to a transition that places equal importance on the training of the police, the public, and workers in all city agencies. Because it will, at least initially require more resources, cities will have to commit themselves to larger budgets in an increasingly difficult fiscal climate. If, however, community policing remains an isolated police department phenomenon, it is difficult to see how the problems of implementing community policing can be overcome.

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