POLICE PATROL TACTICS:
A REVIEW OF RECENT EXPERIMENTS AND RESEARCH

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Introduction

In the past ten years the body of knowledge concerning the effectiveness of various patrol strategies to deter crime, increase apprehensions, or improve community-police relations has expanded considerably. A small number of experimental research projects have explored the effectiveness of preventive, aggressive, and structured patrol tactics, as well as patrol efforts to provide community-oriented policing. In spite of the growth in knowledge about patrol, however, there is much that remains unknown. Although there is descriptive material which points to the effectiveness of a number of strategies, research has not yet demonstrated whether high-visibility (or saturation) patrol actually deters crime, or simply displaces it; measured the effectiveness of directed deterrent patrol; established the relationship between decoy strategies -- and other low-visibility techniques -- and the ability to apprehend offenders; or determined conclusively which patrol methods are most effective in which situations.

The increasing research interest of the seventies in the effectiveness of preventive patrol and the impact on the community of such patrol represents a departure from the patrol research of the sixties. The workload studies of the earlier decade focused on analysis of the components of the patrol day -- the amount of time spent on, and activities generated by, calls for service, administrative tasks and preventive patrol.[1] Such studies demonstrated that most patrol time was spent on service and order maintenance

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[1] For a review of workload analyses of the patrol function see Michele Sviridoff, Calls for Service: Recent Research on Measuring and Managing the Demand (New York: Vera Institute, 1982).

functions and only a small proportion of patrol tasks (generally less than 20%) involved law enforcement or crime control activities. In contrast, patrol research of the seventies focused on exploring the effectiveness of random preventive patrol and other patrol options, specifically as crime control strategies.

A number of the earliest studies of this kind point to the effectiveness of increased patrol presence as a crime deterrent (Operation 25, the New York City 20th Precinct Study). Although the findings of such studies confirmed conventional wisdom, they were not based on sophisticated controlled research or experimental designs. Nor did they clearly differentiate among the types of strategies under scrutiny (saturation patrol or increased patrol presence; foot patrol or RMP patrol coverage).

In contrast, some workload studies suggested that random preventive patrol was inefficient. One such study (Reiss, 1971) termed random preventive patrol "remarkably unproductive." The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al, 1974) was designed to provide the first experimental research into the effectiveness of varying levels of routine preventive patrol. The findings of that study support Reiss's assertion that such patrol produced little. The ensuing controversy about that study represented not only the recalcitrance of adherents of the conventional wisdom, but also general concern about the implementation of experimental conditions and the validity of the findings. Nevertheless, the Kansas City experiment pointed to the need to explore the effectiveness of other forms of patrol organization and strategy, which might be more productive.

Subsequent experimental patrol research can be characterized as involving two distinct areas: the first emphasizes the integration of community-oriented patrol strategies with crime control agendas; the second

is primarily concerned with increasing deterrence and apprehension through various crime-specific strategies, often supported by computer-based, crime analysis units. Some of the resultant efforts in both areas involve reorganization and restructuring of the patrol force (team police and the decentralization movement; Wilmington split force). Other efforts permit new strategies to take the place of random preventive patrol within an unchanged organizational framework (New Haven's directed deterrent patrol, for example).

Historically, the focus on community-oriented strategies can be seen as a response to the urban riots of the sixties, increasing concern with 'police harassment' in minority neighborhoods, and the acknowledged alienation of patrolmen from the community. The strategies which emerged as a response to these conditions (team policing, community policing, the resurgence of interest in foot patrol) assumed that improved community relations would lead to increased citizen support and information which might bolster crime control efforts. Although such strategies echo workload studies' concern with service and order maintenance functions, they emerged primarily in response to particular historical conditions and (unlike the workload studies) emphasized the importance of non-crime related functions in the crime control effort.

There is much greater variety among the second type of strategies which emerged in response to the growing belief that random preventive patrol was unproductive. Many of thee more focused, crime-related patrol strategies which developed in the seventies involved "directed" patrol of specific areas as specific times, predicted by crime analysis units to be where (and when) criminal activity was most likely to occur. Other "directed" strategies involve the saturation of such areas, or the stationing of covert patrols

there, or the combination of high- and low-visibility patrols where crimes are expected. Such patrol is "directed" in that it is non-random, but aimed at particular problems in particular times and places; the patrol tactics employed are sometimes fashioned to deal with particular patterns of crime occurrence.

The following sections review what is known about the effectiveness of these various forms of patrol. Section I concerns early patrol studies, which attempt to assess the impacts of increased patrol presence. Section II reviews literature on community-oriented patrol strategies. Section III reviews recent "directed" or structured patrol strategies and various crime-specific tactics employed by special units.

I. Early Patrol Studies

Although the bulk of research on the impacts of random preventive patrol and increased patrol visibility appeared in the seventies, research interest in such issues extends for at least twenty years. Much of the early research on these issues is methodologically flawed. This section concerns the body of research into impacts of routine preventive patrol in various forms, (i.e., that activity normally engaged in by patrol officers when they are not responding to calls for service or engaged in administrative duties). A major question of these studies involves the impacts of increased patrol visibility -- be it foot patrol; transit patrol; routine preventive patrol in cars; or increased apparent patrol presence, generated by one-man cars or take home patrol cars. Some of these studies involve saturation or "high visibility" patrol techniques, also employed by directed and crime-specific patrol units, discussed in section III. They are included here because these studies were presented in response to questions concerning the efficacy of increasing routine patrol visibility.

One of the earliest, and perhaps most dramatic, attempts to determine the impacts of increased patrol presence was Operation 25, conducted in New York City for four months in 1954 in a single Harlem precinct. During the test period the number of uniformed patrolment in the precinct was more than doubled, increasing from 188 to 440, with the addition of almost an entire graduating class of police academy recruits. Foot patrol and investigative forces were given additional manpower, but RMP coverage went unchanged. Foot patrolmen were designated responsibility for areas on a single street, approximately four blocks long, to permit constant visual surveillance of those areas. Officers were held accountable for crimes in their areas during their beats. The project was deemed an overwhelming success, leading to a

55.6% decrease in reported felonies compared to a comparable four month period in the previous year (Dahmann, 1974).

Yet the findings of the Operation 25 research are subject to criticisms, many of which are equally applicable to other early research on increased patrol presence. The research provided no comparison or control precincts, involved no investigation of possible displacement effects on adjacent areas, and relied on official crime reports, recognized as an inadequate measure of true crime incidence in a given area.[2]

In addition, the project to some extent misrepresented itself as providing a "police force sufficiently large and intelligently deployed." In fact, Operation 25 involved saturation patrol, rather than a simple increase in police presence. Few departments could afford to maintain such manning levels. Nor did the Operation 25 research consider the relative impacts of various types of patrol coverage -- RMP, the doubled foot patrol force and the expanded investigative squads. The project reinforced the belief that "more is better", but it did not indicate the relative importance of different type of forces or tactics, nor did it deal with the issue of displacement or the cost effectiveness of the saturation strategy.

Another New York City effort to assess impacts of increased patrol forces was more carefully designed. The 20th Precinct project provided for a substantial increase in patrol manpower (from an estimated 212 to nearly 300

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[2] "The dark figure of crime" problem concerns the discrepancy between reported and true crime rates. It is generally recognized that a great deal of committed crimes (typically, 50%) are not reported. The proportion of committed crimes actually reported may vary from place to place and from time to time, and variance may relate to the extent of police presence and the quality of police-community relations. Later, more sophisticated patrol studies employ both victimization data and measures of reported crime in order to control for the possibility that changes in reported crime reflect changes in reporting behavior, rather than changes in actual crime occurrence (Biderman, 1967; Dahmann, 1974).

officers -- a 40% increase) for a single month, October 1966. Research on the project, relying on a before-after comparison design, discovered a significant decline (i.e., greater than predicted from review of reported crime in comparable areas) in the number of crimes visible from the street (robbery, grand larceny, auto theft and other "outside" felonies and misdemeanors) during the test period (Press, 1971).

The 20th Precinct Project research was one of the few early patrol studied to address the issue of crime displacement. Press examined possible displacement of crime in three adjacent precincts. He found that possible displacement was confined to a single precinct, the Central Park area, where outside crimes increased consistently, although to a lesser extent than they decreased in the experimental precinct. One virtue of Press's design was that comparison precincts were distinct from areas in which displacement might occur; they were not immediately contiguous to the experimental area, and were not likely to be affected by displacement.

Yet the research was impaired by a major, city-wide change in crime-reporting method. This change made it difficult to compare October '66 statistics (the experimental month) with October, '65. In addition, the research has been criticized for its reliance on reported crime data and the lack of experimental design (Dahmann, 1974). Although the project is recognized as demonstrating an apparent impact on the reported crime level, the research provides little information on how additional manpower was deployed and what form of patrol activity was tested. It is not clear that the impacts on reported crime were the result of experimental efforts.

Another early study of the impacts of increased police patrol explored the effects of expanding visible patrol manpower in three Washington precincts for a one-month period in 1970 (Budnick, 1971). Budnick employed a

before/after comparison design in which comparsion areas (where there was no expansion of patrol) were selected according to the extent that reported crime patterns displayed similar trends over time to those in experimental precincts. Budnick found different impacts in each precinct: in one precinct there was a significant decline in reported burglary and assault; in another, robbery and auto theft declined significantly; and in the third, there was no significant change in reported crime. He also found some evidence of spatial displacement to adjacent areas. The shortness of the experimental period may be responsible for the mixed results, but the findings also suggest that the impact of increased police visibility may vary greatly in different settings.

A retrospective case study of another increase in patrol manpower had more positive results. Reviewing the impacts of the doubling of transit patrol personnel in New York City Subways during the 8 pm-4 am shift in 1965, Chaiken et al. (1974) found a substantial decrease in the felony crime rate for that shift. In addition, the research found a "phantom" effect, responsible for a reduction in daytime subway crime, when increased manpower was not deployed. Chaiken et al, reviewed transit crime data retrospectively for eight years in an attempt to discern the impact of the 1965 manpower increase. They report that for a brief period subway crime was displaced to buses, until the institution of New York City instituted an exact change policy for bus travel. Thereafter, the reduction on the subways was not reflected in any increase in other forms of public transportation. Although not conceived as an experiment, the research provides a rather compelling case study of the potential deterrent impact of a major increase in police visibility in a limited area. Yet the study also suggests that deterrence is costly -- an estimated $35,000 for each crime not committed.

Another high-visibility project, based on deployment of one man patrol cars, deserves brief note. In 1953, the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department experimented in "doubling" police visibility by switching from two-man units to one-man units.[3] Comparison of pre-experimental crime rates with post-experimental rates revealed a 20.51% decrease in Part I crime reported in the city for the time period in which the one-man units were operational, in spite of an increase in crime rates in other similar cities during that time (Branna, 1957). The research, however, suffers from inadequate design -- lack of appropriate comparison groups and reliance on reported crime rates alone.

Another way of creating an apparent increase in patrol visibility without an actual increase in manpower is the take-home car system, in which patrol officers, who live and work in the same city, use patrol cars in off-hours "to increase the police visibility in the community and to provide greater response capability in emergency situations." (Hale, 1981:102.) There is little evidence of the effectiveness of such an approach. The

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[3] Arguments about the relative effectiveness and safety of one- and two-man patrol cars continue to this day. Boydstun et al. (1977) conducted the first experimental research into the relative benefits of the two approaches during a year-long experiment (October 1975-September, 1976) in San Diego. Experimental precincts were chosen through a stratified sampling method, which considered existing staffing levels (one- or two-man cars), as well as socio-economic character of precincts. Four areas were selected: in two previously one-man precincts, one-man cars were either continued or replaced by two-man cars; in two previously two-man precincts, two-man cars were either continued or replaced by one-man cars.

The research found that "one-officer patrol units offer equal performance and increase officer safety as well as substantial cost saving." (p.6). It also found that one-man units were more likely to make arrests and submit formal crime reports than two-man units, which may rely more on informal mechanisms. One-man units were also less likely to be involved in resistance to arrest. The research determined that the San Diego Police Department might field 18 one-man units for less money than ten two-man units, with no greater risk and with improved calls for service coverage. The report does not consider the possible deterrent impacts of increased coverage. (See also, Serrill, 1978.)

Indianapolis fleet plan permitted take-home cars in 1969 and required patrol officers to keep radios on at all times and respond to emergency calls. A review of the impacts of that effort suggests that outdoor crimes (auto theft, purse snatching) did not increase as much as expected, given projected crime rates based on a five-year review; other crimes increased more than expected (Walton, 1972). Yet, according to Dahmann (1974), lack of control in the study makes it impossible to attribute the observed changes with any confidence to the fleet plan effort.

The single, most rigorous attempt to determine the impacts of varying levels of police patrol is the Kansas City Patrol Experiment conducted by the Police Foundation from October 1, 1972 to September 30, 1973. This study sought to compare three different levels of patrol within fifteen patrol districts of the South Patrol Division. The areas in which the different levels were applied were selected on the basis of a rigorous method of stratifying, matching and random assignment. Five areas were designated control beats, where patrol was to continue "as usual". Five were designated reactive beats, i.e., beats with no routine preventive patrol. (Reactive patrols were to enter their beats only in response to calls for service and, at other times, to patrol either the perimeter of their beats or adjacent proactive beats.) The final five areas were designated proactive beats, in which the level of police patrol visibility was increased two to three times. The researchers on this project found:

> ...the overwhelming evidence is that decreasing or increasing routine preventive patrol within the range tested in this experiment had no effect on crime, citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police (or) on the delivery of police service, response time or traffic accidents (Kelling et al. 1974).

Yet, the Kansas City Patrol experiment gave rise to considerable controversy, in spite of the fact that it was conducted with far more rigor than any previous effort to assess impacts of varying levels of patrol. It is argued that the three types of patrol in the experiment were not implemented and the distinctions between them were less clear than intended. Some reviewers point to "incursions" into reactive beats by patrol units of various kinds (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1975). Others argue that beats were not large enough and distinct enough for citizens to detect differences; that reactive patrol presence was not entirely withdrawn; that officers responded more rapidly to calls for service in reactive beats than might be expected if they were, in fact, patrolling outside their beats; and that patrol visibility in reactive beats was at times as large as it had been before the experiment (Farmer, 1976; Davis and Knowles, 1975; Larson,, 1975). Larson also contends that the range of patrol intensities in the experiment was too limited, since many large cities typically provide considerably greater coverage than even the proactive beats; he warns against generalizing from the experiment.

Such criticisms make it clear that we cannot accept the Kansas City Experiment as a valid test of the elimination of random preventive patrol, or of the range of patrol intensities. (Patrol coverage could be substantally higher than that provided in the proactive beats.) Reactive beats continued to provide patrol visibility. Yet the experiment does increase our knowledge of what officers do on random patrol during uncommitted time; it points to considerable non-police activity during that time. Larson accepts the experiment as pointing to the inefficiency of random preventive patrol and suggests that:

> patrol administrations in other cities -- if they proceed with care, as was done in Kansas City -- can be quite flexible in redistributing their resources spatially within a confined region. This conclusion, which seems to emerge as an unexpected by-product of the experiment, allows implementation of crime-directed patrols in high crime areas, and the locations and strategies of such patrols could change on a day-by-day or even hour-by-hour basis. The need for such focusing of patrol efforts is amply demonstrated in the Kansas City Report, which revealed that aimless, purposeless patrol resulted in time spent on many non-police and trivial activities. (271). (Emphasis added)

In spite of criticisms, the Kansas City experiment led to a shift in the focus of patrol research. Since the experiment, studies of the impact of increased patrol presence are far less frequent. Subsequent patrol studies never fail to mention the Kansas City experiment and generally present themselves as efforts to qualify or supplement the findings of that research.

For example, a relatively recent study of the impact of saturation patrol by RMP officers in Nashville sees itself as providing partial confirmation of the Kansas City experiment. For a ten day period, patrol car levels were multiplied four times in two police zones (downtown business districts) during a day shift (9-5) and, in two similar zones, during a night shift (7-3). Participating patrol officers were freed from calls-for-service responsibility during the experiment to assure maximum time devoted to random preventive patrol. Schnelle et al. (1977) found a significant decrease in reported Part I crimes during night patrols, but no impact during day patrols. The researchers suggest that major increases in random preventive patrol (or saturation patrol) are most effective at night because there are fewer people to observe, less traffic, and greater police visibility. The implication is that saturation patrol in busy daylight hours is not particularly noticeable.

Dahmann (1975), reviewing LEAA's High-Impact Anti-Crime Programs, completely accepts the Kansas City Experiment as demonstrating that

"'preventive' patrol, the presence of police patrol officers not actively engaged in any police function, could not be shown to have a deterrent effect on crime levels in the patrol areas." (p.2) She suggests, however, that deterrent effects may vary with the type of patrol and that preventive tactics may be more effective when focused on high-crime areas.

Dahmann (1975) reviews three High-Impact Programs whose primary strategy involved substantial patrol increase: the Special Crime Attack Team in Denver, Colorado, which deployed a team of 32 patrolmen in high crime areas to supplement the regular force in an attempt to reduce burglary; the Concentrated Crime Patrol, in Cleveland, Ohio, which devoted 120 RMP officers to high crime districts covering one-third of the city; and the Pilot Foot Patrol Program in St. Louis, Missouri, which used supplementary foot patrol (RMP officers on overtime) in high crime districts to support regular patrol. For each project, Dahmann projected possible crime rates using official reported crime data for various Part I crimes for the experimental areas, adjacent areas (to review displacement or carry-over effects) and the rest of the city. She found that in some instances decreases in crime in the target area were reflective of a city-wide trend. Yet she also reports some crime reductions, specific to target areas (decreased murder and assault in Denver; decreased robbery in Cleveland). There was some evidence of both displacement and carry-over effects. She concludes that:

> In general these results suggest that while there may be no uniform relationship between overt police patrol activity and official crime levels there is evidence that patrols implemented in high crime areas have been accompanied by crime levels which are lower than would have been expected based on past crime levels in the area. (p. xiii.)

The evidence can only "suggest" the patrol effect, since a controlled design, which would have strengthened the attribution of effect to program, was not employed in any of the cities.

Can increased levels of routine preventive patrol reduce the volume of reported crime? There is no definitive answer to that question. The research that has been done, even the impressively designed Kansas City experiment, suffers from a variety of methodological inadequacies. Taken together, these studies strongly suggest that modest increases or decreases in the levels of routine preventive patrol have little or no effect on the volume of reported crime. Really dramatic increases in patrol coverage, on the other hand, appear to have some deterrent impact on some types of crime in some situations, although it is difficult to predict which crimes are most likely to be deterred.

II. Community-Oriented Patrol Efforts

The influence of the Kansas City Patrol Experiment has been widespread, despite acknowledged problems with the research. It is routinely cited as having led to "the demise of random patrol" (Gay et al., 1977). Yet even before the results of that experiment became public, there was growing discontent with routine motor patrol. Patrolmen in cars, often with windows closed, seemed increasingly removed from the community. In the early seventies, there was revived interest in

> ...harking back to days when the police officer was a familiar neighborhood personality who knew the people on his beat, how they made their living, and which ones he could trust. (Bloch and Ulberg, 1972:55.)

Theorists proclaimed interest in a "decentralized, neighborhood oriented, order maintenance patrol force" (Wilson, 1973-2:163). In such a force, patrolmen would be primarily concerned with keeping a quiet beat, responding to problems as they arose, and developing contacts for information and victim-witness support within the neighborhood.

The strategy of team policing emerged in response to these perceived needs. Although in practice team policing meant different things in different places, in most communities the approach entailed geographical stability (fixed neighborhood assignments for team members); maximum interaction among team members; and maximum communication between patrol teams and the community. Operationally, team policing entailed many, if not all, of the following elements: formal team conferences, in which community information was developed and exchanged; community conferences; community participation; unity of supervision; flexibility at the patrol level; decentralization;

and a combination of patrol and investigative personnel (Sherman, 1973).[4] Organizational principles embodied in such a structure included participant decision-making, decentralized service delivery, generalist officers exercising greater discretion in the field, increased team responsibility for neighborhood conditions and enhanced policy-community relations (Gay, Day and Woodward 1977). Team policing, so conceived, was as much an organizational strategy as it was on operational strategy for patrol.

In reviews of early team police efforts, both Gay, Day and Woodward and Sherman report that a number of attempts to implement such a strategy failed because some team policing concepts were not adequately understood or operationalized.[5] In part, dispatchers were at fault; in only three of Sherman's seven case studies did dispatching procedures permit teams to maintain geographical stability. Sherman also found that team leaders failed to implement team and/or community conferences and that team policing suffered

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[4] The Rochester Coordinated Team Patrol Program, a successful variation of neighborhood team policing, shifted away from the community orientation of previous experiments (Bloch and Bell, 1976). In Rochester, detectives and patrol forces combined in teams designed to improve investigation and apprehension of target crimes (robbery, burglary, larceny) in an experiment based on Rand's study of criminal investigations (Greenwood and Petersilia, 1975:) An evaluation of the program, comparing two experimental neighborhoods to a control neighborhood in which previous patrol style was maintained, reviewed five months of program operations in 1973 and found a 50 percent increase in arrests for burglary, a tripling of robbery arrests and a doubling of larceny arrests. There was a similar impact on crime clearance rates. This experiment is not included in the body of the text, because it is more concerned with crime follow-up and investigation than with tactics of preventive patrol. For a similar patrol strategy, see the discussion of Wilmington structured patrol in Section III.

[5] Sherman reviewed early experiences with team policing in two small cities (Holyoke, Mass. and Richmond, California), two medium cities (Dayton, Ohio and Syracuse, N.Y.), two large cities (Los Angeles, Calif. and Detroit, Mich.) and one "super city" (New York, N.Y.). In addition, Gay, Day and Woodward considered team police efforts in North Charleston, San Bruno, Albuquerque, Rochester, Hartford, San Diego, Albany, Charlotte, Cincinnatti, Palo Alto, St. Petersburg, and Menlo Park.

from a lack of co-ordination and from middle management intereference. Sherman reports that:

> It was not long before the team members noticed that team policing hardly differed from the 'policing' they had done before. In most cases, the style of police work changed very little....But it is impossible to say whether the organizational style of team policing failed to produce a new patrol style or whether the organizational style of team policing was not, in those cases, created at all. (p. 73.)

Gay, Day and Woodward report positive impacts on police attitude and workload management and little impact on crime control, and community services. They found little information about the impacts of team policing on officer role, job satisfaction, and investigative effectiveness, although existing reports suggest that impacts in these areas were mixed, at best.

The only careful, long-term experiment to test the impacts of team policing was conducted in Cincinnati between 1973 and 1975 with support from the Police Foundation and the Urban Institute (Schwartz and Clarren, 1977). Community Sector policing (COMSEC) was instituted in two residentially black, business districts, comprising 3.7 square miles with a population of 35,000. The two areas accounted for approximately 25% of the crime in the city. Team officers were responsible for all activities in the experimental neighborhood, replacing a batery of special units. The patrol team was decentralized and autonomous, stressing informal interaction, increased communication between members and a generalist role for patrol officers. Yet the project proved difficult to implement. Costs for planning, management, training and research and development were high. In addition, during the history of COMSEC, team policing proved difficult to maintain. Schwartz and Clarren report that management decisions undermined the program: there was a drift toward increased central control, incursions by special units, and a gradual return to more standard patrol operations.

In evaluating COMSEC, Schwartz and Clarren conducted before-after surveys (including a victimization survey) with neighborhood and other city residents and COMSEC officers, and reviewed police records. They found that during the experiment burglary (both business and residential) decreased significantly more than in the rest of the city, based on official statistics. Other crimes followed the same trends as the rest of the city. There was a perceived (although small) improvement in police-community relations; citizens felt officers were more likely to arrive than before team policing, that foot patrol presence was more noticeable and that team policing was a good idea. The researchers also found, however, that citizen satisfaction was no greater than in areas without team policing and that tangible (as opposed to perceived) improvements in community relations were not evident. In all, the body of literature on team policing suggests that it was difficult to implement, and not necessarily likely to change routine preventive patrol activities.

In the early 70's, San Diego ran a team policing program and were disappointed in the results. Patrol structure had been functionally modified, but officers' perceptions of their roles remained unchanged; they would persistently revert to routine preventive patrol practices. San Diego's Community Oriented Policing (COP) was designed as a response to the early experience in part to address some of these problems with team policing -- to help change officers perceptions of the patrol function, to increase officer-community interaction and to expand officers knowledge of their individual beats (Boydstun and Sherry, 1975). The concept of the community or beat "profile" was central to the project; 24 experimental officers and three experimental sergeants were trained in the community profile approach, in which "profiling work", (gathering information on community problems,

priorities and resources through repeated data collection and analysis) becomes an integral part of the patrol day. Experimental officers alternated shifts with control officers, not trained in this approach.

The design used a stratified random approach, assigning 24 pairs of experimental and control officers to the same beats for a ten-month period. It found that experimental and control officers did not differ in ability to respond to calls for service or in arrest performance; experimental officers alone, however, based on before-after patrol officer surveys, showed a marked improvement in attitudes toward the community, knowledge about the community, contact with the community, acceptance of citizen advocacy roles, and attention to beat problems. Experimental officers were more likely to exercise discretion and less likely to engage in random preventive patrol. Unexpectedly, they were not more likely to refer citizens to community services, perhaps, as the authors speculate, because increased knowledge of the community led to an assessment of available services as inadequate. Research on Community Oriented Policing and the community profile approach does not consider the relationship between changed officer attitudes and behavior and crime control or the level of order maintenance activities.

Another variation on team policing in Hartford, Connecticut combined efforts to change the physical environment to provide "defensible space", efforts to increase resident use and control of their own neighborhood, and efforts to promote police-citizen co-operation within that neighborhood. In 1976, under the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Project, in an attempt to curb robbery, burglary, and fear of crime in the Asylum Hill area, streets were closed or made to run one-way, two neighborhood police teams were formed, and a formal neighborhood organization was established (Fowler and Mangione, 1981). In the first year, these strategies led to reduced stranger

presence in the neighborhood, increased patrol presence and increased resident use of the neighborhood. A first year evaluation found that burglary and robbery arrests increased markedly and the burglary rate dropped. There were also strong indications of improved social control; it could no longer be said that

> Residents avoided their streets and yards, did not know their neighbors, could not exercise any control over who used their neighborhood or for what purpose...(creating) an environment where offenders could comfortably wander residential streets. (p. 5).

Fowler and Mangione also report, however, that in the second and third year of the project there were marked changes in program implementation, at least on the patrol side. Personnel cutbacks led to reduced manpower: team police personnel no longer attended community meetings, calls for service effectiveness was reduced, and fewer arrests were made. At the same time, there was an increased number of teen-aged loiterers around the neighborhood perimeter. In the second and third year of the program, burglary rates increased, as did the proportion of households burglarized, although these increases were less than in other comparable areas of the city. Nevertheless, the research also found continuing impact on measures of informal social control: residents continued to use the neighborhood more than before the program; they were more likely to recognize strangers as strangers; they intervened in suspicious situations; they provided reciprocal aid to neighbors; they had a general optimism about the neighborhood; and they were less afraid of crime. These findings suggest that the actual crime rate may be largely independent fear of crime in a neighborhood.[6] By

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[6] Fowler and Mangione support the findings of the Northwestern Research Agreements Project on neighborhood fear of crime, which found little relationship between crime rates and fear of crime. (Skogan et al, 1982)

implication, it also appears that decreased police presence was associated with increase in crime rates, although the research did not focus on this issue.

The recent resurgence of interest in foot patrol strategies can be traced in part to the same kinds of concerns as gave rise to team policing, community-oriented policing and the Hartford project. Yet, as was apparent in Section I, foot patrol has also been employed, and successfully employed, in early efforts to deter crime through increased patrol visibility. In the seventies, foot patrol efforts were also proclaimed as a method of reducing the isolation of the patrolman from the beat and bolstering police-community relations, (Pendland and Gay, 1972).

For example, Hogan and Fagin, (1974) contend that community relations and crime fighting functions should be fully integrated, not isolated initiatives, as in neighborhood team policing. They report that Carbondale, Illinois foot patrols, instituted as a crime prevention effort, led to "positive inroads" in police-community relations, although they offer little detail.

Pendland and Gay review impacts of a foot patrol experiment conducted in Fort Worth from September 1969 through August, 1970, in a small area (the Short Southside neighborhood) which was responsible for 1/3 of all Part I crimes in the city. Six foot patrols officers were deployed in racially-mixed, two-man teams. During the first year, the foot patrol units made 12,780 "public relations contacts". The researchers credit the project with a ten percent decrease in Part I crimes and a 24 percent decrease in burglaries. Although the Fort Worth crime rate as a whole decreased 11 percent during the experiment, the researchers report that nearly 96 percent of the decrease was in the foot patrol area. In a survey of community

attitudes, the research also found increased levels of satisfaction with the police. Pendland and Gay contend that

> this program may serve as a reminder that involvement in the community at the most direct and personal level may still be the most effective weapon at our disposal. (p.48)

Unfortunately, the research provided no control or comparison areas, no victimization survey, and relied on reported crime data only.[7]

An experiment with police-civilian foot patrol teams in Rochester, New York in 1973 (Police and Citizens--Together Against Crimes, PAC-TAC) was centrally focused on increasing police ties to their beats. Police-citizen foot patrol teams were deployed in relatively high-crime areas in minority neighborhoods. An ethnographic component of the research reports little genuine development of a paraprofessional role for civilians and little expansion of neighborhood contacts through civilian aide. (Smith et al, 1975.) In addition, research found no clear cut evidence of consistent impacts on offenses or arrests.

A recent foot patrol experiment in Flint, Michigan produced considerably more positive results (Trojanowicz, 1983). For three years (1979-1981) foot patrols were instituted in 14 experimental areas; it was

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[7] Other foot patrol evaluations also suffer from inadequate methodology. In Isla Vista, California, a small college community, foot patrols were initiated in 1970, after large scale disorders on campus, in response to deteriorating police-community relations and increasing crime rates (Kinney et al., 1976). Six foot patrol officers were deployed over an area of .56 square miles (population, 10,000) in two shifts; patrol cars were eliminated. Within five months, a survey of 300 residents showed perceived improvements in police relations; 86 percent of those surveyed favored expansion of foot patrol. The researchers report (based on admittedly inadequate data) that in five years of foot patrol reported felonies decreased 35 percent; they also report a 500 percent increase in reports of malicious mischief, which they attribute to increased reporting, brought on by growing trust of the police. Unfortunately, without a before-after victimization survey it is difficult to interpret such data with confidence.

hoped that foot patrol would serve as the basis for improved police/community relations and initiate community involvement in crime control. The program involved both one-man and two-man beats; base-houses where officers could be contacted regularly; and beats which, in the first two years at least could, be thoroughly covered in a single day.

The evaluation involved personal interviews with residents, neighborhood leaders, police officers, etc.; review of crime and calls-for-service data for the base year, 1978, and the experimental period; and review of foot patrol reports and media coverage. The researchers found close to a nine percent decrease in total crime experimental areas, compared to a 25 percent increase in total crimes city-wide. Impacts on sex crimes, auto thefts, assault and vandalism were particularly strong. The research also found a 43% decrease in calls for service to central communications over the three year period. (It is likely that many incidents were handled informally on the beat by foot patrol officers, or that calls to base-stations were substituted for calls to the station.) In addition, the research also found increased citizen perception of personal safety, and citizen satisfaction with the program. The evaluation also suggested that older recruits, familiar with motor patrol, might be more effective foot patrol officers -- more professional, more familiar with the neighborhood and better able to establish good relations with RMP officers.

Only one foot patrol project, however, the Newark foot patrol experiment, funded through the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program, and evaluated by the Police Foundation, is a fully controlled experiment, rigorously reviewed in terms of its impact on reported crime rates, victimizations, citizen perception of the community and police attitudes toward patrol. The Police Foundation (1981) compared attitudes of foot

patrol officers with those of other officers in the 28 Safe and Clean Neighborhood cities; compared levels of reported crime in Elizabeth, N.J. neighborhoods which featured either steady foot patrol or foot patrol added; and established an elaborate experimental design involving twelve Newark beats, four in which foot patrol was added, four in which foot patrol was maintained, and four in which foot patrol was discontinued. The experimental period began in 1978 and continued through February, 1979.

The research found little impact on levels of reported crime or victimizations because of increased or reduced foot patrol. The research also suggests that foot patrol may be less productive based on some conventional measures of basic patrol activities. The Police Foundation report that foot patrol officers were assigned to calls for service primarily through their own initiative rather than through dispatch; perhaps because of dispatch procedures, they made fewer arrests than other officers and had diminished calls for service responsibility.

Yet the research also found that residents were aware of levels of foot patrol (in contrast to the Kansas City findings about RMP awareness); that residents saw crime problems as diminishing and safety as increasing in foot patrol areas; that residents used fewer protective measures than before foot patrol; and that residents had improved attitudes toward the police. Foot patrol officers had improved job satisfaction levels and less absenteeism than other patrol officers. Merchants in foot patrol areas, however, were unaware of foot patrol levels (perhaps because foot patrols were mostly deployed after business hours) and saw community conditions as growing worse.

The Police Foundation's participant observation of foot patrol in Newark leads to the conclusion that perceptions of increased safety by

citizens are related to improved order maintenance in the neighborhood, rather than to actual impacts on crime frequency. He argues that such impacts on perception are significant:

> Citizens are threatened by non-criminal behavior and that threat dramatically affects their behavior. Those feelings and that behavior are not inconsequential. They directly threaten the viability of major urban areas and undermine attempts to make city life tolerable, much less pleasant. If vulnerable and weak people feel safe as a result of a specific police activity and if that feeling improves the quality of their life, that is terribly important. (p. 118)

Based on research on community oriented patrol strategies, it appears that, whether or not such strategies have a significant impact on target crimes, they can, if they are properly implemented, have a strong impact on police and community perceptions. In theory, if continuing patrol programs of this type can lead to further impacts on order maintenance, perceptions of safety, residential use of neighborhood, and police community interactions, then there may be a delayed impact on neighborhood crime, in response to improvements in quality of life and increased informal social control.

III. Specialized, Tactical and Directed Patrol

This section concerns a variety of patrol techniques which are conceived as either alternatives or supplements to routine preventive patrol and are explicitly designed to reduce suppressible crime. Some of these efforts involve special patrol units, relieved of calls-for-service responsibility. Other efforts involve alternative tactics for basic patrol units, emphasizing aggressive or directed patrol. The terminology about the tactics and procedures involved is often confusing and literature, reviewing the effectiveness of these tactics, generally falls short of true evaluation.

Webb et al. (1977) review a number of specialized patrol projects in an effort to assess what is known about high-visibility, low-visibility, and combined high- and low-visibility patrol tactics. They report that high visibility projects generally appear to be effective at deterrence; that low-visibility projects, designed to increase levels of apprehension, surprisingly appear more effective at deterrence than apprehension (perhaps because perpetrators recognize or learn of even disguised police); and that combinations of high and low-visibility patrol (alternating uniformed and civilian dress tactics either spatially or temporarily) appear most successful at increasing apprehensions.

Webb et al. stress the general inadequacy of evaluations reviewed. They provide few details concerning actual practices employed within projects, and acknowledge that there is very little known about the effectiveness of specialized patrol.

Many of the high-visibility patrol tactics reviewed by Webb were considered above, in our review of early studies of the effectiveness of increased patrol presence. In large part, these efforts involve saturation patrol of selected areas, reviewed with little methodological rigor.

Other aggressive patrol strategies, employed by uniformed patrol, do not necessarily involve increases in the size of the patrol force, but rather concern the extent of proactive policing by basic patrol units during the routine patrol day. A San Diego experiment attempted to determine the value of varying levels of field interrogation, the activity in which patrolmen stop, question, and occasionally frisk citizens on "reasonable suspicion" of criminal intent (Boydstun, 1975). At the time of the experiment, the potential for abuse in such strategies, and the possibility of complaints by minorities about police harassment because of such activity, were central topics of awareness among police administrators. In the San Diego experiment, three zones were designated for nine months in 1973: a control zone, in which field interrogation was maintained as usual; a suspension zone, in which field interrogation was eliminated; and a special training zone, in which officers conducting field interrogations were coached in methods to reduce friction during such encounters.

Boydstun attempted to assess impacts on suppressible crimes, arrest rates and police-community relations; he reviewed data for a seven-month pre-experimental period, the nine-month experiment, and a five-month post-experimental period. He found that there was a significant increase in total suppressible crimes in the zone in which field interrogations were suspended, during the experimental period; the rate of such crimes returned to normal after the experiment. There was no change in reported crime in the other zones. Boydstun concludes that field interrogations help deter suppressible crimes and suggests that aggressive patrol can be an effective strategy for deterrence, although it has little impact on apprehension levels. Boydstun also reports that, in the zone in which field interrogations were eliminated, order maintenance problems and problems with juveniles developed. Finally,

he reports that San Diego citizens surveyed accepted the practice of field interrogation as a legitimate police activity, rather than an infringement of civil liberties. Field interrogation subjects reacted more favorably, however, to "special training" interrogation than to normal aggressive patrol techniques.

Gay et al. (1977) also speak of "truancy patrol" as an aggressive or proactive tactic which has the potential to reduce suppressible crime. In truancy patrol programs, the basic patrol force (or a small, special patrol unit) is instructed to focus on apprehending truant youth on the streets during school hours and returning them to school. Gay et al. classify such patrol as suspect-oriented and report that

> ...Chula Vista, Glendale and San Bernadino, California, were able to achieve substantial reductions in day-time residential burglaries by rounding up truants and returning them to school. (p. 114.)

Reviews of the effectiveness of low-visibility (plain-clothes or covert) patrol tactics generally concern special patrol units, with specially trained members whose status is distinct from the basic patrol force. Pate et al. (1976) evaluated three forms of apprehension-oriented patrol, two of which involved low-visibility tactics (location-oriented and perpetrator-oriented patrol--LOP and POP) and a third, which permitted the South Patrol Division (SPD) -- a basic patrol force -- to operate normally, supplemented with information about criminal suspects supplied by Kansas City's Criminal Investigation Center (CIC). LOP involved intensified surveillance over selected high risk crime areas, identified through crime analysis; POP involved surveillance of potential criminals, identified through the CIC. Both were designed to apprehend persons in the act of committing crimes, especially robbery and burglary.

The impacts of LOP and POP, compared to the SPD, were reviewed from August, 1972 through January, 1974. The research attempted to assess the relative effectiveness of tactical and routine patrol units in apprehending 107 criminal suspects identified through the CIC as responsible for a substantial proportion of target crime. The research found that by supplying CIC information about such suspects, updated by information gleaned by POP, to all units, arrests of known criminals for a variety of offenses (often other than target offenses) increased. The research also found that LOP produced more target arrests per officer hour, more robbery and burglary charges per officer hour, and more robbery and burglary convictions per officer hour than either POP or the SPD. It also found that POP was superior to LOP in producing intelligence for the CIC and that LOP generated more citizen complaints about police than POP. Both tactical approaches were deemed superior to the SPD alone in producing target arrests and arrests of criminal suspects.

Other low-visibility patrol tactics involve decoy operations. New York City's Street Crime Unit (SCU) was designated Exemplary Project Status by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (Halper and Ku, 1974). The SCU began in November 1971 to detect and intercept violent street crimes in the act of being committed. The SCU was manned by a group of highly trained specialists ("the elite of the finest") and assigned on the basis of crime analysis to selected high crime areas to combat specific types of crimes. SCU members dressed in a manner designed to blend into the surroundings or to impersonate subjects likely to be victimized by target crimes. One article reports that, as of April 30, 1976, members of SCU effected 16,851 arrests, of which 88% involved felony charges. Nearly 90% of all SCU arrests made during 1975 resulted in conviction. (McGovern and Connelly, 1976.)

Based on the New York operation, San Francisco initiated its own decoy operation. The results in San Francisco were overwhelmingly favorable:

> Street crimes dropped 27% in one month. Significant decreases were reported for murder (41.2%), robbery (13.6%), aggravated assault (17.4%), burglary (19.3%), larceny (37.6%) and auto theft (11.8%). In February 1977 the San Francisco Police Department recorded 231 arrests for grand theft, compared with only 53 in February 1976, an increase of over 300%! Moreover, the Street Crime Unit accounted for more than three-fourths of all such arrests. (Hale, 119).

Yet, Schack et al. (1977) report that there has as yet been no systematic research on decoy operations, in spite of an enthusiastic media reception. They acknowledge that high conviction rates and high-quality arrests have been attributed to such programs, but suggest that decoy operations are costly and not particularly productive, requiring, on average, approximately eight man-days per arrest. In addition, decoy units are subject to charges of entrapment, in spite of efforts "to use only those tactics which would be considered constitutionally legal" (Halper and Ku, 47).

Warner et al. (1976) review another low-visibility patrol strategy, early warning robbery reduction projects, in which police-owned and deployed alarm systems are installed in cash registers of businesses thought likely targets for commercial robbery. A covert response force in unmarked cars is stationed near threatened locations. Such a strategy permits rapid police response (generally under two minutes). Warner et al. report that half of the projects reviewed systematically move alarm equipment from location to location in response to changing robbery patterns. They also report that it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of such programs, given the prevalence of overlapping private security forces (often, businesses install comparable private systems after police alarms have been removed). In

addition, they suggest that such efforts can entail high manpower costs compared to conventional patrol. Pointing to the normally low apprehension rate for robbery, they suggest that such costly patrol techniques may be valuable if based on accurate prediction methods.

Efforts which combine high-visibility and low-visibility patrol tactics are the subject of considerable recent interest. Schack et al. (1977) report:

> Especially promising is the coordinated use of highly visible and covert patrol. A visible patrol force could be deployed to a particular area to deter crime there and direct it toward other areas in which officers using covert apprehension oriented techniques are working. (108)

Yet Wagner (1978), reviewing impacts of a combination high- and low-visibility patrol project in Albuquerque, New Mexico, (the Special Operations Section Project -- SOS -- conducted from July 1, 1973 through June 30, 1974) found few indications of success. Wagner's study was designed to assess the effectiveness of a highly flexible tactical unit in reducing the property crime rate in high crime districts. In SOS, specially trained anti-crime teams were assigned on the basis of daily crime analysis to specific areas, during specific times to perform saturation patrol either in: a) a marked mode for preventive purposes; b) an unmarked mode for apprehension; or c) a combination of both. The teams did not ordinarily respond to routine calls for service.

Only two phases of the project (Phase 1 and Phase 3) were subject to evaluation. During Phase 1, in the first four months of the operation, SOS teams were deployed into eight preselected areas in the following pattern: saturation patrol by two <u>marked</u> SOS units for 15 days, followed by 15 days of regular patrol, followed by saturation patrol with two unmarked SOS units for

15 days. During the third phase, February 1 to March 30, 1974, SOS teams, using a mixture of marked and unmarked units, consistently saturated three policing districts, whose selection was based on crime analysis information, during a single watch (3:30 to 11:00 pm).

The research found that: 1) Saturation of high crime areas by alternating marked and unmarked modes did not lower property crime rates in general or residential burglary rates; 2) Saturation of high crime areas with marked modes (high-visibility) did not lower property crimes or residential burglaries; 3) Unmarked units made more felony arrests and "on site" felony arrests for property crimes than marked units, although not to a statistically significant degree; and 4) The use of both marked and unmarked units as a single team did not contribute to a decrease in the rate of property crime.

These disappointing results may be specifically related to problems of implementation. Wagner reports that the Albuquerque Police Department consistently thwarted the attempt to design an experimentally valid project. The project failed to secure matching and random assignment, control districts, and used only official crime statistics. According to Wagner, the Police Department honored the integrity of experimental conditions only during the first four months.

Other patrol efforts aimed primarily at reducing suppressible crime through reliance on crime analysis have been termed directed deterrent patrol. Perhaps the most widely known and best researched of these efforts is the Wilmington split force experiment, called an exercise in directed patrol by Gay et al. (1977). The Wilmington split force model divided the patrol force into two units--a basic patrol force, responsible for calls for service, and a structured patrol force, focused through directed patrol

primarily on crime prevention and immediate, incident-oriented criminal investigation (Tien et al., 1978).[8] The first phase of the Wilmington experiment was conducted from 12/1/75 through 11/30/76.

The evaluation reviewed impacts of the project on calls-for-service productivity, the rate of officially reported Part I crimes and the clearance rate for such crimes, by comparing before- (9/74-9/75) and during-program measures. Tien et al. found that the experiment led to a 20.6 percent increase in calls-for-service productivity, largely related to the introduction of one-man cars to the basic patrol force. In addition, the research found a 6.1 percent decrease in Part I crimes and a 105.5 percent increase in the clearance rate (the "arrest-related productivity") of the patrol force. Yet, the research acknowledges that the increased clearance rate was at the expense of the detective division, which began to share investigative responsibility with structured patrol; there was little impact (in fact an overall decline) on clearances for the department as a whole. Tien et al. call this "especially distressing in light of the decrease in Part I crimes." (10-4). A conflict between structured patrol and detectives, and lack of communication with the detective division are implicated.

The Wilmington experiment is widely lauded for permitting the structured patrol force to concentrate exclusively on crime prevention and deterrence by increasing the calls-for-service productivity of the basic patrol force. Yet it can be argued that the precise content of structured force

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[8] Tien et al. trace the Wilmington concern with immediate criminal investigation, carried out by the structured patrol force rather than by specially trained investigative units, to the Rand study of the criminal investigation process, which questioned the effectiveness of traditional forms of criminal investigation and pointed to the value of conducting interviews with victims and witnesses as soon as possible (Greenwood and Petersilia, 1975.)

activity does not represent a marked departure from full-time random patrol. The Wilmington experiment did not involve sophisticated crime analysis; areas of patrol concentration were determined by reviewing 14-day pin maps, suggesting areas of geographical and temporal crime concentration. Structured patrol largely entailed high-visibility and saturation tactics, with some use of plainclothes, stake-out and surveillance methods, when tips by informers indicated such tactics might be of value.

The structured patrol force spent less than ten percent of its time on calls-for-service assists and was permitted largely uninterrupted patrol time. Yet many officers early in the experiment became bored and frustrated with structured patrol assignments. One officer, rotated from basic to structured patrols complained, "I'm so busy in Basic that I don't notice the time going by, whereas just patrolling 8 hours in Structured drives me bananas." (4-76.) Another officer, speaking in contrast of Basic patrol, complained that "...the split-force is analogous to a 'speed-up'. Work is increased without increasing pay or benefits. (9-3)

In spite of the fact that the split-force experiment concentrated efforts on problem-oriented patrol, it is not clear that there were department-wide gains in arrest productivity; instead, there seems to have been a shifting of responsibility within the department. The major benefits of that experiment in its first phase appear to be primarily in the Basic patrol force and its increased calls-for-service productivity.

The impacts of other forms of directed deterrent patrol have not been systematically evaluated. New Haven, Connecticut, instituted directed deterrent patrol in 1975 with assistance from LEAA (New Haven Department of Police Services, 1976). The New Haven program "has at its core the replacement of random patrol with a planning system which directs patrol units to

target areas at specific times based on crime data assessment." (Guidone and Gervassio, 1978:35). It entails:

> --Assignment of deterrent patrol squads to target areas according to a predetermined plan based upon information supplied by the crime analysis unit.
>
> --Written guidelines provided to patrol officers concerning specific patrol strategies to be followed at given times and locations.
>
> --Analysis of crime patterns and trends in small geographic areas rather than within the city as a whole. (New Haven used 21 separate geographic sectors for patrol planning purposes.)
>
> --A six-member planning team that developed patrol strategies, selected crime targets, and devised new patrol procedures.

The deterrent run (or "D-run") is at the heart of the New Haven program; directed patrol officers are assigned particular slow patrol routes which they must transverse at some point during their tours; D-runs are equal in priority to routine calls-for-service. Guidone and Gervassio report that preliminary impressions suggest a positive impact.

Other directed patrol tactics, like New Haven's, permit specific assignments to individual officers, based on crime-analysis, on a beat-by-beat basis. For example, New Castle, Delaware's Directed Deterrent Patrol Program, initiated in 1976, involves production of daily crime bulletins and crime trend analysis by the Crime Analysis Unit (See Hale, 116-117.) These analyses provide patrol officers with current information regarding crime trends in their respective patrol districts. On the basis of these analyses, the Crime Analysis Unit develops a Patrol Tactic Instruction sheet which is issued to all patrol units at the beginning of each tour of duty and which may well vary from day to day and beat to beat.

New York City conducted a mini-directed patrol project as part of 'Operation 88: Patrol Odyssey II' during April, 1975. After each week of robbery incidents, a Directed Patrol Communication was provided to the Administrative Lieutenant of the 88th Precinct. This communication made recommendations for directed patrol deployment and areas in need of special attention. For a brief period, officers assigned to directed patrol recorded the results of such efforts on special forms. A total of 63 hours of directed patrol were documented. During the project, the precinct as a whole experienced 57 reported robberies; those areas subjected to directed patrol, i.e., generally hard-core inside robbery locations, reported none. (Hoffman, 1976.)

Gay et al. (1977) designate the Cleveland Heights, Ohio Patrol Emphasis Program as one of the most comprehensive directed patrol efforts. Deployment of calls-for-service and directed patrol units is based entirely on analysis of an 168-hour workload graph. Responding to peak demand, patrol officers take an aggressive approach in high-crime locations, featuring saturation patrol, field interrogation and car stops

> ...to emphasize police omnipresence and to discourage the potential criminal. By matching deployment to workload and selectively assigning one and two-officer units, the department has tripled the number of units assigned to patrol during peak service and crime periods. The result has been optimum utilization of police personnel and a very effective crime fighting program. (139)

Directed patrol represents an alternative to random patrol in that it responds to identified areas of concentration and need, and bases allocation and deployment of patrol resources on computer-based workload analysis. It has yet to be demonstrated, however, that directed deterrent patrol has major impact on the patterns of criminal activity in particular areas. Although

there has been considerable interest in directed patrol tactics in recent years, there has been little research on the value of such patrol to date.

In summary, two distinct kinds of strategies have developed at least partly in response to the findings of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol study. One set of strategies emphasizes approaches which will improve relations between the police and the community, enhance perceptions of community safety, reverse the cycle of disuse and fear in decaying neighborhoods, and reinforce community willingness to co-operate with police efforts to prevent crime. A second set of strategies focuses more on analysing patterns of crime frequency and deploying patrol forces in response to crime analysis. Both set of strategies represent alternatives to random preventive patrol, the spare-time, slow surveillance of assigned beats by patrolmen. Although there is considerable interest in such strategies as community foot patrol and directed, deterrent patrol, there is not enough information to date to provide proper evaluation of strategic alternatives to random preventive patrol.

The decade of the seventies saw a major expansion in patrol terminology, leading to some confusion about what is entailed in practice by various forms of patrol. The literature of that decade refers to structured, directed, tactical, agressive, specialized, incident, saturation, apprehension-oriented, location-oriented, perpetrator-oriented, foot-, team-, and community-oriented patrol. Many of these terms overlap.

One review of such strategies (Gay, Schell and Schack, 1977) draws a basic distinction between "directed" patrol, which can be performed by the basic patrol force in lieu of random preventive patrol force, who are freed from calls-for-service responsibility. Yet the distinction is not entirely clear. For example, Gay et al. classify the Wilmington split force

experiment as "directed" patrol, in spite of the fact that Wilmington's structured patrol force was freed from calls-for-service responsibility, like a special unit. They argue that this is so, because Wilmington rotated patrolmen from basic to structured patrol and back again, thereby avoiding elite groups within patrol. In our review of recent patrol strategies, it is not always clear which are "directed", and which are special; it appears that some of the tactics of special units can also be employed by routine patrolmen, without special training, who are relieved of calls-for-service responsibility for designated blocks of time.

The various patrol strategies developed in recent years can be distinguished, perhaps more usefully, by classifying them according to the following elements:

> Target: The type of crime addressed by the project may or may not be specified. In addition, projects may be targeted at specific high-crime areas or high-frequency times of occurrence.
>
> Objective: Projects may be designed to increase deterrence, either through increased police presence or more specific operations; to increase apprehensions, generally through low-visibility approaches in some form; or to provide target-hardening, involving a situational change in a particular setting.
>
> Relation to Routine Patrol: Projects may be part of routine patrol, as when routine units perform directed activities when not responding to calls; or they may be separated from routine patrol, and relieved of calls for service responsibility.
>
> Form and Character of Organization: Projects may be carried out by the normal patrol force; or by special units, either drawn from the patrol force and given special status, or comprised of detectives and/or other personnel.
>
> Link to Community: Projects may or may not have provisions requiring special links for community input, support and/or feedback.

Particular Tactics in Response to Particular Problems: Projects may not employ special tactics, or may have no clear conception of the link between specific tactics and particular problems; or tactics may be selected and reviewed based on the characteristics of the problem addressed.

Both types of patrol strategy -- community oriented patrol and crime specific patrol -- can be categorized according to these dimensions. Clarification of the elements involved in patrol projects may prove useful in analysis and planning of further patrol initiatives.

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