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

The Fixed Tour Experiment in the 115th Precinct: Its Effects on Police Officer Stress, Community Perceptions and Precinct Management

by

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THE PROGRAM AND THE RESEARCH STRATEGY

The Origin of the Program

For some time, the New York City Police Department and law enforcement agencies throughout the country have been concerned with the negative effects of job-related stress on the health and well-being of police officers. In 1980, the New York City Police Department hired the consulting firm of Rohrer, Hibler, and Replogle (RHR) to study the causes and effects of police officer stress and to make recommendations for alleviating the problem. RHR concluded that the rotating tour system, which required officers to change shifts on a weekly basis, had a deleterious effects on their health and home lives. Therefore, RHR recommended that the Police Department implement a steady tour system on a limited and experimental basis using officers who volunteered for the program.

At the same time, the Department was considering various approaches to improving the management structure on the precinct level. The Department was particularly interested in the "platoon commander" concept. In such a system, the patrol sergeants would report directly to the lieutenant/platoon commander, rather than to the commanding officer of the precinct. The platoon commander would be responsible for all precinct patrol operations during his or her specific tour (platoon). The platoon commander concept was designed to promote responsibility in supervision by ensuring the lieutenant's assignment to the same tour and giving him or her the authority to direct opera-

tions in the station house and in the field. The Department recognized that exercising such responsibility would be facilitated by a steady tour system which guaranteed continuity of officers and supervisors in each platoon. The combination of the steady or "fixed" tour and the platoon commander concept came to be known as the "fixed platoon concept" and the Department sought an opportunity to experiment with it.

The opportunity arose when, in 1983, the decision was made to open a new precinct, the 115th, in the Borough of Queens. The Precinct was made up of sections of the 110th and 114th Precincts and, based on the crime and calls-for-service statistics for 1983, the year preceding its opening, it immediately became one of the six highest activity precincts in the Borough. The Precinct was designed to implement the fixed platoon concept with a complement of volunteer police officers, sergeants, and lieutenants who were permitted to choose the tour, or platoon, on which they would work over the ensuing year. The Precinct was opened officially on January 4, 1984.

Several months before the opening, the Department asked staff of the Vera Institute of Justice to consider the proposed design of precinct operations and to suggest how its effects on police officer stress and precinct productivity might be studied. Vera proposed a research strategy (described in the pages that follow) which the Department accepted and work was begun on the research design during August of 1983. This document describes the distinctive features of the 115th Precinct operations and the findings of the research.

To understand the nature and potential implications of a steady tour system, one must understand how the normal tour rotation system operates in the New York City Police Department.

9-Squad Chart Rotation System

The NYPD uses a number of scheduling systems. Some officers work "scooter charts", which means that they alternate between a week of day tours and a week of evening tours. They never work a late tour (midnight to 8 a.m.), and they have fixed days off. Others, particularly foot patrol officers, work steady day tours. Some officers work steady late tours, while others work from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Thus, in any given precinct, a number of duty charts are in use. Nevertheless, the majority of the precinct patrol force work on the 9-Squad Chart. This is the duty chart that has been approved by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the police union. According to the PBA contract, an officer must volunteer to work any duty chart other than the 9-Squad Chart.

The tour rotation system on the 9-Squad Chart is based on a 45-day cycle during which each of the 9 squads works 30 tours of duty consisting of 5 midnight tours, 10 day tours, and 15 evening tours. The 45-day cycle of tours is broken into six sets of five working tours. Each set of tours is followed by two or three days off. The pattern may be summarized as follows:

-- The cycle begins with a set of five day tours (8 a.m. to 4 p.m.), followed by a set five evening tours (4 p.m. to midnight), followed by another set of five day tours.

-- Then there are two sets of evening tours (known as back-to-back evening tours) followed by a set of late tours (midnight to 8 a.m.

-- The officers are scheduled for two or three days off in between each set of tours.

In referring to these days off, the officers use the term "swinging out", as in "We're swinging out on the 8x4's on Monday and swinging in on Thursday for the 4x12's." It must be noted that in the 9-Squad Chart, both the tours and days off are constantly changing.*

Figure 1.1 presents the 9-Squad Chart assignment system that was used from March 1 through April 14, 1984 in every precinct in New York City except the 115th. The day tour is manned by two squads, the evening tour by three squads, and the late tour by one squad. The rationale behind this allocation system is that the activity level is the lowest on the midnight tour, considerably higher during the day tour and generally highest on the evening tour. The chart suggests that the volume of calls on the midnight tours is very low thereby necessitating only one squad of officers. This is not quite the case. The officers that rotate into the midnight tour using the 9-Squad Chart are

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* Thus, the officers generally rotate with the clock rather than against it (e.g., going from midnight tours to evening tours). This is believed to be advantageous in the body's adaptation to changed sleeping periods.

actually supplemented by a squad of volunteers who work the midnight tour on a steady basis. If it were not for these volunteers, the Chart would have to be reorganized to provide for two squads working the midnight tour on a rotational basis. In sum, on any given day, six squads are scheduled to work, while three others are off duty.

One of the features of this system is that the officers, as they rotate across the tours, are constantly experiencing the precinct under differing conditions. The conditions, problems, and volume of calls for service in any given precinct vary considerably from the day tour to the evening tour to the midnight tour.

Not only do the officers have to adjust to the constant change in precinct conditions, but perhaps of greater importance, they also have to deal with a continually changing array of patrol officers and supervisors. Thus, over the course of the 45-day cycle, the officers assigned, for example to Squad 8, will work with the officers assigned to the other 8 squads. Sometimes they will work with them on a day tour, sometimes on the evening tour, and sometimes on the midnight tour. To understand the complexity of the problems that this rotational system poses, it is useful to review the scheduling of Squad 8 over the 45 day cycle.

Figure 1.1: Rotation Schedule on the 9-Squad Chart, For One 45-Day Cycle, March 1, 1984 - April 14, 1984

Dates	Squad Schedule			
	Day	Evening	Midnight	Off
March 1	8,2	5,6,9	3	1,4,7
March 2	8,2	5,6,9	3	1,4,7
March 3	8,2	5,6,1	3	9,4,7
March 4	8,2	5,7,1	4	9,3,6
March 5	8,2	5,7,1	4	9,3,6
March 6	9,3	6,7,1	4	2,5,8
March 7	9,3	6,7,1	4	2,5,8
March 8	9,3	6,7,2	4	1,5,8
March 9	9,3	6,8,2	5	1,4,7
March 10	9,3	6,8,2	5	1,4,7
March 11	1,4	7,8,2	5	3,6,9
March 12	1,4	7,8,2	5	3,6,9
March 13	1,4	7,8,3	5	2,6,9
March 14	1,4	7,9,3	6	2,5,8
March 15	1,4	7,9,3	6	2,5,8
March 16	2,5	8,9,3	6	1,4,7
March 17	2,5	8,9,3	6	1,4,7
March 18	2,5	8,9,4	6	1,3,7
March 19	2,5	8,1,4	7	6,3,9
March 20	2,5	8,1,4	7	6,3,9
March 21	3,6	9,1,4	7	2,5,8
March 22	3,6	9,1,4	7	2,5,8
March 23	3,6	9,1,5	7	2,4,8
March 24	3,6	9,2,5	8	1,4,7
March 25	3,6	9,2,5	8	1,4,7
March 26	4,7	1,2,5	8	3,6,9
March 27	4,7	1,2,5	8	3,6,9
March 28	4,7	1,2,6	8	3,5,9
March 29	4,7	1,3,6	9	2,5,8
March 30	4,7	1,3,6	9	2,5,8
March 31	5,8	2,3,6	9	1,4,7
April 1	5,8	2,3,6	9	1,4,7
April 2	5,8	2,3,7	9	1,4,6
April 3	5,8	2,4,7	1	3,9,6
April 4	5,8	2,4,7	1	3,9,6

Figure 1.1: continued

	Day	Evening	Midnight	Off
April 5	6,9	3,4,7	1	2,5,8
April 6	6,9	3,4,7	1	2,5,8
April 7	6,9	3,4,8	1	2,5,7
April 8	6,9	3,5,8	2	1,4,7
April 9	6,9	3,5,8	2	1,4,7
April 10	7,1	4,5,8	2	3,6,9
April 11	7,1	4,5,8	2	3,6,9
April 12	7,1	4,5,9	2	3,6,8
April 13	7,1	4,6,9	3	2,5,8
April 14	7,1	4,6,9	3	2,5,8

As of March 1, Squad 8 had completed the first two sets of the six-set cycle; that is, they had finished their first set of day tours, and their first set of evening tours. On March 1, they were swinging back in to work the second set of day tours. (Refer to Figure 1.1.)

From March 1 to March 5, Squads 8 and 2 worked a set of day tours together. (Note: these are the only two squads working and they work together for five consecutive days. The complications begin when the various squads rotate into the evening tours.)

On March 5, Squad 8 swung out for three days, while Squad 2 swung out for two days. On March 9th and 10th, Squads 8 and 2 worked two evening tours together, accompanied by Squad 6. Then Squad 6 swung out and was replaced by Squad 7 on March 11th. Squads 7, 8, and 2 worked together for two nights, March 11th and March 12th, and then Squad 2 swung out to be replaced by Squad 3

on March 13th. For one night, Squads 7, 8, and 3 worked together, and then Squad 8 swung out and did not swing in again until March 16th, at which time they worked an evening tour with Squads 9 and 3. Thus, in the course of only ten tours the 8th Squad worked with four other squads.

In the 9-Squad Chart system the squads are constantly rotating around the chart. An officer knows the other officers in his squad and his patrol sergeant. Beyond that they are working with a continually changing array of officers and supervisors whom they meet sometimes on a day tour, sometimes on the evening tour, and sometimes on a midnight tour. Lieutenants are on a three week chart, rotating counter-clockwise, from midnights to evenings to days.

The Duty Chart in the 115th Precinct

The scheduling system used in the 115th Precinct for both police officers and patrol sergeants is known as the First Platoon Duty Chart. This is the chart used in all other precincts for officers who volunteer to work steady midnight tours. In the 115th Precinct however the same chart is used for all tours because all police personnel are volunteers. In this system the officers work on a 15-day cycle (as opposed to the 45-day cycle on the 9 Squad Chart) as follows: five tours on, two tours off (64-hour swing); five on, three off (88-hour swing). Days off rotate. Sergeants work 8 hours and 57 minutes instead of the 8 hours and 35 minutes scheduled for patrol officers and the sergeants receive ten chart days in compensation. The

lieutenants designated as platoon commanders work five days in a seven-day period for 8 hours and 30 minutes and receive 14 chart days as compensation. Lieutenants' days off are subject to review by the commanding officer to determine if the precinct needs were being adequately addressed.

In the 115th Precinct, the officers do not rotate around the clock, therefore, the patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants on each tour always work together. The Department hoped that this schedule would reduce the physical stress experienced when the body has to adjust to constantly changing work days and the interpersonal stress which can arise from the fact that the officer's schedule is so often out of step with those of family members.

The Principal Elements of the Program

The fact that everyone worked steady tours was only one of the distinctive features of the program in the 115th Precinct. This was the element thought most crucial to the Department's stress reduction objectives. However, it, in turn, produced other elements in the police officer's work environment which might also contribute to that objective. Those other elements of the program may be summarized as follows:

a) A volunteer force. The fact that everyone working in the precinct was there because he or she wanted to be may have created a general atmosphere which was conducive to good feeling and higher productivity.

b) Working tours of choice. In the 115th Precinct officers were assigned to the tour of their choice. This feature can be distinguished from the steady tour system which might require an officer to work on a tour which he does not want.

c) Working with the same officers and supervisors. In a traditionally organized precinct, a patrol officer is a member of a squad supervised by a sergeant and they all rotate shifts together. This means that they work with many different officers and sergeants. In the 115th Precinct, the officers worked with the same squads and sergeants over the course of the year. This feature could lend greater predictability to the workday and thereby influence both stress levels and productivity.

d) Lieutenants as Platoon Commanders. In the 115th Precinct, a lieutenant serves as commander of each tour, or platoon, with all patrol sergeants reporting directly to him. The platoon commander is also permanently assigned so that continuity of personnel is assured up to him and, through him, to the precinct commander. The platoon commander is then directly responsible to the commanding officer for addressing the problems that arise during his tour and for deploying and managing the resources assigned to that tour. Lieutenants do not have a comparable role in other precincts and this distinctive feature may also influence stress levels and productivity.

e) Continuity of Officer Assignment. It was intended that officers in the 115th Precinct would, as far as possible, work the same sectors each day and, thereby, develop greater famil-

iarity with the problems and resources of the area. This is rarely possible in a traditionally organized precinct because of the 9 Squad Chart.

These then were the major features of the program designed for the 115th Precinct at the time that Vera staff were invited to consider studying it. It was immediately clear that the use of steady tours was not the only distinctive feature of the new precinct. Moreover, while stress reduction was a primary objective of the program, the Department also wanted assurance that the use of steady tours did not adversely affect productivity indicators. Finally, police officials wanted to assess the management benefits, if any, that could be obtained from introducing a platoon commander into the precinct's organizational structure.

The research strategy used by Vera to study the program is outlined later in this chapter. In developing the design and instruments for the research, staff reviewed several important pieces of literature related to occupational stress. The results of that review are summarized below.

The Literature of Occupational Stress

The past fifteen years have witnessed a growing interest in the relationships among job-related physical, mental, and emotional stress and the incidence of physical ailments such as headaches, insomnia, ulcers, heart disease, and gastro-intestinal disorders. Occupational stress has received considerable attention recently because of the humane and utilitarian concerns of

managers. They have realized that if employees are unhappy and ill, productivity will be low, while absenteeism and turnover will be high.

Although researchers have been able to identify the sources of stress in various occupations, they have been less successful in documenting the ways in which occupational stress is translated into psychological or physiological disorders. As a result, there is a dearth of objective data documenting the presumed causal link between the various sources of occupational stress and their effects on the physical and psychological well-being of the employees. Moreover, it is evident that people vary considerably not only in their vulnerability to stress, but also in the ways in which they cope with or adapt to stressful situations. Stress may be defined as the individual's experiencing an unusually high level of demand on his or her mental, emotional or physiological resources and the physical or emotional arousal that accompanies such demand. Situations that produce that level of demand and arousal are stressful. They activate the individual's defense system to ward off dangers from perceived threats. When the situation passes, the individual's system readjusts.

While stress usually conveys a negative connotation, it may be positive as when the heightened level of demand and arousal are managed effectively both in terms of the individual's performance and his or her emotional and physical reaction. Moreover, Seyle, (1974, 1976) coined the term "eustress" to describe states of positive stress brought on by such satisfying experi-

ences as buying a new house, receiving a promotion, getting married, or going on a vacation. It is also clear that certain people seem to find almost any kind of challenge exhilarating and thrive in situations which would be very upsetting for others.

Stress, therefore, is not necessarily harmful. As Teten and Minberman explain (1977, p.1) "Only when the stress becomes prolonged, when it is allowed to accumulate or when we are unable to deal with it effectively, does it cease to be healthy and become a problem" (1982, p.68). Shinn quoting Lazarus and Launier states that "stress refers to events in which environmental or internal demands (or both) tax or exceed the adaptive resources of an individual."

Generally, then, stress is an undesirable state of personal arousal (physical, emotional, or both), resulting from the interaction between unusually demanding situations (unusual in their intensity, frequency or duration) and the person's physical and emotional capacity to manage such arousal. In a useful summary of the research, Malloy and Mays (1984) indicate that the personal capacities studied thus far include hardiness, social support, genetic factors, health practices, and pesonality dispositions.

It is widely believed that the persistence of negative stress can cause a number of undesirable effects. The effects may be physical (elevated blood pressure or pulse rate, gastro-intestinal troubles, frequent colds, headaches), emotional (depression, emotional fatigue, irritability), or behavioral

(shoddy performance at work, apparent withdrawal from responsibility, and absenteeism). In extreme cases, prolonged stress may lead to "burnout", a serious disorder that is characterized by clinical depression, acute fatigue, and apathy (Masloch, 1982).

According to Malloy and Mays (1984, pp. 204-205), although many studies suggest a significant relationship between stressful life events and future illness, the evidence to date is hardly conclusive. They point out that the correlations between stressful life events and illness are statistically significant but not very high. This means that stress alone does not explain a great deal of the variation in the incidence of various illnesses. Moreover, citing Kobasa and others, they state, "There are apparently many individuals who lead quite stressful lives yet do not succumb to illness." Nevertheless, in recent years, these physical, emotional, and behavioral conditions (as well as others not mentioned above) have come to be seen as symptoms of stress. Thus, persons who manifest these conditions are thought to be more highly stressed than persons who do not.

Work is considered a likely area for generating stress. People have come to characterize various occupations as relatively more or less stressful in one of two ways. The first method involves a qualitative assessment of the extent to which the occupation imposes unusually high levels of demand or frustration on its practitioners. Thus, air traffic control is thought to be a highly stressful occupation because the control-

lers must be on the alert constantly and the consequences of a mistake or lapse in attention can be catastrophic. The second method of characterizing the stress level of an occupation is to measure or estimate the extent to which its practitioners evidence the physical, emotional or behavioral symptoms of stress. Thus, a job may be defined as stressful because the workers exhibit unacceptably high levels of absenteeism, sick leave, or emotional or physical disturbances of various kinds.

The air traffic control profession qualifies as a highly stressful occupation using both methods, (Cobb and Rose, 1973). As we shall see, however, the evidence is not clear that policing as a profession is extraordinarily stressful.

Occupational Stress and the Law Enforcement Field

Using essentially qualitative or clincial methods, several authors have described law enforcement, particularly in a metropolitan area, as a highly stressful occupation. Terry Eisenberg, (1975), a former police officer and researcher, identified over thirty aspects of police work that are frequent sources of frustration to police officers. He found that officer complaints included excessive paper work, affirmative action programs for women and minorities, lack of career development opportunities, distorted press accounts of police incidents, negative public opinion, and the inefficiencies and inadequacies of the court and criminal justice system. Although Eisenberg's findings are qualitative in nature and reflect his own personal experience as an officer and his interviews with other officers,

his observations are nevertheless consistent with more methodologically rigorous research. For example, Kroes, Margolis, and Hurrell (1974) interviewed 100 male members of the Cincinnati Police Force, ranging in age from 21 to 53 years on their perceptions of the sources of job related stress. Their analyses indicated that the principal stressors were: the perceived leniency of the courts, administrative policies and procedures of their department, insufficient and inadequate equipment, the policeman's negative image among the public and the public's perceived apathy toward the police officers' needs, and the negative effects of shift changes and sleep, eating habits and family life.

This literature links the alleged prevalence of physical and emotional disorders among police officers to the stressful nature of the occupation. Eisenberg (1975, p. 26) states:

> Police work has been identified as one of a number of high stress occupations. Current research has implicated psychological stress as an important causal agent in such health problems as coronary heart disease, gastro-intestinal malfunction, dermatological problems, severe nervous conditions, neurosis, and a number of other physical and mental disorders. Additionally, it can be speculated that health problems are not the only consequences of psychological stress; the alleged high rates of divorce and marital discord among law enforcement personnel may be attributable, at least in part, to occupational stress. Furthermore, certain forms of police malpractice, under certain conditions, may also have their origins in psychlogical stress.

Malloy and Mays (1984, p. 99) suggest that the police stress hypothesis "consists of two principal assertions: that law enforcement professionals experience a significantly greater degree of

stress than members of other occupantional groups; and that such stress precipitates an unusually high incidence of family disruption, suicide, psychophysiological disorders; and a host of other medical disturbances such as coronary heart disease and diabetes mellitus to name but a few." They then review the available evidence pertaining to both assertions.

They summarize the aforementioned research by Kroes, Margolis and Hurrell regarding the sources of police stress. Because the research did not include the use of control groups, it can shed little light on the comparative stressfulness of police work. Malloy and Mays (1984, p. 200) do note, however, that the major sources of stress identified by this research were "largely organizational or bureaucractic in nature. These results stand in direct contrast to clinical observations...that posit a strong relationship between the potential for physical injury in this occupation and police officer stress."

Malloy and Mays indicate that there is some evidence that police officers have higher rates of hospital admissions and premature death than other occupations, but that the causes of such deaths and admissions are not significantly different from those of other occupations. Indeed, the high rates may be explained by factors other than those included in the police stress hypothesis. They conclude that police work is probably stressful, but not more so than other occupations in light of the fact that those features of police work that intuitively seem most distinctive, such as the threat of physical harm and the

need to confront violent or potentially violent situations, do not emerge as major stressors in the survey research that has been conducted to date. In their words, "Judging from the strongest research in this area, it seems that helplessness and feelings of uncontrolability in the work environment may be major sources of stress for police officers." (Malloy and Mays, 1984, p. 207).

Malloy and Mays also point out that police work actually consists of many different roles which are likely to generate different kinds and levels of stress. This article also emphasizes the more recent direction of stress research which focuses on differences in the ways people react to stressful situations and in the likelihood that characteristics of the individual's physical, psychological or emotional make-up may predispose him or her to particular negative reactions to stress. They stated:

> The organizing principle "police stress" suggests a homogeneity within this occupational category that fails to consider (a) variance on stress due to differences in occupational role, and (b) individual differences on stress response capacities. In short, the traditional police stress theory requires homogeneity assumptions that appear invalid." (p. 218).

The review of the police stress research does identify shift changes as an off-cited source of stress. Indeed, there is evidence outside the police field that shift work has negative effects on the employee's biological rhythms. Specifically, frequent changes in working hours have been associated with disrupted sleeping and eating patterns and these disturbances in

turn are conducive to insomnia, gastro-intestinal problems, and other physical disorders. In extreme cases, the employee may suffer from circadian desynchronosis, a disruption of the twenty-four hour rhythm that regulates body functioning (Moore-Ede and Richardson, 1985).

Researchers in the field of chronobiology however believe that the adverse physical effects of shift work may be less debilitating than the effects on the employee's psychological and emotional well-being. They report that shift work takes its toll on the workers home and social life. Because police officers often work on weekends, holidays, and during the night, they are out of step with people who keep more conventional hours.

Vera's research does not address the question of whether police work is more or less stressful than that of other occupations. Measuring stress levels in other professions was beyond the scope and resources of this research. Instead, it focuses on the question of whether a set of related changes in the immediate organization and managerial environment of the police can reduce the stress levels manifisted by patrol officers. The participants in the 115th Precinct are compared with a sample of officers from other commands. Stress measurements used flow from the conventional assumptions that self-reported frustrations and personal pressures are stressful and that selected physical disturbances such as headaches, gastro-intestinal distress and problems with sleeping are, among other things, indicators that the individual is experiencing stress.

Finally, while variations in the physical, emotional and psychological make-up of the officers undoubtedly affect their reactions to stressful situations and to the changes introduced by the program, it was not possible for us to measure such variables in this research.

Vera's Strategy for Evaluating the Program

As the program began in the 115th Precinct, Vera staff described its objectives as follows:

a) Reduce the levels of stress experienced by patrol officers in the precinct.
b) Deliver police services to the sectors in at least as effective a manner as was the case before the precinct was opened.
c) Increase the citizen's sense of safety and positive assessments of police services in the effective sectors.
d) Realize improvements in the management of patrol resources and thereby improve the effectiveness of service delivery and the morale of the patrol unit.

A three-pronged strategy was adopted to evaluate the program.

Based on a review of the literature on police stress, Vera staff constructed a pencil-and-paper instrument for measuring stress among police officers assigned to the Precinct. The instrument was administered immediately before the program (Time I), approximately four months after it began (Time II), and again just before the end of the first year's operation (Time III). In addition, a stratified, random sample of police officers from the six highest activity precincts in Queens was selected and tested at Time I and Time III. A more detailed description of the methodology, the instrument and the findings is presented in Chapter III of the report.

Departmental situations regarding such things as sick reports, command discipline, and Department vehicle accidents, are often interpreted as indicators of stress. These were collected for the first year of Precinct opearation and compared with borough-wide measures for a comparable period. These data are reported and analyzed in Chapter VII of this report. That chapter also analyzes various statistical indicators of crime and police activity.

Vera staff also developed an interview schedule for measuring the perceptions and attitudes of community residents regarding local problems, the quality of police services and the effects of police actions on crime and order-maintenance problems in the precinct. The questionnaire was administered to a random sample of 300 community residents immediately before the precinct opened and to another sample of 300 residents after the precinct had been in operation for approximately a year. Additionally, in depth interviews were conducted with twenty-five community leaders a year after the Precinct opened. The methods used in this part of the research and the findings are presented in Chapters IV and V of this report.

Finally, Vera staff spent a substantial amount of time in the 115th Precinct observing operations, riding and talking with patrol officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. In addition, the Precinct Commander was interviewed several times during the research period. The principal focus of these observations and interviews was the personnel's perceptions regarding operations,

supervision and management structure of the new precinct. We were particularly interested in determining how police personnel perceived and assessed the fixed platoon concept. Our findings regarding the management utility of this structure and process are detailed in Chapter VI.

The program in the 115th Precinct was not designed as a formal experiment. Rather, it was seen as an opportunity for the Department to learn something about the operations and effects of steady tours and about a new means of streamlining and, to some extent, decentralizing the management of a precinct. For that reason, the program consists of several different components, the effects of which are often impossible to distinguish one from the other.

Despite its non-experimental character, the research reported here provides useful and important information about what police officers find frustrating about their jobs and how they believe a change to steady tours affects their lives. In addition, it describes what citizens and especially community leaders feel about and expect from the police and how receptive they are to police efforts at outreach and dialogue. Finally the report finds much to recommend about the fixed-platoon concept as a means of focusing precinct resources on the principal problems of each tour and a means of clarifying responsibility and accountability throughout the chain of command.

CHAPTER II
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter briefly describes the Police Department planning efforts for the design and implementation of a steady tour system in the 115th Precinct. This chapter reviews staffing requirements for the Precinct, methods for recruiting and selecting patrol officers and supervisors, the tour selection and assignment process, and the extent to which officers requested transfer to another tour, or another precinct.

Staffing

In June, 1983, the Office of Management Analysis (OMA) prepared a report describing the 115th Precinct Stress Reduction Project (June 21, 1983). In considering manning levels, the report indicated that all personnel assigned to the Precinct would be volunteers, and that seniority would play an important role in the tour assignment process.

A workload analysis based on the projected volume of radio runs, index crimes, and complaint reports indicated that the appropriate manning level for the 115th Precinct was 141 patrol officers. Because the precinct would reduce the geographical area and therefore the workload for the 110th and 114th Precincts, the manpower requirements for these precincts would be reduced. Consequentally, the 110th was slated to lose 63 officers, while the 114th would lose 37. Thus, 100 officers from these two precincts would have to be reassigned, presumably to the 115th Precinct.

In June, 1983, Patrol Borough Queens sent a memorandum to the 110th and 114th Precincts announcing the opening of the 115th Precinct and soliciting volunteers to man it. The memorandum also indicated that because of the necessary staff reduction, officers who did not volunteer for the 115th Precinct might be transferred elsewhere.

OMA assumed that the majority of the volunteers could be recruited from these two precincts and that the remaining 41 officers needed to fill the complement could be drawn from other Queens precincts. Any additional remaining slots would be filled by officers from other boroughs who had requested transfer to Queens.

OMA recommended that the seniority level of the officers accepted for assignment to the 115th Precinct reflect the seniority level of the officers in the 110th and the 114th Precincts. Thus, in theory, approximately 37% of the officers assigned to the 115th would have fewer than five years on the job, while 63% would have five years or more. Officers with the highest seniority were to be given preference in tour selection. Moreover, the proportion of officers in the 110th and 114th precincts in each seniority category would be used as a predetermined cap in selecting police officers. For example, the cap on officers with over twenty years was set at 8%. If all of the slots for very experienced officers were filled, then any additional volunteers in this seniority classification would have to be turned down. Furthermore, officers volunteering from the

110th and 114th precincts were to be given preference in the list of candidates. Each officer was to be classified according to his/her tour of choice and seniority level, with the most senior officers receiving first choice of assignments. Candidates would be chosen for a particular tour from the seniority lists in proportion to the seniority levels for the 110th and 114th Precincts. This procedure was designed to assure an equitable distribution of older and younger officers across each tour.

As the following indicates, capping according to seniority levels and tour preferences were superfluous. In early July, 1983 Patrol Borough Queens provided the Integrity Control Officer and the Operations Coordinator for the 115th Precinct with three lists of patrol officers who had volunteered for assignment to the 115th Precinct: 1) volunteers from the 110th and 114th Precincts, 2) officers from other Queens commands, and 3) officers from other boroughs. The lists for the 110th and 114th Precincts identified a total of 80 officers who were interested in transferring to the 115th Precinct; however, the vast majority of these officers had fewer than five years on the job. The list for other Queens commands contained the names of 77 officers, 64 of whom had fewer than five years on the job. The seniority distribution for the City-wide list was similar-- 57 officers had fewer than five years experience while 24 had more seniority. Thus, the initial pool of volunteers for the 115th Precinct consisted of approximately 230 officers, the overwhelming majority

of whom were relatively young and inexperienced. By August 1983, it became clear that it would be impossible to recruit a large pool of highly experienced officers to the Precinct. As a result, the notion of recruitment and assignment by seniority was discarded.

The Integrity Control Officer and the Operations Coordinator personally interviewed many of the volunteers from the 110th and 114th Precincts, while others were interviewed by telephone. After these interviews, the Lieutenants telephoned the candidate's Patrol Sergeant and Commanding Officer for references. The volunteers who were accepted were then sent a memorandum requesting them to submit various types of information including tour preference.

A tentative list of 140 officers to be assigned to the 115th Precinct was drawn up in August, 1983. Nevertheless, as the date for the opening of the Precinct was postponed, several officers withdrew their requests for transfer or requested transfers to other commands. As a result, it was necessary for 115th Precinct personnel to continually process transfer requests.

When the Precinct opened in January, 1984, 50 of the officers had been recruited from the 110th Precinct, and 16 from the 114th. Thus, 66 rather than 100 of the patrol officers were recruited from these two precincts. Moreover, 19 officers were recruited from task forces, such as 16 TF. These officers had completed their NSU training and were assigned to the task forces

pending their ultimate assignment to the 115th Precinct. Overall, approximately 80% of the patrol officers assigned to this command had fewer than five years on the job.

Tour Selection

Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine how many officers assigned to the 115th Precinct as of January 4, 1984, actually received the tour assignment of their choice. Department personnel records did not contain sufficient detail for a comprehensive retrospective analysis on this matter. Moreover, and of greater importance, because the opening of the precinct was continually postponed several officers who were accepted for the precinct changed their minds or were assigned elsewhere. These shifts, in turn, opened up slots that had to be filled again. As a result, the roster of officers assigned to the precinct changed almost daily, and officers who were initially assigned to their second or third choice of tour, ultimately received their first choice before the Precinct opened. The final roster was not completed until the opening of the Precinct.

The existing records do, however, suggest that officers from the 110th and 114th Precincts who volunteered for the 115th Precinct almost always received their first choice. After these slots were filled, the recruitment was expanded to Queens then the entire city and slots were filled on a "first come, first served" basis. Again, while it is not possible to determine ex-

actly how many volunteers got their first choice of tours, it is probable that the percentage was very high. As is explained in a later section in this chapter, this may be inferred from the statistics for requests for tour reassignments.

Steady Sectors and Seat Assignments

Officers in the 115th Precinct were offered the opportunity of working steady sectors-- a very desirable difference from conventional procedures. Specifically, in most precincts seat assignments are determined by the seniority of the officers; that is, the officers with the highest number years in the Department are generally given steady seats and often steady sectors. The officers with low seniority serve as fill-ins and they are often assigned to what officers consider to be the least desireable duties -- walking foot patrol, "flying out" to another command to paint police barricades, or remaining in the station house at the switchboard.

When the 115th Precinct opened, there were not enough RMP's to assign a squad car to every day or evening tour officer who wanted a sector car assignment. During the first few days of operations, the Operations Coordinator made the seat assignments. Preference was given to volunteers from the 110th and 114th Precincts because these recruits knew the territory to be patrolled by the 115th. Additionally, partners who had volunteered together for the 115th Precinct were assigned to the

same RMP whenever possible. Lowest priority was given to recruits without partners and from outside commands.

The Operations Coordinator and the Platoon Commanders emphasized from the outset that all assignments were temporary, and that every officer would have an opportunity to try out for a sector car assignment. For the first three months, the Platoon Commanders worked with various pairs of officers to try to find the best combinations before assigning steady sectors. The Platoon Commander for the evening tour explained the process as follows:

> What happened was pairs teamed up and for the first three months I watched them work. If they were a good team, fine. If they weren't, I'd split them up. I tried to give everyone a chance to see how everybody worked. But I didn't want the assignments to run on a catch-as-catch-can basis as it was run at that time because it was turning into a regular precinct where the police officers were running the show. They had their assignments and they felt that they were getting set in their assignments. So after three months, I decided that I wasn't going to let it go on any longer. And by then I had an idea of who performed well and who didn't. I sat down with my sergeants and discussed who they felt were the performers. I set up a system that would cover all of the sectors in the precinct on my tour and I allotted each squad an apportioned amount of sectors-- two sectors per squad. These would be the primary cars. Then I allotted two or so alternate cars, so that when the primary squads swung out, the alternate cars would swing in. Now we had to go about filling other slots. We looked at not just someone's work and arrests. We looked at attitude, cooperativeness, loyalty, performance on the street-- picking up jobs, clearing up the works, and anything we felt would show us that these people were on our team. We wanted team players because you can't be on their ass all day long. We needed

> self-starters, people who would naturally go out there and get the job done.*

A similar system was used in determining seat assignments on the day tour. Various combinations of officers were tried out and the best pairs were given steady sectors. The remaining officers were assigned to "secondary sectors". For practical purposes, secondary sector assignments are functionally equivalent to "alternates". Again, the sector assignments were made by the Platoon Commander after conferring with his sergeants. In this regard it must be noted that the seat assignment process for the late tour was simplified by the fact that the number of officers assigned to each was fewer than on the day or evening tours. As a result, sector assignments were not a scarce commodity-- every officer who wanted to ride could ride.

Steady Seats Versus Steady Sectors

Vera staff members were not often present at the Precinct during the first few months of operation. We intentionally limited the number of our visits to avoid complicating the already complex task of opening a new precinct with a new staff.

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*See Chapter VI, for a more detailed discussion of the role of the platoon commanders and the patrol sergeants in the assignment process fixed platoon commander management system.

However, in order for us to administer the second wave of stress questionnaires, it was necessary for Vera personnel to be at the stationhouse at various times of the day for several weeks during May and June. We began administering the questionnaires in May, 1984, and this provided us with our first real opportunity to meet with the officers on an individual or small group basis. Although the officers were initially suspicious, they gradually became accustomed to our presence, and they started to express some of their satisfactions and dissatisfactions with the Precinct.

One of the most serious complaints in the early months of Precinct operations pertained to the assignment system. As expected, most of the complaints were voiced by officers who had not been assigned to steady seats. The situation was compounded by the fact that during the first months of operation, a number of the RMPs were severely damaged in vehicular accidents. As a result, on several occassions, it was necessary to borrow RMPs from other precincts or Borough-based units. Thus, officers who might otherwise have been assigned to a car for a given tour, were assigned to foot patrol. Several officers expressed their belief that the selection process was unfair and reflected favoritism. Additionally, these officers reported that they had been attracted to the 115th Precinct by the promise of steady sectors-- they stated that that promise had not been kept. At first, Vera staff believed that we were hearing the grumbling of

a few dissidents; therefore, we asked other officers confidentially about the assignment system. The picture that emerged was that the officers, including the dissidents, were less perturbed by not having steady sectors than by not having the guarantee of an RMP assignment, regardless of the task.

As one officer stated, and his response was typical of several officers:

> Stress. You want to know about stress. Stress is coming in here every day at 3:00 and running over to the roll call to find out whether I'm riding or not, or whether I'm going to be stuck on the TS (switchboard) or walking foot. That's stress and it goes on here all the time. You never know from one tour to the next what you're going to be doing. They lied to us about the steady sector business.

Further conversations with this officer and others revealed that they wanted to have the certainty of riding and did not care whether it meant manning the SP-10 car or a scooter or driving for the supervisors. They simply did not want to have to work in the stationhouse or worse-- walk foot patrol.

It must be noted that these complaints subsided during the summer months when several of the more skilled officers transferred to specialized units outside of the Precinct and others were assigned to the Precinct's Anti-Crime unit. Thus, most of the officers who wanted to ride eventually received an RMP assignment. New recruits to the Precinct are assigned the less desirable posts and then they are assigned to RMP's as slots become available.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the degree to which the goal of assigning steady sectors was achieved; however, by September, 1984, most of the uncertainty about assignments had been eliminated.

Transfer Between Tours

Although the officers who volunteered for the 115th were expected to make a one-year commitment to stay in that precinct and work the tour they requested, it was precinct policy to honor requests for transfers between tours. For example, if an officer wished to be transferred from the evening to the day tour, the transfer was granted as soon as an opening became available on the requested tour. In the course of the year only ten officers transferred between tours. Four of the transfers initially had been assigned to the midnight tours. Three of these officers transferred to the evening tour while one transferred to the day tour. Four officers from the evening tour transferred to the day tour and two day tour officers transferred to the evening tour. Given the small numbers, it is difficult to identify any pattern. Nevertheless, when Vera staff interviewed these officers, we learned that most of the officers had requested transfers because of changes in their personal lives (e.g. marriage, illness in the family, need to adjust to spouse's working schedule) rather than dissatisfaction with the particular tour to which they had been assigned. The fact that there were so few requests for tour

changes suggests that the vast majority of the officers had been assigned to the tour they wanted.

Attrition

Of the original 138 officers assigned to the 115th Precinct 114 or 83% remained at the end of the first year. Two officers resigned from the Department, four others retired, and eighteen transferred out of the Precinct permanently. We interviewed nine of the officers that had requested and received transfers. Only four of these officers made lateral transfers; that is, transferred to other precincts. Vera staff conducted informal interviews with three of these officers to learn why they had requested reassignment. In general, the reasons for transfer were totally unrelated to steady tours. In fact, the officers stated that they enjoyed working steady tours, but that they were dissatisfied with other features of the Precinct, particularly the boredom. They indicated that the Precinct was far less active than they had anticipated, and that they believed they would learn more about policing in a more active command. The other eleven officers transferred to specialized units such as Mounted Patrol, Borough Task Forces, or the Highway Division. Thus, these new assignments represented career advancements, rather than lateral moves.

Five of the fifteen officers who transferred out of the Precinct had been assigned to the midnight tour, five to the day

tour, and five to the evening tour. Thus, requests for transfer were evenly distributed across the tours.

Recruitment of Platoon Commanders

An Office of Management Analysis (OMA) report dated May 19, 1983, stated that sergeants and lieutenants from Queens precincts would be given preference in assignment to the 115th Precinct. If vacancies remained, then these slots would be filled by supervisors requesting transfers from the other boroughs.

In practice, the recruitment of platoon commanders proceeded quite easily. The Commanding Officer of the 115th Precinct informed Vera staff that in some instances lieutenants contacted him to express interest in the opening of the Precinct, while some lieutenants were referred to him by other Commanding Officers. All volunteers were personally interviewed by the Commanding Officer and these interviews usually lasted at least two hours. In describing the selection process the Commanding Officer stated:

> I was looking for lieutenants who not only knew, but enjoyed working the streets -- officers with both supervisory and technical skills -- people that were not necessarily young, but who were "young thinking", interested in innovation, and a challenge to their skills. I wanted officers who were enthusiastic and who wanted to expand their horizons as lieutenants, to develop new skills, and who were willing to take on a new role, accept responsibility, and affect change. A lieutenant as a platoon commander in this steady tour system can grow professionally. I am very pleased with the lieutenants that I selected.

Recruitment of Sergeants

Recruitment of the 14 sergeants was a somewhat more difficult task, but nevertheless not an arduous task. Sixteen sergeants from Patrol Borough Queens volunteered for assignment to the 115th Precinct. Each of the candidates was personally interviewed by the Commanding Officer and eight were accepted for assignment. The remaining six slots were filled primarily by recruiting sergeants from the other boroughs who had requested transfers to Queens.

Conclusion

The complement of officers assigned to the 115th Precinct when the doors were opened was unusually young; 80% had fewer than five years on the job at the time. The vast majority appear to have been assigned to their first choice of tour. In the early months, there was some discontent with the unpredictability of RMP and steady sector assignments. The platoon commanders spent several weeks trying out various combinations of officers in different assignments before making rather permanent assignments. During the period of experimentation some relatively senior officers were sometimes depreived of the seat they desired. By the fourth month this issue seems to have been resolved.

Seventeen percent of the officers originally assigned had left the Precinct by the end of the first year, these transfers

appear to have little to do with steady tours. Most of the officers received career advancement transfers, whole some others made lateral transers because the Precinct was not sufficiently active to suit their preference.

CHAPTER III
STRESS REDUCTION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STEADY TOURS

I Introduction

Because one of the Department's objectives in implementing the steady tour system was to reduce stress levels experienced by police officers, the research was designed to measure change in this area. The strategy was to administer the stress test to the police officers in the 115th Precinct at three points: when the precinct opened, then a few months after the precinct opened, and finally, at the end of the first year of operation. The rationale behind using three test points was as follows: It was believed that officers at Time I might be experiencing more or less stress than usual because they were beginning a new assignment in an experimental precinct. It was hypothesized that after a few months in the precinct, the novelty of the experiment would have faded and as a consequence the stress levels of the officers might change. Additionally, because they would have adjusted to the Precinct, it was believe that the officers stress levels would be at their lowest point at Time II. It was hypothesized further that the stress levels would rise during the second half of the year and then level off at a point that was lower than at Time I, but higher than that at Time II. Thus, Vera staff anticipated fluctuations in stress levels across the year and the research was designed to capture these variations.

While this strategy would identify changes in stress levels for the experimental group that occurred during the course of the project, it would not in and of itself demonstrate that the

changes were attributable solely to the effects of steady tours. It would be possible, for instance, that stress levels among Queens police officers were generally rising or falling during the same time period, and that the observed changes in the 115th force were not significantly different from the general trend in the Borough. Thus, any observed differences in the stress levels of 115th Precinct officers might be a response to external factors such as changes in Borough-wide procedures, or outside pressures on the Department. To measure the extent to which changes in stress levels were attributable to the project and not to external factors, it was necessary to have a comparison group of Queens officers. Unlike the experimental group, the comparison group would take the stress test at two, not three points; that is, just prior to the opening of the 115th Precinct, and at the first year of operations. (The rationale and procedures used in selecting that sample are described in the following pages.)

During the planning phase of the research, it was decided to use a pencil-and-paper questionnaire to measure officer stress levels. Measuring physical indicators of stress such as blood pressure and pulse rate were considered but rejected primarily for logistical reasons. Vera staff recognized that it would be very difficult and expensive to take such measurements for the experimentals who were working regularly on various tours. These logistical difficulties were even more daunting when applied to a comparison group of officers working on the rotation chart in several Queens precincts.

Logistical concerns related to the measurement decision in another way. As previously indicated, stress levels were to be measured at three separate time points for experimentals and two points for the comparison group. However, given the range of factors that can influence blood pressure and pulse readings, no single measurement can reliably characterize the individual. Thus, for each measurement time point, multiple readings of each respondent in each sample would be needed to establish a reliable score for that respondent. Such multiple administration procedures were completely unfeasible.

Using person-to-person interviews was also considered and rejected because of the enormous resource demands and the scheduling difficulties involved.

Finally, pencil-and-paper tests had been used in other stress research studies and we were confident that we could build on that experience to construct a valid and reliable instrument.

The questionnaire construction process is described in the next several pages and a copy of the final instrument appears in Appendix A.

Although the questionnaire required only approximately 20 minutes to complete, it is comprehensive in that it required the respondent to answer a series of questions related to the following eight areas: 1) job stress as indicated by the degree to which various aspects of the job are a source of frustration and aggravation (e.g., inadequate equipment, the promotion system, PD bureaucracy), 2) major pressures in personal life, (e.g., marital

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problems, financial problems), 3) whether the respondent enjoys being a police officer, 4) physical symptoms commonly associated with stress, 5) the effect of an officer's duty chart on seventeen aspects of private life (e.g., family life, sleep, social life), 6) the officer's perception of stress-related problems among his/her three closest friends who are police officers (e.g., problems with spouses, excessive worrying, excessive complaining), 7) strategies that the officer uses to reduce stress (e.g., exercise, listening to music, hobbies) and 8) ways in which being a police officer may cause problems in the household (e.g., communications problems between husband and wife, police officer brings work problems home).

The question regarding the officer's attitude toward being a police officer was not useful. The overwhelming majority of respondents reported either that they liked or greatly enjoyed being a police officer and the differences across the groups were infinitesimal and insignificant. Therefore, this chapter will not consider that part of the questionnaire any further.

Finally, the NYPD collects a number of performance statistics, some of which are seen as indications of stress levels. These indicators, including absenteeism and line-of-duty vehicular accidents, are considered in Chapter VII "Productivity Measures."

II Selection of the Comparison Group

A number of strategies for selecting a comparison group were considered and rejected. For example, Vera considered drawing a sample of 300 patrol officers from the pool of all patrol officers assigned to Queens. This idea was discarded because of the logistical problems involved in administering the questionnaire to 300 officers dispersed across 15 precincts.

Vera staff also considered using one precinct as a comparison group. This idea was rejected for several reasons, including the fact that it would be impossible to find a precinct that was comparable to the 115th in terms of the age and seniority distribution of the patrol force. After much deliberation, Vera staff agreed that a stratified random sample of patrol officers from the following six high-volume Queens precincts would be selected: the 114th, the 113th, the 110th, the 109th, the 105th, and the 103rd.

Because we wanted a comparison group of approximately 150 officers, it was not possible to use all patrol officers assigned to the six comparison precincts. To limit the pool of potential participants, Vera staff asked the Office of Management Analysis and Planning (OMAP) to generate a computer printout of all patrol officers assigned to these six precincts and to list them according to seniority. Vera divided these listings into five seniority categories (12 months to 59 months, 60 months to 119 months, 120 to 179 months, 180 to 239 months, and 240 months and over) and then sampled randomly within each seniority level to

obtain a seniority distribution that reflected the distribution of officers assigned to the 115th Precinct. Because staff anticipated a patrol officer refusal rate of approximately 50%, to obtain a sample of 150 active participants in the comparison group, it was necessary to identify 300 patrol officers for inclusion in our study. Moreover, because the 115th Precinct had a disproportionately large percentage of female officers (14%), it was necessary for Vera staff to select all of the women assigned to the six comparison precincts for our comparison sample. As is explained in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter, 146 of the 300 officers that we contacted agreed to participate in our study and completed the first questionnaire. Because the members of the comparison sample had been selected from six high-volume precincts, it is reasonable to assume that the effects of this variable were neutralized. We made the same assumption with respect to the effects of the personalities and styles of command personnel, because the responses of officers from all six precincts were aggragated to form comparison group measurements. This strategy provides some logical assurance that changes in stress levels of the 115th Precinct sample that were not observed in the comparison sample may reasonably be attributed to this program.

III Constructing and Administering the Stress Questionnaire

In the summer of 1983, with the assistance of a consultant with expertise in research and in counseling police officers on stress management, Vera staff examined several questionnaires

which had been used to measure police officer stress in New York City and other jurisdictions. When this analysis was completed, Vera constructed a questionnaire and submitted it to the Department and the PBA for review. In September, 1983 meetings were held with officials from the Department and the PBA to discuss this instrument. Neither group expressed any objections to the format, structure, or substance of the questionnaire. Rather, discussions focused on technical points such as how certain questions could be rephrased to eliminate any ambiguity.

As a result of these meetings, the questionnaire was revised and subsequently approved by the Department and the PBA. The revised questionnaire was then pre-tested on 70 officers from NSU units and the Police Academy. The purpose of this pre-testing was to determine whether these officers could understand the wording of the questions. The pre-test was successful and only minor revisions were needed to put the questionnaire in final form.

A. Administering the Questionnaire to the Experimental Group

As previously noted, the stress questionnaires were administered to the experimental group three times; however, there were some notable differences in the ways this testing was conducted during the course of the year.

The first wave of questionnaires was distributed on January 2, 1984, at a special meeting for all the patrol officers assigned to the 115th Precinct. This meeting was held at the station house as part of the orientation session convened prior

to the official January 4th, 1984 opening of the precinct. At this session, Vera staff explained the purposes of the study and methods that would be used to guarantee the confidentiality of the data. We emphasized that the officers' participation in the project was entirely voluntary and that neither the precinct supervisors nor any personnel at Police Headquarters would know which officers took part in the survey. Furthermore, we assured the officers that the questionnaires would be kept at the Vera Institute and that no member of the Police Department would have access to these data. Finally, we explained that all the findings in the final report would be expressed in terms of percentages and averages for entire sample of participants and that no individual would be identified in any manner.

After this introduction, the questionnaires were distributed and the officers were asked to complete them at that time. The response rate was excellent-- 96.4% (133) of the 138 patrol officers assigned to the precinct agreed to participate in the stress study.

The administration of the first wave of questionnaires was facilitated by the fact that all of the patrol officers were assembled at the same time and in the same place. The logistical problems multiplied after the precinct opened and the officers were deployed. It was necessary to use a variety of techniques to distribute and collect the surveys. Although the data collection process for the second and third waves of the survey was time- consuming and complicated, the response rates were over 90%.

The second wave of questionnaires was administered between mid-May and mid-July, 1984-- approximately six months after the precinct opened. The third wave of questionnaires was administered between mid-November 1984 and mid-January, 1985, about one year after the precinct opened.

A number of techniques were used to gather the data. Vera staff began by attending unit training sessions. In the 115th Precinct, these sessions are held three days a week at 7:30 a.m. for the purpose of familiarizing the officers assigned to the midnight or day tours with recent changes in Departmental procedures and policies. Vera staff, with the cooperation of the Precinct Training Officer, made arrangements to devote a few of these sessions to completion of the stress questionnaires. In this way, it was possible to obtain questionnaires from many of the officers assigned to steady midnight or day tours. There were, however, several officers who were absent from these unit training sessions because they were on vacation or sick leave or temporarily assigned to details outside the precinct or working steady 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. foot posts. To contact these officers, Vera staff attended roll call sessions for the midnight and day tours. In some instances, the officers were able to complete the forms during roll call, while others returned their questionnaires at the end of their tour.

Another technique used was to give an officer a "Ten-Two" call directing the officer to return to the station house. When the officer arrived, he or she was asked to sit in the roll call room and complete the questionnaire before returning to patrol.

The final tactic, which was only employed when every other method had failed, was to leave a packet in the officer's mailbox containing a questionnaire, a stamped envelope addressed to the Vera Institute, and an explanatory letter requesting the officer to complete the questionnaire and forward it to Vera.

Vera staff used slightly different procedures to distribute the questionnaires to the officers on the evening tour. After roll call, four to six officers (the manning for two or three squad cars) were asked to remain at the station house to spend twenty minutes completing the survey before they went out on patrol. When these officers went into the field, other pairs of officers were given a "Ten-Two". However, there were many evenings, when given the high volume of calls for service and the small number of RMPs in the field, Vera staff decided against calling in any of the units. Again, when other methods failed, a questionnaire packet was left in the officer's mailbox at the station house.

B. Administering the Questionnaires to the Comparison Group

As noted earlier, Vera staff developed a list of 300 officers in six Queens precincts who would be asked to participate in the stress study. From the outset, Vera staff realized that it would be impossible to approach each of these officers individually to explain the project and to assure them that their responses would be confidential. To overcome these logistical problems, Vera enlisted the assistance of the Training Officers for the six comparison precincts and asked them to explain the project to the potential participants and to distribute questionnaires at unit training sessions. Aside from Vera staff, the Training Officers were the only PD personnel who knew which officers had initially been asked to participate in the study. To further assure confidentiality, the respondents were given self-addressed, stamped envelopes with instructions to mail their questionnaires back to the Vera Institute. Questionnaires were distributed at unit training sessions throughout January and February of 1984 and 146 officers, that is, 54.9% of all of the initially eligible officers agreed to participate in the study by filling out the first questionnaire.[1]

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[1] The Office of Management Analysis provided Vera with a print-out of all patrol officers assigned to the six comparison precincts as of in November, 1983, Using this listing, a sample of 300 was drawn in December, 1983. Of the 300 officers on this listing, 34 were ultimately ineligible because they had transferred to other commands, been promoted to sergeant, retired, resigned, or were on extended sick leave. Thus, the actual pool of potential participants was 266 rather than 300. And 146 or 54.9% of these 266 officers completed questionnaires at Time I.

Nevertheless, administering the first wave of questionnaires to the comparison group proved to be a lengthy process because the unit training system in a traditionally organized precinct works on a six-week cycle. Thus, it might be six weeks before the Training Officer encountered some of the officers on the eligibility list. Additionally, some of these officers missed the training sessions because they were on vacation, sick leave, or were absent for other reasons.

Because of these enormous logistical problems, no attempt was made to secure a Time II measurement for the comparison group. Instead, resources were focused on expediting data collection at Time III. In early December, 1984, Vera staff met with each of the Training Officers individually to discuss ways to streamline the data gathering process. At each meeting, a list of the officers who had participated in the first stage of the research was reviewed and updated to identify officers who had transferred to other commands, or who had retired, or who had resigned, or out on extended sick leave.

It was agreed that in this phase of the research, the Training Officers would actively seek out the research participants rather than waiting to meet with these officers at unit training sessions. Thus, the Training Officers were asked to approach the officers at roll call or while they were on a meal break or to give the officers a "Ten-Two" or to use any other method for distributing the questionnaires. Additionally, a Vera staff member was assigned full-time to work in conjunction with the six

Training Officers in distributing and collecting the questionnaires.

As noted above, a number of officers had transferred to other commands, primarily to specialized units such as Mounted Patrol, Health Services, and the Highway Division. Because these officers were scattered all around the city, it was not possible to contact them in person. Instead, a packet containing an explanatory letter, a copy of the questionnaire, and a self-addressed envelope was mailed to each of these officers at their new command. If the questionnaire were not returned within two weeks, then a second packet was sent. If at the end of a month Vera staff had not received a response, then the officer was telephoned at his new assignment or a Vera staff member went to his office.

This data collection was conducted during December, 1984 and January, 1985.

C. Sample Attrition and Resulting Samples Sizes

With the passage of time, members of the experimental and comparison groups were promoted, transferred, retired or otherwise lost to the research. This section considers the reasons for and implications of sample attrition for this research.

When the 115th Precinct opened on January 4, 1984, 138 patrol officers were assigned to that precinct; and, as noted earlier, 133 or 96.4% of the patrol officers agreed to participate in the research. By Time II, after six months of precinct operations, nine of the initial 133 participants were ineligible

for further inclusion in the study: one retired, two resigned from the police force, and six transferred to other commands. As a result, the base was reduced from 133 at Time I to 124 at Time II. However 118 or 95.2% of the officers eligible at Time II completed the questionnaire. By Time III, the panel was reduced to 112 because of nine transfers and three retirements; 105 (93.8%) completed the questionnaire. Overall, 78.9% of the Time I participants completed the Time III survey. Thus, the attrition rate for the experimental precinct was 21.1%.

Of the 146 comparison group officers who participated in the first phase of this research, 5 were unavailable at the Time III due to retirement or extended sick leave. Of the remaining 141, 119 or 84.4% completed the Time III survey. Overall, 81.5% of the initial comparison group officers completed both surveys. Thus, the attrition rate for the comparison group was 18.5%.

The sample sizes were as follows:

Experimental Group	Time I=	133
	Time II=	118
	Time III=	105
Comparison Group	Time I=	146
	Time III=	119

IV Findings of the Research

A. Job-Related Frustrations

Demographically, the comparison and experimental groups were very similar. Eighty percent of the officers in each of the Time I samples had five or fewer years on the job. Eighty-six percent of the experimental group and 85 percent of the comparison were male. Forty-four percent of the experimentals were single, as were 41% of the comparison group. Forty-five percent of the experimentals, and forty percent of the comparison group had one or more children. Again, at Time II, despite the sample attrition the groups were comparable demographically.

This section of the questionnaire consisted of 30 items pertaining to four dimensions of police work that the police literature suggests are sources of frustration to police officers:

> -- Administration of the Department, including policies affecting the way officers work, departmental bureaucracy, lack of support;
>
> -- Administration on the precinct level, including disciplinary actions, evaluation system, lack of continuity in supervision, lack of recognition, assignment system;
>
> -- Situations on patrol, including feelings of helplessness, powerlessness, or fear, dealing with incompetent officers or faulty equipment; and,
>
> -- Courts and the criminal justice system.

For each of the 30 items, the officers were asked to indicate whether they were seldom, sometimes, or frequently frustrated by these various aspects of their job. For analytical purposes a scoring system was developed in which each answer of

"seldom" was assigned one point, "sometimes"- two points, and "frequently"- three points.

Using this system, it was possible to calculate a score for each item for each officer. The scores for the thirty items were then added up to form the Job Frustration Index. Thus, while the scores for individual items ranged from one to three, the total scores could vary from thirty (the lowest stress level) to ninety (the highest stress level). Moreover, using this method, it was possible to calculate an average score for each item for each sample at each time point, and then to compute the average Job Frustration Index for each sample as a whole. The average scores and standard deviations for each group were as follows:

Table 3.1: Average Scores on the Job Frustration Index for the Experimental and Comparison Groups

		Mean	s.d
Experimental Group, Time I	= 53.8	N=133	9.9
Experimental Group, Time II	= 51.1	N=118	9.8
Experimental Group, Time III	= 49.7	N=105	9.5
Comparison Group, Time I	= 52.5	N=146	8.8
Comparison Group, Time III	= 52.3	N=119	9.6
		621	

There was no statistically significant difference between the Job Frustration Index for the experimental and comparison group at Time I (53.8, and 52.5, respectively; t= 1.16, n.s.) Thus, the overall frustration levels of the two groups were comparable at the beginning of the research. However, at Time III, the average score for the experimental group dropped to 49.7, while the average score for the comparison group was 52.3. This 2.6 point difference was statistically significant (t= 2.02, $p < .05$.) indicating that at the end of the first year of precinct operations, the experimental group reported significantly less job frustration than the comparison group.

To determine whether the change in the average scores for the experimental and comparison groups over the course of the year were statistically significant, it was necessary to compute the average for only those officers in each group who completed both the Time and Time III questionnaire. The resulting N was 105 for the experimental group and 119 for the comparison group. The means and standard deviations are presented below:

Table 3.2: Average Scores on the Job Frustration Index for Experimental and Comparison Group Officers Who Completed Both the Time I and Time III Questionnaire

	Mean	s.d
Experimental Group, Time I	53.4	10.2
Experimental Group, Time III	50.0	9.8
Comparison Group, Time I	51.9	8.7
Comparison Group, Time III	52.3	9.6

The Job Frustration Index for the experimental group declined significantly from 53.4 to 50.0 ($t= 3.54$, $p < .001$). In contrast, the Job Frustration Index for the comparison group rose slightly from 51.9 to 52.3; however, this increase was not statistically significant ($t= -.058$, n.s.). These findings suggest that the reduction in the job frustration level in the experimental precinct was attributable to the operations of the program in the 115th Precinct.

Table 3.3 presents the average scores for each of the 30 items for each sample at each measurement point. A cursory review reveals that the average scores for each item were very stable over time. Vera staff analyzed these data first to identify those items on which the experimental and comparison groups showed statistically different scores at Time I. Significant differences emerged for only five questions. The experimental group reported higher levels of frustration due to boredom on the job ($t= 4.85$, $p < .001$), working with different bosses ($t= 2.77$, $p < .01$), the police evaluation system ($t= 2.26$, $p < .05$), and outside political pressure placed on the department ($t= 1.95$, $p < .05$), while the comparison group had a higher average frustration score on the item pertaining to civilians doing police jobs ($t= 2.66$, $p < .01$).

In contrast, at the end of the first year, the comparison group reported significantly higher stress levels than the experimentals in seven areas: salary ($t= 2.00$, $p < .05$), rotating shifts ($t= 2.54$, $p < .05$), police officers doing non-police work

TABLE 3.3: AVERAGE SCORES FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS ON THE 30 ITEM JOB RELATED FRUSTRATION INVENTORY*

	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP				COMPARISON GROUP		
ITEM	Time I (N=133)	Time II (N=118)	Time III (N=105)	Change From Time I to Time III	Time I (N=146)	Time III (N=119)	Change From Time I to Time III
1. Administrators	2.02	2.06	2.05	+.03	1.94	2.00	+.06
2. Supervisors	1.80	1.81	1.76	-.04	1.69	1.61	-.08
3. Discipline	1.92	1.86	1.89	-.03	1.93	1.97	+.04
4. Recognition	1.86	1.75	1.63	-.23	1.81	1.76	-.05
5. Different Bosses	1.67	1.65	1.60	-.07	1.45	1.44	-.01
6. Salary	1.83	1.94	1.87	+.04	1.86	2.08	+.22
7. Promotions	1.83	1.86	1.83	.00	1.86	1.88	+.02
8. Partners	1.44	1.35	1.30	-.14	1.36	1.23	-.13
9. Rotating Shifts	1.96	1.52	1.43	-.53	1.89	1.71	-.18
10. Duty Changes	1.72	1.53	1.40	-.32	1.61	1.40	-.21
11. Boredom	1.84	1.57	1.49	-.35	1.45	1.45	.00
12. Overloaded	1.32	1.24	1.22	-.10	1.25	1.31	+.06
13. Non-Police Work	1.77	1.64	1.49	-.28	1.66	1.73	+.07
14. Powerlessness	1.68	1.62	1.58	-.10	1.60	1.58	-.02
15. Helplessness	1.90	1.79	1.69	-.21	1.93	1.77	-.16
16. Dangerousness	1.42	1.34	1.38	-.04	1.41	1.40	-.01
17. Repulsive Situations	1.59	1.52	1.37	-.22	1.50	1.47	-.03
18. Cop Injuries	2.09	2.04	1.96	-.13	2.15	2.13	-.02
19. Bureaucracy	2.16	2.06	2.02	-.14	2.04	2.00	-.04
20. Evaluations	1.79	1.74	1.70	-.09	1.61	1.69	+.08
21. Incompetent Officers	2.04	1.79	1.71	-.33	1.97	1.87	-.10
22. P.D. Civilians	1.42	1.37	1.50	+.08	1.62	1.64	+.02
23. Equipment	2.10	1.95	1.97	-.13	2.16	2.17	+.01
24. Civilian Insolence	1.46	1.42	1.41	-.05	1.47	1.52	+.05
25. Civilian Complaints	1.94	1.82	1.92	-.02	1.94	2.00	+.06
26. PBA	1.38	1.41	1.45	+.07	1.44	1.70	+.26
27. Political Pressure	1.72	1.59	1.70	-.02	1.55	1.71	+.16
28. Court Situations	1.95	1.80	1.81	-.14	1.98	1.93	-.05
29. Court Decisions	1.93	1.81	1.74	-.19	1.92	1.83	-.09
30. Criminal Justice System	2.27	2.28	2.13	-.14	2.42	2.33	-.09

* Time I = before program for experimentals; within 6 weeks of program commencement for comparison group. Time II = approximately 6 mos. after program began for experimentals; comparison groups not measured at this time. Time III = approximately one year after program began for both experimentals and comparison group members.

(t= 2.81, p <.01), hearing about police injuries (t= 2.04, p <.05), faulty equipment (t= 2.01, p <.05), actions of Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (t= 3.14, p <.01), and criminal justice system leniency and inefficiency (t= 2.14, p <.05). Moreover, there was no item for which the experimental group at Time III reported a significantly higher frustration level than the comparison group.

An item by item analysis was then conducted using only the results for those officers in the experimental and comparison groups who participated in both the Time I and Time III surveys. Table 3.4 presents the average scores for each item for the experimental and comparison groups at Time I and Time III. Table 3.5 indicates that at Time III the experimental group reported statistically significant reductions in stress levels related to the following nine aspects of the job: lack of recognition, rotating shifts, frequent duty changes, boredom and isolation, doing non-police work, feelings of helplessness, dealing with repulsive situations, working with incompetent officers, and Appellate or Supreme Court decisions restricting police actions.

TABLE 3.4: AVERAGE SCORES FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS ON THE 30 ITEM JOB RELATED FRUSTRATION INVENTORY FOR OFFICERS WHO COMPLETED TIME I AND TIME III SURVEY

	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP (N=105)			COMPARISON GROUP (N=119)		
ITEM	Time I	Time III	Change From Time I to Time III	Time I	Time III	Change From Time I to Time III
1. Administrators	2.00	2.05	+.05	1.91	2.00	+.09
2. Supervisors	1.75	1.76	+.01	1.69	1.61	-.08
3. Discipline	1.90	1.89	-.01	1.94	1.97	+.03
4. Recognition	1.82	1.63	-.19	1.82	1.76	-.06
5. Different Bosses	1.62	1.60	-.02	1.47	1.44	-.03
6. Salary	1.80	1.87	+.07	1.82	2.08	+.26
7. Promotions	1.81	1.83	+.02	1.84	1.88	+.04
8. Partners	1.42	1.31	-.11	1.35	1.23	-.12
9. Rotating Shifts	2.05	1.43	-.62	1.88	1.71	-.17
10. Duty Changes	1.70	1.40	-.30	1.61	1.40	-.21
11. Boredom	1.80	1.49	-.31	1.46	1.45	-.01
12. Overloaded	1.32	1.22	-.10	1.26	1.31	+.05
13. Non-Police Work	1.75	1.49	-.26	1.66	1.73	+.07
14. Powerlessness	1.67	1.58	-.09	1.54	1.58	+.04
15. Helplessness	1.88	1.69	-.19	1.90	1.76	-.14
16. Dangerousness	1.45	1.38	-.07	1.41	1.40	-.01
17. Repulsive Situations	1.61	1.37	-.24	1.50	1.47	-.03
18. Cop Injuries	2.05	1.96	-.09	2.11	2.13	+.02
19. Bureaucracy	2.12	2.02	-.10	1.98	2.00	+.02
20. Evaluations	1.77	1.71	-.06	1.59	1.69	+.10
21. Incompetent Officers	2.05	1.71	-.34	1.97	1.87	-.10
22. P.D. Civilians	1.40	1.50	+.10	1.57	1.64	+.07
23. Equipment	2.11	1.97	-.14	2.13	2.17	+.04
24. Civilian Insolence	1.50	1.41	-.09	1.42	1.52	+.10
25. Civilian Complaints	1.93	1.92	-.01	1.88	2.03	+.15
26. PBA	1.41	1.45	+.04	1.42	1.70	+.28
27. Political Pressure	1.71	1.70	-.01	1.55	1.71	+.16
28. Court Situations	1.88	1.81	-.07	1.96	1.93	-.03
29. Court Decisions	1.91	1.74	-.17	1.88	1.83	-.05
30. Criminal Justice System	2.21	2.13	-.08	2.39	2.33	-.06

Table 3.5: T Test for Experimental Group At Time I and Time III

QUESTION	ITEM	T	TWO-TAILED PROBABILITY	df
4	lack of recognition	2.30	0.05	10
10	frequent duty changes	3.92	0.001	100
11	boredom and isolation on assignment	4.18	0.001	101
13	doing non-police work	3.30	0.001	101
15	feelings of helplessness in assisting citizens who need aid	2.61	0.01	101
17	anxiety due to the officer having to deal with repulsive situations	3.76	0.001	102
9	rotating shifts	6.11	0.001	96
21	working with incompetent officers	4.78	0.001	112
29	anger and frustration caused by Appellate or Supreme Court decisions which restrict police actions	2.03	0.05	102

With the exception of drop in frustration due to adverse court decisions, the other areas in which significant reductions were reported pertained to conditions in the officers immediate working environment rather than the department level.

As Table 3.6 shows, comparison group officers who completed the survey at both Time I and III reported significant stress reduction in four areas: rotating tours, partner assignments, duty changes, and feelings of helplessness. Nevertheless, they reported significantly higher frustration in four areas: salary, public criticism of the police, the patrolmen's union, and out-

side political influence on the PD. It is interesting that reported stress reduction pertained to frustrations on the precinct level, while increased stress was related conditions beyond the control of the individual officers.

Table 3.6: T Test for Comparison Group At Time I and Time III

QUESTION	ITEM	T	Two-Tailed Probability	df
9	rotating tours	-2.86	.005	116
8	partner assignments	-2.01	.05	117
10	duty changes	-2.58	.01	116
15	feelings of helplessness	-2.09	.05	117
6	salary	+3.83	.001	116
24	public criticism	+2.13	.05	116
26	police union	+4.40	.001	117
27	outside polical pressure	+2.52	.01	118

By grouping the scores from the experimental and comparison groups at each test point, it was possible to identify several aspects of the patrol function that were consistently stress-provoking, and others that were seldom sources of frustration. The sample used for this overview consisted of 621 sets of responses. The average scores for each item are shown in Table 3.7.

In general, stress items at the high end of the range pertained to either the management and structure of the Police Department or the operations of the criminal justice system, for example, departmental bureaucracy, the investigatory and disciplinary systems, promotional practices, the rotating tours, and negative actions by top-level police administrators. All of these grievances are related to what officers perceive to be

TABLE 3.7: RANK ORDERING OF JOB-RELATED STRESS ITEMS (N=621)

RANK ORDER	STATEMENT	MEAN SCORE
1	Criminal justice leniency or inefficiency	2.30
2	Hearing about injuries or death of fellow officers	2.08
3	Equipment that is faulty or insufficient	2.08
4	The bureaucracy of the Police Department (the paperwork; the petty regulations, the multitude of procedures, etc.)	2.06
5	Actions by top-level police administrators, such as: police and decisions effecting how I work; lack of support; favoritism; etc.	2.01
6	Public criticism of police, including civilian complaints	1.93
7	Department investigations or disciplinary actions that seem unfair or overly harsh	1.92
8	Matters regarding salary	1.91
9	Court situations in which the police are put down	1.90
10	Fellow police officers who goof off or aren't competent	1.89
11	Rotating shifts*	1.86
12	Promotional practices in the Police Department	1.85
13	Decisions by the Appellate or Supreme Court which restrict police actions	1.85
14	Not being able to help people who really need help	1.83
15	Lack of recognition for the good work that I perform	1.77
16	Actions of immediate supervisors, such as: enforcement of department rules; decisions affecting how I work; lack of support; favoritism; etc.	1.73
17	The performance evaluation system in the Police Department	1.70
18	Doing non-police jobs that should be done by someone else	1.66
19	Political pressures from outside the Police Department	1.65
20	People expecting me to do things that I do not have the power to do	1.61
21	Being bored or isolated on assignments	1.56
22	Different bosses expecting different things from me	1.56
23	Frequent changes in the duties I am assigned to	1.54
24	Civilians doing jobs that used to be done by police officers	1.51
25	Repulsive situations on patrol (fatal accidents, battered children, dead bodies, etc.)	1.50
26	Police union problems (P.B.A.)	1.48
27	Insults that I personally receive from citizens	1.46
28	Dangerous situations on patrol	1.39
29	Partner assignments	1.34
30	Being overloaded on assignments — too many jobs during the tour	1.27

*The scores for this item were based on the responses for Experimental Group at Time I, and the Control Group at Times I and II. The N was 398.

flaws in systems that are beyond the control of the individual officers. Again, this is consistent with the findings of Malloy and Mays (1984) indicating that the major sources fo police stress are organizational and bureaucratic in nature.

There were three questions in the survey about the operations of the criminal justice system. Table 3.7 indicates that the most frequently cited source of job frustration in patrol work is coping with "criminal justice leniency or inefficiency." An average score of 2.30 suggests that all of the officers were sometimes frustrated by the criminal justice system and many were frequently frustrated. Court situations in which police were "put down" ranked ninth and decisions by the Appelate or Supreme Court restricting police actions ranked 13th.

In contrast, mid-range items generally pertained to situations on patrol and supervision on the precinct rather than the departmental level. Thus, officers were occasionally annoyed by a lack of recognition for the good work they performed, the actions of immediate supervisors, favoritism, lack of support, and a lack of continuity in assignments. The officers reported little stress due to dealing with repulsive or dangerous situations on patrol, feelings of being overworked on assignments, or receiving insults from the public. Although it may be stressful to deal with repulsive situations or be insulted by the public, these situations are rare and, therefore, they are not a continuous sources of stress. In contrast, having to cope with a police bureaucracy thought to be insensitive to the needs of the

officers or dealing with the perceived inefficiencies of the criminal justice system are more persistent sources of frustration.

The data in Table 3.7 may be seen in a slightly different way. Items that are a direct part of the officer's daily experience such as actions of immediate supervisors, doing "non-police" work, changing bosses, changing assignments, or dangerous situations tend to score relatively low on the frustration scale. On the other hand, items which officers tend to experience as negative parts of more remote sytems that define their working environment tend to produce higher levels of frustration. The two most notable exceptions to this generalization are the items dealing with hearing about injuries and deaths of other officers and rotating shifts. While these are a part, sometimes an important part, of the officer's personal experience, he or she can exert little control over their occurrence or effects.

B. Areas of Major Personal Pressures

Section II of the questionnaire pertained to areas of the officers' personal lives which may be sources of stress. This section consisted of a ten-item checklist and the participants were requested to identify areas in which they were currently experiencing "major pressures". The results for the two groups at the different measurement points are presented in Table 3.8. The percentages in this table refer to the proportion of respondents who answered "yes" to the various questions.

A review of this table indicates that the largest single source of stress was financial problems, and in this area, there was very little variation across the groups and over time. Approximately two out of every five respondents reported financial worries. After financial problems, there was a clustering of scores for the three items labelled: "love problems," "problems concerning children or parents or other relatives," and "worries about health or safety of myself or someone else." Between ten and twenty-three percent of the respondents in both groups indicated that they were experiencing pressures in one or more of these areas. The only other area of pressure which more than five percent of the respondents identified was "marital problems."

Our analysis first sought to identify differences between the experimental and comparison group at Time I. The differences between the groups on the various items were negligible. Moreover, although 31.5% of the comparison group compared 26.3% of experimental group reported experiencing no serious pressures in

TABLE 3.8: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS REPORTING MAJOR PRESSURES IN PERSONAL LIFE

ITEM	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP				COMPARISON GROUP		
	Time I (N=133)	Time II (N=118)	Time III (N=105)	Change From Time I to Time III	Time I (N=146)	Time III (N=119)	Change From Time I to Time III
1. Financial Problems	40.6%	37.3%	43.8%	+3.2%	41.1%	40.3%	-0.8%
2. Overloaded - Extra Jobs	1.5	3.4	3.8	+2.3	2.7	3.4	+0.7
3. Love Problems	15.0	11.0	12.4	-2.6	17.8	13.4	-4.4
4. Retirement Worries	3.8	3.4	3.8	--	7.5	5.9	-1.6
5. Health/Safety	22.6	15.3	16.2	-6.4	15.1	10.9	-4.2
6. Children/Parents	21.1	16.1	16.2	-4.9	16.4	14.3	-2.1
7. Overloaded - Attending School	3.0	3.4	1.9	-1.1	4.1	3.4	-0.7
8. Marital Problems	6.8	4.2	6.7	-0.1	6.2	5.9	-0.3
9. Drinking Problems	2.3	0.8	3.8	+1.5	--	0.8	+0.8
10. Other	8.3	4.2	5.2	-3.1	12.3	5.0	-7.3
11. No Problems	26.3%	43.2%	34.3%	+8.0%	31.5%	39.5%	+8.0%

any of these areas of personal life, this difference of 5.2% was not statistically significant (X^2= 0.904). Although the differences between the groups were not significant, members of the experimental group tended to report more pressures in private life than did members of the comparison group.

At Time III both groups had a higher percentage of respondents reporting no major problems-- 34.3% of the experimental and 39.5% of the comparison group. But the 5.2% difference between the groups was exactly the same as Time I. Thus, according to this indicator, the experimental group remained somewhat more stressed at Time III than did the comparison group. And, again, despite some fluctuations, an item-by-item analysis revealed no meaningful differences between the groups. The overall distribution of responses for Time I resembled those for Time III. Furthermore, there were no significant differences within or between the groups from Time I to Time III.

In sum, while there was a decline from Time I to Time III in the percentage of experimentals reporting pressure from problems in their personal lives, a decline of equal magnitude was registered by the comparison group. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the declining trend observed in the experimental group was an effect of the program.

We were surprised, of course, by the fact that, contrary to our hypothesis, pressures from personal problems declined in the comparison group. Additional analyses were conducted in search of some insight into that trend. For example, we noted, as indi-

cated in Table 3.9, that 35.2% of the comparison group were working on the steady tour or scooter charts at Time I and that percentage increased to 49.6% at Time III. While the shift to steady tours was much greater in the 115th Precinct (44.6% to 97%), this table indicates that a substantial proportion of the comparison group also worked steady tours during the research period. Nevertheless, our analyses failed to reveal any consistent relationship between steady tour assignments and the presence of pressues in selected areas of the officer's personal life.

Table 3.9: Assignment Schedule

Group	9 Squad		Scooter/ Steady		Total
	N	%	N	%	%
Experimental Group - Time I	58	44.6%	72	55.4%	130
Comparison Group - Time I	94	64.8%	51	35.2%	145
Comparison Group - Time II	59	50.4%	58	49.6%	117

C. Physical Symptoms of Stress

This section listed ten health problems that are often symptomatic of stress. The items presented in this listing ranged from frequent headaches and gastro-intestinal problems, to high blood pressure and insomnia, to feelings of boredom, depression, argumentativeness, and irritability. The officers were asked to place a checkmark next to the physical problems that they had

experienced during the three months prior to their completion of the questionnaire.

Table 3.10 shows the response patterns for the experimental and control groups at each measurement point. At Time I, a slightly higher percentage of the experimental group (33.8%) than the comparison group (30.8%) reported none of these physical symptoms of stress. However, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant (X^2= 0.291.) Additionally, the experimental group reported fewer of these symptoms. Specifically, there were notable, but not statistically significant differences between the experimental and comparison groups in the percentage of respondents reporting: frequent headaches (6.8% and 14.4%, respectively), muscle pains (5.3% and 11.6%), sleeping problems (19.5%, 24.0%), feeling keyed-up/tense (12.0%, 19.9%), and feeling argumentative (17.3%, 30.1%). Thus, the experimental group seemed slightly less stessed at Time I than did the comparison group.

At Time III, the percentage of experimentals reporting no physical symptoms was significantly higher for the experimental group than for the comparison group (X^2= 8.68, $p<.01$). Specifically, at this test point, 61% of the experimentals reported no physical symptoms compared to 41.2% of the comparison group. Moreover, the percentage of experimentals reporting specific symptoms was notably, but not significantly, lower than that for the comparison group on six items: frequent headaches (8.6% and 13.4%, respectively), cold/flu (12.4% and 19.3%), muscle

TABLE 3.10: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS REPORTING PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS OF STRESS

ITEM	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP				COMPARISON GROUP		
	Time I (N=133)	Time II (N=118)	Time III (N=105)	Change From Time I to Time III	Time I (N=146)	Time III (N=119)	Change From Time I to Time III
Frequent Headaches	6.8%	3.4%	8.6%	+1.8%	14.4%	13.4%	-1.0%
Stomach/Intestinal Problems	11.3	9.3	10.5	-0.8	14.4	10.1	-4.3
Cold/Flu	16.5	7.6	12.4	-4.1	18.5	19.3	+0.8
Muscle Pains/Stiffness	5.3	4.2	3.8	-1.5	11.6	10.9	-0.7
High Blood Pressure	6.8	4.2	6.7	-0.1	8.9	5.0	-3.9
Sleeping Problems	19.5	11.0	10.5	-9.0	24.0	16.8	-7.2
Boredom/Blahs/Depression	26.3	14.4	14.3	-12.0	25.3	13.4	-11.9
Keyed up/Tense	12.0	2.5	5.7	-6.3	19.9	12.6	-7.3
Argumentative	17.3	8.5	9.5	-7.8	30.1	20.2	-9.9
Other Problems	3.8	2.5	1.0	-2.8	5.5	3.4	-2.1
No Problems	33.8%	59.3%	61.0%	+27.2%	30.8%	41.2%	+10.4%

pains/stiffness (3.8%, 10.9%), sleeping problems (10.5%, 16.8%), feeling keyed up/tense (5.7%, 12.6%), and feeling argumentative (9.5%, 20.2%). A slightly higher percentage of the experimental than the comparison group reported stomach/intestinal problems, high blood pressure, or other problems, but the differences between the groups was negligible. Thus, the comparison group seemed considerably more stressed at Time III than did the experimental group.

In sum, the percentage of respondents reporting no physical symptoms of stress was approximately the same for the two groups at Time I. However, by Time III the difference between the groups was large and statistically significant. The percentage of the experimental group reporting no physical symptoms rose to 61% compared 41.2% for the comparison group. Thus, it appears that the reduction in reported physical symptoms of stress in the experimental group is attributable, at least in part, to the program operating in the 115th Precinct.

D. The Effects of Duty Charts on Personal Life

When the participants were asked to indicate how their duty schedules affected seventeen specific aspects of their personal lives, it was apparent that the officers in the 115th Precinct found that working steady tours had very positive effects on their personal lives. Specifically, the officers were asked to indicate whether their current duty chart had positive, negative, or no effects on various aspects of their lives. Table 3.11 presents the findings in terms of the percentage reporting positive effects of their work schedules on their personal lives.

TABLE 3.11: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS REPORTING POSITIVE EFFECTS OF CURRENT DUTY CHARTS ON SEVENTEEN ASPECTS OF PERSONAL LIFE

ITEM	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP				COMPARISON GROUP		
	Time I (N=133)	Time II (N=118)	Time III (N=105)	Change From Time I to Time III	Time I (N=146)	Time III (N=119)	Change From Time I to Time III
Recreation	11.3%	56.8%	57.1%	+45.8%	15.1%	16.8%	+1.7%
Family Life	12.8	55.1	62.9	+50.1	14.4	14.3	-0.1
Sleep	9.0	53.4	61.9	+52.9	11.0	13.4	+2.4
Holidays	12.8	36.4	48.6	+35.8	12.3	13.4	+1.1
Digestion	4.5	38.1	47.6	+43.1	6.8	10.9	+4.1
Sex Life	6.0	35.6	45.7	+39.7	6.8	13.4	+6.6
Eating Habits	4.5	39.8	56.2	+51.7	8.9	10.9	+2.0
Alertness	8.3	48.3	55.2	+46.9	10.3	12.6	+2.3
Social Life	9.8	50.0	61.9	+52.1	13.0	12.6	-0.4
Energy Level	10.5	55.1	58.1	+47.6	17.8	13.4	-4.4
Second Job	11.3	22.0	27.6	+16.3	11.0	10.1	-0.9
Child Care	6.0	18.6	21.0	+15.0	6.8	10.1	+3.3
Friendships - Police	27.1	33.9	40.0	+12.9	31.5	25.2	-6.3
Friendships - Non-Police	11.3	39.8	49.5	+38.2	11.0	12.6	+1.6
Household Chores	14.3	55.1	53.3	+39.0	24.7	26.1	+1.4
Personal Errands	27.1	56.8	65.7	+38.6	36.3	30.3	-6.0
School	9.0	26.3	26.7	+17.7	10.3	9.2	-1.1

The results for the experimental group and the comparison group at Time I were similar in that relatively small proportions of the officers in both groups reported that their current working schedules had a positive effect on the selected aspects of their lives. For example, very few officers in either group reported positive effects on family life, sleep, digestion, sex life, eating habits, alertness, social life, friendships with non-police personnel.

The results for the experimental group over time were remarkable. Not only were there substantial differences between the reports from Time I to Time II, but the improvements continued from Time II to Time III. Thus, by the end of the first year of operations, the percentage of the officers in the 115th Precinct who believed that their duty charts had a positive effect on their personal lives had risen dramatically on every aspect of personal life included in the instrument. For example, the percentage of officers reporting positive effects on family life rose from 12.8% at Time I to 55.1% at Time II to 62.9% at Time III. Similarly, the results regarding the positive effects on sleep patterns increased from 9.0% at Time I to 53.4% at Time II to 61.9% at Time III.

Moreover, the change in the experimental group from Time I to Time III was enormous in many areas. Specifically, the percentage reporting positive effects of duty schedule on recreation rose by 45.8%; digestion, 43.1%; sex life, 39.7%; eating habits, 51.7%, alertness, 46.9%; social life, 52.1%; energy level, 47.6%; and friendships with non-police personnel, 38.2%.

In contrast, the changes for the comparison group over the course of the year were negligible, despite the fact that by the end of the experimental year nearly half of the participants were working steady tours. The percentage reporting positive effects on sleep patterns rose by 2.4%; digestion, 4.1%; sex life, 6.6%; eating habits, 2.0%; and alertness, 2.3%. Moreover, unlike the experimental group, the percentage of comparison group members reporting positive effects from their current duty chart dropped for several aspects of personal life. Positive effects on social life decreased by 0.4%, energy level by 4.4%, ability to hold second job 0.9%, friendships with police officers down 6.3%.

The substantial differences between the experimental group and the control group suggests that the remarkable change in the ways experimental group members assess the impact of their work schedules on their personal lives is largely attributable to the program in the 115th Precinct.

E. Perceived Personal Problems Among Police Friends

In Section VI of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to review a checklist consisting of 11 behavioral items and to check-off problems they had observed among their three closest police friends. This measure was included for two reasons. First, it was assumed that the close police friends would tend to be persons with whom the respondent worked. The respondents' tendency to empathize with close friends who were experiencing personal problems could increase his or her own stress levels. Secondly, it was assumed that respondents would, to some extent,

identify sources of their own personal stress by projecting them onto close friends.

As Table 3.12 shows, at Time I, a slightly higher percentage of experimentals (27.1%) than the comparison group (24.7%) reported that their close police friends had no problems, but the difference was not statistically significant. The most frequently cited problem noted by both groups was excessive complaining--42.1% of the experimental group and 41.8% of the comparison group. The next highest items were spouse problems, reported by 35.3% of the experimental group and 30.1% of the comparison group, and moodiness-- 32.3% of the experimental group and 26.0% of the comparison group. A significantly higher percentage of the comparison group (25.3%) than experimentals (15.8%) indicated that their friends were plagued by excessive worrying (X^2= 4.27, $p<.05$). None of these differences between the groups was statistically significant.

At Time III, 56.2% of the experimentals and 45.4% of the comparison group reported no problems among their three closest police friends. Again, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant. However, an item analysis reveals that that there was a statistically significant difference between the groups in terms of the percentage of respondents reporting "spouse problems. Specifically, 12.4% of the experimentals reported spouse problems among their three closest police friends at Time III compared to 28.6% of the comparison group (X^2= 8.76, $p <.01$.). Thus, while there were no overall dif-

TABLE 3.12: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS REPORTING MAJOR PRESSURES AMONG THREE CLOSEST POLICE FRIENDS

ITEM	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP				COMPARISON GROUP		
	Time I (N=133)	Time II (N=118)	Time III (N=105)	Change From Time I to Time III	Time I (N=146)	Time III (N=119)	Change From Time I to Time III
Excessive Worrying	15.8%	11.9%	11.4%	-4.4%	25.3%	20.2%	-5.1%
Behavior Changes	14.3	8.5	8.6	-5.7	17.8	10.9	-6.9
Losing Temper	20.3	11.0	10.5	-9.8	24.7	16.0	-8.7
Neighbor Problems	1.5	0.8	2.9	+1.4	3.4	2.5	-0.9
Moodiness	32.3	15.3	17.1	-15.2	26.0	19.3	-6.7
Spouse Problems	35.3	16.1	12.4	-22.9	30.1	28.6	-1.5
Excessive Alcohol Use	21.8	18.6	12.4	-9.4	19.2	21.0	+1.8
Medication Abuse	0.8	--	1.9	+0.8	--	0.8	+0.8
Children Problems	3.0	1.7	1.9	-1.1	8.9	4.2	-4.7
Excessive Complaining	42.1	33.9	29.5	-12.6	41.8	31.1	-10.7
Other	--	0.8	--	--	3.4	0.8	-2.6
No Problems	27.1%	50.0%	56.2%	+29.1%	24.7%	45.4%	+20.7%

ferences between the experimental and comparison groups at Time III, the operation of the program in the 115th Precinct seems to have decreased the participants perception of marital stress among their three closest police friends.

F. Techniques of Stress Reduction

Section VII of the questionnaire listed nine activities such as exercising, watching television, consuming alcohol, or reading and listening to music, which the officers might use to relieve frustration. The officers were asked to characterize their use of each relaxation technique as "never", "sometimes", or "frequently."

These questions were included in the questionnaire not to measure stress, but to describe how officers sought to relieve it and to determine whether there were any changes in the use of such techniques over the course of the research period.

In constructing this section of the questionnaire, Vera staff, the PBA, and the police department were mindful of the fact that alcohol consumption may be the preferred method of tension reduction for a large segment of the Department's personnel. Because alcohol usage is a sensitive topic within the Department and among police officers, the question pertaining to alcohol consumption was placed fourth on this list of nine recreational activites.

As Table 3.13 indicates, while between 40% and 50% of the officers reported at the various measurement points that they drank alcohol "sometimes" or "frequently" to lessen tension, this method of tension reduction ranked last in reported methods for reducing stress. In fact, the two most popular methods for reducing stress were "keeping the job in perspective" and "reading or listening to music, or engaging in a hobby". In this

TABLE 3.13: PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS EMPLOYING VARIOUS TENSION-REDUCTION TECHNIQUES

ITEM	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP			COMPARISON GROUP	
	Time I (N=133)	Time II (N=118)	Time III (N=104)	Time I (N=146)	Time III (N=118)
Talking to Spouse/Friends	89.4%	89.6%	88.5%	93.2%	93.2%
Exercise	81.8	81.9	84.6	82.2	85.5
Put Problems Out of Mind	81.1	84.3	82.7	76.0	84.6
Alcohol Use	46.2	38.3	45.2	49.3	49.2
Keep Perspective	99.2	95.7	95.2	99.3	97.5
Work - House/Car	74.8	80.9	79.8	79.5	81.4
Television	82.7	82.6	87.5	82.9	89.7
Reading, Music	96.2	93.1	95.2	95.9	99.2
Family Activities	90.0	88.3	86.6	86.2	89.3

regard, it must be noted that an individual officer may employ one or more techniques for reducing stress with alcohol consumption being only one of the panoply -- and not the technique of choice.

This table also shows little difference over time or between the two groups in the use of various techniques. Therefore, the findings suggest that the program in the 115th Precinct has had no discernible impact on the techniques that the patrol officers use to reduce tension.

G. Marital Problems

Section VIII of the questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part asked all officers who were married or living in a "married-type" relationship to indicate whether his/her mate "greatly enjoys," "likes," "neither likes nor dislikes," "dislikes," or "strongly dislikes," the fact that the respondent is a police officer.

In considering the data presented in this section, it must be emphasized that only approximately two-thirds of the officers in each of the five samples reported that they were married or living in a married-type relationship. Thus, the number of cases in the various categories is relatively small. Also, several of the officers had difficulty completing this section because they

were engaged to be married or involved in a long-term relationship, but the couple was not living together.* Because there is some bias in these data, these findings should be considered with caution. Additionally, again because of this bias, no tests of statistical significance were conducted. Despite these shortcomings, the data are quite interesting from a descriptive rather than an evalative perspective.

At Time I, 38.6% of the experimental and 50.0% of the comparison group reported that their spouse/mate approved of the respondents' occupation. Thus, the difference between the two groups was substantial, with the experimental groups reporting higher rates of spousal disapproval. At Time III, the percentage of experimental group officers reporting spouse/mate approval rose by 15.0% to 53.6%. In contrast, the percentage of comparison group officers reporting approval from their spouse/mate rose by a mere 1.9% from 50.0% to 51.9%.

In considering the responses for the groups at the different measurement points, it must be noted that at least half of the spouses of the officers were either neutral towards the officer's occupation or actively disapproved of it.

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* A few officers wrote comments on the bottom of their questionnaires indicating that being a police officer sometimes created tension in a dating situation and they believed that the question should have been broadened in scope and not limited to couples who were living together. Other officers approached Vera staff in person and made the same comments.

The second part of Section VIII consisted of a series of ten questions pertaining to common marital and family problems. The ten problems cited ranged from communications problems between husband and wife to financial difficulties to the non-police spouse complaining of feelings of frustration and being tied-down. For each of these ten items the officers were asked to indicate whether the problem "never", "sometimes", or "frequently" arose in his/her household. Again, the fact that some of the officers had difficulty completing this section is reflected in the shifts in the number of officers answering the various questions. For example, the N for the experimental group at Time I varied from a low of 81 for Question 2, pertaining to communications problems between parents and children to a high of 91 for Question 5, which pertained to the officer's duty hours causing difficulties in family life. (See Table 3.14)

The scoring system for these items was as follows: A response of "never" was assigned one point, "sometimes" -- 2 points, "frequently" -- 3 points and then averages were computed for each item. Thus, the higher the average score, the higher the frustration level. However, given the fluctuations in the size of the N, no tests of statistical significance were conducted.

Results for both the experimental and comparison groups were generally stable across time. Nevertheless, for the experimental group there were two noteworthy changes in the distribution of responses between Time I and Time III. The first pertains to

TABLE 3.14: AVERAGE SCORES FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON GROUPS ON THE MARITAL PROBLEMS ITEMS

ITEM	EXPERIMENTAL GROUP						COMPARISON GROUP			
	TIME I		TIME II		TIME III		TIME I		TIME II	
	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$	N	$\bar{X}$
Communications - Husband/Wife	86	1.94	79	1.78	69	1.81	93	1.87	76	1.88
Communications - Parents/ Children	81	1.58	73	1.51	65	1.52	83	1.47	68	1.44
Financial Difficulties	88	1.93	78	1.99	72	2.01	95	2.05	77	2.12
School/Promotion Study	88	1.77	74	1.53	70	1.51	87	1.51	73	1.66
Interrupted Family Life	91	2.14	79	1.73	71	1.69	95	2.16	77	2.16
Spouse Frustrated	85	1.59	78	1.51	68	1.47	91	1.76	75	1.65
Officer Brings Work Home	88	1.48	78	1.40	71	1.45	94	1.51	77	1.42
Unsatisfactory Sex Life	88	1.43	79	1.29	72	1.33	94	1.49	76	1.58
Alcohol Problems	88	1.09	79	1.11	72	1.13	95	1.13	77	1.18
Anxieties, Resentments	88	1.43	77	1.34	72	1.36	93	1.41	76	1.38

Question 4 which read: "Police officer's school or promotion study takes too much time". The average score for this item fell from 1.77 at Time I to 1.51 at Time III -- a change of 0.26. For the comparison group, the mean score on this item rose from 1.51 to 1.66. The second difference pertained to Question 5 which read: "Police duty hours cause difficulties in family life". The average score for this item dropped by a substantial 0.45 points from 2.14 at Time I to 1.69 at Time III. For the comparison group, the mean score on this item for the comparison was unchanged. This finding is consistent with the findings presented earlier that respondents believed that the introduction of steady tours had a very positive effect on family life.

V Conclusion

Did the 115th Precinct program reduce patrol officer stress as it was intended to do? The answer is affirmative based on the indicators used in the research.

At the end of the first year of program operation, the officers in the 115th Precinct evinced a lower average score on the job frustration index than did the members of the comparison group. The difference was statistically significant as was the decline in the "job frustration" level of the experimental group from Time I to Time III. In contrast, the job frustration level for the comparison group remained essentially unchanged over the course of the year.

The research also indicates that the principal sources of job frustration for patrol officers in general pertain to the

organizational and bureaucratic aspects of the police department and the operations of the criminal justice system. These are matters over which they have no control. This finding is consistent with the findings of other research in the area of police stress as reported in Malloy and May (1984). In this regard, it also important to note that neither the threat of physical harm nor the probability of encountering repulsive situations emerged as major sources of stress for the officers who participated in this research.

The evidence suggests that the 115th Precinct project had the desired effect on some broad organizatonal sources of frustration as well as sources inherent in the daily work experience of patrol officers. Statistically significant reductions in frustration levels emerged on such items as rotating shifts and anger over court decisions, as well as a lack of recognition, working with incompetent officers, and experiencing frequent duty changes. Among the comparison group, statistically significant reductions occurred on immediate sources such as partner assignments, duty changes, and feelings of helplessness, while significant increases in frustration levels emerged with respect to such broad organizational sources as salary, public criticism, and outside political pressures.

The program's effect on stress levels was evident also in the respondent's reports of experiencing physical symptoms of stress. While approximately the same percentage of experimental and comparison group members reported they experienced no physi-

cal symptoms at Time I (33.8% and 30.8%, respectively), there was a sizeable and statistically significant difference between the groups at Time III (61% versus 41.2%, respectively).

Another indication of reduced stress is reflected in the enormously increased percentage of experimentals who indicated that their current duty chart had a positive effect on selected aspects of their personal lives. At Time I, small and similar percentages of experimental and comparison group members reported that their working schedules had a positive effect on their personal lives. However, by the end of the year, the percentage of experimentals reporting positive effects rose dramatically on all seventeen measures included in the instrument. For example, the percentage of these officers reporting positive effects on their family life increased by 50.1%, on social life by 52.1%, on sleep by by 52.9%, and alertness by 46.9%. In contrast, changes in the comparison group were negligible.

In short, after a year of program operations, the patrol officers in the 115th Precinct reported lower levels of job frustration, fewer physical symptoms of stress, and more positive personal benefits from their steady tour duty charts. Similar changes were not evident among the comparison group members.

CHAPTER IV
REACTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY TOWARD THE NEW PRECINCT

Introduction

The New York City Police Department asked the Vera Institute to conduct a survey of residents in the 115th Precinct to determine the extent to which the opening of the new precinct affected residents' attitudes toward the police, their assessment of the quality of police services, and their fears regarding crime and personal safety. The Department wanted this information as an indication of how the people responded to their new precinct. At the same time, public reaction to service is, to some extent, a measure of productivity and police officials wanted assurance that the innovative features of the 115th Precinct would not adversely affect productivity. In response to this request, Vera hired Kane, Parsons, and Associates, a marketing research firm, to conduct two telephone surveys of community residents. The first survey of three hundred residents was conducted in November and December, 1983, just prior to the January 4, 1984 opening of the Precinct. The second set of three hundred interviews were conducted in November and December, 1984, and January, 1985, approximately a year after the opening of the Precinct. As this chapter explains, prior to the opening of the Precinct, the vast majority of the interviewees expressed favorable attitudes toward the police and the quality of police

services; nevertheless, a year later, the interviewees' attitudes were even more favorable.

I Method Used

A. Sample Selection

A total of six hundred people were interviewed as part of the community attitude survey -- three hundred before the Precinct opened and three hundred a year later. These respondents were selected using random sampling techniques. Moreover, these samples were selected independently; that is, the respondents in the second sample were not the same as those in the first sample. This selection technique was employed because it prevents certain types of response biases from arising. Specifically, there are a number of methodological and logistical problems that arise in trying to interview the same panel of respondents after a one-year interval. First, at the end of the year, a certain proportion of the respondents from the first sample will be unavailable because they have moved from the area, or changed telephone numbers, or are not home when the researchers try to contact them. Depending on the type of neighborhood surveyed, the number of respondents that are unavailable for the second survey may be quite large, and the loss of twenty percent or more of the sample may introduce bias. Secondly, if the respondents know that they are going to be re-contacted in a year to discuss their perceptions of the police, then this prospect may affect the participants attitudes. For example, they may start paying more attention to crime problems and police

activities. As a result, all sorts of unknown biases may be reflected in their responses at Time II. By using two independently selected random samples, these problems are avoided.

Vera chose to use telephone surveys because this method is efficient and relatively inexpensive when compared to the logistical problems and expense involved in conducting face-to-face interviews. Nevertheless, telephone surveys are not without limitations that may introduce certain types of bias. Specifically, and as is explained in greater detail in Appendix C, although 96% of all households nationwide have telephones, 27% of households have unlisted telephones. As a result, a large segment of the households in any given community cannot be contacted using directories of published telephone numbers. Additionally, the available research indicates that it is the poor rather than the affluent who are more likely to have unlisted numbers. Vera staff were not able to determine the percentage of households in the 115th Precinct that had unlisted numbers; however, we were informed by the telephone company that 30% of the households in Queens had unlisted numbers. We assumed that percentage for the 115th Precinct was equivalent to the Queens average. Additionally, we realized that, given the demographics of the Precinct, the affluent white households in the Jackson Heights section were likely to be overrepresented in our samples, while the less affluent Hispanic residents in the Corona area were likely to be underrepresented. Nevertheless, given our time, logistical, and financial constraints, we decided to draw our samples of households from directories of published telephone numbers.

After reviewing community survey instruments used in other police research, Vera staff constructed an interview for this project. The instrument asked the respondents about: conditions in their neighborhoods, their perceptions of and fear of crime in the community, their perceptions and assessments of the visibility of police, and the adequacy and the quality of that service. A copy of the instrument is included in Appendix B of this report and a more detailed description of the information elicited by it is provided in the pages that follow.

B. Representativeness and Comparability of the Samples

1. Race/Ethnicity

The primary criteria that we used to determine whether the two random samples were biased was the race/ethnicity of the respondents. This criteria was chosen because many studies have shown that attitudes toward the police are strongly related to race/ethnicity and socio-economic class. Additionally, although it is often difficult to obtain information about the economic level of residents in a particular community, the 1980 Census data provides several statistics regarding the racial composition of various areas.

The data presented in Table 4.1 indicate that, as anticipated, whites were overrepresented in both samples, while Hispanics were underrepresented, and blacks were adequately represented.

Table 4.1: Race/Ethnicity of Community Survey Samples

Racial/Ethnic Group	TIME I		TIME II		1980 Household Census
	N	%	N	%	%
White	194	64.7	165	55.0	50.4
Black	55	18.3	56	18.7	18.4
Hispanic	40	13.3	61	20.3	25.5
Other	9	3.0	11	3.7	5.7
Refused	2	0.7	7	2.3	
TOTAL	300	100.0%	300	100.0%	100.0%

Census data suggest that 50.4% of the households in the 115th Precinct are white, while 25.5% are Hispanic. At Time I, white households comprised 64.7% of the sampled households, while Hispanics constituted only 13.3%. However, the racial/ethnic distribution of the Time II sample more closely approximated the estimated household demographics of the Precinct. Specifically, at Time II, white households comprised only 55.0% of the participating households, while Hispanics constituted 20.3%. The shift in the white and Hispanic percentages were statistically significant, ($Z=2.4$, $p<.01$, and $Z= -2.31$, $p<.05$, respectively). Moreover, Census data suggest that black households constitute 18.1% of the 115th Precinct households, and Table 4.1 reveals that they accounted for 18.3% of the Time I respondents and 18.7% of the Time II sample. Thus, the percentage of black interviewees in each survey sample is consistent with the Census data.

Overall, the second sample is probably more representative of the broader community than the first.

2. Gender

As noted above, the principle criteria we used to measure the representativeness of the samples was race/ethnicity. A secondary criteria was the gender of the respondents. The 1980 Census data reveal that 45% of the adult population of the 115th Precinct is male, while 55% is female. Additionally, a substantial proportion of these women are elderly and live alone. To preclude the possibility that elderly women would be overrepresented in the samples, we used a capping system whereby each sample would consist of 150 men and 150 women. Moreover, the sampling was done so that no more than 30% of the respondents would be 60 years of age or older. As Appendix C explains in more detail, by using this capping system, the average age of the respondents was somewhat lower than would have been obtained without a capping system, and women respondents and the elderly are not overrepresented.

3. Other Demographic Characteristics

Race/ethnicity, gender, and, to a lesser extent, age were the primary criteria Vera took into consideration in assessing the representativeness of our survey participants. We nevertheless collected additional demographic data for descriptive, rather than evaluative purposes. Thus, the following demographic data are presented to provide an overview of the characteristics of the participants in the Vera telephone surveys.

The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 93 with a median age of 47.2 at Time I and 46.3 at Time II. Additionally, as Table 4.2 reveals, 29% of each sample were age 60 or older. In general, the respondents were middle-aged to elderly and this result is not unexpected given the household demographics of this precinct.

Table 4.2: Age Distribution of Community Survey Samples

	TIME I		TIME II	
Age	N	%	N	%
18-39	108	36.0	116	38.7
40-59	97	32.3	85	28.3
60+	87	29.0	87	29.0
Refused	8	2.7	12	4.0
TOTAL	300	100.0	300	100.0
Median	47.4		46.3	

There were also some differences in the educational level of the respondents in the two samples (Table 4.3). Notably, the percentage of interviewees who were not high school graduates dropped from 23.7% to 12.7%. Conversely, the proportion that had attended college rose from 39.7% to 44.6%. Thus, the participants in the second survey had a somewhat higher educational level than the first.

Table 4.3: Highest Educational Attainment of Community Survey Samples

	TIME I		TIME II	
	N	%	N	%
Less than high school	71	23.7	38	12.7
High school graduate	105	35.3	110	36.7
Some college	59	19.7	62	20.6
Four-year college grad.	47	15.7	51	17.0
Attended grad. school	13	4.3	21	7.0
Refused	5	1.3	18	6.0
TOTAL	300	100.0	300	100.0

Table 4.4: Employment Status

CLASSIFICATION	TIME I		TIME II	
	N	%	N	%
Employed full time	163	54.5	170	56.7
Employed part time	25	8.3	17	5.7
Retired	67	22.3	67	22.3
Other	45	14.9	46	15.3
TOTAL	300	100.0	300	100.0

Although no direct questions were asked regarding household income levels or sources of income, the respondents were asked about their employment status (Table 4.4). The distributions for each sample were comparable. Just slightly over half of the respondents were employed full time (54.5% at Time I, 56.7% at Time II), and 22.3% in each sample were retired. Although the "Other" category included interviewees who were full-time students, or unemployed persons looking for work, most were women who classified themselves as housewives.

4. The Implications of Sample Differences

Appendix C provides a detailed description of the methods that were used to obtain these samples. We have two samples which differ significantly from one another with respect to racial/ethnic compsition, and it is conceivable that these differences could affect the results. The majority of the Hispanics in the 115th Precinct tend to be poor, minority group members, and police literature indicates that the poor and minority group members tend to perceive and value the police less favorably than do white, middle class persons. Because Hispanics are underrepresented in the sample, one might expect that our samples would produce a rosier assessment of community conditions and police services than the people of the community actually felt.

The data presented in this chapter indicate, however, that such an assumption about the direction of Hispanic opinion would be incorrect with respect to this research. For example, a higher percentage of Hispanics than of blacks or whites believed that

neighborhood conditions were getting better at both Time I and Time II; a higher percentage of Hispanics thought community crime rates were decreasing at both points in time; and at Time I, a higher proportion of Hispanics saw improvement in the quality of police services.

These data suggest that if Hispanics were more adequately represented in our study samples, the effect of positive change in community perceptions and assessments would have been even greater.

II Findings from the Surveys

A. Changes in Neighborhood Conditions

1. Overview of Change

The first survey question asked the respondents whether they believed that, in general, conditions in their neighborhood had gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same during the past year. Thus, the participants were asked to provide a summary assessment of whether changes had occurred. In both the base and the test year slightly over half of the interviewees reported that conditions had stayed the same (54.3% and 52.7%, respectively). Nevertheless, there was a significant increase ($Z= 4.0$, $p < .001$) in the percentage of the participants who indicated that conditions had improved-- doubling from 10.7% before the 115th Precinct opened to 22.7% at the end of the first year of Precinct operations. Conversely, there was a significant reduction ($Z= 2.2$, $p < .05$) in the proportion of respondents who

stated that conditions had worsened--the percentage dropped from 31.7% to 23.7%.

2. Open-ended Questions Regarding Neighborhood Changes

All participants, regardless of their overall assessment of changes in their neighborhood, were asked to mention specific ways in which conditions in their neighborhood had improved in the past year.

The percentage of respondents noting one or more improvements rose from 38.3% at Time I to 46.0% at Time II, ($Z= -1.99$, $p<.05$). The most frequently noted area of improvement was police visibility which increased significantly from 6% to 20% from Time I to Time II, ($Z= -5.2$, $p <.001$). Other areas of amelioration noted at both Time I and Time II included improvements in property and building maintenance (22% and 28%, respectively) and cleaner and quieter neighborhoods (28% and 20%). Also, 14% of each sample mentioned that a "higher quality of people" had moved into their area, and a similar percentage noted improved shopping facilities (16% and 14%).

The percentage of respondents indicating one or more ways in which their neighborhood had deteriorated from 41.3% at Time I to 49.0% at Time II, ($Z= -1.93$, $p<.10$). At both times, the mostly frequently cited negative factor was the perceived increase in the crime rate. However, this response was cited less often at Time II, (55% at Time I to 39% at Time II). The percentage of respondents stating that teenagers "hanging out" or disorderly conduct was a problem dropped from 20% to 9%, ($Z= 4.2$, $p<.001$),

while those citing drug use and trafficking declined from 21% to 13%, ($Z = 2.9$, $p < .01$).

3. Perceptions of Change According To Racial/Ethnic Group

When the responses to the general question regarding whether conditions had gotten better, gotten worse or stayed the same were analyzed, according to the race/ethnicity of the respondents, some interesting variations emerged. As Table 4.5 shows, the general pattern of responses was similar for both blacks and whites at Time I and Time II. That is, about 50% of the whites and 70% of the blacks at both points in time saw neighborhoods as essentially the same as they were the year before. The second most likely response for both groups was that conditions in the neighborhood had deteriorated, whereas the third was that conditions had improved. This pattern is also true for Hispanics at Time I; however, at Time II, Hispanic respondents who saw conditions improving outnumbered those who saw them as worsening by 12.7%.

This general pattern of response, however, masks some important changes that occurred from Time I to Time II. For example, the percentage of white respondents reporting improvement rose significantly from 11.7% to 22.0% ($Z = -3.4$, $p < .001$), while the percentage of blacks and Hispanics noting better conditions more than doubled (5.6% to 12.5%, and 14.9% to 31.0%, respectively). At the same time, the percentage of respondents who thought that neighborhood conditions were worsening fell notably for all three

TABLE 4.5: PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE IN NEIGHBORHOOD CONDITION ACCORDING TO RACE/ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENTS

EVALUATION	RACE/ETHNICITY											
	WHITE				BLACK				HISPANIC*			
	TIME I		TIME II		TIME I		TIME II		TIME I		TIME II	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Better	22	11.7	36	22.0	3	5.6	7	12.5	7	14.9	22	31.0
Worse	68	36.2	49	30.1	14	25.9	9	16.1	13	27.7	13	18.3
Same	98	52.1	78	47.9	37	68.5	40	71.4	27	57.4	36	50.7
Total	188	100.0	163	100.0	54	100.0	56	100.0	47	100.0	71	100.0

N at Time I = 289
N at Time II = 290

*The "Hispanic" category at Time I includes 7 respondents who classified themselves as "Other." Similarly, the Time II statistics for Hispanics include 10 persons who classified themselves as "Other."

TABLE 4.6: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS AT TIME I AND TIME II REPORTING CHANGES IN EIGHT SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS

FACTORS	TIME I (N = 300)				TIME II (N = 300)			
	Better	Worse	Same	Don't Know	Better	Worse	Same	Don't Know
Crime Problems	8.7%	37.3%	45.7%	8.3%	18.3%	27.0%	48.3%	6.4%
Police Visibility	29.0	19.7	47.0	4.3	61.0	6.7	30.0	2.3
Neighborhood Environment	16.0	37.3	46.7	--	17.3	27.0	54.3	1.4
Building Conditions	29.0	22.7	47.0	1.3	36.3	14.0	49.0	0.7
Disorderly People	9.3	30.3	56.3	4.0	13.0	24.7	59.3	3.0
Community Involvement	21.7	7.7	40.3	30.3	23.7	6.6	46.0	23.7
Neighborhood People	11.3	28.7	55.7	4.3	14.7	22.0	60.7	2.6
Traffic	4.0	35.7	53.0	7.3	7.0	40.3	52.0	0.7
OVERALL ASSESSMENT	10.7%	31.7%	54.3%	3.3%	21.7%	23.7%	51.3%	3.3%

groups-- from 36.2% to 30.1% among whites; from 25.9% to 16.1% among blacks; and from 27.7% to 18.3% among Hispanics. It is also interesting to note that a higher percentage of Hispanics than blacks or whites stated that conditions were improving at both points in time. Unfortunately, given the small number of black and Hispanic respondents in each, it is not possible to determine whether these shifts in perception are statistically significant. In short, while the majority of all respondents saw neighborhood conditions as essentially unchanged, there were appreciable increases across the groups in the proportion of respondents who saw conditions as improving and concomitant decreases in the percentage who saw them as worsening.

4. Specific Questions

After the open-ended questions, the participants were asked to indicate whether several specific aspects of their neighborhood had gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same. The findings for these closed-ended questions were generally consistent with those for the open-ended questions; nevertheless, when the respondents were asked to focus on particular aspects of their neighborhoods some findings emerged which were of particular importance to this research.

As Table 4.6 indicates, the most important change pertained to police visibility. The percentage of respondents reporting increased police visibility rose significantly from 29% at Time I to 61% at Time II ($Z = -8.0$, $p < .001$), while the percentage reporting a decrease in police visibility dropped sig-

nificantly from 19.7% to 6.7% (Z= 4.3, p <.001). Additionally, the percentage of interviewees who perceived that the crime problem had diminished rose significantly from 8.7% at Time I to 18.3% at Time II (Z= -3.2, p <.01), while the percentage reporting that crime rates had increased dropped significantly from 37.3% to 27% (Z= 2.6, p <.01.)

The results regarding other conditions were less pronounced; however, in general, the percentage reporting that conditions had improved increased slightly, while the percentage reporting worsening conditions declined slightly.

B. Fear of Crime

1. Overview

The participants were then questionned about their fear of victimization in six areas: 1) robbery, 2) assault, 3) burglary of an occupied dwelling is occupied, 4) burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, 5) auto theft, and 6) children being assaulted. In considering the results, it must be emphasized that a third of the interviewees did not own cars, so this question was irrelevant to them. When the response rates were calculated using only those participants who owned cars, it was found that the percentage who were worried about having their cars stolen dropped significantly from 78% at Time I to 64% at Time II (Z= 3.1, p <.01). It is evident from these statistics that although the car owners were somewhat less worried about auto theft after the precinct opened, their level of fear remained high.

Similarly, 60% of the respondents did not have children living at home and therefore they could not answer the question regarding their fear that their children would be assualted. Although the percentage of interviewees with children who reported that they were worried about their children being assaulted fell by 10% from 63.5% to 53.5%, this reduction was not statistically significant.

Almost all respondents were able to answer the questions pertaining to fear of assault, burglary, and robbery. As Table 4.7 reveals the opening of the 115th Precinct seemed to have little impact on fear levels for these crimes. Specifically, the percentage of interviewees reporting that they were worried about being burglarized, while at home, declined by 7.4% from 73.4% to 66.0%, while those who worried about being robbed fell by 4% from 70.3% to 66.3%. The reductions for the other crime categories were even slighter.

2. Perception of Changes in Crime Rates

The respondents were asked to indicate specifically whether crime had increased, decreased, or stayed the same during the past year. As Table 4.8 indicates the proportion stating that the crime rate had increased dropped significantly from 34% in the base year to 26% in the test year ($Z= 2.0$, $p < .05$). Additionally, the percentage indicating that the crime rate had decreased rose significantly from 8.3% to 19% ($Z= -3.6$, $p < .001$). Again, the plurality at both Time I and Time II indicated that

TABLE 4.7: RESPONDENTS' WORRY OVER CRIME VICTIMIZATION AT TIME I AND TIME II

CRIME CATEGORY	TIME I				TIME II			
	N	Worried	Not Worried	Don't Know	N	Worried	Not Worried	Don't Know
Robbery	300	70.3%	29.0%	0.7%	300	66.3%	33.0%	0.7%
Assault	300	59.0	40.3	0.7	300	56.3	42.7	1.0
Burglary at Home	300	73.4	26.3	0.3	300	66.0	31.7	2.3
Burglary Not at Home	300	51.4	48.3	0.3	300	50.7	49.0	0.3
Car Theft	200*	78.0	22.0	—	197*	64.0	36.0	—
Children Assaulted	115**	63.5	36.5	—	116**	53.5	46.5	—

* Excludes respondents who indicated that they did not own an automobile.
** Excludes respondents who replied that they did not have children living at home.

the crime situation remained the same (45.0% and 41.7%, respectively).

Table 4.8: Respondents Percepions of Changes in Crime Rates at Time I and Time II

	TIME I		TIME II		CHANGE
	N	%	N	%	%
Increased	102	34.0	78	26.0	-8.0
Decreased	25	8.3	57	19.0	+10.7
Same	135	45.0	125	41.7	-3.3
Don't Know	38	12.7	40	13.3	+0.6
TOTAL	300	100.0	300	100.0	

3. Perceived Change in Crime Rate by Race/Ethnicity

When the data are considered according to the race/ethnicity of the respondents some notable differences appear. As Table 4.9 reveals, approximately 50% of the respondents in each sample, regardless of race or ethnicity, reported that the crime situation had remained the same. Nevertheless, at both Time I and Time II, white respondents were somewhat more likely than black or Hispanic respondents to report that the crime rate had increased; however, the differences across the groups were not dramatic. What is of greater interest is that the proportion of respondents in each group who believed that crime was increasing had declined since the opening of the 115th Precinct. Conversely, the percentage of participants who believed that crime had

TABLE 4.9: PERCEIVED CHANGES IN CRIME RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENT

EVALUATION	RACE/ETHNICITY											
	WHITE				BLACK				HISPANIC			
	TIME I		TIME II		TIME I		TIME II		TIME I		TIME II	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Increased	71	41.8	46	34.3	17	32.7	15	28.8	14	35.0	17	25.4
Decreased	12	7.1	21	15.7	6	11.5	13	25.0	7	17.5	21	31.3
Same	87	51.2	67	50.0	29	55.8	24	46.2	19	47.5	29	43.3
Total	170	100.0	134	100.0	52	100.0	52	100.0	40	100.0	67	100.0

N at Time I = 262
N at Time II = 253

declined has increased across all groups. The responses of the Hispanic interviewees are notable in that while 25.4% at Time II reported that crime had increased, a higher percentage (31.3%) believed that it had decreased. Thus, approximately 75% of the Hispanic respondents stated that the crime situation had stayed the same or gotten better. This finding is consistant with those reported earlier regarding Hispanics perceptions of change in the overall quality of the neighborhood environment. Specifically, the Hispanic respondents are somewhat more optimistic about conditions than black or white respondents.

C. Police Visibility

As noted earlier in this chapter, many respondents stated that there had been an increase in police visibility. When the interviewees were asked whether they has seen a police officer in the last 24 hours, the affirmative response rose significantly from 38.0% at Time I to 54.7% at Time II ($Z= -4.2, p < .001$). Respondents who stated that they had not seen a police officer in the last 24 hours were then asked if they had seen an officer in the past week. In response, an additional 32.7% of the Time I interviewees, and 29.7% of the Time II participants answered in the affirmative. When these two measures of police visibility are combined, the findings indicate that the percentage of respondents who had seen an officer in the past week rose significantly from 70.7% at Time I to 84.4% at Time II ($Z= -4.6, p < .001$).

D. Respondents' Expectations of Police Response to Emergencies

When the interviewees were asked whether they expected the police to respond quickly if they were called in an emergency, 73.7% of the first sample stated that they expected a rapid response compared to 78.3% in the second sample-- an improvement of 4.6%. Although this modest increase is not statistically significant, it is nevertheless in the expected direction. Additionally, in each year there was a certain proportion that did not expect rapid police response in an emergency situation. Nevertheless, this proportion fell by 4.4% from 18.7% at Time I to 14.3% at Time II.

The relatively small number of citizens who had reported that they did not expect a rapid police response were then asked to state their reasons. As the following indicates, while certain themes recurred in these responses, no definite patterns emerged across the two samples. Fifty-six interviewees in the first sample stated they did not expect rapid police response. Thirty-two said that from past experience they did not expect the police to respond quickly. Other commonly cited reasons were: "response time depends on the type of situation" (11); "police don't care" (8), "police are too busy" (7); or "police take their time" (6). The respondents in the second sample echoed similar sentiments, yet, the number in each category varied. For example, only 10 participants based their assessment on past negative experiences with police response time. Others stated the "police don't care" (7); "police are too busy" (6) or "never around" (2);

"police take their time" (14) or, "response time depends on the type of situation" (6).

Given the lack of a pattern in these responses and the small number of responses in each category, it is not possible to draw any inferences.

E. Evaluation of Police Performance

The participants were asked to evaluate police performance in the areas of crime prevention, helping crime victims, maintaining order on the streets and sidewalks, and traffic enforcement. The results for the Time I sample indicate that, in general, the respondents believe that the police were performing satisfactorily in these areas. Nevertheless, the results of the second survey revealed a decided improvement in the citizens' assessment police performance after the opening of 115th Precinct. In considering the findings presented in Table 4.10, it must be noted that a fair proportion of the respondents could not answer one or more of these questions.

1. Crime Prevention

There was a significant increase in the percentage of respondents reporting that the police were doing a good job in preventing crime. This proportion rose by 17.4% from 40.6% at Time I to 58.0% at Time II ($Z = -4.4$, $p < .001$). At the same time, the percentage of respondents reporting that the police were doing poorly fell from 11% to 5.3%. The percentage of respondents who could not answer this question remained relatively

TABLE 4.10: EVALUATION OF POLICE PERFORMANCE IN PREVENTING CRIME, HELPING CRIME VICTIMS, AND MAINTAINING ORDER

CATEGORY	TIME I (N=300)				TIME II (N=300)			
	EVALUATION				EVALUATION			
	Good	Fair	Poor	Don't Know	Good	Fair	Poor	Don't Know
Preventing Crime	40.6%	35.0%	11.0%	13.4%	58.0%	25.3%	5.3%	11.4%
Helping Victims	34.7	23.7	14.7	26.9	43.3	22.7	8.3	25.7
Maintaining Order	47.4	25.7	16.0	10.9	58.6	25.3	7.0	9.1

stable from Time I to Time II, (13.4%, and 11.4%, respectively). Thus, the observed variations in the response rates are not a product of fluctuations in the "non-response" rate; rather, they reflect statistically and substantively meaningful shifts in opinion.

2. Assisting Crime Victims

Similarly, the interviewees reported that the police have been providing more assistance to crime victims since the 115th Precinct opened. Specifically, the percentage of respondents who stated that the police were doing a good job in assisting crime victims rose significantly from 34.7% at Time I to 43.4% at Time II ($Z= -2.2$, $p < .05$). Conversely, the percentage of respondents reporting that police assistance to crime victims was poor dropped from 14.7% to 8.3%. One in four survey participants could not answer this question. This finding suggests that while most of our respondents were willing to express an opinion regarding police crime prevention efforts, a large segment had too little first-hand or second-hand knowledge of police activities to evaluate their skills in assisting crime victims.

3. Order Maintenance

Again, the findings reveal a marked improvement in the respondents' assessments of police performance in the order-maintenance area. The percentage of respondents reporting that the police were doing a good job maintaining order increased significantly from 47.4% at Time I to 58.6% at Time II ($Z= -2.8$, p

<.01). Conversely, the percentage stating that the police were doing a poor job fell from 16.0% to 7.0%.

4. Traffic Enforcement

Judging by the result of this survey, the public seems to be more satisfied with law enforcement practices in the traffic area than in the past. In each sample, only 7% of the respondents believed that traffic enforcement was too strict. In contrast, the percentage of respondents who believed that enforcement of traffic laws was "about right" increased significantly from 43.7% at Time I to 53.7% at Time II ($Z = -2.5$, $p < .05$). Conversely, the percentage of citizens who believed the traffic laws were not enforced strictly enough declined from 32.2% at Time I to 27% at Time II.

F. Evaluation of the Quality of Police Service

1. Helplessness, Fairness, and Politeness

The respondents were then asked questions pertaining to their perceptions of police helpfulness, fairness, and politeness. While respondents at Time I were generally positive about the quality of police services, the Time II respondents were even more pleased.

In considering the following findings, it must be noted that the percentage of respondents expressing no opinion in these areas ranged from 13.7% to 29%. Thus, a substantial minority of the participants were unable to answer this set of questions, probably because they had experienced too little direct or indirect contact with the police.

At Time I, approximately two out of three of all the respondents rated the police as being very helpful or somewhat helpful. At Time II, this percentage rose signifcantly to four out of five ($Z= -4.1$, $p < .001$). Conversely, the proportion of interviewees who believed that police were not helpful decreased from 12.7% to 6.0%. Also, the percentage who could not answer this question fell from 22.6% to 13%.

The results regarding police fairness were similar. The proportion rating the police as fair increased significantly from 66.4% to 74.7% ($Z= -2.1$, $p < .05$), while the proportion rating them as unfair remained constant at 4.7%. The percentage answering "don't know" dropped from 29% to 20.6%.

In both years, the police received very high marks regarding politeness. The percentage of respondents evaluating the police as "polite" rose from 74.7% to 79.7%. There was, however, a negligible increase in the percentage of interviewees who reported that the police were impolite, which rose from 5.7% to 6.7%. Additionally, 18.3% of Time I respondents and 13.6% of the Time II respondents were unable to answer this question.

2. Changes in the Overall Quality of Service

As the following explains, one of the most dramatic changes in the respondents' perceptions pertained to their overall evaluation of the quality of police performance. Specifically, the percentage of participants who reported that the quality of police services had improved significantly over the preceding year, doubling from 30.3% prior to the opening of the 115th to

61.3% at the end of the first year (Z= -6.2, p <.001). Conversely, the percentage of interviewees who stated that the quality of police services had remained the same dropped significantly from 43.3% to 25.6% (Z= 3.0, p <.01). Moreover, the percentage indicating a decline in the quality of police services dropped from 8.0% to a mere 4.3%. The percentage expressing no opinion fell from 18.4% to 8.2%.

3. Change in Overall Quality by Race/Ethnicity of Respondent

When the responses were analyzed according to the race/ethnicity of the interviewees some profound differences emerged. (See Table 4.11.) For example, the percentage of white respondents who reported that the quality of police services had improved rose significantly from 38.6% to 66.0% (Z= -3.4, p <.001). In considering this finding, it must be recalled that the white respondents were much more likely than others to report that general conditions and crime conditions in their neighborhood were staying the same or deteriorating; nevertheless, they believe the quality of the police services has improved substantially.

The distribution of responses for the black interviewees was even more remarkable. The percentage reporting that the quality of police services had improved soared from 28.0% to 78.0% (Z= -4.2, p<.001). In addition, the percentage of black respondents stating that there had been no change in the quality of services

TABLE 4.11: RESPONDENTS' EVALUATION OF THE OVERALL QUALITY OF POLICE SERVICES ACCORDING TO THE RACE/ETHNICTY OF THE RESPONDENTS

EVALUATION	RACE/ETHNICITY											
	WHITE				BLACK				HISPANIC			
	TIME I		TIME II		TIME I		TIME II		TIME I		TIME II	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Better	61	38.6	101	66.0	14	28.0	39	78.0	16	43.2	40	59.7
Worse	13	8.2	8	5.2	7	14.0	3	6.0	4	10.8	2	3.0
Same	84	53.2	44	28.8	29	58.0	8	16.0	17	46.0	25	37.3
Total	158	100.0	153	100.0	50	100.0	50	100.0	37	100.0	67	100.0

N at Time I = 245
N at Time II = 270

fell sharply from 58.0% to 16.0% ($Z = 2.7$, $p<.01$). Although the change in perception was less marked for Hispanics, it was nevertheless notable. The percentage reporting improvements rose by 16.5% from 43.2% to 59.7%. Unfortunately, the number of Hispanic respondents in the survey was too small to determine whether the differences are statistically significant.

C. Police/Citizen Interaction

1. Extent of Police Contact

The respondents were then asked a series of seven questions about their contacts with the police during the preceding year. As Table 4.12 shows, the degree of contact ranged from speaking to an officer on patrol in their neighborhood to reporting a crime to being arrested. It must be noted that half of the respondents each year reported no direct contact with the police (56.3% at Time I and 53.0% at Time II). Thus, despite the opening of the new precinct, there seemed to be very little difference in the amount of direct citizen and police interaction, although there was a modest increase in the proportion of respondents who spoke to the police (from 20% to 25%) and those who asked the police for help (from 12.7% to 18%).

Table 4.12:
Comparison of the Percentage of Respondents
At Time I and Time II
Who had Interactions with the Police
In the Preceding Year

TYPE OF INTERACTION	TIME I		TIME II	
	N	%	N	%
Spoke to police	60	20.0	75	25.0
Met police	41	13.7	35	11.7
Reported crime	63	21.0	57	19.0
Questioned by police	23	7.7	27	9.0
Asked for help	38	12.7	54	18.0
Arrested	9	3.0	12	4.0
Other	22	7.3	27	9.0
No contact	169	56.3	159	53.0

2. Helpfulness, Fairness, and Politeness Assessments Among Respondents Who Had Contact with Police

In each year, the respondents who reported having contact with the police were then asked whether they thought the police were helpful, polite, and fair. They were also asked whether as a result of this encounter they were more or less likely to contact the police in the future. Tables 4.13 to 4.15 present the results for these questions. A review of these tables reveals that the results for both years were almost identical, and in many categories the differences were less than 1%. Additionally, and what is of greater interest is that the respondents in each sample rated the performance of the police positively. For example, approximately 80% of all the participants indicated that the police were very helpful or somewhat helpful. Similarly, nearly 90% stated that the police were very polite or somewhat polite, while 85% rated them as being very fair or somewhat fair.

Table 4.13:
Assessment of Service Quality by Respondents
Who Had Contact with Police-- Helplessness

	TIME I		TIME II		CHANGE
	N	%	N	%	%
Very helpful	66	50.4	71	50.4	----
Somewhat helpful	41	31.3	43	30.5	-0.8
Not very helpful	11	8.4	12	8.5	+0.1
Not at all helpful	10	7.6	11	7.8	+0.2
Don't know	3	2.3	4	2.8	+0.5
TOTAL	131	100.0	141	100.0	

Table 4.14:
Assessments of Service Quality by Respondents
Who Had Contact with the Police -- Politeness

	TIME I		TIME II		CHANGE
	N	%	N	%	%
Very polite	78	59.5	86	61.0	+1.5
Somewhat polite	40	30.5	39	27.7	-2.8
Somewhat impolite	6	4.6	10	7.1	+2.5
Very impolite	3	2.3	2	1.4	-0.9
Don't know	4	3.1	4	2.8	-0.3
TOTAL	131	100.0	141	100.0	

Table 4.15:
Assessments of Service Quality by Respondents
Who Had Contact with Police -- Fairness

	TIME I		TIME II		CHANGE
	N	%	N	%	%
Very fair	79	60.3	77	54.6	-5.7
Somewhat fair	36	27.5	39	27.7	+0.2
Somewhat unfair	9	6.9	6	4.3	-2.6
Very unfair	4	3.1	7	5.0	+1.9
Don't know	3	2.2	12	8.4	+6.2
TOTAL	131	100.0	141	100.0	

III Conclusion

The operation of the 115th Precinct during its first year had a significant influence on citizen perceptions and attitudes. Significantly more respondents at the end of the first year thought that conditions in their neighborhood had improved and there was also a sharp increase in the perceived visibility of the police. Fear of crime was down somewhat, but not significantly except for the fear of auto theft among car owners. Nevertheless, there was a significant increase in the percentage of community residents who believed that the crime rate had fallen during the previous year. This trend in perception was true for whites, blacks, and Hispanics. In fact, Hispanic respondents had the most optimistic perceptions in this regard.

The percentage of respondents indicating that they had seen a police officer during the past week and during the past twenty-

four hours increased significantly by the end of the Precinct's first year of operations. This increased visibility is undoubtedly related to the significantly higher percentage of respondents who gave the police favorable ratings with respect to their performance in preventing crime, helping victims, and maintaining order. Finally, there was a very sharp increase in the percentage of respondents who reported that the overall quality of police services had improved since the opening of the Precinct (from 30.3% at Time I to 61.3% at Time II). It is important to note that this dramatic improvement in the assessment of service quality was reported by white, black, and Hispanic respondents, with the largest increase recorded by blacks.

CHAPTER V
COMMUNITY LEADERS SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

While telephone surveys of the type described in Chapter IV provide an overview of the opinions of a broad spectrum of the community, the results are nevertheless limited by the fact that the samples invariably include a certain percentage of respondents who have little awareness of, or interest in police activities.

To supplement the information we obtained from the telephone surveys, Vera staff interviewed personally and at some length, twenty-five citizens who are active in local community affairs, including present and former members of Community Planning Board 3, officers of local civic and booster organizations, leaders of tenant or block associations and clergymen.

Civic leaders are in contact with a wide range of citizens and often have a more indepth knowledge and understanding of the problems in their communities than the average citizen. As a result, the opinions of the community leaders provide a more informed assessment of conditions, problems, and general attitudes, than the opinions of three hundred respondents selected at random. The interviews with the community leaders were informative also because they provided considerable insight into the problems faced by the various communities within the precinct and the ways in which the opening of the 115th achieved its effect on

the community in general, and police-community relations in particular.

With few exceptions, the community leaders that we contacted were eager to be interviewed and to express their opinions about the problems in their community and the adequacy of the police response to these matters. In fact, several stated that they were elated that the Police Department was conducting an evaluation of the 115th Precinct and soliciting the opinions of residents and civic leaders.

While most of the interviews were conducted in the evening at the homes of the respondents, others were conducted at their offices. Although the same series of questions were posed to all participants, the interviews were basically open-ended, and, depending on the talkativeness of the civic leader, varied in length from thirty minutes to two hours. In most instances the interviews lasted an hour. It must be noted that the questions that Vera staff asked these respondents were somewhat different from those asked in the telephone surveys. For example, because the civic leaders were knowledgeable about police matters, we could use technical terms such a "police response time." The sophistication of our respondents is reflected in the fact that they mentioned NSU (Neighborhood Stabilization Units) and SNAP units (Serious Narcotics Abatement Program) without prompting by the interviewers.

To identify community leaders, we began by discussing the nature of the survey with the two Community Affairs Officers at

the 115th Precinct. They provided Vera staff with a list of seventy-one block associations, tenants groups, and other civic organizations in the Jackson Heights, Corona, and East Elmhurst sections of the Precinct. These lists included the name of the president of each organization, the mailing address, and in most instances, a telephone number.

From these lists we identified ten potential interviewees, who represented the most active community organizations. We then attended the February Precinct Council meeting, to meet a few of these leaders, and to schedule interviews. As part of this process, we asked each respondent to identify other civic leaders who might be useful to interview. We also consulted the Chairwoman of Community Board 3, who identified several other people whom she felt we should interview. It is perhaps not surprising that the same names were mentioned several times. This suggests that there is a nucleus of fifteen to twenty people who are very active in community affairs and known to residents of various neighborhoods in the precinct. With few exceptions, our respondents were 50 to 65 years old and had lived in the precinct for twenty years or more. Several of our respondents were past or present members of Community Planning Board 3 and most belonged to the Precinct Council or had had direct dealings with the Commanding Officer and the Community Affairs Officers in the past year.

I The Neighborhoods Comprising the 115th Precinct

Before reporting the findings from these interviews, we will describe briefly the land use and demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods that comprise the 115th Precinct.

The neighborhoods comprising the 115th Precinct, according to Police Department reports, is the most racially and ethnically diverse precinct in New York City. This precinct consists of three very different and distinct communities: Jackson Heights, East Elmhurst, and Corona.

Sixty percent of the population of the 115th Precinct live in Jackson Heights, a middle-class, predominantly white community. This community is bisected by Northern Boulevard, and the area south of this boulevard is referred to by residents as the "garden side" of Jackson Heights, while the area north of the boulevard is known as the "home owner" side.

The garden side is a densely populated area consisting of many blocks of enormous apartment complexes. One of the communtity leaders whom we interviewed stated that Jackson Heights was the first community in the United States to institute the cooperative apartment system, beginning in the late 1920's. Whatever its antecedents the "co-op" movement took a strong hold on the community in the mid to late 1970's and has continued to the present time. Various community leaders that we interviewed in this area stated that many "young", primarily Jewish, Irish, and Italian families settled in the neighborhood shortly after World War II. Forty years later, the children and grandchildren

of the World War II generation have left the neighborhood, and many of these spacious apartments are occupied by what are now elderly World War II veterans and their wives or widows. Our interviewees spoke very favorably of the co-op movement noting that it has increased land and apartment values while promoting stability in the neighborhood.

Although perhaps 70% to 80% of the territory referred to as the garden side of Jackson Heights is covered by apartment buildings, the remaining areas contain one and two family dwellings. These brick, stucco, and wood frame houses give the appearance of sturdiness and the yards and lawns, although small are well-maintained.

Overall, the vast majority of the residents of the garden side of Jackson Heights seem to be middle-aged to elderly, white, and middle class. Nevertheless, this is a community in transition. Over the past fifteen years, there has been an influx of Hispanics primarily from South America, who have rented apartments in the less fashionable neighborhoods adjacent to Roosevelt Avenue, the principal shopping district in the Precinct. In addition, many immigrants from India have opened stores and taken up residence around Roosevelt Avenue in the 70th Street area. These changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the community have produced a certain amount of tension. The white residents, many of whom have lived in the community for thirty or more years, object to the "life style" of the new residents. They criticize the Hispanics for allegedly being boisterous,

noisy and involved in the drug trade. They also claim that the Indian businessmen are not community-oriented.

The home owner side of Jackson Heights is a stable middle class, white community. A large percentage of this community consists of very attractive, detached, single family houses with Tudor style architecture. Some blocks consist of brick or stucco, one and two family dwellings adjoined in a "row housing" fashion. The overall tone of the home owner side is one of stability and prosperity.

East Elmhurst is a very stable community, composed predominantly of working-class to middle-class blacks. A fifty-year resident of this community explained that, when La Guardia Airport (which serves as the northern border of this community) was under construction in the late 1940's, a number of highly skilled, black craftsmen were hired to work on this project, and many of them purchased homes in the East Elmhurst area. Although many of the houses are constructed of brick or stucco --most are wood frame, one and two family dwellings-- the houses and yards are well-maintained. There is, however, a section near La Guardia airport that contains several large and elegant houses belonging to prosperous, black professionals. For the most part, the East Elmhurst residents, like their counterparts in the garden side of Jackson Heights, are now a middle-aged to elderly population.

Property values in both Jackson Heights and East Elmhurst have escalated tremendously in the past twenty years. A modest

house in East Elmhurst, which could have been purchased for $25,000 twenty years ago, is now worth a $150,000.

As the Commanding Officer explained, "There are no rich people people in this Precinct. Except for Corona, which has many poor people, it's all pretty much working class and middle class. They don't have big bank accounts. Their main asset is their co-op or their house, and everything they have is probably tied up in that."

Although the Vera staff never asked any direct questions about property values in the neighborhood, the subject nevertheless crept into several of our discussions. One home owner on the garden side of Jackson Heights complained about commercial vehicles parking in residential areas. He said, "Suppose I wanted to put this house on the market. I would have to show people around and what would they see? This huge, ugly van parked out there blocking traffic. What would they think? Well, they wouldn't think much of this neighborhood."

As this chapter describes in more detail later, East Elmhurst appears to be a placid community with few crime or quality of life problems. However, all of the community leaders we spoke to from this area were very distrubed by the presence of a "welfare" hotel near La Guardia Airport. One respondent stated:

> This is a decent, respectable community out here and we work hard to keep it that way. And then they turn that motel in to a welfare hotel and there go the property values. Who in their right mind wants to live near one of those places? And the stuff that goes on there! Drugs, prostitution, and the kids run wild in street. It's a disgrace.

Another respondent from East Elmhurst described in detail the efforts of one businessman to turn a small apartment building into a quasi-hotel, where tenants could lease apartments by the week or month. She stated:

> We defeated that by working with the zoning people. This is a residential neighborhood. We don't want transients and riff-raff coming through here. They don't care about this neighborhood. We do. I've been here for forty-five years and its always been nice. We take pride in our community, and if they built that thing over there it would be an eyesore and hurt the property values.

In our interviews with community leaders in Corona, there was little discussion of property values. Corona is the least affluent community in the Precinct, and it is an area that has undergone very rapid transition in the last ten years. The housing consists of two, three, and four-family, wooden tenement houses. However, there are a number of small, four or five story brick apartment buildings that were constructed prior to World War II. Historically, this area was populated by Irish and Italian working class families, who have since left the area. Although, there is a small proportion of black families in this area, the bulk of the population is primarily from Central and South America. In the commercial district around Roosevelt Avenue there is a book store specializing in Spanish material, a movie theater showing exclusively Spanish films, music stores featuring Spanish records and tapes, and numerous bodegas and small shops catering specifically to the Spanish population.

Roosevelt Avenue is the main thoroughfare and commerical district in this precinct. It serves as the southern border of

the 115th Precinct, dividing it from the 110th. Despite the activity on the streets and the stores in this area, there is a gloomy, almost sinister atmosphere, because transactions in this area are conducted in the shadow of the elevated subway. Roosevelt Avenue for several years has been a robbery target area. Pickpockets, chain-snatchers, purse thieves, and muggers are attracted to the safety provided by the dark and sheltered corners provided by the El. In addition, there are a number of "neighborhood" bars in this district, and when these bars close, the intoxicated patrons are easy prey for muggers and drunk rollers.

The southern portion of the precinct, specifically the area adjacent to Roosevelt Avenue appears to be deteriorating, particularly in the Corona area. The atmosphere there suggests that these neighborhoods have seen better days.

II Conditions Prior to the Opening of the 115th Precinct

Prior to January, 1984, Community Planning Board 3 was the only district in Queens that did not have its own precinct, and this lack was a source of aggravation for many of the residents. As explained above, the areas below Northern Boulevard, specifically, the "garden side of Jackson Heights and Corona" were patrolled by the 110th Precinct, while the territory above Northern Boulevard were covered by the 114th Precinct. As one president of a merchants' association explained: "We were the bastard children of the Elmhurst (110th) Precinct." Several of our respondents reported that they had been dissatisfied for many

years with the quality of the police service provided by the 110th and 114th Precincts. As a result, over the course of several years, residents and members of the business and professional community wrote many letters, and attended meetings and hearings to express their frustration and to demand the opening of the 115th Precinct. Without reviewing the history of these citizens' lobbying efforts to obtain their own precinct, suffice it to say that these citizens viewed the opening of the 115th Precinct as the reward for their efforts.

A. Crime Situation

Relative to some other Queens precincts, the territory now patrolled by the 115th Precinct was a high crime area with respect to predatory crimes such as muggings, chain and purse-snatchings, and burglaries. However, PD statistics and our research interviews suggest that crimes of a predatory nature were limited to certain clearly identifiable locations during specific hours. For example, there were problems with muggings, robberies, and purse-snatches on Roosevelt Avenue, the main commercial strip in this precinct. The victims were often the residents of Corona and the "garden side" of Jackson Heights who were attacked in their neighborhood while on their way to or from the stores and subways stations on Roosevelt Avenue. As one Jackson Heights businessman stated:

> Before the 115th Precinct, there were lots of problems with muggings, chain-snatching, shop-lifting, people drinking on the streets and getting rowdy and breaking windows. It was terrible.

The other catagory of victims were residents of the neighborhood who drank too much in the taverns on Roosevelt Avenue and were "rolled" in the early morning hours. While the civic leaders reported that they had been concerned about robberies and other predatory crimes, they were much more disturbed by the drug problem. The citizens' perceptions of the shape and magnitude of this problem varied considerably by community. For example, all of the residents of Jackson Heights that we interviewed were extremely upset by the fact that the media had dubbed their community the "Cocaine Capitol of the World." While they conceded that there probably were Columbian cocaine dealers operating multi-million dollar industries in their houses and apartments, they believed that the media reports were greatly exaggerated. Moreover, the notion of high level drug transactions conducted in secrecy in their neighborhood offended them less than the "wide-open" street level trafficking in cocaine, heroin, and marijuana on the major thoroughfares and in the parks and playgrounds. They indicated that the street-level trade attracted all sorts of unsavory people both from inside and outside the precinct. As a result, undesirable people were congregating on street corners, in front of stores, and in the parks buying, selling, and using drugs and harrassing and threatening the citizens.

The Jackson Heights residents also indicated that a number of problems had been caused by the opening in 1983 of two "cocaine clubs" on Roosevelt Avenue. According to these respon-

dents, these clubs are private and usually do not open until 10:00 p.m. or later and then remain open until dawn. Only members and their guests are allowed admission. Again, the residents of this area seemed to be less concerned by the existence of these clubs than by the types of people that are drawn to them. They believe that the problems are not caused by the members of the clubs, but by the people who are turned away. The rejected patrons, many of whom apparently have driven in from out-of-state, still want to buy cocaine and therefore they have to resort to buying from street-level traffickers. Once a sale is made, the buyer then needs a place to indulge in the cocaine. The place of indulgence may, in some instances, be the residential areas adjoining Roosevelt Avenue. One Jackson Heights resident, who is also an employee of the Jackson Heights Community Development Corporation, described the drug situation as follows:

> In the last couple of years an image was created of Jackson Heights as the Coke Capitol of Queens and the City. It's a bit over-blown and what happens is that people hear about it and they create a market for it because they come here looking for drugs. It's supply and demand, people are looking for drugs so people start to supply them... The problem blocks are the blocks intersecting Roosevelt Avenue. You can isolate the heavy trafficking.
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> The main problem that the community sees is not the club itself but what the club attracts. For people who do not get in the club, there are other dealers outside. I found a guy free-basing on the front steps of my building and I said, "Hey, would you mind moving?" And the guy said, "Wait, I'll be finished in a minute." That's the attitude these guys have. Maybe the community residents wouldn't mind as much if they kept to themselves, but they don't. They're all around the block. They are making trouble.

In sum, the presence of what the Jackson Heights residents perceived as wide-open drug trafficking in their neighborhood fostered a sense of insecurity and fear in the residents.

The concerns of the residents of Corona were similar to those of Jackson Heights. Prior to the opening of the Precinct, the Corona residents had been very worried about robberies, particularly in the Roosevelt Avenue area. Nevertheless, they were primarily concerned about the drug situation. Several smoke shops flourished on Northern Boulevard and the avenues. Additionally, there was an active drug trade on the streets, in cars, playgrounds, vacant lots, and abandoned buildings. Our respondents indicated that while the dealers provided drugs for local customers, many of their clients were from other boroughs or from out-of-state. In contrast to the Jackson Heights residents, the residents of Corona resented the very presence of drug dealers because they believed that the dealers created an environment of violence -- that many people carried guns, and there were robberies, muggings, shoot-outs, and murders associated with drug trafficking.

These residents had also been concerned about what they perceived as the proliferation of "numbers joints" everywhere in Corona but particularly on Northern Boulevard. They reported that teenage boys and men congregated in front of these stores drinking beer and hanging out waiting to hear about the next number. These groups were often rowdy and menacing.

The Corona residents also indicated that there had been problems due to burglaries, auto theft, and vandalism of cars.

In general, our respondents believed that these problems came into existence, continued, and grew because they had received little systematic attention from the police.

In contrast to the reports from the civic leaders of Jackson Heights and Corona, our respondents from the East Elmhurst area reported that crime was not a serious problem in their community. They stated that occasionally there were instances of auto theft or burglary, but, overall, these events were few and far between. Given the demographics of this community, this result is not unexpected. As explained earlier, the East Elmhurst community is a very stable, middle-class, residential area consisting primarily of single and two-family dwellings. In general, the residents are middle-aged to elderly, and relatively few households include teenagers or children. Of perhaps greater importance, there are no subway stations in this area, or any major commercial strips or parks which might attract potential criminals.

B. Quality of Life Problems

In general, our respondents from Corona and Jackson Heights believed that many of the quality-of-life and order-maintenance problems in their communities were engendered by the street-level drug trafficking and numbers places. They believed that the drugs and numbers trade created an environment that encouraged disorderly groups to form and congregate in parks, playgrounds, and on the major thoroughfares.

Our respondents also reported a number of violations of the public order -- acts which are not defined as criminal in the

Penal Law, but which are summonsable offenses. The Jackson Heights residents stated that they had been disturbed by blaring radios, loud parties, vandalism, graffiti, commercial vehicles parking in residential area, disorderly persons and groups, double parking on the major thoroughfares, and people repairing their cars in the streets. The Corona residents had similar complaints, but their emphasis was on street conditions caused by the drug and numbers industries, and "after-hours" and "social" clubs. They explained that the after-hours and social clubs in this area are not the large dance halls that are found in parts of the Bronx and Brooklyn; rather, they tend to be small operations that cater to local residents. Nevertheless, when these clubs close in the early morning hours, the patrons are often noisy and disruptive.

Additionally, our Corona interviewees indicated that a number of problems were caused by abandoned automobiles. Specifically, they stated that because Corona is near LaGuardia Airport and accessible from a number of expressways, it had become a dumping ground for stolen and abandoned automobiles. According to our respondents, the streets of Corona were used as "chop-shops" to strip stolen cars. Although responsibility for towing derelict automobiles rests with the Sanitation Department, our respondents believed that the police had done little to pursue auto thieves or to prevent Corona from turning into an automobile graveyard.

Respondents from East Elmhurst had very few complaints about quality-of-life problems in general. Nevertheless, there was

unanimous agreement that the presence of a "welfare motel" next to LaGuardia Airport had lowered property values in their neighborhoods and detracted from what was an otherwise prosperous, middle-class community. A few respondents even asserted that prostitution and drug trafficking flourished in this motel. All of our respondents wanted this establishment closed down or converted to a "regular" hotel.

C. Quality of Police Services

In general, our respondents from Corona, Jackson Heights, and East Elmhurst believed that prior to the opening of the 115th, the police had been inattentive to the concerns of the citizens -- that citizen problems were a low priority item for the 110th and 114th Precincts. They stated that police visibility was very low, and that they seldom saw a patrol car. Additionally, they believed that police response time was poor, particularly in non-emergency situations. Our interviewees reported that the police often took hours to respond to a non-emergency situation, if they responded at all. As a result, the citizens had become frustrated, and this frustration, in turn, fostered an attitude that there was no point in requesting assistance from the police unless the situation was an emergency. Nevertheless, most of our respondents sympathized with the plight of the police. They believed that the police from the 110th and 114th Precincts had to patrol and respond to calls in a very large area and therefore they were over-burdened; they simply

did not have the manpower to deal with problems of a non-emergency nature arising in what is now the 115th Precinct.

One of the most graphic summaries of the situation was provided by the president of one of the largest co-op apartment buildings in Jackson Heights:

> With the 110, it was rare to see a foot patrolman. The response time was always a problem with the 110. They were just spread too damn thin... The 110 tried, but because of the demands, they could not cut the mustard -- given the manpower they had and the geography that they had to cover. Also, and this is an intangible -- there is no way of proving or disproving it -- the Jackson Heights community felt that the officers from the 110 were not lax nor, God forbid, corrupt, but that they were less than enthusiastic. They were just strung out too thinly. I think there was an overall feeling in the community that the 110 was burnt out.

While this respondent's remarks pertain to the 110th Precinct, they echo the sentiments of the civic leaders we interviewed from the former 114th Precinct -- there was no visibile police presence, and the response time particularly for non-emergency cases was poor.

Again, while the civic leaders may have been dissatisfied with the quality of police services, they were not unaware of the magnitude of the problems confronted by the police, particularly in the 110th Precinct. As one merchant stated:

> The 110th Precinct was too large for the manpower they had. They did the job as best they could with the amount of men and the precinct... It was a good precinct, but just too big. We got token protection.

Similarly, a long-time member of Community Board 3 and a thirty-year resident of Jackson Heights reported:

> When this was the 110th Precinct, I think we were a bit more tolerant because we realized that we were at the tail end of their precinct and they had serious problems at Lefrak Village. And we were not a high crime area for them... And they were responsive to quality of life problems, given everything... And everything was a lot! We had problems with drugs, and youths on corners who were into robbery. Finally, the 110th put an officer on that corner and the problems cleared up. Crime was heavier then and we were more frightened.

In general, our findings suggest that while the community leaders and the community were dissatisfied with the overall quality of police services prior to the opening of the 115th Precinct, they did believe that the police tried but did not always succeed in responding in a timely manner when the call involved an emergency situation. As one civic leader reported cynically: "When the 110 had to get over here, they got over here." Moreover, when the situation involved a non-emergency or quality-of-life problem, they believed that the police response was insufficient or non-existent.

Again, most interviewees attributed this lack of police response to manpower shortages rather than to police indifference. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning provided cold comfort: They believed that the police may have been doing the best they could under the circumstances, yet it was not enough. The needs of the citizens were not being met. Moreover, because the police of the 110th and 114th Precincts were, they believed, over-burdened, certain crime and quality-of-life problems developed and continued unabated until a point was reached where initially minor conditions evolved

into serious and chronic problems that severely impinged on the citizens' sense of well-being and security. It was this line of reasoning that led the citizens and civic leaders of Community Board 3 to launch a concerted effort to hasten the opening of the 115th Precinct.

III. Conditions Since the Opening of the 115th Precinct

Although our respondents were willing to discuss conditions prior to the inception of the Precinct, they preferred to focus on conditions since the opening of the 115th Precinct. The civic leaders that we interviewed agreed unanimously that conditions in the community had improved immensely since the precinct opened. The following sections report the civic leaders perceptions of changes in police visibility, response time, crime rates, quality of life problems, and other matters.

A. Police Visibility and Response Time

All of the community leaders that we interviewed believed that street crime had diminished and that this reduction was attributable primarily to heightened police visibility.[1] As one civic leader from Jackson Heights explained:

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[1] See Chapter VII for a discussion of changes in the complaint rate before and after the opening of the 115th Precinct

> Crime was heavier prior to the opening of the Precinct and we were more frightened. We do feel more secure now. I do like seeing the police around, a police car coming down the street. When it was the 110, we rarely saw a car. Now we see cars, and the police walking... The visibility is much increased.

Similarly, an office holder in the 115th Precinct Community Council stated:

> I think the most dramatic difference with the 115th was the visibility factor...We see cars, and in the past we rarely saw cars, and there is foot patrol, when there was never foot patrol... We see scooters and sector cars. We see the 115th Precinct and the NSU. So the most dramatic change is the visible, higher profile of the police. And there is no greater deterrent, it promotes safety and security.

The improvement in police visibility has enhanced the citizens' sense of well-being which, in turn, has increased their willingness to walk about in their neighborhood at night and frequent local stores and restaurants. Increased activity on the commercial strips has benefitted both the residents and the businessmen. An Hispanic businessman with an office in Jackson Heights described the situation as follows:

> The people are happier. They are willing to stay out a little later at night to take a walk or get a pizza or an ice cream cone, because there are always cops around. It's a big, big improvement. You wouldn't believe it's the same neighborhood. Now we have cops at the schools. It's a good feeling. People feel better. They are not so afraid to walk from the subway down 37th Avenue. The young people -- there doesn't seem to be the amount of rowdiness. It is very gratifying.

Additionally, all of our respondents reported that the police response time was much more rapid for both emergency and non-emergency calls. As one Jackson Heights resident stated:

> When we have had problems that I know about first-hand and we have had to call the police -- I don't know what the percentage reduction in response time has been, but it has been dramatic. I know that the police are here and that they can get here faster -- or that they want to and try to. Anyway, they are here when we need them. I have seen the response time for the EMS, response time for NSU, and for the sector cars. I have seen the change and I am impressed. Things are on the upswing.

Or as another leader reported:

> I'll tell you one thing, when it is a serious case, like last Sunday when someone was robbed, the response time is very good... Response time is better than it used to be for serious cases, like criminal cases, and we have a very good relationship with the Precinct.

B. Steady Tours and Steady Sectors

When the 115th Precinct opened, seven foot posts were established in the commercial districts. The seven officers who volunteered for these foot posts work from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. It was clear from our interviews that the concept of foot patrols is very popular with both the residents and the civic leaders. As the following comments reflect, the merchants are not only elated by the presence of foot patrols, but also by the fact that the same officer patrols the same post at the same time every day.

A businessman who has operated a store in Jackson Heights for thirty years and who has been the president of a merchants association for several years stated:

> The idea of steady tours is great. We have a permanent man out here on Junction Boulevard, Officer C. He's on the street all day -- walking up and down. He likes it. He even gave up his

> Saturdays off to work the street out here. We have problems with double parkers and parking in general. So he shifted his schedule for the convenience of the merchants. Now he has Sunday and Monday off... I think the cooperation of the police with the merchants has been phenomenal... We have a very close relationship.

Similarly, a Jackson Heights civic leader reported:

> The platoon system, which was the most radical innovation, is working in a lot of ways. I know from speaking to merchants and block association friends, acquaintances, and other people -- that seeing the same police has had a tremendous morale boost. They know a lot of them by name, and the officers know a lot of the people by name. They are out there at the same time and in the same place everyday, and it is a great advantage in terms of just trying to keep the community together.

Additionally, a North Corona businessman and current member of the Community of Planning Board explained:

> Steady tours are really good because the patrolman becomes a man you can rely on. He knows what's happening. He is going to do his job, and if he wants respect, he is going to see that certain things are done. In the past, several years ago, a lot of patrolmen lost the respect of the community because they became involved in what was going on. They became part of the action -- gambling or whatever. This time it wasn't like that.

These interviewees and others were able to name one or more of the officers.

C. Crime Situation

All of our respondents believed that the crime rate had dropped since the precinct opened. However, several said that they did not know what the statistics were, but simply assumed that the increased police visibility had had a deterrent effect on street robberies and other crimes. The respondents from the

East Elmhurst area emphasized that robberies, burglaries, and auto theft had never been a problem in their neighborhoods; therefore, they believed that conditions had remained unchanged. They nevertheless noted that they were pleased to see squads cars patrolling their area because it increased their sense of safety and well-being. The consensus of all our respondents was that the 115th Precinct was providing more protection than they had received from the 110th and 114th Precincts.

One Jackson Heights civic leader summed up the situation as follows:

> People are certainly not satisfied-- we are not living in a placid, crime-free community. But there is more of a feeling of security on the "garden side" of Jackson Heights than there was before the precinct opened. In this end of the Heights people feel more secure. I know they are on 37th Avenue. The senior citizens now sit in front of the Post Office. They feel better. Yes, we still have muggings, but they are not as frequent.

As noted earlier, our respondents from Jackson Heights and Corona had been very concerned about the drug problem, and at the time of our interviews, these respondents believed that the police were starting to make some progress in these areas. One Jackson Heights resident stated:

> I think that Jackson Heights has lost its reputation as the "Cocaine Capitol of the World." The police, including the 115th, have really gotten on top of the situation. The drug problem is still here, but it is not as visible. It's not right out on the street like it was.

A member of the Jackson Heights Community Development Corporation expressed similar sentiments and emphasized the effective-

ness of the Precinct's undercover SNAP unit (Serious Narcotics Abatement Program.)

> One thing that we have noticed is that the community residents like the SNAP program... I know that the SNAP unit has succeeded. They've gotten the marijuana dealers off Northern Boulevard at 106th and 108th Streets. They got rid of them! That's what the community wants! We just want them out of here! The cops are starting to work on the cocaine clubs and the clubs are starting to feel the pressure. And we realize that it is a lot harder for the cops to deal with cocaine clubs than with a few two-bit marijuana dealers. But last summer, the community, the 81st Street Merchants Group, which is a group that is mainly concerned with the cocaine club problem, was really up in arms because they felt that not enough was being done. Captain Clancy decided to put the problem with the cocaine clubs and drugs as one of his top priorities and now the 81st Street group is very happy about what is happening. The merchants realize that it is going to take a while to get them out... but the precinct is trying to change something! They are not expecting an immediate change, but they are expecting work on it. And that's what the SNAP program is doing. Going in and busting people.

The civic leaders that we interviewed acknowledged that the problems posed by the drug situation were not going to be resolved quickly and they did not expect an immediate solution given the complexities of the situation. They were elated however that the police were giving a high priority to combatting drug trafficking in the 115th Precinct. As one businessman stated:

> The cops are doing a super job chasing these drug dealers and arresting them. So, the guys may be out of jail in a couple of days, but the police are trying, they are really trying.

As reported earlier, the Corona area had a number of crime problems, some of which were related to the drug problem and some

of which were not. The following statement was made by a block association president in this area.

> The police are dealing with the drug problems by putting more cops in the area -- and this didn't happen in the past. They said that they have cleared out 104th Street -- that they had cleared out the drug sellers. They also said that they are working on the stolen car situation. At least this has been evident on my own block. It's fantastic! Before they used to bring stolen cars to this block and strip them. Because this is a dead end street, they would bring in cars, and the next day we would find two or three cars stripped. So, since the precinct opened up, we have more support from the police.

Thus, our respondents expressed the belief that the police had begun to deal effectively with crime, particularly street robberies, drugs, and abandoned autos.

D. Quality of Life Conditions

While all of our respondents reported that the 115th Precinct has successfully addressed a number of "quality of life" problems they believed that a great deal of work remained to be done in these areas.

One condition that the Precinct seems to have dealt with successfully in dealing with pertains to loud radios that are played on the street. As one member of Community Planning Board-3 explained:

> Loud music as a topic is very significant. It permeates the community. Radio boxes that are played on the street but the police have done a really good job of picking them up. And I witnessed the police last summer handling the situation, and I thought they were superb. I think in technique they are very good. I watched their manner, how they dealt with people and they should get very high marks on that.

On the other hand, while loud box radios were also a problem in Corona, there were other quality of life problems that were more serious -- specifically, the problems caused by the after-hours clubs and the numbers joints. A black civic leader who lives in East Elmhurst and has a professional practice in Corona stated:

> The police expected the worst when the precinct opened because we must have had at least ten social clubs. But things have really quieted down. There has been a dramatic change since the 115th Precinct opened. They did a beautiful job in cleaning up a lot of the after-hours joints and numbers places. Our problems are nowhere near what they used to be.

Although all of our respondents agreed that, in general, conditions had improved immensely since the opening of the 115th Precinct, several mentioned very specific problems that they believed needed more attention. These matters are discussed at a later point in this chapter.

IV. Community Organizations

As noted earlier, prior to January, 1984, the "homeowner" side of Jackson Heights and the East Elmhurst communities were served by the 114th Precinct, while the "garden-side" of Jackson Heights and Cornona were served by the 110th Precinct. Community Planning Board-3 was split between two precincts and the citizens believed that they were not receiving adequate service from either precinct. Although the citizens were frustrated they would often qualify their remarks by saying, "Well, we weren't really part of the 110. I mean they were responsible for patrolling here, but we were part of Community Planning Board-3 and we real-

ly should have had our own precinct." The phrase "our own precinct" recurred innumerable times throughout our interviews. The citizens are very pleased now that they have "their own precinct."

Although the Vera staff never asked any direct questions about the impact that the opening of the Precinct may have had on community organization per se, a review of our interviews suggested that the opening of the 115th Precinct has begun to have an impact in this area. More specifically, the data suggest that the presence and operations of the Precinct have promoted a positive attitude toward the police, assisted citizens in coping with and solving various problems in their neighborhoods, increased the sense of security and well-being, become a source of information and assistance, and encouraged the formation of tenant groups, block associations, and other organizations concerned with improving conditions in the community.

As reported earlier, it was clear that the heightened police visibility has increased the community leaders sense of safety and security. Nevertheless, the opening of the Precinct seems to have done more than that--it seems to have promoted a sense of confidence and pride or what a priest from St. Garbiel's Parish in East Elmhurst termed "a whole new consciousness."

> I feel that the police have been very effective... Just the way the people feel about the neighborhood. I think that since the new precinct opened there is a whole new consciousness here. That we're somebody important and that the City has not just pushed us aside -- that they have a precinct right in the middle of this neighborhood... The people feel very good about that.

He stated that the parish house, church, and school have benefitted directly from the 115th Precinct in a number of ways, particularly because of the formation of the Auxiliary Police. He explained that the Auxiliary Police were important because it involved citizens, particularly young people, in a positive relationship with the police and the community. The Auxiliary Police not only patrolled the neighborhood in and around the church and school to prevent vandalism and theft, but they also served as security guards at teen and parish functions such as dances and other activities. He spoke very highly of the Commanding Officer and the Community Affairs Officers and he stated that he believed that the police officers were doing their best to "reach out to" and "understand" the community.

The following quote from a civic leader from the Corona community reinforces the notion that the opening of the 115th Precinct has inspired confidence in the communities. But he goes further by explaining how this increased confidence has been translated into action.

> There seems to be an increase in confidence in the community -- that we are finally getting some protection. The new precinct has meant a lot to this community. There has been a decided difference, no question about it. Just having the Precinct has inspired people to form block associations because now they feel they have someone in the police they can talk to. The precinct personnel have been very receptive and they have to be given credit for that.

Thus, in this predominantly black and Hispanic working-class community, leaders speak of block associations forming because the citizens now believe that the police are sincerely interested

in working with civic groups and citizens to resolve neighborhood problems.

In considering the following comments from a Jackson Heights civic leader, it must again be emphasized that prior to the opening of the 115th Precinct, Jackson Heights was split between the 110th and 114th Precincts. While this respondent's remarks describe recent community development in Jackson Heights, they may, nevertheless, serve as a summarizing statement for the entire precinct.

> Groups are being pulled together, whether they like it or not. A lot of the credit goes to the Precinct and the Community Board in terms of pulling the groups together. Jackson Heights until we got the Precinct was not a community. It was a group of blocks that happened to be next to each other. It was not a neighborhood. But now people are starting to realize "Hey, we're a neighborhood. Let's start acting like one." And people are starting to work together and to think of Jackson Heights as a community. And I have seen more and more of this since the Precinct opened. It's gaining more and more momentum. For example, you are starting to see new faces at the meetings.

The results of our interviews with community leaders suggest that it is not just the Jackson Heights area that is beginning to see itself as a community. Rather, the three distinct communities of Jackson Heights, East Elmhurst, and North Corona are starting to see themselves as part of a larger community; that is, the community of the 115th Precinct. As the chairman of Community Planning Board-3 stated: "They have something of their very own. It is their precinct and it has united a community that was previously split because one half belonged to the 110th, the other half to the 114th."

While it will take years to determine the extent to which the opening of the 115th Precinct affects the level of community organization and police-community relations, the results to date have been very promising.

V. Areas Where Improvement Is Needed

Clearly the community leaders believed that the quality of police services in their community has improved dramatically since the 115th Precinct opened. There was widespread agreement that the magnitude of the crime problem had decreased, that police visibility was greatly increased, and that the response time had decreased. Nevertheless, there was a consensus that the Precinct must become more responsive to quality of life problems.

The following comments are indicative of the types of responses we received when we asked our interviewees about ways in which the quality of police services could be improved.

One woman who has been a lifelong resident of Jackson Heights stated:

> The police are concerned with eliminating crime, and I guess they don't think quality of life problems are too important... I gave the 115th Precinct a period to get their act together and the community allowed for that. I would like to see the priorities shift a little now that the crime problems are supposedly under control.
>
> I would like the police to tend to noise problems, young people drinking in the street, drugs, commercial vehicles parked in the street... Except for quality of life problems, people are very satisifed with the response time. But when it comes to quality of life, either they don't come at all or they come an hour later when the problem has already dissipated.

The following comment was made by a community leader who lives in the Jackson Heights area a few blocks from Roosevelt Avenue. When the topic of quality-of-life issues arose, he became quite agitated as he described his various futile efforts to get the 115th Precinct personnel to deal with the problems posed by commercial vehicles parking in residential zones and by double parkers. As an example, he reported that around the corner from his house there was an import-export company that routinely parked a large moving van in the street and tied up traffic while crates and boxes were loaded and unloaded. He indicated that he had reported this situation to the police on several occasions and that the police had responded by issuing summonses. He then stated that this was an ineffective solution to the problem because the owner of the store obviously considered the summonses to be just another business expense. This respondent believed that the police were indifferent to quality of life problems and therefore they were not enforcing laws that were designed to deal with these types of problems. This, in turn, created an environment in which certain residents felt that they could violate the law with impunity. He stated:

> Regarding quality of life-- the police seem to have blinders on. They don't give a summons; they don't discourage people from violating the law... parking next to hydrants, graffiti, stolen cars -- they use the streets as a dumping ground. Sometimes this street looks like a parking lot. And the police do nothing.

He concluded: "I don't know what the solution is, but the way the system is set up-- it is not working, let's face it!"

A current member of the Public Safety Committee for Community Board 3 summarized the situation as follows:

> Quality of life complaints are really important to be resolved because they have a very high priority in the lives of people. Quality of life problems create stress much more than crime in my opinion, because they are more continuous. If you get mugged, that's unfortunate, but it's an isolated incident. Quality of life problems are the kinds of things that are repetitive and stressful and they are the kinds of things, more so than crime, that inhibit good inter-community relations between the different ethnic groups.

She continued:

> Whatever the ethnic group, they are concerned with the quality of life. Unfortunately, there is just a small percentage of the people that create these problems and they make it hard for the rest of the community. And, let's face it, if it is one ethnic group that is doing these kinds of things then it creates poor attitudes and that is unfortunate because there are too many good people. But the police, by not monitoring the quality of life problems, are actually fostering poor inter-ethnic relations.

Conclusion

The results from our interviews with these community leaders clearly indicate that they believed that the quality of police services had improved enormously since the opening of the 115th Precinct. All of these respondents reported major improvements in police visibility and response time in both emergency and non-emergency situations. They also indicated that the police were making substantial progress in addressing crime and quality of life conditions. Moreover, several of the interviewees stated that the opening of the Precinct had served to unify the Jackson Heights, East Elmhurst and Corona communities.

While all of the community leaders that Vera staff interviewed expressed very favorable opinions about the overall performance of the officers from the 115th Precinct, several respondents stated that the Precinct's patrol force ought to pay more attention to low priority, yet annoying quality of life conditions that plague the community. These interviewees emphasized the Precinct's need to address the problems posed by double parkers and people repairing cars in the street and obstructing traffic, commercial vans parked in residential areas, and cars parked next to fire hydrants. Although these problems may seem trivial to an outsider, these conditions are nevertheless very aggravating to neighborhood residents. In an area where parking spaces are at a premium, the presence of

a commercial van occupying two parking spaces is exasperating. Cars that are double parked impede the flow of traffic in the narrow and congested thouroughfares of the Precinct. Similarly, cars illegally parked next to fire hydrants pose a threat in the event that fire occurs and fire department personnel have difficulty gaining access to the fire hydrants.

Thus, many of the complaints about quality of life issues pertained to matters affecting public safety. They were not simply complaints about loud parties and other situations with high nuisance values.

In many respects, the findings from the community leaders survey were consistent with the results of the telephone surveys. There was agreement that police visibility had improved, that the quality of police services had improved, and that police were tackling crime problems. The greatest difference between the community leaders interviewed and the telephone respondents seems to be a matter of tone. The attitude of the latter may be characterized as "guarded optimism", some conditions in their neighborhoods were better, some were worse, and many had stayed the same. In contrast, the attitudes of the community leaders were decidedly upbeat. From their own observations and discussions with their costituents, these respondents concluded that conditions had improved greatly and would continue to improve. They agreed that the opening of the Precinct had bolstered their confidence in the Police Department and its ability and willingness to combat

the serious crime and quality of life problems existing in their neighborhoods.

CHAPTER VI
MANAGING A PRECINCT ON FIXED TOURS

Introduction

The term "platoon" has been part of the nomenclature of the New York City Police Department for decades. It refers to the personnel assigned to a given tour of duty. The term platoon has always been used to define the work hours rather than the personnel assigned to work any given tour because in the 9 Squad Chart system, the patrol officers rotate across the three platoons. In the 9 Squad Chart System officers are designated by their squad number rather than by platoon.

The advent of the steady tour program in the 115th Precinct brings a new meaning to the term platoon. In this command, with the use of steady tours, platoon not only refers to the hours covered, but also to the personnel who are working the same hours on a daily and permanent basis. This variation on the platoon structure may be termed the "fixed platoon concept." The introduction of steady tours in the 115th Precinct also provided the Police Department with the opportunity to create a role of platoon commander.

Unlike lieutenants who function as desk officers in conventional precincts, the platoon commanders in the 115th Precinct do not rotate around the chart; rather, they worked a fixed tour, and they are responsible on a daily basis for all police operations on that platoon.

This chapter examines the ways in which the introduction of the "fixed platoon" concept (including steady and fixed tours for lieutenants, sergeants, and patrol officers) has affected the managerial structure, procedures, and policies in the 115th Precinct as compared to traditionally organized precincts. The following issues are addressed:

-- allocation of responsibility and authority

-- chain of command

-- assignment system

-- specialization

-- supervision and discipline

-- quality of the delivery of police services

To conduct this phase of the evaluation, Vera staff spent about six hundred hours riding around in squads cars with patrol officers and supervisors on all three platoons on weekdays and weekends. As a result, we became familiar with the conditions and problems that arise on each of the tours, and the ways in which the officers assigned to those tours respond to various problems. Additionally, riding with the officers provided us not only with an opportunity to observe patrol operations, but also to discuss informally the many dimensions of the patrol function.

After several weeks of observation and discussion, Vera staff formally interviewed the Commanding Officer, the three Platoon Commanders, the Integrity Control Officer, the Operations Lieutenant, and eight Patrol Sergeants. These interviews were tape recorded. The interviews with the Lieutenants and the Com-

manding Officer lasted between an hour and two hours. The interviews with the sergeants were conducted while these officers were on patrol. As a result, these interviews were conducted over the course of two to three hours because the sergeants frequently had to interrupt the conversation to respond to calls. Although conducting the interviews in the squad car was inconvenient at points, it was a successful technique. When a sergeant is working the desk, he is too busy with log entries, telephone calls, and dealing with officers and citizens to concentrates on an interview.

I. Role of the Lieutenant in Traditonally Organized Commands

Vera staff were repeatedly informed that lieutenant is the "lost rank" in the Department-- that it is an important rank without commensurate responsibility or authority. In a traditionally organized precinct, the lieutenant's primary function is to serve as the desk officer and maintain order in the station house. Specifically, he rarely becomes involved in the assignment system because these matters are usually handled by the commanding officer, roll call clerks, and the patrol sergeants. He rarely ventures into the street, because his territory is the station house. Routine "communications", citizens complaints, and reports about post conditions are not directed to him; rather, they are forwarded to the Operations Lieutenant.

All of the platoon commanders in the 115th Precinct had served as lieutenants in other commands and, without exception,

they were very dissatisfied with the role of the lieutenant in traditionally organized precincts. Consider the following comments:

> In other commands, the lieutenant works the desk and he is nothing more than a high paid secretary. He logs in roll call changes, he logs in this, he logs in that, he logs in the other thing. He is not part of the decision-making process.

Another platoon commander stated:

> In other precincts, the lieutenant is the desk officer and this is a difficult and frustrating job. It's difficult to set the tone because everyone is looking at you like you are part of the furniture. They are all trying to slip by you and avoid you and make you part of the furniture instead of the person in charge who has control of things... People flow in and flow out and you are not in charge of the flood gates.

Similar sentiments were expressed by the sergeants. As one explained:

> We have taken the rank of lieutenant and created this desk officer image of a person who sits behind the desk and essentially he is responsible for very few things. He makes sure all of the entries are made in log. He keeps people out of the station house or logs them into the station house. Logs arrests -- takes care of situations like that. To me, it is demeaning and demoralizing to use a second level supervisor as a desk clerk in a motel. He puts people in a book. All the lieutentants have to do is sit in a chair and get fat.

Often, in a traditionally organized precinct, the lieutenant is, in a sense, outside of the chain of command. When the commanding officer wants something done, he may bypass the lieutenants and deal directly with the patrol sergeants. The rationale for this procedure is obvious-- the patrol sergeants know the terrain, the conditions in the street, and their

officers. The patrol sergeants are the supervisors who are in the best position to carry out the commanding officer's instructions. The lieutenants lack both first-hand knowledge of conditions in the street and the power to effect change in street conditions because they are ensconced behind the desk.

The platoon commanders all agreed that the desk could and should be supervised by a sergeant. One platoon commander summed up the situation by stating: "A lieutenant as a desk officer is a waste of a good rank, an important rank if you really want to get the job done."

II. Chain of Command In a Fixed Platoon System

In the fixed platoon system, the lieutenant has an important and clearly defined place in the chain of command. He is an integral part of the command structure, and, as a result, the chain of command is simplified and strengthened. The Commanding Officer described the command structure in the 115th Precinct as follows:

> Span of control can be thought of in two ways. With the platoon commander system, there are fewer people reporting directly to the Commanding Officer, so I consider that as a reduction in the span of patrol operations. In a normal precinct, the desk officer is outside the span of control. You have a captain, and fourteen sergeants who run patrol and a desk officer who is sort of out on the side.
>
> In the platoon system, the number of people that the Commanding Officer can effectively supervise is increased because the number of people that directly report to him is reduced.

In the fixed platoon system, the Commanding Officer discusses matters with three lieutenants, who in turn deal with the

three, four, or five sergeants assigned to their platoon. Thus, the chain of command is streamlined and clearly defined. It is not fragmented as it is in a traditionally organized precinct. Moreover, the lieutenants are directly involved in the decision-making process, and they have a meaningful role in the command structure. They have responsibility and power appropriate to their rank. As one platoon commander reported:

> The (fixed) platoon system is simple and easy to administer. My chain of command is very small. There's me and the four sergeants and the sergeants take care of the cops. The assignments are very easy to handle: Who's going to ride, who is going to walk. In fact, one of the things that I feel very good about in the sixteen months that I have been a platoon commander here is the assignments that I have made. The assignments I have been made have been very good. There has been a minimal amount of groussing and this is a good sign.

Streamlining of the chain of command is also beneficial to the patrol sergeants. In a conventional precinct the sergeants report to four different lieutenants who are rotating around the chart in the <u>opposite</u> direction from the sergeants. In this system it is difficult for the sergeants to learn the policies and procedures of the individual lieutenants and they often receive conflicting messages. One respondent stated:

> In a conventional command, the patrol sergeant is more or less at sea because he does not work for any particular officer other than the Commanding Officer. In the rotating chart, for a couple of tours he is working for Lieutenant Jones, and the next two he is working with Smith. Jones' expectations may be higher or lower than Smith's. There is a lack of continuity that does not exist in this command. The lieutenant sets the general tone and his expectations are clear. This assures that what you are doing today is not going to be unsatisfactory tomorrow.

III. Assignment System

In traditionally organized precincts, the lieutenant as desk officer has very little interest or control over the assignment system. Rather, contol over assignments lies to a great extent with the Roll Call staff. At the beginning of each tour, the patrol sergeants review the roll call and make "last-minute" adjustments in these assignments to reflect unforeseen circumstances -- an officer calling in sick, an emergency situation, and the like. One of the platoon commanders in the 115th precinct described the assignment system in conventional precincts as follows:

> Lieutenants in regular precincts almost never get involved in the assignment system. If he's interested, he may get involved in the daily assigning of people to this or that sector. He may. But most lieutenants never get to have a say about who's going to walk and who's going to ride.
>
> Sadly enough, most assignments are usually made by a PAA in Roll Call. Some captains make certain assignments about primary things that they are interested in, like TOPAC, or the warrant people or Anti-Crime. But they rarely, if ever make decisions about who's covering the sectors -- who's getting the good sector; who's getting the quiet sector; who's getting the busy sector. In most places, the PAA should not be deciding who's getting tour changes, and who's getting days off. Unless somebody balks, most of the people that the PAAs like get what they want. That shouldn't be! In most precincts, the people with power are not the supervisors, but the men or women in Roll Call.

This supervisor explained that in the 115th Precinct, all assignments are made by the platoon commanders after consultation with the patrol sergeants. The Roll Call staff draw-up the daily

rosters to reflect the policies of the platoon commanders. This platoon commander emphasized that the assignment system in the 115th Precinct is used by the supervisors to reward "good performers" and "team players" and to punish officers who are not performing. In the 115th Precinct, all tour changes and days off must be approved by the platoon commander or in his absence, the patrol sergeant. He stated,

> Days off and tour changes are a commodity. If the supervisors don't use this commodity to their advantage then it's like throwing money down the drain. Let's be honest, there isn't much that the bosses can do to get the men on their side. But if you can control the rewards and punishments, then you can extract good performances from the men.

Thus, in the fixed platoon system as it has been instituted in the 115th Precinct, the platoon commanders have assumed responsibility for making assignments; and they are very pleased with the situation. While they appreciate the leverage provided by administering rewards-and-punishment system, they emphasize that controlling assignments means that they can select the most appropriate officers to handle the tasks at hand. As a result, they believe that the productivity of the officers is higher than in a traditionally organized precinct.

IV. Fixed Responsibility and Accountability

One of the themes that recurred throughout our interviews, both formal and informal, was that in the traditionally organized precinct it is possible for the lieutenants, sergeants, and police officers to "duck" and "hide" from responsibility. This

opportunity to avoid responsibility seems to be built into the rotating chart system which provides every officer with an "easy out." As one platoon commander explained:

> When you work a 9 squad chart with lieutenants rotating, sergeants rotating, and cops rotating, there is simply no fixed responsibility for who should take care of a problem. Most police problems are of a routine nature. For example, commercial parking in residential areas is always a problem for the midnight tour in any precinct. But if you can't identify who should take care of the problem then you are not going to get a good response. But if you know that every night Officer Smith and Officer Jones ride that sector on a late tour, you can tell them to take care of that problem. And they will. They won't turn to you and say: I'm working days this week. Or I work up in another sector. It's their sector, and their problem and they will take care of it. The (fixed) platoon system is a very, very simple way of running a precinct. People are accountable and responsibility is fixed.

A similar, but more emphatic statement was made by another platoon commander:

> We hold the officers to very high standards and I will say that it has a lot to do with the (fixed) platoon concept. We are responsible for this particular group of people -- and it reflects upon me how they are... Word will spread through the grapevine about the tone of this precinct. And I think this makes the supervisors do a good job because they realize that they are responsible for what goes on. And without the (fixed) platoon concept you don't. Everyone is swinging in and swinging out. No one knows what squads are working, and if certain squads are screwing up, no one knows. In every other precinct everyone hides behind the anonymity of swinging around the clock. "Hey, if you have a problem, you will swing out of it in a day or two, so don't worry about it." Here, it's with you everyday. Here, it is impossible to hide away from the problems. Now things have to be done.

In the fixed platoon system as it has been instituted in the 115th Precinct, it is not possible to duck responsibility because

there is basically no place to hide. The chain of command is very clear: If something is going wrong on the evening tour, then the platoon commander for the evening tour is responsible, and his sergeants are, in turn, responsible as are the police officers in turn. The "anonymity" characteristic of the rotating tour system is gone.

V. Specialization

The Commanding Officer of the 115th Precinct and the platoon commanders were generally opposed to the use of specialized units other than those mandated by the Department (e.g. Anti-crime). They all agreed that ideally most if not all problems should be handled by the sector cars. However, in practice, it was necessary for the 115th to deploy a few specialized units.

The Commanding Officer described his attitude toward the use of specialized units as follows:

> Having to resort to specialization is admitting that you have failed in some way-- admitting that you can't get a certain job done through your generalists; that is, your cops on foot, and your cops in radio cars. So you have to specialize. One of the ways in which we are all specializing is in terms of quality of life. We can't get the average cop to stop and do something about quality of life problems, so we created a specialized unit to address these particular problems. What we have here is an absolute minimum of specialization... We do not have burglary teams, and more significantly we do not have traffic safety officers -- officers just giving out summonses. We were able to accomplish tremendous increases in productivity in both moving and parking summonses without any specialization whatsoever. This means that in their spare time the cops on patrol are giving out sum-

> monses -- instead of having four or five men giving out summonses as a full-time duty. We don't need as much specialization here because of the (fixed) platoon concept. We get greater productivity out of our people. We are addressing problems and we are failing less. Therefore we have to specialize less.

Similar sentiments were expressed by one of the platoon commanders:

> We have made better use of our resources than in any other precinct in which I have worked. Other precincts invest heavily in summons men and conditions cars. I personally believe that these are a waste of resources. If you have a condition, it should be handled by the sector. If it is not handled by the sector, get someone in that sector who will handle the condition. To superimpose two or four police officers over the entire precinct to handle conditions -- you are taking away the responsibility of the individual sector officers to handle their own conditions. And that is wrong! Take those four cops and those two cars and give them sector assignments, so they ride those sectors and handle those problems.

Nevertheless, despite their reluctance to use specialized units, the day and evening tour platoon commanders both instituted Quality of Life cars within a few months of the precinct's opening, because they realized that certain persistent problems are more effectively handled by deploying these units. The day tour Quality of Life car is primarily a school car; however, it does handle other assignments such as blocked driveways, complaints about people repairing automobiles in the street, and other low priority calls for service. During the warm weather months, the evening tour Quality of Life car patrols the parks and playground, disperses groups congregating on corners, confiscates radios being played too loudly, and attends to other matters. Also, because these units are not confined to specific

sectors, they can handle conditions in any part of the precinct. Moreover, they are listed with the 911 dispatcher; therefore, if necessary they can be assigned to a call for service. They are a flexible resource, and as such they often serve as back-ups to the sector cars or the Anti-Crime unit.

A Quality of Life car was not instituted on the midnight tour until August, 1984. The platoon commander was reluctant to designate a Quality of Life car because he initially believed that his limited resources were more efficiently deployed in sector cars.[1] Nevertheless, he came to believe that a Quality of Life car was essential, given the conditions in the precinct on the late tour. As he explained,

> I felt that I could get a better response to noise complaints and conditions posed by disorderly persons, if I had just two people that I could go to and make aware of certain conditions and they would develop a certain expertise and familiarity with conditions. It seemed better than intermittently giving one conditions slip to another sector. I felt that if I had the same two people continually working conditions that they would become much more aware and therefore much more effective.

Also during the early months of precinct operations, the day and evening tour platoon commanders decided that it was desirable to deploy an SP-10 car in order to avoid an alert or backlog situation. The Commanding Officer vigorously opposed the use of

[1] Subsequently, as part of Total Patrol Concept, all precincts were required to deploy a TOPAC car on each tour. The primary purpose of these cars is to address quality of life problems. TOPAC is listed with Central Communications; therefore, they are on the 911 calls-for-service queue.

SP-10 car because he believed that calls regarding past crimes should be handled by the sector cars. Nevertheless, he deferred to the judgement of the platoon commanders who were more familiar with the type and volume of calls for service on their tours than he was.

The SP-10 car is not listed on the 911 calls-for-service queue; therefore, this unit seldom responds to radio dispatched calls for service. Rather, their primary responsibility is to complete complaint reports on past crimes, particularly burglaries. They also serve as the latent prints car and in their spare time, they issue summonses and attend to miscellaneous problems. The platoon commanders believe that these units have been very successful. As one lieutenant explained:

> SP-10 does a good deal of work. They alleviate a number of problems because they can take a number of assignments at one time and go out and handle them... Calls that would otherwise put you into an alert or backlog situation.

While a few specialized units have been deployed in the 115th Precinct, the platoon commanders believe that, in the fixed platoon concept, there is less of a need for specialization because the generalists are more productive. For example, as Chapter VII explains in more detail the number of summonses for moving violations increased by 56%, while summons for parking violations increased by 42.8%. Moreover, in 1984, the 115th Precinct was surpassed only by the 112th Precinct in terms of the speed with which they handled 911 calls-for-service. This short service time suggests that the officers were picking up jobs

quickly, handling them expeditiously, and reporting in dispositions in a timely fashion. This high level of productivity appears to be attributable, in large part, to the streamlined chain of command, continuity in supervision, and fixed responsibility and accountability. In this system the same officers and the same supervisors are working the same territory every day at the same time of day. As a result, they developed an understanding of their sectors, the people, and the conditions. Thus, the problems that need to be addressed are handled by the officers most familiar with conditions -- the officers assigned to the sector. One sergeant stated:

> Police officers and the supervisors have an absolute knowledge of the conditions in the precinct during the hours that they work...We have a tendency in this job to think that the problems will go away. "Next week I'll be doing 4 to 12's, so we won't have the school problem". Here you know you're doing days today and days tomorrow and maybe days three years from now, so I have to deal with this problem now instead of just hoping that it will go away. There's much more continuous patrol by the same people than in a regular precinct. You know the people. The continuity is there; therefore, you know the problems are going to be there and you take care of them. You may even discover problems because of your continuous patrol during the same hours.

VI. Supervision and Discipline

The topics of supervision and discipline are closely related to the notions of accountability and fixed responbility. In the fixed platoon commander concept, the lieutenants are ultimately responsible for everything that occurs on their tour; therefore, they must actively supervise their subordinates to insure that

situations are being handled efficiently and appropriately. It is probable that the patrol sergeants and the patrol officers in the 115th Precinct are more closely supervised than in traditionally organized precincts, because the lieutenants are out on patrol with their officers, thereby, adding a layer of supervision not available in other precincts. Moreover, the sergeants and patrol officers understand that the lieutenant determines the priorities and actively assesses the work of all personnel in his platoon. As one platoon commander explained:

> The greatest strength of the (fixed) platoon concept is accountability. Lieutenants and sergeants here are accountable... The sergeants are much more under the watchful eye of the lieutenant. In other precincts the lieutenant is on the desk, he never goes out and sees what the sergeants are doing. Here I go out and see what they are doing, whether they are supervising or not supervising. The lieutenant has power and an overview of what is going on.

Similar sentiments were expressed by another platoon commander:

> The critical area of police work is the street. Everything in this job is contingent upon what happens in the street. And it seems obvious to me that we should have the highest ranking person available in the street to make those decisions that most severely affect the Department. The lieutenants in this precinct are out in the street. He has overall supervision for the entire platoon. When I first made lieutenant and went to a precinct I felt like a clerk. When I came here I felt like I had been promoted. For the first time I feel that sergeants function subordinate to me and it is night and day. You stagnate on the desk. In the (fixed) platoon concept the lieutenants grow professionally.

The patrol sergeants, in general, view the presence of the platoon commander on the streets as an advantage. As one patrol sergeant explained:

> It is a tremendous advantage to the Department to have the lieutenant in the field. The lieutenant now has an idea of what's happening in the street. The advantage to the Department is that the lieutenant is now much more capable of evaluating his personnel because he sees them in various situations-- how they react under pressure. He can size them up almost instantaneously. The desk officer just sees them when they come into the station house... I cannot think of a disadvantage to having the lieutenant in the field. The lieutenant knows the street and the station house and he is capable of responding to any situation with a thorough knowledge.

In the fixed platoon system, the platoon commander has not only the responsibility, but also the opportunity and authority to affect patrol procedures. He, in conjunction with the Commanding Officer, determine policies and procedures, and he has the power and authority to see that his wishes are carried out. Thus, this system promotes continuity and consistency in the ways in which situations are handled. The patrol sergeants know their platoon commander's expectations and therefore they are not receiving conflicting messages about the appropriate method for handling certain conditions. As a result, even in the absence of the platoon commander, field operations can proceed smoothly. One patrol sergeant stated: "There are no hassles over turf or procedures here. We (the patrol sergeants) know what we are supposed to do and we do it."

One consequence of the platoon concept is that there is a subtle shift in the balance of power and responsibility between the sergeants and the lieutenants. In the platoon system, sergeants have less autonomy than in a traditional precinct because they are reporting directly to a lieutenant who is a

presence both in the station house and on the street. The sergeants are not free to make decisions in important matters on an ad hoc basis; rather, they have to adhere to the policies set by the Platoon Commander and the Commanding Officer. As the Commanding Officer explained:

> The relationship between the cop and the sergeant has not changed. But everything above the sergeants level has changed. Some sergeants may not like the situation. Now instead of having total control and being the boss out in the street, now they have the lieutenant as the boss on the street running the show.

Vera staff interviewed eight patrol sergeants and discussed ways in which the platoon system affected the sergeants' patrol procedures, supervisory roles, and decision-making processes. They explained that the function of the patrol sergeant in the fixed platoon concept is basically the same as in a conventionally structured precinct. His principal responsibilities are to monitor the radio, respond to serious calls, and assist and supervise the patrol officers in performance of their duties. However, the patrol sergeants that we interviewed stated that the fixed platoon system is a great improvement over the 9 Squad Chart because the patrol sergeant's job is simplified. The sergeants not only get to know the strengths and weaknesses of the officers in their own squad, but also the skills of the other officers assigned to the other two squads in their platoon. From the sergeants' perspective there are fewer "unknowns" in this system because they do not have to deal with a constantly changing array of police officers and supervisors. The advantages of

the fixed platoon concept were explained by one patrol sergeant as follows:

> What I particularly like (about the fixed platoon system) is that you know the people, so you are <u>not</u> walking into a strange situation. In the 9 Squad Chart there is a time where you do what is called "back to back 4 to 12's." You do two sets of evening tours in succession. And in that second set you work with an entirely different group of cops. I always hated that because I didn't know the people. You feel very uncomfortable when you respond to serious runs -- guns, knives, fights, holds-ups -- and you don't know how the cops operate. That's what I like about this precinct-- I know exactly how the cops operate. There are no surprises for me. The perp might be a surprise, obviously, but not the cops. So I'm 50% ahead of the game.

Additionally and as a result of the fixed platoon concept, the patrol sergeants know which officers can be assigned to attend to difficult or sensitive areas. This, in turn, means that precinct conditions can be handled more efficiently.

The Commanding Officer and the Platoon Commanders tended to emphasize the positive aspects of supervision -- that is, they regarded supervision as an assistance and training process. Conversely, they de-emphasized the potentially punitive aspects of supervision. For example, the platoon commanders expressed a reluctance to write-up an officer unless Department policies mandated formal proceedings. Rather, all of the lieutenants preferred to use informal sanctions, such as having a heart-to-heart talk with the officer and working closely with the officer to improve his skills. If these forms of gentle persuasion were not effective, then they resorted to more punitive measures such as assigning the officer to station house duty or continually

assigning him to disagreeable tasks. Command discipline was used as a final resort. As the following quotation from one of the platoon commanders indicates, supervision is sometimes a combination of training and punishment:

> My belief is that you go on the jobs with the people you are concerned about -- the people who are not doing the job. Even if it's a minor case you can learn a lot about them. And they get the message. You are not going to see the other officers. You are constantly coming to see them and they will make mistakes. And you keep bringing these mistakes to their attention. And it is a form of discipline. You're almost harrassing them and it's a form of discipline.

The platoon commanders observed that patrol sergeants traditionally are reluctant to discipline the officers because the sergeants tend to identify with the cops. One platoon commander stated:

> It's the nature of the job. The sergeants tend to be right down there with the cops. They see themselves as the laborers and we are management. So it's "them" and "us." The patrol sergeants in any precinct don't want to get involved with disciplining the troops if they can possibly avoid it. They figure it's just better to let things blow over, or to work around some guy that's a problem. And that's bad.

He continued:

> But in the (fixed) platoon concept, I think that the lieutenant serves a really good purpose in that he can be that person that everyone looks to and says, "Oh, it's because of him that there's all of this pressure." And the men can feel good about the sergeants and lay the blame on the lieutenant -- he's the tough guy that's putting all of this pressure on them. And still the sergeants can discipline them to a certain degree because the lieutenant is forcing them to. And the sergeants can work with the men and get them to do the job.

> In my experience here, I found myself even doing some of the disciplining for the sergeants and it hasn't really been bad. I have seen the sergeants come a long way: They have started to do their own disciplining -- disciplining that they did not do originally -- disciplining that I have not seen in very many precincts -- sergeants disciplining their men.

One of the differences between the 115th Precinct and traditionally organized precincts is that the lieutenants in the fixed platoon concept have both the responsibility and power to ensure that delinquent officers are punished and that the punishment is carried out. This is not possible in a conventional precinct, because the lientenant as desk officer has neither the opportunity nor the responsibility for administering routine discipline. One lieutenant summarized the situation as follows:

> In a regular precinct, if I was a desk officer, I wouldn't have the opportunity to take a cop out of the sector unless I went to the Commanding Officer and got his permission to do it first. As a lieutenant working the desk, I don't have that type of authority. But here, as platoon commander, I gave them the sectors to begin with and if I want to pull them out for a couple of days I can. I have the latitude and the ability, and the system is structured such that there are no adverse effects if I do that.
>
> In the (fixed) platoon system, we have a wide range of informal sanctions available to us. We have the ability to institute the sanctions and the ability to follow up, because the people you are imposing the sanctions against aren't going to swing out and start working another tour where the bosses might not necessarily know about the sanctions so they are not in effect. So discipline just went down the drain because the sanctions are not being imposed. You don't have that problem here because everything is a constant. When sanctions are imposed, they are going to stay imposed until you lift them.
>
> In a conventional environment, they might be less prone to institute discipline because of the way the

> system is. Bosses get the attitude "Hey, I work with this guy one out of five sets, so why bother." It's easier to let things slide.
>
> The system suffers under the conventional precinct arrangement because if discipline is warranted and it is not imposed then you have a person who should be subject to discipline who is getting away with something and that is sending a clear message to his peers that if he can get away with it so can they. And that is where the breakdown starts and it is costly to the organization.
>
> The sergeants here are more willing to get involved with discipline because the (fixed) platoon system mandates it. The sergeants are working with the same people all of the time and if they don't hold those people to a certain standard they are going to suffer because of it. They are not going to be able to swing out of those problems. They are stuck with those problems that they create by not imposing the necessary discipline. So the system forces them to be better supervisors than they would have to be in another precinct where they can shirk responsibilities.
>
> In a traditional precinct, the lieutenant acting as desk officer doesn't really care what the patrol sergeants are doing or not doing because he has no proprietary interest in what is going on in the street. Even if he knows there is a patrol sergeant out there who is doing very little, there is no point in the lieutenant trying to bring him into line. The lieutenant only sees this guy two days in ten, so why should he get all bent out of shape trying to bring him into line? He will only expend a monumental amount of effort for two days and then he won't be working with him and the lieutenant is back at square one and he has to start all over again. The system breeds that because those are the constraints under which the lieutenants have to act. If you don't have the tools, you can't get the job done and in a regular precinct the lieutenants don't have the tools.

Our interviews and observations suggest that in the fixed platoon concept the platoon commanders do "have the tools to get the job done." The platoon commanders control the assignment

system, therefore, officers are assigned to tasks according to their skills, attitude, and level of performance. Thus, the assignments are based on a ranking officer's assessments of an individual's abilities, rather the favoritism or whimsy of the Roll Call staff. Additionally, because there is continuity and consistency in assignments, the platoon commanders and patrol sergeants are able to work closely with officers whose skills need improvement. This combination of supervision, instruction, discipline, and appropriate assignments creates an environment which is likely to reduce mistakes made by the patrol officers and encourages their handling in a professional manner. Moreover, because the supervisors continually work with the same groups of officers, they have, an incentive to become involved in the disciplinary process. The accountability and fixed responsibility that is built into the platoon concept, does not allow a supervisor to let an officer "screw-up" and get away with it. However, because the supervisors and officers work closely, there is a willingness on the part of the supervisors to deal with errant officers by imposing and enforcing in formal sanctions. It must be emphasized, however, that the use of informal sanctions, such as assigning an officer to four weeks of telephone duty, is only possible and effective in a system such as the fixed platoon concept in which the lieutenants and patrol sergeants have meaningful control over the assignment and disciplinary systems. Our interviews suggest that in traditionally organized precincts, officers are either not disciplined at all, or they are referred

for command discipline.

VII. Patrol Officers' Attitudes Toward the Platoon Concept

As noted earlier, Vera staff rode on patrol with approximately 70 officers and there were a number of other officers that we talked to informally in the station house. The interviews with the police officers were not tape recorded because many of the officers were initially suspicious of us. Additionally, even when we took notes, we tended to do so surreptiously in order to avoid the impression that we were evaluating each of the officers individually. While most of the officers were quite willing to tell us about their educational background, family background, why they had joined the police force, and other somewhat personal matters, they had very little to say about the fixed platoon concept *per se*. Their reluctance to discuss the fixed platoon concept seemed to stem from their erroneous belief that they were being asked to discuss the various supervisors. Therefore, the answers were often vague, "The bosses are okay. We could do worse." Other officers did not know how to answer the questions because they had come to the 115th Precinct directly from the NSU's and, as a result, they had had limited experience with traditional precincts and the 9 Squad Chart. Still other officers focused on specific aspects of their platoon and they were unable or unwilling to make any general statements about the overall effectiveness of the fixed platoon concept. The responses we received were often on the order of, "The bosses here run every-

thing by the book. Everything! You come into the station house to get your raincoat and you have to be signed in and signed out. What bull shit!" Or, "If you have a boss that's a real ball buster, you can't get away from him. Yeah, in this system we get to know the bosses real well, but they get to know us too well."

Nevertheless, one of the officers who had four years on the job stated:

> The platoon system is good and I'm not just talking about steady tours. Here we get to know everybody. I know that when I'm out here, that J and S are working Sector Henry, and X and Y are up in Charlie. So, if me and my partner get into a tight situation, we know that we have back-ups that we can trust, and that's important. You know all of the guys that you are working with. We work together as a team. Back-ups here are no problem. It's not like some other precincts where I worked.

He continued:

> There's more peer pressure here to perform. If some guy's not towing his weight, he's going to hear about it not just from the bosses, but the other cops. We've got a lot of young and motivated cops in this platoon, and we want to get the job done.

VIII. Advantages of the Platoon Concept

The apparent advantages of the fixed platoon concept may be summarized as follows:

A. The Chain of Command is Simplified. The Commanding Officer deals directly with three platoon commanders, rather than fourteen sergeants. The lieutenants, in turn, deal directly with the three or four sergeants assigned to their platoon. In this system the span of control of the commanding officer and the

lieutenants is reduced. In addition, the system promotes consistency and continuity in command.

B. Accountability and Responsibility. Duties are clearly defined and responsibility is fixed. In this system it is very difficult to shirk responsibility and hide behind the anonymity of the 9 Squad Chart. Accountability extends not only to the platoon commanders and the patrol sergeants, but also to the police officers who are held accountable for conditions in their sector.

C. Meaningful Role for Lieutenants. Lieutenants in the role of platoon commanders have a definite and useful place in the chain of command. They have authority and responsibility to direct all patrol operations during their tour. They are in the field and thereby develop a first-hand knowledge of conditions and problems in the street.

D. Improvement in the Quality of Supervision. The presence of the lieutenant in the field adds a layer of supervision that is not available in traditionally organized precincts. As a result, the activities of the sergeants and patrol officers are more carefully monitored and lieutenants have the opportunity to work continuously with officers who need personal training or graduated levels of discipline.

E. Familiarity with the Area. Because the same officers are patrolling the same territory at the same time of day every day, they develop an extensive knowledge of the area, the people, and the problems. Thus, officers can be deployed more effectively to combat problems and deliver services to the community.

F. Teamwork. Because the supervisors and the patrol officers are working with the same set of personnel everyday, they tend to develop a sense of comraderie that fosters an attitude of cooperativeness and teamwork. In this system, the police officers themselves may, through peer group pressure, informally sanction an officer who is not a team player.

G. More Efficient and Effective Deployment of Resources. The 115th Precinct may use fewer specialized cars and units than many precincts in New York City because the officers assigned to the sectors and foot patrol perform tasks that are often delegated to specialized units in other precincts. Specifically, while the 115th does deploy a Quality of Life car on each tour, and an SP-10 car on the day and evening tours, it does not deploy summons units, burglary or robbery cars, or other specialized and ofter temporary units that are designed to deal with particular conditions.

Because a smaller percentage of the patrol force is assigned to details, the platoon commanders and sergeants have more resources to devote to everyday conditions in the precinct.

H. Improvement in the Quality of Police Services. The findings suggest that the fixed platoon concept is an efficient and effective management structure. It is a simple yet powerful management system. It is reasonable to assume that an improvement in the management structure of a precinct, including more appropriate deployment of resources, will result in an improvement in the quality of police services.

Disadvantages of the Platoon Concept

It was the consensus of the Commanding Officer, the Platoon Commanders, and the Patrol Sergeants that there were very few disadvantages to the fixed platoon concept, and that the advantages far outweighed the disadvantages.

However, one theme that recurred throughout the interviews was that the 115th operated not as one precinct but as three. We were informed on many occassions that: "We're running three different precincts here." We heard this statement many, many times from the police officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. One platoon commander explained the situation as follows:

> The only disadvantage that I have seen with the (fixed) platoon commander concept is the compartmentalization. The platoons start to think of themselves as distinct, separate entities -- almost as different police departments. And unless you have very good cross-communications between the lieutenants, between the sergeants, and the cops, you tend to think of your problems as the overriding concerns of the precinct, rather than just a concern of the precinct. You don't care what the problems are on the late tour because you don't have to work late tours. When you would rotate, you would have the late tour problems one week, and the 4 to 12 the next week and the 8 to 4 problems the week after, so they weren't simply out of your domain. Now, that's a problem. I don't think it's a serious problem, but it's a problem. The advantages far outweigh it.

Basically, the officers in the 115th tended to identify with their platoon rather than the precinct as a whole. As a result, they are primarily, if not solely, concerned with the problems, events, and personnel associated with their platoon. Because they have only experienced the precinct under a limited set of circumstances (their own tour), they have little knowledge of the

conditions during other tours -- and they are not particularly concerned. This lack of interaction and understanding among the personnel assigned to various tours generated a certain amount of friction. The main criticism was that each tour had to "mop up" for the previous tour and that this problem did not arise in a conventionally organized precinct. As one police officer stated:

> When we were going around the clock, we knew the precinct under all sorts of conditions, and we wouldn't dump jobs on the next tour, because we knew that in a week or so, we would be working that tour and we didn't want jobs dumped on us. Here, no one cares.

This criticism was expressed by both the supervisors and the officers. The supervisors were concerned because they did not want to begin the tour with a near alert situation because calls for service were backing up. As one patrol sergeant from the day tour explained:

> Here there is a sense that cops from the previous tour are dumping jobs on us. In the traditional precinct, because of the way the 9 Squad Chart works -- you relieve and get relieved by the same people. Say this week, if I were in a traditional precinct, for my first two sets of tours I may relieve you and then next week for my first two sets of tours you may relieve me. So you have a tendency to say "Well, they had it and now I'm getting it. Or, I had it and now they're getting it." It balances off. You feel they are sticking you with work, but then you get your chance to stick them with work. Many times the day tour ends up the tour with a lot of work, and evening tours start off with a lot of work. It's a normal situation. There's a lot of calls between 3:00 and 3:30, so work piles up, and some of it gets left for the evening tour. Here, because of the fixed tours you don't get this kind of balancing. There is no chance for the evening tour cops to leave work for the day cops. The system just doesn't work that way. You can't get the reverse. This has created some animosity and

> hard feelings, because there is no opportunity to reciprocate. But I don't see it as a big thing, certainly nothing compared to the benefits of the steady tours.

A supervisor from the evening tour described the "dumping" and "mopping up" problem as follows:

> One of the annoyances and stressful things for us on the 4 to 12's is that people who do not work this tour on a regular basis do not know or forget what we have to put up with. One problem is the late tour crying about us passing on work to them occasionally. And the late tour people haven't worked a 4 to 12 in so long, they forget what it is like.
>
> When you worked 4 to 12's, you know that the start of the tour is a really stressful time. There's pressure because there's very little turn-over time. There's a lot of pressure to get the people out. When you get out there, the jobs are waiting for you. You have to hustle and get the jobs done before you find yourself in an alert situation. During the night, there's more arrests on the 4 to 12 than on any other tour. There's usually more complaints taken and we usually issue more summonses. A lot of work is done on the 4 to 12. And occasionally the 4 to 12, because of the extra work, will pass something on to the midnight tour. I'm sure the other tours have the same problem.

The Commanding Officer, and other supervisory staff are well-aware of the problems arising from the insularity of the platoons that develops in fixed platoon concept. These problems are discussed at the bi-monthly supervisors meetings and effort have been made to improve channels of communiciations between and across the tours.

The police officers were also disturbed by what they perceived as the "cliquishness" and aloofness of the officers assigned to the other platoons. A frequent complaint was, "You only know the guys in your platoon. You don't socialize with

cops from other platoons." In this regard, it must be noted that this complaint was most frequently expressed by officers who did not come from either the 110th or 114th. Officers from other commands, certainly at the beginning, felt as if they were outsiders trying to break into a closed circle. Moreover, the complaints about cliquishness have persisted. Although the 115th Precinct Club has sponsored dances, parties, athletic events, and other outings that are well attended, several officers, for example, stated that: "Evening tour cops hang out with evening tour cops."

Our observations at the precinct and the comments of both the supervisors and police officers suggest that the officers know primarily the personnel assigned to the their own platoon. For example, when the Vera staff were trying to distribute the stress questionnaire, we would often approach the officer on the telephone-service and say "We're looking for Officer X, have you seen him around?" And the response, almost invariably was, "Oh, Officer X, he works evening's (or days, or late tours), I don't know him. In only know guys in my platoon."

While there may be less overall unity on the precinct level in the 115th than in other precincts, it seems to have been more than compensated for by the increased loyalty of the officers to their squad and platoon.

All of the officers and supervisors agreed that while "mopping up" and cliquishness are problems, they are minor problems, which are more than off-set by the major strengths of the fixed platoon system.

CHAPTER VII
STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF CRIME AND POLICE ACTIVITY IN THE 115th PRECINCT

Introduction

Chapters IV and V presented the findings from our interviews of residents and community leaders, which indicated that a substantial proportion of the citizenry believed that the quality of police services had improved dramatically since the opening of the 115th Precinct. Moreover, our survey of community leaders revealed that they believed that the crime rate was declining, that there were fewer robberies, and that there was less disorder in the streets. They stated that the residents felt much safer since the opening of the Precinct. Furthermore, the community leaders stated that residents were much more likely to call the police, because now they had "their own precinct" and they expected assistance from the police.

This chapter first considers the impact that the opening of the 115th Precinct had on the volume of crime complaints, arrests, and calls for service issued for parking and moving violations. The statistics for 1983 were created by combining those pertaining to the sections of the 110th and 114th Precincts which were joined to form the 115th Precinct in 1984. The chapter ends with a review of statistics describing absenteeism and automobile accidents, two measures which the Department regards as indicators of performance.

I Complaints for Seven Major Offense Categories

Crime complaints are a very ambiguous measure of police activity. Conventional assumptions suggest that greater police presence and activity will lower the volume of crime complaints. Logically, this is not necessary so, empirically, it is often untrue. Certain types of crimes, such as in-door assaults, are typically committed in situations in which the police can't be present. Moreover, the police are a source of crime complaints themselves since they will notice criminal situations which may or may not result in an arrest and they will issue summons for infractions that might have gone unnoticed in their absence. Finally, increased accessibility of the police through increased presence and heightened sensitivity to the needs of the citizen encourages the residents of a community to report conditions which they might not have reported in the past. Thus, increasing the number of police officers or concentrating them in areas that previously received less intensive service, may very likely produce an increase rather than a decrease in the volume of crime complaints. This appears to be one of the results of creating the 115th Precinct.

The New York City Police Department groups serious crime into seven major offense categories: 1) murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 2) forcible rape, 3) robbery, 4) felonious assault, 5) burglary, 6) grand larceny, and 7) grand larceny auto. It should be noted that the seven major offense categories used by

the Department do not correspond directly to the Uniform Crime Report classifications employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Rather, they are tailored to the New York State Penal Code.

The total number of complaints for the seven major offenses for Patrol Borough Queens (PBQ), excluding the 115th Precinct, rose by 1.6% from 95,926 in 1983 to 97,465 in 1984. During this same period the complaint rate rose for the area comprising the 115th Precinct by 4.3%, from 7,389 in 1983 to 7,709 in 1984.Thus, the increase in the volume of complaints for serious crimes was somewhat higher for the 115th Precinct than for the Borough as a whole.

Although the volume of complaints for index offenses increased for PBQ, escluding the 115th Precinct, there was a 1.8% decrease in the reported robberies, which fell from 12,242 to 12,071. In contrast, the reported robberies rose by 5.7% from 790 to 835 in the 115th Precinct. Similarly, reported burglaries for Queens, excluding the 115th Precinct, dropped by 5.8% from 28,510 in 1983 to 26,859 in 1984, while the number of reported burglaries for the 115th Precinct remained virtually unchanged--1599 complaints in 1983, and 1603 in 1984.

Table 7.1 presents 115th Precinct data on the number of complaints for each of the seven major offenses before and after the Precinct opened, the numeric changes for each category, and the percentage change. Although, the total number of complaints rose by 4.3%, certain offense categories registered larger increases,

while others decreased. Specifically, there were declines in two categories-- murder and grand larceny auto, for a reduction of 69 complaint reports. The remaining five categories collectively accounted for an increase of 389 reports. These increases and decreases produced a "net" increase of 320 reports (389 increases minus 69 decreases). Table 7.1 indicates the absolute number of grand larceny complaints alone rose by 251, while the felonious assault reports increased by 82-- for a total of 331 reports. In sum, the large numeric increases in reported grand larcenies and assault more than off-set the reduction in the murder and grand larceny auto categories.

Table 7.1: Volume of Complaints for 7 Major Offenses, 115th Precinct Comparison, between 1983 and 1984

Offenses	Complaints		Change	
	1983	1984	N	%
Murder/Manslaughter	20	18	- 2	-10.0%
Forcible Rape	30	37	+ 7	+23.3%
Robbery	790	835	+ 45	+ 5.7%
Felonious Assault	223	305	+ 82	+36.8%
Burglary	1599	1603	+ 4	0.0%
Grand Larceny	3064	3315	+251	+ 8.2%
Grand Larceny Auto	1663	1596	- 67	- 4.0%
TOTAL	7389	7709	+320	+ 4.3%

II Total Crime Complaints

The volume of complaints for all forms of crime for the Borough of Queens rose by 4.6% from 186,894 in 1983 to 195,472 in 1984, while the total volume of crime complaints for the 115th Precinct rose by 23.2% from 12,533 to 15,438. When Vera staff discussed this substantial increase with the Commanding Officer, other supervisors, and the precinct crime analyst, they all offered the same explanation. They believed that with the opening of the Precinct, there were more police to notice more infractions and the residents became more aware of a visible police presence and, as a result, they were more likely to report crimes, no matter how trivial. This explanation is plausible and consistent with two opinions expressed by the community leaders we interviewed: that they received substantially more service than they did before the Percinct opened and that the residents were a good deal quicker to report problematic conditions. The explanations is also consistant with the data. As indicated above, the volume of reported serious crimes increased by 4.3%. When the complaints for serious offenses are subtracted from the total volume of crime complaints for the 115th Precinct, it is evident that the number of complaints for lesser offenses, which are more likely to be affected by changed reporting patterns, rose by 50.3% from 5,144 in 1983 to 7,729 in 1984. Thus, what appeared to be an inordinate increase in the crime rate is probably due to a substantial shift in citizen reporting patterns especially for

less serious offenses, rather than enormous increases in the actual volume of criminal activity in the Precinct. The residents of the Precinct appear to be reporting criminal victimizations that they would not have brought to the attention of the police when the areas were patrolled by the 110th and 114th Precincts.

III Arrest Rates for the Seven Major Offense Categories

The volume of arrests and summons are a less abiguous indicator of police activity than is the complaint rate. The police can influence directly the number of arrests made and summons given by becoming more or less active and by setting policies and strategies for the use of arrests and summons in attacking various problems in the community. And, of course, simply increasing the number of police personnel in an area which had been under-serviced is likely to affect the arrest and summons rates.

The number of arrests for the seven major offenses for PBQ, excluding the 115th Precinct, declined by 5.7% from 10,375 in 1983 to 9,788 in 1984. In marked contrast, the volume of these arrest for the 115th Precinct increased by 43.2%, from 549 to 786. As Table 7.2 indicates, the territory comprising 115th Precinct witnessed substantial increases in arrests for robbery, felonious assault, burglary, and grand larceny auto. For example, robbery arrests increased by 111%, felonious assault by 67%, and burglary by 32%.

Table 7.2: Volume of Arrests for 7 Major Offenses, 115th Precinct, 1983 and 1984

Offenses	Arrests		Change	
	1983	1984	N	%
Murder/Manslaughter	8	10	+ 2	+ 25.0%
Forcible Rape	5	8	+ 3	+ 60.0%
Robbery	91	192	+101	+111.0%
Felonious Assault	99	165	+ 66	+ 66.7%
Burglary	95	125	+ 30	+ 31.6%
Grand Larceny	149	136	- 13	- 8.7%
Grand Larceny Auto	102	150	+ 48	+ 47.0%
TOTAL	549	786	+237	+ 43.2%

By comparing the complaint figures in Table 7.1 with the arrest figures in Table 7.2, it is evident that arrests rose sharply in every category except grand larceny, while complaints declined for murder, manslaughter and grand larceny auto and were unchanged for burglary. Moreover, the proportionate increases in arrests for robbery, felonious assault and grand larceny auto were a great deal larger than the proportionate increases in complaints for these offeses.

Another way of assessing police arrest activity is to look at the number of arrests made for each offense as a proportion of the total complaints for that offense. The data presented in Table 7.3 indicate that relatively large gains in this measure were achieved for each of the major offense categories except

grand larceny, in the territory comprising the 115th Precinct. For example, whereas robbery arrests amounted to only 11.5% of the robbery complaint total in 1983, that figure doubled to 23.0% in 1984, producing a relative change of 100%. These figures suggest that in serving the territory covered by the 115th Precinct, the police were notably more productive in making arrests for the seven major offenses than they had been in 1983.

Table 7.3: Arrests as a Percentage of Complaints for Seven Major Offense Categories in the 115th Precinct, 1983 vs. 1984

OFFENSES	1983	1984	AMOUNT OF CHANGE	RELATIVE CHANGE
Murder/Manslaughter	40.0%	55.6%	+15.6%	+39.0%
Forcible Rape	16.7%	21.6%	+4.9%	+29.3%
Robbery	11.5%	23.0%	+11.5%	+100.0%
Felonious Assault	44.4%	54.1%	+9.7%	+21.8%
Burglary	5.9%	7.8%	+1.9%	+32.2%
Grand Larceny	4.9%	4.1%	-0.8%	-16.3%
Grand Larceny Auto	6.1%	9.4%	+3.3%	+54.1%
TOTAL	7.4%	10.2%	+2.8%	+37.8%

IV Summons Activity

The number of summons issued for parking and traffic infractions is another frequently used measure of police productivity. The Department places emphasis on the issuance of these summonses for a number of reasons including, for example, the fact that automobiles that are double-parked impede the flow of traffic and cars parked next to hydrants pose safety hazards. Additionally, illegal parking and moving violations are unlawful activities that can be deterred if parking and traffic laws are vigorously enforced. Finally, summonses are a source of revenue for New York City. Summons statistics should be considered within the context of the magnitude of the problems and the police resources available in an area. For example, it is not appropriate to conclude that, because Precinct X issued the most traffic summonses

in the borough, that Precinct X is therefore the most efficient precinct is dealing with these problems. Rather, it is necessary first to ask: What are the nature and volume of the moving and parking violations problems in this precinct? How many and what types of resources have been deployed to deal with these problems? What are the other problems in this precinct? For example, Precinct X may be devoting a relatively large percentage of its patrol force to issuing traffic summonses but paying insufficient attention to other local problems. In this case, we were not so much comparing the summons activity of precincts as looking for change in the volume of summonses issued in an area after a new precinct was created to service that area.

According to information supplied by the Borough office in Queens, the volume of parking summons issued in PBQ rose 4.8% from 1983 to 1984. By contrast, the volume of parking summons issued in the territory comprising the 115th Precinct rose by 42.8%. In fact, it is estimated that fully one-third of the Borough's productivity gain in this regard was accounted for the volume increase in the 115th Precinct.

Similarly, the number of summonses for moving violations for PBQ rose by 6.3% from 1983 to 1984, while the number of summonses for moving violations in the 115th Precinct rose by 55.9% over the same period. Again, 30% of the Borough's increase was due to the 115th Precinct activities. It should be recalled that the 115th Precinct did not deploy any Summons Units. Rather, all of the officers were expected to become involved in summons

activity. That fact may have contributed to this productivity gain.

V Radio Runs

While the number of radio runs handled by the patrol force is a useful measure of workload, this statistic always underestimates the actual workload of individual units and the patrol force in general. The volume of radio runs is the number of calls for service dispatched by Central Communications plus the number of "pick-up" calls; that is, calls initiated by the officers themselves and reported to Central Communications.* The volume of radio runs is based on the number of incidents to which the police respond, not the total number of police units that respond to an incident. For example, if a call is dispatched for a robbery-in-progress or an officer-in-danger, then three, four, or five units may respond to that call. Nevertheless, regardless of the number of units responding, this incident is recorded as one radio run. Because the volume of radio runs does not include the number of back-up units, it will always underestimate the actual number of jobs that the units are responding to individually or collectively.

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*For example, when a citizen flags down a patrol car and asks the officer to render assistance, the officers call in that they are responding and the incident is recorded at Central Communications as a call-for-service and a radio run.

From 1983 to 1984, the number of radio runs for PBQ, excluding the 115th Precinct, rose by 4.0% from 558,574 to 581,039. In contrast, the number of radio runs for the 115th Precinct increased by 14.6% from 37,964 to 43,494. Again, the increase in the volume of radio runs in the 115th Precinct does not appear to be attributable to deteriorating conditions. Rather, the change seems to be attributable to a greater willingness on the part of the residents to request police assistance.

VI Statistical Changes for the Territory Comprising the 110th, 114th and 115th Precincts

The statistical increases in the arrest and summons activity in the areas comprising the 115th Precinct were impressive. These data indicate that those areas received more intensive service from the new precinct than they did while they were geographically marginal areas within the 110th and 114th Precincts. They leave open, however, the question of whether the total territory covered by the 110th and 114th Precincts in 1983 was more fully serviced by the police through those Precincts in 1984.

To address this question, data were secured from headquarters describing arrests, summons and traffic activity in the 110th and 114th Precincts in 1983 and in each of three Precincts in 1984. The numbers appearing in Table 7.4 for the 115th Precinct are, in part, a function of the declines recorded in the other two precincts. However, in all cases, except the non-traffic summons category, (for which the available statistics were unexplainably unreliable), the 1984 figure for the 115th

Percinct exceeds the aggregate decline for the other two precincts. For example, the felony arrests made in the 115th Precinct were approximately 10% higher than the aggregate decline in felony arrests for the 110th and 114th Precincts. The number of sommonses given for traffic infraction in the 115th Precinct in 1984 was 62% higher than the aggregate decline in the other two precincts. These data indicate that the level of activity in the territory comprising the 110th and 114th Precincts was really and substantially increased by the opening of the 115th Precinct in 1984. A measure of that increase is provided by adding the figures for the two precincts in 1983 and comparing the results with the aggregate for the three precincts in 1984. That comparison is presented in Table 7.5.

Table 7.4: Arrest Summons and Traffic Enforcement Activity in the 110th, 114th, and 115th Precincts during 1983 and 1984

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	110th 1983	110th 1984	114th 1983	114th 1984	115th 1984
Felony Arrests	1,564	937	1,668	1,149	1,260
Misdemeanor Arrests	1,709	1,236	1.048	893	1,096
Violation Arrests	23	26	89	30	67
Non-Traffic Summons	3,450	2,795	4,622	3,064	1,712
Traffic Infractions	25,693	19,892	17,678	12,780	17,419
Parking Summons	72,102	62,105	57,724	43,233	39,338

Table 7.5: Arrest Summons and Traffic Enforcement Activity for the Whole Territory

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	1983	1984	% CHANGE
Felony Arrests	3,232	3.346	+3.5%
Misdemeanor Arrests	2,757	3.225	+17.0%
Violation Arrests	112	123	+9.8%
Non-Traffic Summons	8,072	7,571	-6.2%
Traffic Infractions	43,371	50,089	+15.5%
Parking Summons	129,826	144,676	+11.4%

The decline in the "non-traffic summons" category seems to be a statistical antifact and some of that decline is reflected in the very large increase in "misdemeanor arrests". The increase in police activity regarding traffic and parking is particularly evident and, again, may be partially attributed to the decision in the 115th Precinct to use all patrol officers for this function.

VII Increased Services and Increased Personnel

That the Police Department produced more services for the people residing within the boundaries of the 115th Precinct seems clear. What is not clear is the extent to which those service gains were a product of the increased number of sworn personnel assigned to the area, or of increased unit productivity by the officers working there.

Table 7.6: Sworn Personnel Assigned to the 110th, 114th and 115th Precincts as of July 1, 1983 and July 1, 1984

PRECINCT	1983	1984
110th	203	167
114th	192	169
115th	---	160
TOTAL	395	496

Table 7.6 indicates that the total number of sworn personnel assigned to the whole territory was increased by 101 persons, or 25.6%, from 1983 to 1984. Using the number assigned on a given day is merely a statistical convenience. In fact, the number of officers actually working in the precincts fluctuates from day to day. Moreover, these numbers include officers of all ranks, assigned to the range of tasks including precinct administration. They do not describe only those assigned to patrol, nor do they permit a determination of the net increase in the number of patrol units deployed during various tours. Such refined data would be more appropriate for the estimating unit productivity since the vast majority of radio runs, arrests, summons, and traffic enforcement activity is performed by the patrol force, including the anit-crime units.

Nevertheless, we attempted to estimate the levels of unit productivity by dividing the activity figures presented in Table 7.4 by the personnel assigned figures presented in Table 7.6. For this purpose, we excluded the "non-traffic summonses" category because of the unreliable figure for the 115th Precinct. Table 7.7 presents the per person productivity figures for each of the precincts during 1983 and 1984.

Table 7.7: Per Person Productivity in Various Activity Categories, by Precinct and Year

TYPE OF ACTIVITY	1983		1984		
	110th	114th	110th	114th	115th
Felony Arrests	7.7	8.7	5.6	6.8	7.9
Misdemeanor Arrests	8.4	5.5	7.4	5.3	6.9
Violation Arrests	0.11	0.46	0.16	0.18	0.42
Traffic Infractions	126.6	92.1	119.1	75.6	108.9
Parking Summons	355.2	300.6	371.9	255.8	245.9

Since these are not the most appropriate data for estimating productivity, we confine our inferences to two. It is eveident that the figures for the 110th and 114th Precincts fell off some after the new precinct was opened. We do not know, however, how the new figures compare with those for other Queens precincts. The adjustments may have brought the 110th and 114th down from unusually high levels.

It is also evident that the unit productivity figures for the 115th Precinct compare favorably with those for the other two in 1984. In fact, per person felony arrests in the 115th Precinct were higher than in either of the other two precincts, and the parking summons figure was almost identical with that for the 114th Precinct.

The matter of unit productivity is of some importance in relation to the managerial changes introduced in the 115th

Precinct. For that reason, it would be wise to pursue it further with more appropriate types of data for a wider array of precincts.

VIII Absenteeism

The steady tour system was instituted on the belief that if the officers worked steady shifts they would feel healthier and actually be healthier than if they were working rotating shifts. One measure of the general health of the officers is the absenteeism rate.

The Department measures absenteeism for a precinct as the average number of "person-days" lost per year. This rate is simply the total number of days lost due to illness or line-of-duty injuries divided by the number of officers assigned to the command. For 1984, the average number of person-days lost for Patrol Borough Queens was 8.01. The 115th Precinct had the lowest absenteeism rate in PBQ, that is, 4.9 person-days per year. This rate was 38.8% lower than the PBQ average. Additionally, the Queens precinct with the second lowest absentee rate was the 109th with an absentee rate of 5.89 person-days per year. The absentee rate for the 109th, while much lower than the Borough average, was still 20.2% higher than the 115th. This finding suggests that the steady tour system and perhaps the other changes in the 115th Precinct does in fact reduce officer absenteeism.

One rather unexpected finding is that the 115th Precinct also had the lowest civilian absentee rate in the Borough-- 10.1

person-days per year compared to a Borough average of 14.13 person-days. In this regard, it must be noted that the precinct with second lowest civilian absenteeism rate was again the 109th with an average civilian absentee rate of 11.14 person-days per year. Since civilians in all Queens precincts work steady tours, the unusually how reate in the 115th Precinct may reflect higher civilian morale brought about by the management innovations.

IX RMP Accidents

In 1984, patrol officers from the 115th Precinct were involved in 32 line-of-duty RMP accidents-- the second highest accident rate in Patrol Borough Queens. The 107th Precinct with 34 accidents had the highest rate in Queens.

The accident rate in the 115th Precinct was particularly high during the first months of precinct operations. Although no officers or civilians were seriously injured in these accidents, the squad cars were often severely damaged, and in some cases demolished. When all of the RMPs were functioning, the Precinct was able to field 11 RMPs on the evening tour, for example. However, there were points in the spring of 1984 when only six squad could be deployed, because the remaining RMPs were being repaired. To increase the number of available units, the patrol sergeants and platoon commanders borrowed RMPs from neighboring precincts or Borough-based task forces.

The shortage of RMPs and the causes of the accidents were a constant source of concern to Precinct personnel and Patrol Borough Queens. When we asked the patrol officers, the super-

visors, and the Commanding Officer about the reasons for the accidents, we were given a number of explanations. One of the most commonly stated speculations was that the officers assigned to the 115th Precinct were very young and very inexperienced. As a result, they enjoyed the excitement of blaring the siren and racing across the Precinct on calls that were not high priority cases. Other respondents noted that many of the officers were from Long Island and that they were not accustomed to the difficulties in driving in urban areas. Others stated that several of the officers had never even had a driver's license until they joined the Police Department and therefore they were very inexperienced drivers. It is probable that all of these factors contributed to the high accident rate for this command.

In the early months of Precinct operations, there were no consistent policies regarding how officers involved these accidents were to be treated. In general, each case was treated on its individual merits. If the Precinct investigation revealed that the officer was not responsible for the accident then he or she was allowed to return to patrol. For example, in one incident, an RMP was stopped at a red light and the RMP was "rear-ended" by a civilian in an unregistered car. However, if it was determined that the officer was at fault then the officer was "grounded" and assigned to station house duty for ten or more days depending on the seriousness of the accident.

In the fall of 1984, the Commanding Officer of the 115th Precinct instituted a policy that all officers involved in acci-

dents were to be grounded for thirty days. Shortly thereafter, Patrol Borough Queens, in response to rising accidents rates in most precincts in the Borough and the City issued an order requiring that all officers involved in accidents were to be grounded for thirty days regardless of whether they were responsible for the accident.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

The decision to open a new precinct flowed from the Department's desire to provide more and better services to a segment of the Queens population. The 115th Precinct combined areas that had previously been covered by the 110th and 114th Precincts. This research report provides much evidence that this objective was achieved.

The residents of the Precinct expressed generally positive perceptions of and attitudes toward the police both before the Precinct opened and after it had been operating for about a year. However, there were significant increases in the proportion of those residents who thought that conditions in the community were improving; crime rates were dropping; police personnel were more visible; police services were more extensive and the general quality of such service had improved over the preceding year.

Community leaders were even more generous in their assessments. They identified several specific problems that had been eliminated or alliveated since the Precinct opened and they found the police to be a great deal more sensitive to and more quickly responsive to the needs of the people. They thought the problems of crime were a bit less severe and that people were generally more willing to bring their concerns to the attention of the police because they had significantly more confidence that they would receive the help they sought. Indeed, they expressed the

belief that this increased police attention had encouraged more residents to become involved in a whole range of community activities.

Statistical indicators also reflect the increased levels of service provided to the residents of the 115th Precinct. Although crime complaints for the seven major offenses increased by a little more than 4% for that territory from 1983 to 1984, the volume of complaints for lesser offenses rose by 50% over the same period. While these figures may or may not reflect some real increase in amount of criminal behavior in the area, it certainly reflects a greater willingness on the part of the citizens to report and the patrol force to discover apparently criminal incidents.

The volume of arrests made in the 115th Precinct for the seven major offenses increased by over 40% from 1983 to 1984. The ratios of arrests to complaints for these offenses increased sharply over the year, while over 40% more parking summonses and 55% more summonses for moving violations were issued and over 14% more radio runs were made in the territory comprising the 115th Precinct.

Thus, the citizens' belief that they received considerably more service from the police since they were given "their own" precinct is demonstrably so. The complaint statistics do not support their belief that the crime rate had dropped, but the significant increases in arrests and the greater visibility and responsiveness of the police in general are probably related to

the residents' and leaders' contention that crime was less of a problem in the community than it has been.

The operations and structure of the 115th Precinct contained some innovative elements which related to the additional objectives which the Department established for this "experiment". All of the sworn personnel were volunteers, all worked on steady tours of their choosing, and responsibility and authority for directing precinct operations was effectively delegated to three lieutenants, each of which served as permanent platoon commander for one of the three tours. The Department hoped that this configuration of changes would help reduce the level of stress experienced by police officers, make precinct management more effective and efficient and maintain acceptable levels of performance and productivity. This research indicates that the Department did fairly well with respect to these objectives.

The literature suggests that the potential for danger and for encountering repulsive situations are not the major sources of officer stress that the general public believes them to be. Rather, the officers' perception of the criminal justice system as unsupportive to their efforts and of the police department as arbitrary, authoritarian and excessively bureaucratic are the principal sources of job-related frustration for them. Rotating shifts, however, are an important source of frustration. They are at once a product of the bureaucracy and a persistent of the officer's daily work experience. Moreover, frequent rotation im-

poses strain on the body's capacity to adjust its biological clock. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that a significant change in shift rotation schedule would reduce job frustration and other indicators of stress.

This research confirms the generalization that the criminal justice system and the bureaucratic characteristics of police organization are the chief sources of job frustration. It also confirms the finding that shift rotation is one of the more stressful characteristics of the job.

More to the point, statistically significant reductions in job frustration scores among the officer's of the 115th Precinct, coupled with an absence of such changes among officers in a randomly selected comparison group, suggest that the program in the new precinct did reduce stress levels to some extent. That conclusion is strengthened by the fact that significantly fewer officers in the 115th Precinct complained of experiencing various physical symptoms of stress at the end of the research period than did so immediately before the Precinct opened. The stress reduction effect of the program is inferred also from the enormously increased percentage of experimentals who expressed the belief that their duty charts had positive effects on seventeen selected aspects of their personal lives. No such changes were observed among the comparison group.

Perhaps the most provocative findings of the research, however, relate to the managerial changes embodied in the platoon commander concept. Based on interviews with the Precinct's Com-

manding Officer, the lieutenants, sergeants and sample of patrol officers, the use of platoon commanders permanently assigned to the same tour and directing the activities of the same sergeants and patrol officers appears to offer a number of important managerial advantages. These include: a reduced span of control for the CO and a simplified chain of command at all levels; more clearly defined responsibility, authority and accountability; a meaningful role for lieutenants to reclaim what is widely referred to elsewhere in the Department as "the lost rank"; more efficient and effective deployment of resources; and an improved capacity to supervise and discipline subordinate personnel.

The only disadvantage which emerged from our interviews was the tendency for the 115th to operate as three precincts rather than one. Even while a number of interviewees noted this perception, they hastened to add their belief that it was not a "serious" problem, that it was manageable and that it was more than offset by the numerous advantages of the fixed platoon concept.

Of course, to be acceptable mangaement, changes must also satisfy various productivity criteria. A careful, systematic assessment of this issue was beyond the scope of this research. Our emphasis was on measuring the effects on stress and community perceptions and observing how the Precinct personnel reacted to the new management system. Nevertheless, we did analyze data that relate to these concerns.

As previously indicated, there was a substantial increase in the volume of services provided to the people residing in the

115th Precinct. This was not simply a redistribution of the level of service previously offered in the 110th and 114th Precincts. Acitivity indicators for that whole territory were up sharply from 1983 to 1984. For example, felony arrests increased by 3.5%, misdemeanor arrests by 17.0%, violation arrests by 9.8%, summons for traffic infractions by 15.5% and summonses for illegal parking by 11.4%

In short, the opening of the new precinct produced a real and substantial increase in the services provided in the area that was encompassed by the 110th and 114th Precincts in 1983. The principal beneficiaries of this service were the people residing within the boundaries of the newly formed 115th Precinct. At the same time, the number of sworn police personnel assigned to the whole territory was increased by an estimated 25% from 1983 to 1984. Therefore, we attempted to assess the effect of the new precinct on the per-person productivity levels in the area.

Although the data available for this purpose were crude and our methods rudimentary, it appears that productivity levels in the 115th Precinct compared favorably with those for the 110th and 114th in 1984. For example, the 115th ranked higher than the other two with respect to the number of felony arrests per sworn person, and it ranked second with respect to the per-person levels of misdemeanor arrests and traffic infractions summonses. Although it was third with respect to the number of parking summonses issues per sworn person, its level was only slightly lower than that for the 114th Precinct.

In conclusion, we find much to recommend that the Department arrange to extend the innovations introduced in the 115th Precinct to other precincts. In this regard, it is important to note that the managerial benefits experienced in the 115th Precinct would almost surely be less evident if the Department tried to introduce the platoon commander system into a precinct operating on the normal 9 squad rotational chart. This is because the continuity of personnel and supervision probably contributes as much to the mangagement benefits as does the increased responsibility and authority of the lieutenant.

Should such an expansion be undertaken, it should be designed to permit a careful analysis of the efforts of these managerial changes or what the Department considers its most useful indicators of precinct and officer performance and productivity.

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APPENDIX C

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE 115th PRECINCT COMMUNITY ATTITUDES SURVEY

Introduction

In designing the strategies to be employed in conducting the two community attitude surveys, Vera staff had to consider and make decisions regarding a number of methodological and logistical problems. Obviously, we wanted to minimize the time, expense, and complexity involved in conducting this phase of the research without sacrificing the reliability and validity of the results. This methodological note describes the most important issues considered and the rationale behind various decisions that were made.

I. Survey Technique

A. Telephone Versus In-Person Interviews

The Vera Institute considered and decided against using in-person interviews because the survey would be conducted in Queens, and it was believed that residents would be reluctant to open their doors to strangers. This, in turn, would result in a very high refusal rate. Additionally, in-person interviews are expensive because the interviewer must be paid for the time spent trying to contact potential respondents and there are also the travel costs. Moreover, given that we intended to use a short and very straightforward questionnaire requiring little elabora-

tion by the respondent, the telephone survey approach seemed to be the most effective and least expensive technique available.

B. Sample Size

The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment had used a survey sample of 300 residents and 300 business establishments. Given the costs, time-constraints, the number 300 was deemed adequate for the purposes of this survey. Additionally, it was anticipated that an N of 300 would be large enough for cross-tabular analysis. Moreover, in polling of this type, the critical element is not the size of the sample, but its randomness.

C. Selection of Sampling Frame

Because we were using residential telephones as our survey technique we were already committed to using the "household" as at least one measure of representativeness. Our objective was to obtain a random sample of households in the precinct.

There are two principle limitations to telephone surveys: 1) there is a small percentage of households that do not have telephones, and 2) there is some percentage of households that do not have listed phone numbers; that is, these numbers cannot be obtained from the annual directory or the Coles Reverse Directory. Thus, there is a certain portion of households which are automatically excluded from eligibility in the survey because they are inaccessible.

Frey (1983) in discussing the problems posed by persons who do not have telephones described the situation as follows:

> Nonsubscribers are especially a problem in rural and inner city areas. While we have little information on the characteristics of nonsubscribers, what we do know suggests that these persons are predictably unattached, young members of minorities, and renters. (pp. 35-36)

Frey then indicated that according to the 1980 census, 96% of all households now have telephones, but a far more serious problem is posed by unlisted numbers. Citing previous studies, Frey explained that in urban areas the unlisted rate is about 27%, and:

> There is ample evidence to demonstrate that those with unlisted numbers differ on a number of characteristics from those with published phone numbers. Those with unlisted numbers tend to be younger, have lower incomes, and live in urban areas. They are also non-white, non-joiners, enters, and less educated... Obviously, the differences are too significant for those with unlisted numbers to be overlooked in any probability sampling procedure. (Ibid, p62).

It is difficult to determine how many telephones in a given area are unlisted. Telephone numbers are not assigned according to precinct, community districts, or any other clearly definable areas. Additionally, the telephone company is reluctant to give out this type of information. Nevertheless, when Vera contacted the Public Relations Department of the New York Telephone Company, we learned that 30% of the residential and business telephones for the entire borough of Queens are unlisted. We do not know what number or portion of these unlisted telephones are in the 115th Precinct.

One technique for overcoming the problems posed by unlisted numbers is to use Random Digit Dialing. The key to suc-

cessful use of this technique is the exchange-- the first three digits of a local telephone number. While exchanges are assigned to specific areas and neighborhoods, the boundaries of the exchange bear no relationship to precinct boundaries. Thus, one exchange may be shared by two or more precincts. Vera ruled out the possibility of using Random Digit Dialing for two reasons: First, using this system, a number of commercial establishments would be contacted-- and businesses were not to be included in this survey. Thus, much time and effort would have been expended contacting ineligible people. Secondly, using this system would have meant that before an interview could be conducted it would have been necessary to determine whether the potential respondent actually lived in the 115th Precinct. It would be necessary to ask them their address (information that they may be reluctant to reveal). Another method would be to ask them, for example, whether they lived north or south of a particular intersection or avenue. The respondents may find it difficult to orient themselves to that location and as a result some participants who could have been included in the survey would be ruled out while others who actually lived in the 110th or 114th Precinct would be included. In short, this method is time-consuming, complicated, expensive, and error-prone. Given these constraints, it was clear that Random Digit Dialing methods would be inappropriate for this survey. It was therefore necessary to rely on numbers published in a directory, despite the fact that those with unlisted numbers would be lost to our survey.

D. Selecting A Sample

Vera hired the marketing research firm of Kane, Parsons, and Associates to identify the sample and to conduct the interviews. The sampling techniques used are described below.

In surveys of this type there is a fairly high refusal rate-- usually about 40%. Many people simply do not want to be bothered; others are "too busy" and tell the interviewer to call back later and then they are not at home or have changed their minds about participating in the survey. In other cases, the telephone goes unanswered or it has been disconnected. To obtain a final sample of 300 completed interviews, a list was drawn up containing 900 telephone numbers. The list was obtained using the Cole's Reverse Directory for Queens. Unlike the standard telephone book which lists subscribers alphabetically, the Cole's Directory lists telephone numbers according to address. All of the streets in Queens are listed alphabetically, block by block, followed by the address, name, telephone number for each household and in the case of multiple listings per household, the name and telephone number of each subscriber.

The first step in developing a sampling frame (the population of households from which the sample would be drawn) was to go through the Cole's Directory to identify all streets and blocks located within the 115th Precinct. These clusters of

listings were then measured off in "column inches", and each inch was assigned a number sequentially beginning with "1" for the first inch of precinct streets beginning with the letter "A". There were 2976 column inches of 115th Precinct listings. A table of random numbers was then used to select 300 "sample points". For example, if the number 566 was chosen from the random number table, then the interviewer referred to "column inch" numbered 566 and the first three residential numbers listed at that sampling point were selected. In the case of multiple listings for one household, the first number was selected. For sampling points where there appeared to be a high proportion of Hispanic residents, six to ten numbers were selected, because it was anticipated that there would be a disproportionately high refusal rate in a Hispanic community. Thus, the pool of respondents was drawn using random sampling methods. Each household with a listed telephone number had an equal chance of being included in the survey.

E. Developing the Questionnaire

Vera staff reviewed questionnaires that had been used by other researchers interested in citizen's perception of crime, community problems, and police efficiency. Because we intended to use a telephone survey, we wanted to construct a questionnaire that could be answered in 15 to 20 minutes. We also wanted a well structured questionnaire that elicited the respondent's opinions without inviting the respondent to tell anecdotes or stray from the questions asked. Because we anticipated a certain

number of Spanish-speaking respondents, we also developed a Spanish version of the questionnaire. The instrument used was adapted from a number of other surveys, particularly the questionnaire used by the Police Foundation in their evaluation of the Newark Foot Patrol experiment, and appears as Appendix B of this report.

F. Administering the Questionnaire

Kane, Parsons and Associates hired ten interviewers, including two Spanish-speaking interviewers, to administer the questionnaire. Vera staff attended the training sessions for the interviewers. At these meetings, the purpose of the survey was explained and each question was discussed in detail. The questionnaire was constructed such that the interviewer simply had to circle a number indicating the respondent's answers. Thus, the interviewers were not required to interpret what the respondent said. The system left little room for error.

Each interviewer was given 30 questionnaires. On the front of each questionnaire was a list of three or sometimes six households with the name of the household, the address and the telephone number. The interviewers were instructed to make three attempts to obtain an interview from the first household on the list. If an interview could not be obtained then the interviewers called the second household on the list. In practice, the results may be as follows: The interviewer makes his first attempt to contact Household X at 10:04 a.m. and there is no answer. He calls back at 6:06 p.m. and the line is busy. He then

calls back at 7:17 p.m. and the respondent refuses to participate in the survey. He then contacts the second household and finds out that that number is no longer in service. He contacts the third household and on the first try completes the interview. The only exception to this procedure occurred when the respondent was willing to participate in the survey but was Spanish-speaking. In these situations the initial interviewer contacted Kane Parsons and the interview was assigned to a Spanish-speaking interviewer.

The first wave of interviews were conducted in November and December, 1983, and the second in November and December, 1984, and January, 1985.

G. Selecting A Respondent: Sample Adjustment

In August, 1983, during the planning phase of this project, Vera staff met with Dr. Wayne Parsons of Kane, Parsons and Associates to discuss criteria for selecting a respondent in a household of two or more adults. We agreed that an "adult" would be defined as a person at least 18 years old. At that meeting it was noted that women tend to answer the telephone far more often than men, regardless of whether a man is home at the time. Thus, if the first adult to answer the telephone were chosen as our selection criteria, the vast majority of the respondents would be women. Because this procedure might introduce bias into the sample, it was agreed that a technique known as the "next birthday" rule would be used. In this system, the person who answers the telephone is asked which adult in the household has

the next birthday and that person is designated as the respondent. While this technique serves to increase the number of male respondents and to compensate to some extent for sex differences in telephone-answering patterns, it is not without limitations. If the household consists of one adult, then that person by default is designated the respondent regardless of gender. Similarly, if a household does not include any adult men, then the designated respondent will be female. In sum, even using this technique it is still possible to obtain a sample in which women respondents are overrepresented.

Another method for choosing a respondent is to ask for the head of the household. This method was rejected because it would likely result in a sample of respondents with an average age much higher than the general adult population. Other methods for selecting a respondent such as using stratified sampling within age groups were considered and rejected because of their complexity. The "next birthday" rule seemed to be a suitable technique for designating respondents.

In early November, 1983, Vera staff reviewed the first 100 questionnaires returned to Kane, Parsons and it became clear that the sample consisted of a disproportionate number of elderly people. (Census data indicated that approximately 25% of the households in the Precinct were headed by elderly persons.) In discussing these findings, Dr. Parsons, noted that these were the "early returns" and that they represented households that could be contacted on the first or second telephone call. He explained

that because the elderly tend to stay indoors, they are relatively easy to contact by telephone. Nevertheless, it was agreed that tallies of the age of the respondents would be kept by Kane Parsons and that the final sample would consist of no more than 100 persons aged 60 or older. As a result, no more than one-third of the sample would consist of the elderly.

Additionally, at the end of November, it became clear that women were heavily overrepresented in the sample, despite the use of the "next birthday" rule. Specifically, at that point 69% of the respondents were female and only 31% were male. Demographic data pertaining to the adult population of the precinct indicated that 55% of the adult population were female and 45% were male. It was then decided that Kane Parsons should aim for a final sample consisting of 50% men and 50% women.

These concerns about the age and gender of the respondents did not influence the data collection process until the very end. When approximately 260 of the 300 interviews had been completed, a tally was made and then the interviewers were instructed to screen subsequent households on the basis of the age of the respondent and whether there was an adult male in the household who would participate in the survey. The use of these two additional screening criteria resulted in the rejection of only 16 households that would otherwise have been eligible for participation in the survey. Thus, these last-minute adjustments to compensate for age and gender overrepresentation were successful and altered only slightly the distribution that would have been

obtained without these modifications in the screening procedures. The same procedures were used in conducting the Time II interviews and the results were similar. In sum, the sampling bias does not appear to be attributable to the methods used in defining the samples, selecting the respondents, or administering the questionnaires.

II. Racial/Ethnic Composition of the Population and Samples.

Race/ethnicity was the third criterion variable implemented to test our samples. To do so we had to estimate the distribution of households in the Precinct by the racial/ethnic identification of the head of household.

The Census Bureau defines a household as "a housing unit occupied by one or more persons no matter what their relationship." They then distinguish between "family" and "non-family" households. Family households are defined as "a housing unit with at least two persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption." A non-family unit is any other configuration: persons living alone, common-law relationships, six unrelated people sharing an apartment, or any other non-family combination.

In the 115th Precinct, according to the 1980 Census, there were 122,187 persons comprising a total of 48,262 households. The average number of persons per family household was 3.18, while the average number of persons per non-family households was 2.52.

Census data can be used to describe the varied distribution of the population and the household in the 115th Precinct. How-

ever, the racial/ethnic categories used by the Census do not separately identify Hispanic persons or households. The Census data revealed that there were 48,262 households in the 115th Precinct, and that 12,284 of those were Hispanic.

The New York City Planning Commission, on the other hand, provided us with the desired racial/ethnic breakdown of the Precinct population shown in Table I.

TABLE I: Ethnic/Racial Composition of the Population of the 115th Precinct

Race/Ethnicity	N	%
White	51,063	41.8%
Black	32,099	18.9%
Hispanic	39,094	32.0%
Other	9,031	7.3%
TOTAL	122,287	100.0%

Using the data from both the Census Bureau and the Planning Commission we estimated the racial/ethnic distribution of households in the 115th Precinct as follows:

(a) Census data indicated that there were a total of 48,262 households, of which 12,284 were Hispanic.

(b) Census data also indicated that the average household size for whites and blacks in the 115th Precinct was 2.1 persons and 2.6 persons respectively.

(c) By dividing those averages into the total population figures for both races, (51,063 and 32,099, respectively), we estimated the numbers of white and black households in the Precinct.

(d) Finally, by adding the white, black, and Hispanic figures and subtracting the sum from the total number of households, we derived the number of households that should be classified as "other". The resulting distribution is shown in Table II.

TABLE II: Estimated Ethnic/Racial Composition of Households in the 115th Precinct

Race/Ethnicity	N	%
White	24,316	50.4%
Black	8,884	18.4%
Hispanic	12,284	25.5%
Other	2,778	5.7%
TOTAL	48,262	100.0%

The racial/ethnic distribution of the Time I and Time II samples is presented in Table III.

TABLE III: Race/Ethnicity of Respondents at Time I and Time II

Race/Ethnicity	N	%	N	%
White	194	64.7	165	55.0
Black	55	18.3	56	18.7
Hispanic	40	13.3	61	20.3
Other	9	3.0	11	3.7
Refused	2	0.7	7	2.3
TOTAL	300	100.0%	300	100.0%

It is evident that whites were significantly over-represented at Time I (64.7% vs. 50.4%) and Hispanics were significantly under-represented (13.3% vs. 25.5%). This pattern applied as weel to the sample at Time II. Although the extent of over and under representation was much less, it was still statistically significant.

The procedure used in conducting the first survey were consistent and devoid of any obvious bias. A review of those procedures, however, led to the conclusion that an unusually large number of potential Hispanic respondents were lost either because of insurmountable language problems when the first contact was made, or because the would-be respondent was not available when the return call was made by a Spanish-speaking interviewer. Therefore, when the second survey was being planned, the consulting firm hired a larger number of Spanish-speaking interviewers. As a result, the disproportionate representations were corrected although not eliminated entirely when compared with racial distribution of households in the Precinct. We are inclined to believe that the remaining discrepancy reflects the likely fact that Hispanic people are somewhat under-respresented in the population of those who have registered phone numbers; that is, the population from which the samples were drawn.

Nevertheless, we have two samples which differ significantly from one another with respect to racial/ethnic composition. Moreover, those differences could effect the distribution of responses to various questions. Since the majority of the Hispanics in the community tend to be poor, minority group members, and since this general literature indicates that the poor and minority group members tend to perceive and value the police less favorably than do white, middle class persons, one might expect that our samples would produce a rosier assessment of community conditions and police services than the people of the community actually felt.

The data presented in Chapter IV indicate, however, that such an assumption about the direction of Hispanic opinion would be incorrect with respect to this research. For example, a higher percentage of Hispanics than of blacks or whites believed that neighborhood conditions were getting better at both Time I and Time II; a higher percentage of Hispanics thought community crime rates were decreasing at both points in time; and at Time I, a higher proportion of Hispanics saw improvement in the quality of police services.

These data suggest that if Hispanics were more adequately represented in our study samples, the effect of positive change in community perceptions and assessments would have been even greater than those described in Chapter IV.

III. Rates of Response, Non-Contact, Completion, and Refusal

There are four interrelated measures that are used to determine the extent to which the researcher has succeeded in identifying and contacting potential respondents: response rates, non-contact rates, completion rates, and refusal rates.

The response rate is the most conservative measure of efficiency because it is simply the ratio between the total number of households that the researcher attempted to contact and the percentage of households that actually participated in the study. The response rate for both of the community attitude surveys was relatively low-- 54.6% at Time I and 45.0% at Time II. Specifically, it was necessary to attempt to contact 549

households at Time I and 666 at Time II in order to obtain 300 completed interviews for each survey.

The response rate does not take into consideration the percentage of households that are inaccessible because the telephone is out of service or no one answers the telephone despite repeated callbacks. The percentage of inaccessible households is referred to as the non-contact rate. The non-contact rate in these two samples was relatively high: 98 respondents, 17.9%, of the households were inaccessible at Time I, as were 120, or 18.0%, at Time II.

Thus, at Time I, 451 households were actually contacted by an interviewer, (that is, someone answered the phone), while at Time II that number was 546.

The completion rate is a better measure of efficiency than the response rate because it is based on the number of households that the researcher actually contacted. The completion rate for Time I was 66.5% and 55.0% for Time II.

The difference between the number of respondents contacted and the number of interviewers completed consists of: 1) those households that were reached but were ineligible for study because the respondent had not lived in the 115th Precinct for a year or more or the respondent did not speak enough English to complete the interview, (13.1% of contacts in Time I and 21.6% in Time II); and 2) those households in which the respondent refused to participate in the study, (20.4% in Time I and 23.4% in Time II.).

APPENDIX A

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
30 East 39th Street
New York, N.Y. 10016

115th Precinct Evaluation

PARTICIPANT DATA FORM

Research Identification Number _____

Please answer the following questions:

Marital Status: (please circle)

Single Married Separated Widowed Divorced

If married, number of children _____

Total number of persons in your household: _____

Do you: ___ Own your own home

___ Rent an apartment

___ Live with parents

___ Other: please describe

Do you hold a second job(s)? _____ If yes, how many hours per week? _____

If you are married, does your spouse work? _____

What county do you live in? _____

How long does it take you to get to work? _____

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE POLICE OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE Research I.D. No. _____

I. Please place a check in the box which best describes the degree to which each of the following aspects of your job in the Police Department bothers you.

THIS BOTHERS ME:	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	FREQUENTLY
1. Actions by top-level police administrators, such as: policies and decisions effecting how I work; lack of support; favoritism; etc.			
2. Actions of immediate supervisors, such as: enforcement of department rules; decisions affecting how I work; lack of support; favoritism; etc.			
3. Department investigations or disciplinary actions that seem unfair or overly harsh.			
4. Lack of recognition for the good work I perform.			
5. Different bosses expecting different things from me.			
6. Matters regarding my salary.			
7. Promotional practices in the Police Department.			
8. Partner assignments.			
9. Rotating shifts.			
10. Frequent changes in the duties I am assigned to.			
11. Being bored or isolated on assignments.			
12. Being overloaded on assignments -- too many jobs during the tour.			
13. Doing non-police jobs that should be done by someone else.			
14. People expecting me to do things that I don't have the power to do.			
15. Not being able to help people who really need help.			
16. Dangerous situations on patrol.			
17. Repulsive situations on patrol (fatal accidents, battered children, dead bodies, etc.)			
18. Hearing about injuries or deaths of fellow police officers.			
19. The bureaucracy of the Police Department (the paper work; the petty regulations, the multitude of procedures, etc.)			
20. The performance evaluation system in the Police Department.			
21. Fellow police officers who goof off or aren't competent.			
22. Civilians doing jobs that used to be done by police officers.			
23. Equipment that is faulty or insufficient.			

THIS BOTHERS ME:	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	FREQUENTLY
24. Insults that I personally receive from citizens.			
25. Public criticism of police, including civilian complaints.			
26. Police union problems. (P.B.A.)			
27. Political pressure from outside the Police Department.			
28. Court situations in which the police are put-down.			
29. Decisions by the Appellate or Supreme Courts which restrict police actions.			
30. Criminal justice system leniency or inefficiency.			

II. Please complete the following statement:

I feel major pressures in my life right now, stemming from: (check all that apply)

___ Financial problems.

___ Problems concerning children or parents or other relatives.

___ Overloaded - extra job(s)

___ Overloaded - attending school

___ Love problems.

___ Marital problems

___ Retirement worries

___ Drinking problems

___ Worries about the health or safety of myself or someone else

___ Other: (Please Describe)

___ I DO NOT feel any pressures in my life at this time.

III. Please check the response which best describes how you feel about being a police officer.

___ I greatly enjoy being a police officer.

___ I like being a police officer.

___ I neither like nor dislike being a police officer.

___ I dislike being a police officer.

___ I strongly dislike being a police officer.

IV. Please indicate if you have had any of the following health problems during the past three months by placing a check next to the problem described.

___ Frequent headaches

___ Frequent stomach/intestinal problems

___ More than one cold or flu

___ Frequent muscle pains and stiffness

___ High blood pressure

___ Trouble with sleeping

___ Boredom, the "blahs", depressed

___ Feel keyed-up, tense

___ Feel argumentative, easily annoyed

___ Other problem (please describe)

___ None of the above.

V. Please answer the following questions:

1. What kind of hours do you work in your current assignment?

___ Rotating tours on the 9 Squad Chart.

___ Other rotating tours.

___ Steady tours.

2. What kind of effect does working these hours have on each of the following aspects of your life?

(In answering, please use the following code by placing the number which best describes how those hours affected that aspect of your life in the box to the left of each item.)

Code: 1 = Very Negative
2 = Somewhat Negative
3 = No Effect
4 = Somewhat Positive
5 = Very Positive
6 = Does Not Apply

	Recreation		Eating habits		Friendships with other police officers
	Family life		Ability to stay alert		Friendships with people who aren't police officers
	Sleep		Social life		Ability to deal with household chores
	Holidays		General energy level		Ability to perform personal errands
	Digestion		Ability to hold a second job		Ability to go to school
	Sex life		Child care arrangements		Other: (describe)

VI. Please complete the following statement:

Among my three closest friends who are police officers, I have noticed: (check all that apply)

___ Excessive worrying

___ Sudden changes in their behavior

___ Losing control of their tempers

___ Problems with their neighbors

___ Increased moodiness

___ Problems with their spouses

___ Excessive alcohol use

___ Excessive medication use (tranquilizers, energizers, sleeping pills, etc.)

___ Problems with their children

___ Excessive complaining

___ Other (Please Describe)

___ None of the above.

VII. Please complete the following statement by placing a check in the appropriate box.

I find that doing the following helps to relieve the pressures I sometimes feel as a result of my job as a police officer:	NEVER	SOMETIMES	FREQUENTLY
1. I find that talking things over with my spouse or a close friend helps to relieve the pressures.			
2. I find that exercise (jogging, etc.) really helps me to wind down.			
3. I find that putting the job out of my mind after work really helps best. I rarely talk about the job to my spouse or other close friends.			
4. I find that having a drink or two after work really helps me to unwind.			
5. I try to keep things in perspective and not let the pressures of the job get to me.			
6. I find that working around the house or on my car helps to relieve the pressures of the day.			
7. I find that watching television helps me to unwind after a tough day.			
8. I find that reading, or listening to music, or engaging in a hobby helps me to relax.			
9. I find that playing with the kids or engaging in other family activities really helps me to put aside the pressures of the job.			
10. Other(s): Please describe.			

VIII. PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ONLY IF YOU ARE MARRIED OR ARE LIVING IN A MARRIED-TYPE RELATIONSHIP.

1. How do you think that your mate feels about your being a police officer?

___ My mate greatly enjoys the fact that I am a police officer.

___ My mate likes my being a police officer.

___ My mate neither likes nor dislikes my being a police officer.

___ My mate dislikes my being a police officer.

___ My mate strongly dislikes my being a police officer.

2. Please check the box which best describes the degree to which the following common problems arise in your household:

	NEVER	SOMETIMES	FREQUENTLY
a. Communication problems between husband and wife			
b. Communication problems between parents and children			
c. Financial difficulties			
d. Police officer's school of promotion study takes too much time			
e. Police duty hours cause difficulties in family life			
f. Non-police spouse complains of feelings of frustration, being tied down, etc.			
g. Police officer brings work problems home			
h. Dissatisfaction with sex life			
i. Alcohol problems			
j. Anxieties, resentments or jealousies by one or both partners			
k. Other(s): Please Describe			

KANE, PARSONS & ASSOCIATES
1995 Broadway
New York, New York 10023
(212)799-4100

APPENDIX B

POLICE SERVICES SURVEY

P.N. 1342

October, 1983

1. Thinking generally, would you say that during the last year your neighborhood has become a better place to live, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?

Become a better place to live---	1	(ASK Q.s 2, 3, 4 IN THAT ORDER)
Gotten worse----------	2	(ASK Q.s 3, 2, 4 IN THAT ORDER)
Stayed about the same----------	3	(ASK Q.s 2, 3, 4 IN THAT ORDER)
Not sure----------	4	(ASK Q.s 2, 3, 4 IN THAT ORDER)

INSTRUCTION: Q.s 2, 3, 4 ARE ASKED OF EVERYBODY. VARY THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE ASKED AS INDICATED ABOVE.

2. In what ways has your neighborhood gotten better? (PROBE) What else?

3. In what ways has your neighborhood gotten worse? (PROBE) What else?

4. What about (READ EACH ITEM) in your neighborhood, would you say that over the last year they have gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?

	Gotten Better	Gotten Worse	Stayed Same	Not Sure
Shopping facilities----------				
Crime problems----------				
Schools----------				
Police visibility and activity----------				
The neighborhood's environment, such as noise or trash----------				
The condition of buildings in the neighborhood----------				
Problems of disorderly people such as drunks, loiterers, and so forth--------				
Involvement of local residents in community affairs----------				
Recreational facilities----------				
Kinds of people living in your neighborhood----------				
Traffic----------				

5. Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about things that might worry you in your neighborhood. How worried are you that (READ EACH ITEM), very worried, somewhat worried, or not worried at all?

	Very Worried	Somewhat Worried	Not Worried At All	Not Applicable (Vol.)	Not Sure
Someone will try to rob you or steal something from you while you are outside in this neighborhood----------					
Someone will try to attack you or beat you up while you are outside in this neighborhood-					
Someone will try to break into your home while no one is there----------					

- continued -

5. (CONTINUED)

	Very Worried	Somewhat Worried	Not Worried At All	Not Applicable (Vol.)	Not Sure
Someone will try to break into your home while you or another member of your household is home-----					
Someone will try to steal or damage your car in this neighborhood--------					
Someone will deliberately try to hurt your children while they are playing in this neighborhood--------					

6. How safe would you feel being outside alone in your neighborhood at night, would you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

Very safe----------	1
Somewhat safe----------	2
Somewhat unsafe----------	3
Very unsafe----------	4
Not sure----------	5

7. Is there any place in your neighborhood where you are afraid to go alone?

Yes----------	1	ASK Q. 8a, b, c
No----------	2 }	
Not sure----------	3 }	SKIP TO Q. 9

8a. Where exactly is that? (RECORD ANSWER BELOW UNDER "8a -- LOCATION")

8b. What is it about that particular location that makes you afraid to go there alone? (RECORD ANSWER BELOW UNDER "8b --REASON". PROBE TO GET SPECIFIC REASON; i.e., "UNSAFE" IS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH, THOUGH SUCH REASONS AS "TOO DARK," "THERE ARE A LOT OF UNDESIRABLE PEOPLE HANGING OUT THERE," "THE BAR ATTRACTS UNRULY PEOPLE," ARE VALID REASONS.)

8c. Are you afraid to go there alone during the day, at night, or both at night and during the day? (RECORD ANSWER BELOW UNDER "8c --WHEN")

INSTRUCTION: RECORD UP TO 4 LOCATIONS, THOUGH EACH RESPONDENT NEED NOT HAVE 4 LOCATIONS. TRY AND GET EXACT LOCATION, e.g., AN INTERSECTION, IF POSSIBLE.

	8a -- Location	8b -- Reason	8c -- When		
			Day	Night	Both
1.			1	2	3
2.			1	2	3
3.			1	2	3
4.			1	2	3

9. In the last year, has the amount of crime in your neighborhood increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

Increased	1
Decreased	2
Stayed about the same	3
Not sure	4

10. We're interested in knowing what effect fear for their personal safety has had on the kinds of activities people take part in. As a result of fear for your personal safety, do you (READ EACH ITEM) much less often than you would like, somewhat less often than you would like, or about as often as you like?

	Much Less Often Than Would Like	Somewhat Less Often Than Would Like	As Often As Like	Not Applicable (Vol.)	Not Sure
Socialize with other people in your neighborhood					
Walk in your neighborhood in the daytime					
Walk in your neighborhood at night					
Take your children outside to play or for fresh air					
Go out in your neighborhood for local entertainment, such as the movies					

11. Let's turn now to the police in your neighborhood. Have you seen a police officer in your neighborhood within the last 24 hours?

Yes	1	(SKIP TO Q. 13)
No	2	} ASK Q. 12
Not sure	3	

(ASK Q. 12 ONLY IF "NO" OR "NOT SURE" IN Q. 11).

12. What about within the last week? Have you seen a police officer in your neighborhood within the past week?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	3

13. Do you know any of the police officers who work in this area by name or by sight?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	3

14a. Do you know how to contact the police if you need them?

Yes	1	ASK Q. 14b
No	2	} SKIP TO Q. 15a
Not sure	3	

14b. How would you contact the police? (DO NOT SUGGEST ANY OPTIONS TO RESPONDENT)

By telephone	
Would call 911	1
Would call emergency number, no mention of specific response	2
Would call local precinct	3
Would call, general response (no further information)	4
Would go to police precinct	5
Other _____ (SPECIFY)	6
Not sure	7

15a. Is there any place in this neighborhood where you can go to get information about the police and talk to them about neighborhood problems?

Yes	1	ASK Q. 15b
No	2	SKIP TO Q. 16
Not sure	3	

15b. Where is that?

16. Do you know where your local police precinct is located?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	3

17a. If you had to call the police in an emergency, would you expect them to respond quickly or not?

Yes	1	SKIP TO Q. 18
No	2	ASK Q. 17b
Not sure	3	SKIP TO Q. 18

17b. Why not?

18. How good a job do you think the police in your neighborhood are doing to prevent crime? Are they doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, a poor job, or a very poor job?

Very good job	1
Good job	2
Fair job	3
Poor job	4
Very poor job	5
Not sure	6

19. How good a job do you think the police in your neighborhood are doing in helping people out after they have been victims of crime? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, a poor job, or a very poor job?

Very good job	1
Good job	2
Fair job	3
Poor job	4
Very poor job	5
Not sure	6

20. How good a job are the police in your neighborhood doing in keeping order on the streets and sidewalks? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, a poor job, or a very poor job?

Very good job	1
Good job	2
Fair job	3
Poor job	4
Very poor job	5
Not sure	6

21. What about traffic law enforcement? Do you think the police in your neighborhood are too strict, not strict enough, or just about right in how they enforce traffic laws?

Too strict	1
About right	2
Not strict enough	3
Not sure	4

22. In general, how helpful are the police in dealing with people in your neighborhood? Are they very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not helpful at all?

Very helpful	1
Somewhat helpful	2
Not very helpful	3
Not helpful at all	4
Not sure	5

23. In general, how fair are the police in your neighborhood in dealing with people around here? Are they very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, or very unfair?

Very fair	1
Somewhat fair	2
Somewhat unfair	3
Very unfair	4
Not sure	5

24. In general, how polite are the police in your neighborhood when dealing with people? Are they very polite, somewhat polite, somewhat impolite, or very impolite?

Very polite	1
Somewhat polite	2
Somewhat impolite	3
Very impolite	4
Not sure	5

25. Overall, would you say that police performance in your neighborhood has gotten better or worse during the last year?

Better	1
Worse	2
Stayed the same (VOL.)	3
Not sure	4

26. We're interested in how people learn about the police and their activities in their neighborhood. How do you find out about the police in your neighborhood? (PROBE) What other ways?

_____

_____

_____

27. Please tell me if in the last year you have (READ EACH ITEM).

	Yes	No	Not Sure
Spoken to police officers on patrol in your neighborhood	1	2	3
Met police officers at meetings of local community organizations	1	2	3
Reported a crime to the police	1	2	3
Been questioned by the police as a witness to a crime or accident	1	2	3
Asked the police for help for some other kind of issue	1	2	3
Been arrested or given a summons by the police	1	2	3
Had any other kind of contact with the police	1	2	3

Specify if "YES"

_____

_____

INSTRUCTION: IF "NO" TO ALL ITEMS IN Q. 27, SKIP TO Q. 33.
IF ONE OR MORE "YES" ANSWERS TO Q. 27, CONTINUE WITH Q. 28.

28. The last time you talked to the police, did the police clearly explain what action they would take in response to your contact?

No	1
Yes	2
Not sure	3

29. Did you find the police very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful?

Very helpful	1
Somewhat helpful	2
Not very helpful	3
Not at all helpful	4
Not sure	5

30. When you talked to the police, did you find them very polite, somewhat polite, somewhat impolite, or very impolite?

Very polite	1
Somewhat polite	2
Somewhat impolite	3
Very impolite	4
Not sure	5

31. How fairly were you treated by the police that time? Were they very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, or very unfair?

Very fair	1
Somewhat fair	2
Somewhat unfair	3
Very unfair	4
Not sure	5

32. After this recent experience, would you be more or less likely to contact the police in the future?

More likely	1
Less likely	2
No change (VOL.)	3
Not sure	4

33. Finally, just a few questions for classification purposes only. Are you presently employed full-time, employed part-time, umemployed and looking for work, retired, or unemployed and not looking for work for some other reason?

Employed full-time	1
Employed part-time	2
Unemployed and looking for work	3
Retired	4
Unemployed and not looking for work for some other reason	5
Other _____ (SPECIFY)	6
Refused	7

34. What is your current marital status, are you married, separated or divorced, widowed, or never married?

Married	1
Separated or divorced	2
Widowed	3
Never married	4
Refused	5

35. Does your family rent or own your house or apartment?

Own (INCLUDES STILL PAYING MORTGAGE)	1
Rent	2
Not sure	3
Refused	4

36. How many adults 18 or over live in this household?_____

37. And how many children less than 18 live in this household?_____

38. What is your age at your last birthday?_____
(IF REFUSED, REMIND RESPONDENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND RE-ASK.)

39. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (READ CATEGORIES; RECORD 2-YEAR COLLEGE DEGREE AS "SOME COLLEGE")

Less than high school graduate	1
High school graduate, including vocational or technical school	2
Some college	3
Graduated from a four-year college	4
Attended graduate school	5
Refused (VOL.)	6

40. How would you describe your racial or ethnic background? Are you white, black, Hispanic or of some other racial or ethnic background?

White	1	Other (SPECIFY)	4
Black	2		
Hispanic	3	Refused	5

ASK SEX ONLY IF NECESSARY

Male	1
Female	2