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CPOP

**COMMUNITY POLICING
IN PRACTICE**

**The Vera Institute of Justice
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CPOP COMMUNITY POLICING IN PRACTICE

In 1984, the New York City Police Department was still feeling the aftershocks of the City's fiscal crisis, and had not fully recovered from the manpower cuts of the late nineteen-seventies. The massive volume of calls-for-service in New York City, numbering some seven and one-half millions calls annually by 1984, resulted in the vast bulk of the Department's patrol force being assigned to emergency response cars on the 911 queue. While this strategy had allowed the Police Department to maintain a viable response to calls-for-service during the lean years, it did not permit the Department to devote resources to dealing with low-level crime and disorderly conditions. As a result, local communities as well as the Police Department were struggling to devise ways to deal effectively with order maintenance conditions and improve the quality of life at the neighborhood level.

Against this backdrop, the New York City Police Department implemented a pilot community-policing program in Brooklyn's 72nd Precinct in July, 1984. Named the Community Patrol Officer Program, or CPOP, the pilot sought to determine the feasibility of permanently assigning police officers to foot patrol in fairly large neighborhood beat areas, and requiring them to perform a variety of non-traditional tasks in addition to their normal law enforcement duties. Police Officers assigned as Community Patrol Officers, or CPOs, were expected to be full service police officers, and to serve as community resources, helping to organize community groups, attending community meetings, making service referrals, and helping to devise strategies to deal not only with local crime and order-maintenance problems, but also with social needs.

The Community Patrol Officer Program differed in significant ways from traditional patrol deployment strategies. All of the police officers assigned to CPOP were volunteers, which permitted the Department to authorize wide flexibility in patrol hours. CPOs were recruited on their agreement to work those hours which permitted them to focus on the problems peculiar to their beat areas, and to change those hours on a daily basis if need be. The officers were encouraged to solicit input from the residents and merchants on their beats in setting their patrol priorities rather than being guided solely by crime incidence, and to involve the community in formulating solutions to neighborhood problems where possible.

Of all of the ways in which CPOP differed from conventional patrol, the most notable was that the CPOs were given the responsibility to work on problems over time. Working in a police radio car is analogous to being a paramedic in an ambulance. Just as a paramedic's principal function is to stabilize the patient until he can be delivered to a hospital for appropriate medical treatment, the principal function of a police officer responding to an emergency call is to stabilize the situation, to prevent further harm or violation of law, to make an arrest or issue a summons, to take a report of a past crime, or to make a referral for some follow-up action. That being done, the police officer must make himself available for the next emergency call. The Police Department is not at all like a hospital, however, and is largely unable to provide follow-up services, except where serious, unsolved crimes require investigation by detectives.

CPOP sought to fill this gap by making the CPO available to follow-up on community problems, and by allowing the officer sufficient time to deal with them effectively.

The pilot CPOP project was judged to be a success, both by Department officials and community representatives. The CPOs demonstrated their ability to perform the wide range of duties assigned to them and expressed much satisfaction with their new role. The residents and merchants of Sunset Park voiced overwhelming support of the program and other communities began to lobby for its implementation in their areas.

Based on these early results, the Department began a careful expansion of the program in January of 1985, when CPOP was implemented in 6 additional precincts. Usually, a precinct CPOP Unit requires 9 police officers assigned to individual beats and one assigned as Unit Coordinator, a supervisory sergeant, and a police administrative aide. Because CPOP represented a substantial investment of personnel, the pace of program expansion was constrained somewhat by the Department's authority to recruit and hire new police officers. As budgetary increases allowed the hiring of new officers, new CPOP Units were created until finally, in September of 1988, CPOP had been instituted in each of New York City's 75 patrol precincts. Now, the program involves over 800 police officers (including trained alternates), 75 sergeants, and 75 administrative aides. Fortunately, the moderate pace of expansion helped preserve the pilot program design as more personnel were assigned.

This document presents brief accounts of effective problem-solving work by CPOs attempting to address crime or order-maintenance problems arising on their beats. Each account describes an undertaking which effectively embodies one of the program's stated goals or objectives. It is hoped that these illustrations will be useful in the CPOP training programs, and to community groups anxious to understand what can be expected of their police force, operating in this mode.

These stories are not evidence that the design and implementation of the CPO program are without shortcomings. Nor are they intended to suggest that the structure and operations of CPOP are a model for all police agencies working to enact the principles of community and problem-solving policing. They do show, however, that a structure which frees a police officer to focus consistent attention on neighborhood problems and provides him or her with the tools to do so can produce genuine benefits for both the community and the Department.

**Mission
of the
Community Patrol Officer Program**

The mission of the New York City Police Department Community Patrol Officer Program is to enhance the quality of life in the many neighborhoods that make up the City of New York.

Specifically, the primary objectives of the Community Patrol Officer Program are:

To prevent and control conduct threatening to life and property, particularly that which affects neighborhoods as a whole.

To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community by reducing disorder and the fear of crime in neighborhoods.

To identify and address community problems that are potentially serious law enforcement or governmental problems.

In order to achieve these objectives, the Community Patrol Officer Program is committed to:

Involving the community in identifying its own public safety concerns and setting the Department's priorities for addressing those concerns.

Increasing community participation in policing activities and community-based public safety programs.

Exchanging information with the community on a regular basis.

Using a problem-solving approach to developing strategies for police operations that respond to specific community problems, including non-traditional tactics and strategies.

Coordinating strategies for addressing communities' problems with other police personnel, other government agencies, and private organizations.

Assigning Community Patrol Officers to permanent neighborhood beats.

**...Increasing community participation in
policing activities and community
based public safety programs....**

In May, 1986, Police Officer Vincent Esposito joined the Community Patrol Officer Program in the 72nd Precinct. Officer Esposito had been a member of the Transit Police, but had changed to the NYPD with the hope of being able to work more directly with people in communities. When the opportunity to join CPOP arose, he volunteered. One of the locations on Officer Esposito's beat was a neighborhood playground on 5th Avenue between 49th and 50th Streets in the Sunset Park section of Brooklyn. Typical of many of the vest-pocket parks in New York City, there are handball courts, basketball courts, a sandbox, swings and seesaws for the smaller children, and benches to lure the senior citizens to come in and sit in the sun. At least, that was the intention. What Vinny found when he began patrolling the area was that there were no children in the park, and no seniors sunning themselves. Instead the park was overrun with drug users and dealers.

Officer Esposito could, and did, observe these conditions, but he also heard about them from the residents of this neighborhood. He was repeatedly told that they had been unable to use the park for several years and that, although police officers in radio cars frequently caused the loiterers to disappear, they would return as soon as the police left the scene.

CPO Esposito began to spend as much time as possible in the vicinity of the park. He disbursed the loiterers; when he observed drug transactions, he made arrests. However, he knew that these tactics were not alleviating the problem. Officer Esposito's beat area was fairly large and he had other community problems to deal with in other areas. This limited the amount of time he could spend at the park. Even more troublesome was the fact that every time he made an arrest he effectively removed himself from the area (and from the rest of his beat) for the balance of his tour, while he processed the defendant in the criminal justice system. When he was gone, the park reverted to the junkies.

Officer Esposito decided to take a different approach to dealing with the problem. He held meetings of the tenants in the apartment buildings which overlooked the park. At these meetings he told the residents he needed their help in dealing with the problems in the park. Through these meetings he recruited a number of homebound residents who agreed to watch the drug dealing from their windows and observe where the dealers hid their drug stashes. He instructed them to then call the CPOP Office and leave anonymous messages telling him where the stashes were located. When such messages came in, the officer or Police Administrative Aide receiving them would relay the information to Officer Esposito. He would then go to the park and confiscate the stash, taking it to the Precinct and vouchering it as found property. This tactic only took Officer Esposito off patrol for fifteen or twenty minutes.

The community cooperated with Officer Esposito and on some days he went to the park and confiscated drug stashes as many as five or six times. In effect, he made it economically unbearable for the dealers to continue to use the park as their base of operations, and placed some in the uncomfortable position of having to explain to their suppliers why they lost the drugs without being arrested. Some dealers began to hold their stashes on their person, and when this information was relayed to CPO Esposito, he arrested them. Within one month of initiating these tactics, the drug dealers left the park.

To Officer Esposito, the victory belonged to the residents of the community. He believes that the drug dealers knew that it was the community residents who were responsible for providing the information to the police which led to the seizures, and faced with this organized resistance to their activities, they chose to leave the area.

Today, more than two years after the community reclaimed their park, there are children playing on the swings, teens using the basketball and handball courts, and seniors sunning themselves. There are still drugs in the Sunset Park area, but not in that playground.

...Involving the community in identifying its own public safety concerns and setting the Department's priorities for addressing these concerns....

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Elizabeth Street is a small apartment building in the Little Italy section of Lower Manhattan. This area is primarily residential, with an ethnic mix of Italian and Spanish. The economic status of most residents ranges from lower to middle income. This location had a long history of disputes between the tenants and the landlord, and police officers from the 5th Precinct had responded to 911 calls at the building at all hours. However, the real sources of these disputes was never clear; most often, incidents would end with referral of the complainants to the summons part of the lower court, for private prosecution.

CPO DeFazio first became interested in the problems at 239 Elizabeth Street in 1986, when an elderly woman, a tenant in the building, was standing outside as the officer patrolled the area. This woman approached the CPO to explain that she and other tenants were being harassed by the landlord, who lived on the first floor. The woman went on to explain that the landlord owned four pitt bulls, which he had stationed in the lobby of the building. Two of the dogs were always in the lobby, while the other two were held in cages in the back. The landlord had rigged the cages so that all he had to do was push a button to release the cage door and the dogs could be summoned. Late at night, the dogs would run up and down the hallways, barking and scratching on people's doors; on occasion, she said, the landlord rubbed dog feces on the tenants' doors. He had turned their electricity off, with the result that people were afraid to leave their apartments or ask for help from the police, fearing further retaliation by the landlord. This woman believed that these tactics were used to terrorize tenants whom the landlord wanted to move out, since he could raise the rent ten percent when a new tenant moved in.

CPO DeFazio went to the building to verify the stories. He also wanted to speak with the landlord, to get his version; but when the officer went to the landlord's apartment to ask if there were any problems in the buildings, the door was slammed in his face. CPO DeFazio then went from door to door in the building and got the names and phone numbers of all the tenants. He felt that, if he could get all of the tenants together at a meeting, they could discuss the problems they were having with the landlord and perhaps work together to solve them. At first many of the tenants were unwilling to talk, fearing the landlord would find out, get angry, and harass them further. However, with the officer's continued persistence and his patrol of the building, the tenants began to see that he was at least sincere in wanting to help them.

In due course, a tenants association was formed and CPO DeFazio encouraged the residents to make complaints against the landlord by calling the 5th Precinct station house. Over a short period of time, approximately 100 calls were received, which helped to document the problems in the building. CPO DeFazio got in touch with the Department of Housing Preservation and Development, which referred him to the Chief Prosecutor for the State Division of Housing and Commercial Renewal (DHCR). He also contacted the ASPCA, hoping that they could do something about the pitt bulls; the ASPCA, however, was unable to remove the dogs without documentation of violations.

CPO DeFazio began issuing summonses to the landlord for not having the dogs on a leash, for excessive noise, and other violations. He then learned that one of these pitt bulls had attacked a child in a near-by park and that an off-duty police officer had also been bitten. He referred this information, along with the information he had received from the tenants, to the ASPCA. He also

referred the people hurt by the dogs to the Summons Part at the Manhattan Criminal Court. The Criminal Court judge ordered that the pitt bulls be removed from the building and secured in a holding pen until it could be determined whether the dogs were so dangerous that they should be put to sleep. (Two of the pitt bulls were eventually put to sleep and the other two were sent to a kennel.)

During the time that CPO DeFazio worked on getting the dogs removed from the building, the DHCR prosecutor had been filing lawsuits against the landlord for numerous building violations and for tax evasion. The prosecutor asked CPO DeFazio to serve the landlord with the summonses he had been able to obtain from the court, but the CPO's attempts to serve the landlord proved futile. The landlord refused to answer the door or to leave his apartment. Officer DeFazio also stood outside the building for hours on several days, waiting for the landlord to leave. He had the tenants watching for the landlord when he could not be there and asked that they contact him the minute anyone saw the landlord in the area. He also arranged with the tenants of another building owned by this landlord, to contact him if any of them saw the landlord. Eventually the summonses, which covered both the landlord's buildings, were served. According to a *New York Post* article in the April 14, 1988 issue, there were a total of 130 violations filed against this particular landlord.

Several months later, the landlord had been found to owe so much in back taxes for these buildings that 239 Elizabeth Street was turned over to the City. Although the landlord was allowed to remain in the building, the president of the tenants association was appointed by Housing Preservation and Development to serve as their agent in collecting the rent and maintaining the conditions in the building. Four months after the City gained possession of this building, the problems there seemed to have been alleviated. CPO DeFazio visited the building periodically and found it clean and in good order. There were no complaints from the tenants who had originally complained about the problem. However, one Saturday afternoon CPO DeFazio received a call from two tenants who lived in the apartment above that of the previous landlord. They were having repair work done on their floor and because some of the floor boards were missing, could hear the landlord and his wife discussing a plan to blow the building up. Apparently, he had set up acetylene gas tanks with which to set the building on fire and to kill everyone in the building with the exception of a few tenants who had testified on his behalf in court.

Although CPO DeFazio felt the information from the tenants could very well be valid, there was nothing he could do without additional evidence. He advised tenants to be alert to the possible threat and, if they smelled gas, to get out of the building and call Fire and Police Departments immediately. After speaking with the tenants, CPO DeFazio telephoned the landlord. He did not discuss the reported threat, and said that he was calling to see if there had been any further problems in the building; he hoped thereby to test the validity of the threats he had heard about. The landlord's wife told Officer DeFazio that he was not to call them at all anymore and that if he did, they would register a harassment complaint against him.

The next week, when CPO DeFazio returned to work, he found a message to contact the tenants who had reported the landlord's arson plan to him previously. The message indicated that the officer should not come around the area or into the building because they had information, a taped conversation between the landlord and his wife, that the landlord was going to blow DeFazio's brains out. The taped conversation between the landlord and his wife indicated that they felt that DeFazio was up to something because he had telephoned them the week before. The landlord could be heard saying that if DeFazio came into the building he would shoot him. Also on the tape was a clicking sound which CPO DeFazio believed to be the noise made by pulling the slide on a .45 automatic. At another point on the tape, during a fight between the landlord and his wife, the wife could be heard saying not to point that gun at her.

The taped conversation was taken to the 5th Precinct Detectives Unit to see what could be done. CPO DeFazio and one of the detectives went to the Manhattan District Attorney's office and obtained a search warrant for the .45 automatic weapon. The judge, who issued the warrant, requested to speak with CPO DeFazio and have him explain how he knew about the .45. CPO DeFazio convinced the judge that he was confident that the sound he heard on the tape was from a .45 automatic slide, and that he felt that the lives of the tenants, and perhaps others, were in jeopardy.

After obtaining the warrant, CPO DeFazio and the detective returned to the station house and met with the Precinct Commanding Officer. The Captain telephoned Emergency Service Division and, due to the possibility of there being gas in the apartment, the bomb squad was also contacted. The search ultimately involved as many as 50 police personnel, including the Patrol and Detective Borough Commanders, the commander of Emergency Services Unit 8; a Detective from Terrorist Task Force; an Agent from Federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Assistant District Attorney; CPO DeFazio and several other precinct personnel.

The raid was conducted at 12:30 P.M. The Emergency Service Unit had two unmarked cars parked outside the building and the entire building surrounded. Members of the EMS entered the building and knocked on the landlord's door. The landlord refused to open the door. EMS officers then attempted to break down the door, but were unsuccessful because the landlord had welded about five inches of steel to the door. Eventually, the officers were able to get inside. Both the landlord and his wife were arrested. The loaded .45 automatic was found under a towel by the television set. There were old engine parts as well as garbage and newspapers lying around the apartment. Bins of guns and ammunition were found in the apartment, but since the original warrant was issued only for the .45 automatic, the police had to return to court to obtain a warrant for additional evidence.

Ultimately 49 handguns, 13 rifles, 14 boxes of ammunition, and 48 assorted swords and knives were recovered from this apartment. The landlord had also set up a bunker-like barricade in his basement, surrounded by fifty bags of cement. According to a *Post* article, the landlord's collection included Civil War-era muskets, automatic pistols and some antique swords. It was later learned that seven or eight of the guns had hits on them. In fact, one of the guns may have been used to kill a drug enforcement officer in Florida, a possibility that is still being investigated.

Sometime after the arrest, CPO DeFazio indicated that the landlord was still in jail awaiting trial. The tenants at 239 Elizabeth Street can now live in peace. However, CPO DeFazio commented that the elderly woman who had first brought the problem to the officer's attention was no longer living in the building. The woman had moved before the efforts of CPO DeFazio and the tenants were complete.

...Using a problem-solving approach to developing strategies for police operations that respond to specific community problems, including non-traditional tactics and strategies....

The 79th Precinct, which covers the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, is burdened by a large number of abandoned apartment houses and brownstones. Some of these abandoned buildings are privately owned, some have been seized by the City. The abandoned housing stock has become the source of a lot of community problems, including crime problems. The level of crime in the precinct, which has been high, has increased over the past few years due to the influx of drugs. The precinct residents are primarily Black, middle to lower-income working people. Although there is some higher-income gentrification taking place on the outlying boundaries of the precinct, the area is generally depressed economically and without a vital commercial sector.

The precinct CPOP Unit found the abandoned buildings to be a recurrent theme in the crime and other complaints heard from residents throughout the area. Junkies used the buildings, of course; but even when empty, the buildings were extremely dangerous for playing children. In response to these complaints, CPO Mazzone, Coordinator of the 79 CPOP Unit, resolved to get the buildings sealed. Since many of the buildings also were adjacent to garbage strewn lots, he wanted to get the lots cleaned too. CPO Mazzone developed programs that addressed both these conditions.

Operation Seal-Up aims to close off all access to abandoned buildings in the area. The Unit's CPOs identify abandoned buildings on their beats and report them, with city lot number and location number, to CPO Mazzone. Officer Mazzone records the information in proper form, including whether the building is privately or city owned, for action by the local Community Planning Board. If squatters are found in city owned buildings, the Community Board contacts the Buildings Inspector and begins proceedings to have the squatters evicted. Once a building is cleared, the next step is to get it properly sealed. CPO Mazzone has discovered that, unless the proper materials are used (cinder blocks or concrete rather than tin), the buildings are easily broken into, and the problems start all over again.

If a building brought to their attention by CPOP is not owned by the City, the Community Board attempts to contact the private owner. For example, if the building is creating a health hazard because there is so much garbage inside, or if junkies tend to hang out inside, the Community Board will request that the landlord work with them (e.g., as complainant) to alleviate the condition, or to seal the building. If the landlord is reluctant to become involved, the Community Board may take steps to have the improvements made at the location, or to have the building sealed, and then charge the landlord for services performed by the City.

Often these abandoned buildings are infested with drug dealers, conducting their operations out of individual apartments. CPOP refers such locations to the Brooklyn North Narcotics Unit, through intelligence reports, until arrests are made. If the problem is limited to drug use and dealing in plain sight, the CPOs will make arrests themselves. CPO Mazzone keeps careful records of when buildings were referred to either Narcotics or the Community Board, so that he can respond to residents who call about abandoned buildings in their neighborhoods.

In addition to sealing abandoned buildings, the CPOP Unit has effectively organized area residents to clean their blocks. CPO Mazzone contacted Community Board #3 to find out what

resources were available for block beautification and was referred to We Care About New York, an organization funded by private donations to supply equipment for block clean-ups. As a general rule, CPO Mazzone contacts the presidents of the various block associations to see if they would like to participate in a block clean-up and a date is chosen for the effort. A few days before the clean-up, garbage bags are given to block residents so that they can remove the garbage from their homes. Fliers are distributed announcing the clean-up and No Parking signs are posted on the block. The CPOP officers close off the street and announce over a loud speaker that the block is having a clean-up. The CPOP officers also go door to door to encourage residents to get involved.

Residents are given gloves and brooms, supplied by We Care About New York, and sweep the debris from abandoned lots into the street. Once all of the garbage is cleared, the Sanitation Department workers cart it away and clean the block with the street flusher. Operation Clean-Up has done more for the precinct's neighborhoods than cleaning the streets: Cakes and other goodies now routinely appear at these events (the Precinct supplies juice and soda), and all participants receive t-shirts with "We Care About New York" printed on them.

Between February and October, 1988, 76 abandoned buildings were referred to the Community Board, properly entered in the queue for seal-up, and are getting the attention this process requires. (About six months are required to get a building sealed after the CPO first reports it.) More than 400 precinct residents have participated in Operation Clean-Up. Both programs have generated significant community support for a closer working relationship with the precinct.

Block association presidents and precinct residents now call CPOP, to provide specific information about abandoned buildings and conditions in them that deserve police attention.

**...Increasing community participation
in policing activities and community
based public safety programs....**

On April 16, 1987, Community Patrol Officer Michael Lamm of the 44th Precinct CPOP Unit received a phone call from a representative of the tenant's association at 1200 Woodycrest Avenue, a large, city-owned building located in his Beat Area. The resident informed Officer Lamm of ten separate drug dealing locations in the apartment building, specifically naming dealers and the apartments in which they sold drugs. The informant complained that the building was inundated with dealers and purchasers who occupied apartments and loitered in the halls, making deals. The building's residents were frightened and frustrated, as were other members of the community who later asserted that the problem had existed for three years prior to it being brought to the attention of the Police Department.

Officer Lamm's initial move was to call a meeting with the tenant's association. There was a good turnout of the residents, and Officer Lamm initiated a discussion in which the conditions in the building were described clearly. He insisted that no specific details be given or accusations be made, however, since some of the building's drug dealers were attending the meeting in order to observe and intimidate others, and to acquire information for themselves. The meeting showed clearly that most of the building's residents shared a common attitude toward the problem, but also had simplistic expectations about the solution. From their perspective it seemed obvious that, because drug dealing is illegal, it is the responsibility of the police department to eliminate it. Their demand was clear; they wanted the police to clean up the building by more frequent patrolling and evictions or arrests of the drug dealers.

Officer Lamm believed it essential that he convince the tenants that they could not wait passively for the problem to be solved for them, but had to become active participants in the solution. He argued that the police could not possibly devote to one building as much time and attention as these tenants were requesting. He explained that the building's residents needed to act not only as reporters of the problem, but also to take some responsibility for eliminating it. Officer Lamm suggested the formation of a tenant's patrol of the building to supplement police activity, and promised his support of the patrol. The tenants came around; they formed their own patrol unit.

Within two weeks the tenants association had been transformed from a rather limited and fragmented organization to a far more cohesive and powerful group. The association established an around-the-clock patrol of the building which monitored and recorded the presence of every person who entered it. The tenants gave this information to Officer Lamm, who conducted vertical patrols of the building five or six times a day, every day. During this period, Officer Lamm regularly informed Bronx Narcotics and the Precinct's Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit (SNEU) about the situation. In addition, he met with representatives the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (which managed the building for the City), the local City Councilman, representatives of the Bureau of Family Services, and implementers of the Human Resources Agency's Multi-Family Development Program which had targeted 1200 Woodycrest as a location greatly needing help. These different resources collaborated in providing information to the tenants, worked on renovating apartments and assisted in responsibly choosing future tenants in order to assure that the problem would not simply begin again with new faces when the present dealers were evicted.

After a few weeks, the combined effort of CPO Lamm and the tenants' patrol started to pay off, and the building's hallways began to clear. After a month the hallways were empty. At this point, Officer Lamm, working with the building manager, the superintendent, and the information from the tenant's patrol, began to enforce the eviction notices for which he had helped to gather evidence, and to collar people for illegal occupancy of apartments or illegal possession of weapons or drugs. CPO Lamm also spoke with Judge Trussell of the Bronx Housing Court, who provided him with signs in both English and Spanish which forbade loitering and warned of the consequences of so doing. With warnings like these available to the public, Officer Lamm was then allowed to levy misdemeanor charges, which carry heavier penalties than a mere summons, on anyone caught loitering. To prevent the return of evicted squatters, Officer Lamm turned to the HPD and requested that they seal the windows and put proper locks on the doors of several of the empty apartments. This kept dealers away and, after six months, the tenants' association decided that the situation had improved to the point where they could end their patrol.

For CPO Lamm, however, the problem was not over, for the dealers had moved their transactions to the corner of Anderson Avenue and 167th Street, an intersection within his beat. He again committed himself to frequently patrolling the area, giving summonses for disorderly conduct to those who behaved suspiciously and refused to follow his directions to clear the corner. Lamm had won solid support from the residents of the community, and persisted in paying active attention to the dealers until they finally left the neighborhood altogether. Drug sales in the location have completely ended. 1200 Woodycrest is still experiencing occasional problems, but the frequency has been reduced considerably.

Officer Lamm faced many difficult issues in solving the drug problem of this area. He encountered bureaucratic difficulties in his relationship with some city agencies, and had to proceed carefully, so as not to misuse the laws regarding the different treatment of squatters and trespassers. He had to gather information from community residents intimidated by the power of the drug dealers, and he devoted a great deal of time and energy to a persistent and dedicated attack on the problem. By returning to 1200 Woodycrest time and again, Officer Lamm gained the respect of the building's residents and the law abiding members of the community, who then joined his effort to combat the problem. By convincing the tenants of 1200 Woodycrest that their responsible participation was an essential ingredient in the solution of this neighborhood problem, Officer Lamm established a precedent that may inspire community residents to combat similar situations should they arise in the future. And by devoting himself so thoroughly to the problem, CPO Lamm has won the trust and friendship of the residents of the 9th beat of the 44th Precinct.

...To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community by reducing disorder and the fear of crime in neighborhoods....

Police Officer Ronald MacGregor was frequently assigned to Sector Boy of the 26th Precinct and often responded to calls for assistance in a single room occupancy hotel on West 112th Street. His recollections of the location are that it was a filthy place, infested with rats, roaches and lice. Like many SRO hotels the residents were mainly persons holding marginal jobs, the elderly and mentally handicapped, drug addicts and former prostitutes—many of whom are AIDS victims. Most often, when he responded to the location he was unable to find out who had requested the Police. It seemed to him, and to the officers who responded with him, that the residents of the building were afraid to be seen talking to the police, although from the frequency of calls it must have provided them with some relief just having the police show up.

In April, 1988, the Community Patrol Officer Program was introduced into the 26th Precinct and CPO MacGregor was assigned to the Beat Area which covered 112th Street. The general area houses a racially mixed, predominately upper middle class population, and the Columbia University student dormitories are closeby. As the Community Patrol Officer for this Beat, Officer MacGregor felt that the SRO hotel was a source of many of the quality of life problems in the area and decided that additional information was needed if such problems were to be alleviated. In order to get to know the tenants of the hotel, Officer MacGregor patrolled the building on a regular basis while on foot patrol. He went into the building and spoke to many of the occupants. Initially, the residents, who had been told by the landlord that the police could not be trusted, were not willing to speak with him. However, as time passed, they started to open up and told him about the problems they had encountered.

The living conditions inside the building were extremely bad. Officer MacGregor contracted lice twice from patrolling inside. He was told that the landlord was harassing the tenants, throwing firecrackers in their rooms, scaring them and withholding their mail, and that there were drug dealers in the building who were also intimidating the tenants.

A lot of crime was going on, both inside and in the areas surrounding the building. Officer MacGregor was told about a number of rapes in the building, almost all of which had gone unreported. Women were afraid to leave their apartments, as were the many elderly people in the building. One of the tenants, a former prostitute who had Hepatitis B, reported that she was being pressured to give sexual favors to men in the building in exchange for protection. He heard about a man, who was a former prostitute and now an AIDS victim, who had raped several women in the building; only one of which had been reported. (Another CPO had arrested the rapist, who was later released from jail and moved back into the building.)

The first thing that CPO MacGregor did was to get in touch with the landlord and explain to him that there were complaints of harassment against him. The officer made a point of going to the building when the mail was dropped off and told the desk clerk that federal charges could be brought against him if the mail was not delivered. Eventually the landlord began to cooperate with CPO MacGregor, and the internal telephone system in the building, which was being used by the drug dealers to conduct business, was disconnected. In addition, Officer MacGregor contacted the phone company and had the phone in the lobby, which was also being used by the drug dealers to conduct their business, altered so that no incoming calls could be received.

In order to curtail some of the drug activity, the officer gave summonses to the dealers who had double-parked their vehicles outside the building. In addition to summoning the drug dealers, Officer MacGregor met with tenants and formed what they call an "intelligence network". This enabled the tenants to set up a self-monitoring system in which several people were designated as floor leaders. They were responsible for recording all information which other tenants would give to them, anonymously, about unusual and suspicious activity in the building. The floor leaders then passed this information on to CPO MacGregor when he came to the building. This system became necessary because most of the tenants did not own telephones and could not relay such information directly to the officer. Officer MacGregor also escorted the elderly tenants to the supermarket to lessen the possibilities of being victimized. He also felt that there was a need to teach some of the tenants how to take care of themselves to reduce the possibilities of contracting the diseases that were fairly common in the building. To do this, he held a class on personal hygiene, based on the training he had received in the Marine Corps.

CPO MacGregor also got in touch with several organizations that could address the various needs of the tenants. Through his contact with a nurse at St. Luke's Hospital, he was able to refer several mentally-handicapped people to their Psychological Services Emergency Room. Because of his experience in the 26th Precinct, he was aware of several social welfare resources in the area. He contacted the Social Services Program at St. John the Divine Church which provided several residents with food and clothing; other, needier tenants were referred to the Broadway Presbyterian Church food line as well. Officer MacGregor also referred tenants to the Living World Christ Center for clothes, drug rehabilitation and marriage counseling. The officer also contacted the Department of Health, hoping they would be able to do something.

The concerted efforts of Officer MacGregor and the help that he received from residents themselves have worked some dramatic changes in the building. For example, building residents were aware of eight alleged attacks on women in June, 1988, although almost all of them went unreported. In July, no incidents of this kind were known to the CPO or his network. Furthermore, the landlord, who was responsible for creating some of the problems in the building, has become involved in the attempts to improve conditions. Drug activity has decreased, due to the efforts of Officer MacGregor and the tenants now know their neighbors and feel a sense of self-determination and control over what happens in the building. Although the problems in the building have not entirely disappeared, Officer MacGregor continues to work with the tenants to alleviate them. The proper City agencies have been notified about problems they need to address at the hotel and Officer MacGregor intends to continue his daily patrols until the horrendous conditions which allowed the building to become so hazardous have been corrected.

...Coordinating strategies for addressing communities' problems with other police personnel, other government agencies, and private organizations....

The area around East 158th Street and Courtland Avenue consists primarily of tenement houses, interspersed with abandoned buildings and burned out structures. Nearby are the Jackson and Melrose public housing projects which extend from East 158th Street to East 153rd Street. There is no discernible industrial or commercial trade in the area, although there is a public grammar school nearby, on East 157th Street. This area, like others in the South Bronx, is physically deteriorated, is overrun with drug dealers and junkies, and has experienced an increase in drug-related crime over the past few years. The area is part of CPO Beat Area 9 in the 40th Precinct and is patrolled by CPO Bob Addolorato.

In July, 1987, CPO Addolorato, known as Officer Bob to the residents on his beat, began patrolling the area of East 158th and Courtland Avenue on a daily basis because of the heavy incidence of drug trafficking at that location. CPO Addolorato knew about this area before he joined CPOP; he had worked the area in a sector car while on regular motor patrol. He believed that this location was the focal point of the delivery and distribution of large quantities of heroin, which were cut and prepared for street sale. However, his knowledge regarding the key actors and the dynamics of the overall operation was limited.

In order to obtain additional information CPO Addolorato, along with other members of the CPOP Unit, began making surreptitious observations of the area at various times during the day and night. This allowed the officers to observe the dealers and the buyers without being detected. Specific groups of individuals, some who served as steerers and look-outs, and others who were responsible for delivering and distributing the heroin, were identified. Based on these observations, CPO Addolorato and other CPO's were able to apprehend and arrest both the dealers and the buyers. While making these arrests, the CPOs began issuing disorderly conduct summonses to individuals who failed to obey to the officers' orders to disperse. One of these arrested was wanted by the 40th Precinct Detective Unit in connection with a recent homicide.

As a result of his arrest and summons activity, CPO Addolorato became familiar with the regulars on the block and was able to share this information with other patrol officers and units of the 40th Precinct. Residents whom CPO Addolorato had come to recognize from patrolling the area on a regular basis, but who seemed to be somewhat apprehensive about talking with him, began to introduce themselves to the officer. After seeing the police efforts to address this long-term condition, they began providing CPO Addolorato with solid information about persons involved in the drug trade.

The Assistant District Manager of the local Community Planning Board also became a source of information on the problem, as did representatives from the South Bronx Council of Churches. Several meetings were held with these groups, in which the area around East 158th Street and Courtland Avenue was identified as a major problem and concern of community residents. At these meetings CPO Addolorato emphasized the need for the area residents to work together with the police and for them to become organized as a group. At one meeting a community resident approached CPO Addolorato about organizing a Block Association. With the help of CPO Addolorato, a Block Association was formed about a month later and the residents became involved in cleaning up a few of the garbage strewn lots in the area. With the help of the Department of General Services, the lots were then fenced.

CPO Addolorato contacted Bronx Narcotics and supplied them with specific information about the dealers and the locations. Within a couple of weeks of the initial contact with Bronx Narcotics, the CPOP Unit, other 40th Precinct personnel and Narcotics coordinated efforts to conduct a sweep of this location. The sweep was successful, resulting in 20 felony, 5 misdemeanor, and 42 violation arrests. One of those apprehended was in possession of \$10,000 worth of heroin at the time of arrest. This particular arrest led the CPO to believe the operation was much larger than he had originally suspected, and was being run by a Cuban family, consisting of several brothers, who had been using abandoned apartments at the location to conduct their business.

CPO Addolorato continued to gather information and maintained steady contact with Bronx Narcotics. As a result, two officers from the 40th Precinct Street Conditions Unit were assigned permanently to the area, resulting in a series of additional arrests for possession of narcotics and weapons.

Many of the arrests made at the locations targeted by CPO Addolorato led to the seizure of substantial quantities of heroin and currency. Many involved the arrest of illegal aliens. As a result, CPO Addolorato contacted the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency to request additional assistance. This resulted in the DEA making arrests of some of the key dealers, and in other dealers moving out of the area.

In a further attempt to stem drug trafficking in the area, CPO Addolorato contacted the City's Department of Housing Preservation and Development, which ultimately responded by vacating and sealing one of the most problem-prone buildings in the area.

In discussing the drug problem in his Beat Area, CPO Addolorato credits the information provided by community residents and leaders and the consistent support of both City and Federal law enforcement personnel with what has been accomplished to date. And while there are still drugs in the 40th Precinct, community residents and the 40 CPOP Unit have learned that something can be done about them.

...To identify and address community problems that are potentially serious law enforcement or governmental problems....

108 Siegal Street in East Brooklyn had been named by the City's Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) as one of the ten worst drug locations in New York. The building had also been targeted as a major community problem by the East Brooklyn Council of Churches. In 1986 alone, the 90th Precinct's Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit (SNEU) made 600 arrests at the location, working at the building one hour a day, one day a week. Originally, the primary drug was heroin, a brand called "homicide". Later both heroin and crack were being sold. The location was extremely active and often there were so many addicts waiting to buy drugs that they formed a line outside the building. Drugs were not the only problem in the building; the CPOP Unit was faced with robberies, burglaries, criminal mischief, and shootings there as well. All of this activity appeared to result from the overriding problem of drugs. The building itself was falling apart and many of the apartments were vacant. To the neighborhood, it seemed that no one cared about the problems, which had existed for close to ten years.

The CPOP Unit was implemented in the 90th Precinct in March, 1987. By January 1, 1988, the Unit had an intensive effort underway to deal with the drug problem at 108 Siegal Street. As the building is City-owned, CPOP Unit Supervisor Sgt. Greenwood contacted HPD, which manages the building. Angelo Guzman, an Area Director for HPD, was assigned to work on the problem with the CPOP Unit.

The people who lived in the building were potentially a valuable source of information, but they were clearly afraid to talk to the police. One of the first things the CPOP Unit did was to hold a meeting with the tenants and Mr. Guzman. The CPOs distributed fliers announcing the meeting, which was held in the precinct station house to soothe tenants' fears. About fifteen tenants, more than half of the building's residents, attended. The goal was to form a tenants association which would work closely with CPOP. The tenants spent the first hour of the meeting, Sgt. Greenwood recalls, venting their anger and complaints, but in due course were ready to tell the police what they knew. Many had very specific information about the dealers, the suppliers and the buyers, having spent a lot of their time watching the activity. Sgt. Greenwood did not let anyone detail their information at the meeting, in case some of the dealers were present. He told them to call the CPOP Unit and talk to him or another CPO, or to leave a message on the Unit's answering machine, either giving their name or remaining anonymous.

A crucial next step in attacking the building was enforcing the Criminal Trespass Program. Angelo Guzman signed a statement on behalf of HPD which allowed the CPOs to act as complainants against building trespassers. With this power the CPOs could conduct vertical patrols to clear out the building. The steerers and spotters—the people who control the buyers and watch for the cops—are important people in this sort of drug operation. They are also extremely difficult to arrest, as they are never in possession of anything illegal. The Criminal Trespass Program gave the officers a way to arrest them.

At 108 Siegal, the CPOP Sergeant was always present during vertical patrols. He and a few other CPOs would go from the roof to the basement, asking the people found in the hallways why they were in the building. Often, people claimed to be visiting a friend. The CPO would then ask for a name and an apartment number, and would accompany the person to the apartment to verify the story. Other times the trespassers admitted being in the building to buy drugs.

On one of these patrols two women were arrested. One was in possession of 50 glassine envelopes containing drugs and the other had twice that number. This arrest turned out to be a major breaking point, because the woman in possession of the 100 glassines wanted to help herself by helping the police. She told them the name of one of the guys running the drug operation, who went by the street name "Cracko". The Sergeant took the woman with him to Manhattan Court (they had to go to Manhattan because it was midnight and the courts in Brooklyn were closed). There they were given a No Knock Warrant. At 1:00 AM the Sergeant, the Precinct's Commanding Officer, the CPOP Unit and 10 Emergency Services personnel raided the building. During the raid they got several of the main dealers, including Cracko, and a large quantity of drugs. The early morning raid was a big step, but it did not end the drug activity entirely.

Throughout the time the CPOP Unit was working on the drug problem at 108 Siegal Street, they were sending Complaint Reports and Intelligence Reports to the Brooklyn North Narcotics Unit. Information was also referred to the precinct's Anti-Crime Unit. This information led to additional arrests, by these units as well as by CPOP and the Precinct SNEU Unit.

Shortly after the raid, the Commissioner of Housing Preservation and Development came to see the building and major renovation work began. HPD agreed to work on the building only if CPOP would continue to patrol the location. The presence of CPOP was needed both for the safety of the construction workers and to keep new fixtures from getting stolen. Sgt. Greenwood viewed the presence of the HPD renovators as psychologically helpful, providing residents with evidence that conditions were changing. The work crews also seemed to make the drug dealers uncomfortable. The CPOs made frequent visits to the building for HPD. They also continued to conduct vertical patrols.

Soon the drug trade was confined to the evening hours, and, after several months of continued attention from CPOP and HPD, the dealers moved out entirely. The building is now virtually drug-free. Sgt. Greenwood continues to hold informal meetings with the tenants and has several people in the building with whom he stays in close contact. They keep him informed of activities in the building. A CPO continues to patrol the building to make sure that the dealers do not return. The CPOP Unit is using this same general strategy for cleaning up other drug locations in the precinct.

...To prevent and control conduct threatening to life and property, particularly that which affects neighborhoods as a whole....

Typical of the melting-pot character of the area, Henry Street on Manhattan's lower east side, has served as home to wave after wave of new immigrant groups. The Irish came in the latter half of the 19th century, followed by the Italians and the Germans. Today, Henry Street's tenements are home to a large Asian population, many of whom work either in the nearby Chinatown restaurant industry, or in the numerous garment sweat shops which abound in the area.

Henry Street is also home to Police Officer Thomas McLaughlin, who patrols the area as a member of the 7th Precinct's Community Patrol Officer Unit. Officer McLaughlin has been a police officer for four years, and a member of the CPOP Unit for the last nine months. Before coming into CPOP, he frequently rode in the Radio Car which covered Henry Street, and his early recollections of the block are that there was always a problem with persons frequenting the area in large numbers searching for drugs. He used to chase the loiterers off, as did the other officers who rode the sector, but could never spend enough time on the block to really deal with the problem.

Shortly after he joined the CPOP Unit in March of 1988, CPO McLaughlin began to spend time on a two block stretch of Henry Street between Pitt and Jefferson Streets. These two blocks are primarily of four and five story tenement buildings, with a small playground in the middle of one block and a Catholic Church on the corner of the other. During his patrols he observed what he believed to be a flourishing street drug trade, and by varying his tours, learned that it operated twenty-four hours a day. As the residents of these blocks were almost exclusively Asian, he was able to see that both the drug dealers and buyers were from outside the neighborhood. Tom began to talk to the residents of the block with the hope of enlisting their aid in dealing with the problem. He did not get far at first. The neighborhood residents were clearly afraid of the drug dealers and the junkies, but they seemed most afraid of being seen voicing their concerns to the police. For the most part, they just went to work, often for sixteen hours a day, and they locked themselves into their apartments at night. The playground, intended to be a haven in the midst of tenement life, was relegated to being one of the focal points for the drug trade.

On the Beat for about two months, CPO McLaughlin was finally approached by the president of the Henry Street Block Association, who asked the officer for help in dealing with the drug problems on Henry Street. The CPO was told that, while the Block Association was small in terms of numbers, they were very concerned. Parents were afraid to let their children play on the street, let alone use the park, and the noise made by drug dealers hawking their wares during the night prevented them from sleeping. Officer McLaughlin listened to more residents' complaints, which began to flow to him, and promised that he would try to do something to alleviate the problem.

CPO McLaughlin discussed the problem with his supervisor and arranged for a meeting between the members of the Block Association and a number of Police Department personnel. Using the community room of St. Theresa's Church, the meeting was held the following week. In addition to CPO McLaughlin and his supervising sergeant, the meeting was attended by the supervisor of the 7th Precinct's Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit (SNEU), a member of the Department's Narcotics Division, and the Director of Manhattan District Attorney's Community Affairs Office. Each promised to do whatever they could to help deal with the problem.

After the meeting, CPO McLaughlin began to spend a lot of time on Henry Street, doing what he could to interrupt the drug trafficking. He talked to the blocks' residents and through information given by them and his own observations, began to pass on intelligence reports to the Narcotics Division and the Precinct SNEU Unit. He was given keys to the front doors of many of the tenement buildings which were alleged to be used by the drug users as shooting galleries and, with the assistance of other CPOs, began doing vertical patrols in them.

Both the Narcotics Division and the SNEU Unit responded to the information given them, and over the next several months made over 100 arrests on the two block stretch. The Manhattan District Attorney's Office, alerted to the problem by CPO McLaughlin and the area's residents, began to press for higher bail for those persons arrested on Henry Street, and when convictions were obtained, sought jail sentences. And throughout the period, Tom and the other members of the CPOP Unit held monthly meetings with the Block Association members, telling them what was being done, and soliciting additional information.

All of these efforts, coordinated by CPO McLaughlin, have begun to have their effect. For the most part, the two blocks of Henry Street are clear of drugs, and the playground is again being used by neighborhood children. The drug trade has been pushed to one corner location and now operates almost exclusively during the midnight hours. While the residents of Henry Street are delighted with what has been done, the CPOs, the members of the SNEU and Narcotics Units, and the Manhattan District Attorney's Office are intent on entirely ridding the area of drugs.

**...Assigning Community Patrol Officers
to permanent neighborhood beats....**

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East 138th Street is an abandoned building next to the St. Luke's grammar school in the 40th precinct in the South Bronx. For several years it was also a shooting gallery for the junkies of the area who would buy their drugs and needles elsewhere in the neighborhood and then get high in the building and in the empty lots behind it, all of which adjoined the playground of St. Luke's. The playground had become a nighttime hangout for the junkies. During recesses, many of the school's students spent their time picking up used needles to show to each other and to their teachers.

Police Officer Eamon Donohoe is the Community Patrol Officer for the beat which covers this location, and he became aware of the problem both through personal observation and complaints from parents of students and from the school's principal. Not only was the playground littered with used needles, he learned, but cars parked on the block were being broken into with increasing frequency. Officer Donohoe visited the principal of St. Luke's and went to a meeting of the local Community Planning Board to learn more about the concerns of the area's residents. Within a week, feeling that he sufficiently understood the problem, CPO Donohoe contacted the Department of Housing Preservation and Development and recommended that the building be sealed to keep the junkies out. Two weeks later, HPD sealed the building. Officer Donohoe also involved the Sanitation Department, which removed the derelict cars from the street so that the ones belonging to residents could be watched more carefully. He increased his own patrol hours on the block and arranged with the Police Officers assigned to Radio Motor Patrol in the area to cruise the area as often as possible during their tours. These efforts produced results almost immediately. Deprived of their shooting galleries, the drug users moved elsewhere, and larcenies from autos began to decline.

CPO Donohoe continues to patrol the block carefully, making sure that the junkies do not try to unseal the building or somehow sneak into the lots behind St. Luke's. The building has remained sealed for 9 months, the junkies have not returned, and the number of auto burglaries has decreased substantially. The students of St. Luke's grammar school are no longer playing with used needles.

