

VERA INSTITUTE
LIBRARY
1035

**REPORT OF THE WORK
OF THE
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE**

**FOR THE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Through April 1992

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Vera Institute: Background	1
History of Vera's Work with the Police Department	6
Background	6
Felony Case Preparation	7
Research on the Civilian Complaint Review Board	8
CCRB in the Current Period.....	10
Steady Tour Assignment	10
Study of Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT)	10
The Community Police Officer Program – CPOP	13
CPOP: The Research	16
Problem-Solving Policing – Beyond CPOP.....	18
The Current Contract Period.....	20
January – July 1991:	
Staffing the Model Precinct	22
Organizing the Beat Areas	23
Establishing Problem-Solving Operations Precinct-Wide	24
Getting and Using Information in the Model Precinct	26
Bringing Other Units into Alignment.....	27
Training	30
The Model Precinct Is Launched	32
July – December 1991:	
Technical Assistance Teams (TAT)	35
Calls-for-Service (CFS) and Load-Sharing in the Model Precinct	37
Volume and Geographic and Temporal Distribution of the 911 Workload.....	38
The Problem of Cross-Sector Dispatching	40
How Good are the Data?	45
Design of an Experiment to Reduce Cross-Sector Dispatching.....	46
Other Work in the Model Precinct	49
New Analyses of CFS Data	
Enhancements to the Hotsheet Application	
Mapping CFS Data	
Testing and Refining MISD Procedures	
Hotsheet Production	
Administrative Support Systems	
A Local Area Network for the Model Precinct	
An Electronic Beatbook Application	
Collecting and Disseminating Illustrative Successful Problem-Solving Cases..	51
January – April 1992:	
Model Precinct Development and Implementation	53
Report on Arrest Activity	53
Quantitative Measures	54
Qualitative Assessment	57
Report on Experiment in Reduction of Cross-Sector Dispatching	59
Further Work on Problem-solving by Model Precinct Personnel	64
Information Systems Activity in the Model Precinct (<i>Electronic Beatbook</i>)	65
Collecting and Disseminating Illustrative Successful Problem-Solving Cases..	66

THE VERA INSTITUTE: BACKGROUND

The second half of this report details work being performed by the Vera Institute of Justice pursuant to a contract with the New York City Police Department that commenced January 1, 1991. As that work represents the current phase of joint program development and research activity which began in the mid-1960s, a brief history of the Vera Institute is presented first, covering the rationale and circumstances of Vera's creation, its mission, and its methods. This section is followed by a review of Vera's work with the Police Department, up to the beginning of this contract term.

Origins

The Vera Institute was created in 1961 to assist the agencies comprising New York City's criminal justice system to develop and test new techniques to enhance public safety and to make the criminal justice system more just and more efficient. Every year since, foundations have provided a modest core of funding, to permit Vera to bring some private resources to contractual relationships with City, State and Federal agencies with which Vera then works on particular planning, research and demonstration projects.

Sometimes a government agency contracts with Vera separately, to mount a major multi-year demonstration or research program. But New York City has maintained a general consultancy contract with Vera, since 1967, which supports the Institute's staff in developing new approaches to a host of public safety and criminal justice matters. Until 1991, these consultancy contracts were between the Vera Institute and the City acting through the Police Commissioner and either the Coordinator of Criminal Justice or (in the current period) the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety. In 1991, the contractual relationship was restructured, with the Police Department contracting for work in the Department's areas of concern, and the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety engaging Vera on all other criminal justice planning, research, and technical assistance.

How the First Project Established a New Approach to Research and Development in Criminal Justice

The idea of a Vera Institute began one evening in 1960, during a social conversation between Louis Schweitzer and an official of New York City's Department of Correction. Schweitzer learned that the local jails were dangerously overcrowded. He was told that thousands were being detained for long periods, at high public expense, on minor charges for which they were not likely to be jailed even if they were eventually found guilty. He was told that many were not, in fact, convicted and that they were subjected to pretrial imprisonment not because a judge ordered it, but because they were unable to pay the fees of bail bondsmen or to put up the collateral bondsmen require.

Schweitzer was an immigrant chemical engineer who had prospered in this country and had become an active philanthropist. The way he saw it, decisions about an individual's liberty should be made by judges, not by insurance agents. And, from his business experience, he knew that a man with no collateral might be as good a risk as many men with a great deal of it.

Convinced that a publicly-spirited private group could find a solution – even to a problem that would ordinarily be thought the exclusive province of lawyers – he engaged a staff to help him find one. The staff's research disclosed that all major studies of the American bail system since 1920 had exposed the same defects. Their interviews with New York judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, bondsmen and prisoners made it clear that a substantial proportion of those imprisoned for inability to post bail had strong family ties, stable residence, and current or recent jobs in the area, and that they would be good bets to return to court voluntarily if released on their own recognizance. This research uncovered the surprising fact that – even by 1960 – the court's statutory power to release on recognizance (ROR) was being used in less than one percent of cases.

As neither forty years of academic research nor the informed opinions of practitioners had changed the system's reliance on money bail, the staff hired by Schweitzer designed an *action-research* project that would both attempt to obtain the release of defendants who could be relied upon to return voluntarily, and give judges the confidence to ROR such individuals in the future.

The city's administrative judges were persuaded to cooperate in testing, directly, whether appropriate defendants would be released on their own recognizance, without bail, if arraignment judges were given verified information showing strong ties to the community, and whether defendants released this way were any less reliable than those who made bail.

In October 1961, the Vera Institute was created to conduct the experiment. Schweitzer provided the financial support necessary to get this first project – the Manhattan Bail Project – in motion, and local law students were recruited part-time to staff it. The law students administered a four-page questionnaire to everyone arrested in Manhattan (except those brought in on the most serious charges), prior to their appearing before arraignment judges. The questionnaire elicited details about criminal record, financial resources, residence, employment and dependents, and other indicators of the depth and quality of a defendant's community ties. A point scale was devised so that, after the community ties information was independently verified, project staff could make uniform, objective assessments of the strength of these ties. Defendants with scores at or above the threshold established for reliability were eligible for a recommendation, from the project to the judge, that they be granted release on their own recognizance (ROR).

That was the *action*. The *research* required that project staff forward ROR recommendations and verified community ties information to arraignment judges in only half the eligible cases. The other half, randomly selected as "controls" after ROR eligibility had been determined, went before the judges in the customary way. By comparing judges' decisions in the experimental cases with their decisions in the control cases, Vera could know the extent to which providing verified community ties information makes a difference in the willingness of judges to ROR

instead of setting bail; by comparing the subsequent behavior of the two groups, Vera could know whether defendants ROR'd on the basis of verified community ties are less reliable than those released because they can afford to make bail.

This was the first time social scientists had ever mounted a controlled experiment in a court setting. The decision to combine sophisticated research techniques with the innovative action program of the Manhattan Bail Project arose from the accurate observation that lasting reform of the bail system would require irrefutable evidence both that the new techniques reduced judges' reliance on money bail and that no injury resulted to the interests of justice.

The Manhattan Bail Project began in October 1961, and ran for three years. The judges ROR'd 3,505 defendants on the project's recommendation. Only 56 (1.6%) willfully failed to return to court, and less than one percent were rearrested while free on ROR. As time passed and

In 1964, New York City institutionalized the Manhattan Bail Project. Budget officials determined that the project, operating in only one of the City's five counties, had already saved over a million dollars.

the judges saw that setting bail was not the only way to assure a defendant's presence for court hearings, the rate of ROR rose in the control group too. But over the entire three years, judges were four times as likely to ROR an eligible defendant when they had the project's recommendation and the verified community ties and prior record information to guide them. The 1.6 percent "skip rate" for ROR'd defendants who met the project's criteria remained less than half the skip rate for defendants released by posting bail. The results spoke for themselves: a conventional bail bond is often a less effective guarantee for the court than verified information about prior record and community ties.

In 1964, New York City institutionalized the Manhattan Bail Project. Budget officials determined that the project, operating in only one of the city's five counties, had already saved over a million dollars in the Department of Correction's operating budget, and the Department of Probation was charged with making the new ROR procedures standard city-wide. (Today, the work is carried forward by a Vera "spin-off", the New York City Criminal Justice Agency.)

Meanwhile, press reports of the transformation in New York's bail system inspired a replication of the project in Des Moines, Iowa, and attracted the interest of Robert Kennedy, then Attorney General of the United States. He instructed all U.S. Attorneys to adopt the new ROR techniques to guide individual prosecutors at federal arraignments; over the next two years, the federal ROR rate rose from 6 percent to 39 percent without any increase in the "skip rate." To assist the country as a whole to take advantage of what had been learned in the Manhattan Bail Project, the Justice Department and Vera co-sponsored a National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, which brought more than 400 judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and police and prison officials to Washington for three days in May 1964. By the Spring of 1965, replications had sprung up in 44 counties and cities; starting with Des Moines, Vera staff provided technical assistance in as many sites as they could get to.

By October 1965, sixty projects were underway in cities and counties around the country, 25,000 defendants had been ROR'd, and their "skip rate" was still lower than for defendants released on bail. The President signed the Bail Reform Act of 1966 the following June. The first reform of the federal bail system since 1789, it required that information about defendants' prior records and community ties be routinely provided at federal arraignments, and it directed judges to ROR or to fashion suitable, non-monetary conditions of release in appropriate cases.

Thus, in its first five years, the Vera Institute had designed an innovative remedy for a pressing problem, proved its practicality and worth in a pilot project, measured its effects through sophisticated research, and saw its systematic use institutionalized in New York City and extended across the nation.

In its first five years, the Vera Institute had designed an innovative remedy for a pressing problem, proved its practicality and worth in a pilot project, measured its effects through sophisticated research, and saw its systematic use institutionalized in New York City and extended across the nation

By staying with a problem until the effort yields a potentially workable solution, by taking responsibility for field-testing the new approach, by shouldering the risk of failure which makes innovation difficult in the public sector, and by insisting that disappointments along the way be analyzed and used to refine program design, Vera pioneered a new way of bringing about specific, practical changes in urban policies.

The modest core of private sector funding enables Vera to contract with government agencies to devise, implement and test new ideas, without losing its ability to question the fundamental assumptions that shape the standard operating procedures of the government agencies with which it collaborates. Its *action* orientation keeps the Institute from settling into the conventional role of a consulting firm or "think tank." Its *research* capacity keeps the Institute from wishful thinking. Vera does not do a quick study, offer advice and move on; it forms long-term partnerships with public agencies, and it institutionalizes the reforms it has devised.

Because Vera was created to devise and test innovations, and to help the City adopt new programs and procedures, it has been important for the Institute not to get enmeshed in long-term management responsibility for the programs it has created. By "spinning off" reforms, when they are sustainable as City agency procedures or as stable independent non-profit agencies in their own right, Vera has freed its core staff from open-ended operational responsibilities so they can devote their energies to further innovation.

Over the years, Vera's projects have shaped the policy and the standard operating procedures of all of New York City's and New York State's criminal justice agencies, both in the executive

and in the judicial branches of government. Sometimes a Vera project addresses problems for which no government agency has sole or direct responsibility, or the new techniques Vera has developed can more efficiently be carried out in the non-profit sector. Vera has so far created ten independent non-profit agencies that provide the city with sustained implementation of new approaches of this type. In this way, Vera created for New York City the Victim Services Agency, the Manhattan Bowery Corporation, the Criminal Justice Agency, the Court Employment Project (now the Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services), the Wildcat Services

By "spinning off" reforms when they are sustainable as City agency procedures or as stable independent non-profit service providers, Vera has freed its core staff from open-ended operational responsibilities so they can devote their energies to further innovation.

Corporation, the Legal Action Center of the City of New York, Housing and Services, Inc., and others. More often, the city or state agency with which Vera has jointly developed an innovation simply re-absorbs Vera's demonstration program activity into what thereby becomes a revised standard operating procedure. This process produced, for example, the Police Department's Community Patrol Officer Program, its *Guidelines on the Use of Deadly Force*, and its use of Desk Appearance Tickets in lieu of arrest. It is also how the city's prosecutors' developed their Early Case Assessment Bureaus, how the courts came to have a pre-arraignment system, and how the state Corrections Department got its *Inmate Rulebook* and its furlough screening system.

Other jurisdictions have followed the same pattern, in adapting to their problems and circumstances the practical knowledge generated in New York by Vera's program and research staff working collaboratively with its City and State partners. Several hundred jurisdictions have created independent non-profit agencies to replicate Vera projects. Countless others have amended the operating procedures of their police, prosecution, court, corrections and employment agencies to take advantage of the innovative approaches reported in the Institute's publications.

The Institute serves this wider audience in more than one way. Most of the time, Vera's own publications and the books and articles published by its staff – such as *Community Policing: CPOP In New York* (forthcoming later this year from Sage Press) – are the vehicles by which the lessons learned in New York get into the nation's store of useful knowledge. Sometimes Vera sends a technical assistance team to another city for an extended period: this practice helped create the Hartford Institute of Justice and the Cincinnati Institute of Justice. Sometimes the shape of the demand for technical assistance in a particular field leads Vera to help set up a national agency to respond. To provide technical assistance on bail, pretrial diversion and jail over-crowding, Vera helped establish the National PreTrial Services Resource Center in Washington, D.C. To carry out national replications of Vera's supported work programs, the Ford Foundation, Vera and several federal agencies created the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. More recently, Vera helped set up a national Prosecuting Attorneys Research Council, which is now governed by its own Board of metropolitan prosecutors, from all regions of the country, who want to apply Vera's action-research techniques to their own work.

HISTORY OF VERA'S WORK WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Police Officer Bob Orazem, like most patrolmen, spent frustrating years racing around unfamiliar neighborhoods, responding to radio calls from the 911 operator. Radio motor patrol, the conventional method for policing urban America since the advent of cars and radios, permitted him to respond swiftly to crime scenes — but usually after the suspects had fled. In June, 1984, he and nine other officers of the 72nd Precinct in Brooklyn were taken out of their cars and given a radically different assignment. Under the supervision of a Vera-trained sergeant, they became the pilot for New York's Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP), an experiment designed by the Vera Institute, in which police officers were put back on foot and back in touch with the neighborhoods they are charged with protecting.

In the seventeen square blocks that became his steady beat, Orazem was required to get to know the residents and merchants and to work with them to identify, attack and eliminate the conditions that bred crime and the fear of crime in what was to become his neighborhood. Vera's police planning staff trained him to do so.

This approach to policing at first stunned the people of the 72nd Precinct. Seven called the station house in the first week of the CPOP pilot to report that someone impersonating a police officer was introducing himself around. Orazem soon established his credibility with the law-abiding and the delinquent on his beat and, able for the first time to follow through on citizens' complaints, he experienced professional satisfactions that are denied to officers responding by car to an endless string of 911 calls.

Orazem made more than 100 arrests over the next 15 months. But something more was required to get rid of the drug pushers who hung out in an abandoned lot at the heart of his neighborhood. His new assignment made him accountable, both to the community and to his sergeant, for eliminating what he and they had identified as the priority problem on his beat. He tried the conventional tactic: he arrested junkies as they bought and sold dope in the open-air drug market. But the next day others would take their place. So he and the local block association president organized neighbors to clean the debris from the lot. Then Orazem negotiated the maze of bureaucracy to get two separate city agencies to cooperate in hauling away the trash and building a fence. Finally, with the help of more local volunteers, Orazem landscaped the lot, built some benches and erected a swing set. The addicts disappeared, some of them to the drug-rehabilitation centers to which Orazem had referred them. They left behind the fruits of a new form of urban policing — a place where children are safe at play.

The Background of Vera's Work in the Police Field

Since 1964, the New York City Police Department and the Vera Institute have been developing programs, like CPOP, that permit more efficient and effective deployment of police resources. The first joint effort was the Manhattan Summons Project, launched in 1964. Until that time, the thousands of suspects brought into precincts on minor misdemeanor charges were routinely held in police custody until arraignments where most were routinely fined, given some other non-custodial sentence or released on their own recognizance. Arresting officers were kept on duty — but off patrol — throughout the many hours of processing.

Vera staff discovered that state law gave the courts authority to allow the police to issue summonses, in these cases, instead of processing them all the way through arraignment on the day of arrest. The Police Department wasn't prepared to ask the court for that power until it had some objective way to know which suspects could be relied upon to show up for arraignment on their own. Vera agreed to try adapting, for police use, the decision-making tools it had developed for arraignment judges in the Manhattan Bail Project (described in the previous section of this report).

Court approval was secured for the experiment and, starting in one pilot precinct, Vera staff gathered and verified information about the community ties of misdemeanor suspects as arresting officers brought them in. When the weight of a suspect's community ties met pre-determined eligibility criteria, and his prior record did not exclude him from further consideration, project staff recommended to the precinct desk officer that the suspect simply be issued a summons to appear at court on a fixed date.

The pilot project so quickly and substantially cut into the waste of police patrol resources that, after five months, the Department began expanding it to other precincts. By July 1967, the new procedures were in place city-wide.

An audit showed that, over the next four years, each of the 32,000 summonses issued freed up an average of 10 hours of police time – a savings valued at \$6.7 million (in 1967 dollars), most of which was invested in more patrol by the police officers. Thousands of citizens, charged with minor violations of the penal law, were enabled to keep their jobs, remain with their families, and prepare their defenses before going to court. Ninety-five percent appeared voluntarily for arraignment.

The procedures developed in the Manhattan Summons Project soon became standard operating procedure in the New York City Police Department, and police departments across the country followed suit. In 1971, the Vera guidelines and the court orders that made the Manhattan Summons Project possible were codified in New York law.

The Manhattan Summons Project gave the Police Department both confidence in Vera as a partner and an appetite for further innovation. In

The procedures developed in the Manhattan Summons Project soon became standard operating procedure in the New York City Police Department, and police departments across the country followed suit.

1967, the Department formalized the partnership with the first of the string of contracts for planning, research and technical assistance that has governed the relationship ever since. In the previous year, the Department had stationed two lieutenants to work at the Institute in a Police Liaison Office. Establishing this office at Vera signalled to the rest of the law enforcement community the depth of the Department's commitment to research and development, and the police personnel who have rotated through the office over the past twenty-five years have helped shape and sharpen the Institute's work. There has been plenty of work to do:

- Hispanic prisoners held in precinct lock-ups could not communicate with the cops on duty because of language barriers. In 1966, when suicide attempts were rising, Vera developed a

system for the quick transfer of Spanish-speaking defendants from the precincts to the Correction Department, which employed more bilingual personnel. Suicide attempts subsided.

- New York, like other cities in the 1960s, experienced an increase of incidents in which white police officers shot and killed black youngsters. In 1967, Vera helped the Department draft stricter rules on deadly force. Vera's explanatory *Guidelines On the Use of Deadly Force* were distributed to every officer, together with the Department's new and more restrictive rules. Then, in 1969 Vera designed and published detailed procedures for all agencies that would be involved in the *Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions*. Put into practice in New York several times over the following years, these plans helped minimize violence to and by police officers; other departments have used these books as blueprints for constructing their own procedures.
- New York's Bowery presented the sort of challenge to the criminal justice system found on skid rows everywhere: Police officers would round up derelicts lying in doorways or sprawled unconscious across the sidewalk, charge them with public drunkenness, vagrancy or disorderly conduct, toss them into precinct "drunk tanks," and transport them to court. The judges had no plausible solution; they were forced each year to process thousands of sick and disoriented alcoholics through the court and, in short order, back to the Bowery where they resumed drinking and drifting. Some died during the court process. In 1967, Vera and the Police Department pioneered a new response to the street alcoholics. Vera opened a 50-bed detoxification center on the Bowery. Two-man "rescue teams" – a plainclothes police officer and a recovered Bowery alcoholic – patrolled the area in unmarked cars and coaxed the most deteriorated drunks off the streets to spend five days drying out. Vera had medical personnel on hand to help them through detox and to deal with the illnesses and broken bones from which they suffered. The result: New York finally had a medical response to a medical problem, and the court and the police were freed from an inappropriate burden as arrests for public drunkenness on the Bowery went from 4,000 in 1967 to 29 in 1968. In due course, following New York's example, jurisdictions across the country moved their primary response to public drunkenness from "drunk tanks" and

arraignment courts to detox centers and after-care referral. The Manhattan Bowery Project moved quickly to expand its services, to include after-care and out-patient treatment aimed at extending the periods of sobriety for the Bowery drunks who went through detox. Some escaped their addiction entirely, and a few of these became rescue aides and counselors in the program. Today, as an independent non-profit agency, the Manhattan Bowery Corporation sends rescue teams into other areas of the city, to bring street alcoholics into detox and to provide mobile psychiatric treatment to the homeless. It operates residential centers where recovered alcoholics can live in an atmosphere of sobriety and work in Manhattan Bowery business ventures until they graduate to the regular labor market. The Manhattan Bowery Project provides mobile medical services to the homeless population throughout Manhattan, and it has established residences for the homeless mentally ill with whom the rescue teams come into contact on the streets.

- In 1969, Vera and the Police Liaison Office launched a pilot project to speed up and modernize the process of getting defendants arraigned, once they reached the courthouse. This permitted arresting officers to be released – to go back on patrol, or to go off duty if their tours were over – except in cases where their testimony would be required at arraignment. A 1985 audit showed that this Pre-Arraignment Project (now institutionalized city-wide) saved the Department \$27,150,000 in police time, in that year alone.
- Even after arraignment, criminal cases waste patrol resources. Police officers spent thousands of hours each year waiting in court to testify on days when cases were adjourned or dismissed. Starting in 1967, Vera persuaded prosecutors and judges to cooperate with the police in a series of pilot projects aimed at keeping cops on patrol. Vera developed a city-wide “alert” system by which police stayed on the street but could be called in to the courthouse on short notice. A 1977 audit showed that, in Brooklyn, the Appearance Control Project was avoiding an average of 70 police court appearances each day, an annual savings of \$2 million in that borough alone. At that point, Vera staff was able to turn over to the Department the responsibility for managing its Appearance Control Unit.

By the mid-1970s, as these and half a dozen other police-Vera programs became permanent fixtures, the Department was hit by a fiscal crisis. Between 1974 and 1982, the city lost over 9,000 police officers, at precisely the same time that reports of crime and demand for police services were growing. The question every police manager wanted answered was how to get more results from fewer troops. One answer came from Vera’s *Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City’s Courts* (New York: Longman, 1981). That seminal book documented why some felony arrests, but not others, lead to convictions, and it led to the identification of things police can do to prevent the collapse of stranger-to-stranger felony cases. The first and most important: Work harder on preparing the felony arrests that the officers were already bringing into the system.

Felony Case Preparation

Vera designed a Felony Case Preparation Project and tested it in the 43rd Precinct in the Bronx. The basic idea was to have precinct detectives conduct a thorough follow-up investigation immediately after each felony arrest, before the case goes to the prosecutors in the Complaint Room. The Vera-trained detectives searched out additional evidence, recorded witnesses’ statements, found additional witnesses to fill out the evidentiary basis for a prosecution and, after proper warnings, took formal statements from the suspect. As Vera expected,

In the test precinct, the percentage of felony arrests indicted by the District Attorney increased by 53 percent. Sentences to “felony time” – more than a year in prison – increased by more than 45 percent, and prison terms of five years or more doubled.

detectives following these “case enhancement” steps in the pilot precinct were able, in almost all felony arrests, to present prosecutors with a full written report of the evidence before the suspect even reached the District Attorney’s Office.

The results were impressive. In the test precinct, the percentage of felony arrests indicted by the District Attorney increased by 53 percent. Sentences to "felony time" – more than a year in prison – increased by more than 45 percent, and prison terms of five years or more doubled. And there was no increase in arrest-to-arraignment time. Vera's Research Department, having tracked these measures of performance in neighboring precincts, was able to demonstrate that the effects were due to the new procedures alone. In September 1981, after Vera helped test the new case preparation procedures in several other precincts, the Department began expanding a version of this program to every precinct in the city.

Research on the Civilian Complaint Review Board

In the mid-1980s, the Department asked Vera to help it assess the performance of The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), and advise it on possible improvements in procedure and function. The CCRB has been the subject of controversy since it was established in 1966. Under authority granted in the City Charter, the CCRB was created to receive, investigate and hear complaints filed by civilians against police officers and to recommend disciplinary action to the Police Commissioner in appropriate cases. The agency is responsible for the resolution of complaints involving (1) misuse of Force, (2) abuse of Authority, (3) Discourtesy and/or (4) use of Ethnic slurs (FADE).

For years, Department officials had been concerned about the low credibility of the CCRB among segments of the public and among police officers. Department officials wanted to take a dispassionate look at how the CCRB works – whether it functions as a fair and accessible grievance resolution mechanism, whether it is capable of providing satisfaction to civilian complainants, and whether it succeeds in enhancing the Department's ability to reduce police misconduct toward the public.

Vera's research on the CCRB, carried out between 1986 and 1991, had three parts: (1) a quantitative review of the dispositional process, for which Vera staff secured, coded and analyzed quantitative data on over 6,000 complaints received by the Civilian Complaint

Review Board: (2) a qualitative review of cases processed, for which Vera researchers collected full file data on a subsample of 150 of these cases, selected to represent adequately the various CCRB dispositional categories and various complaint types; and (3) a survey of complainants (designed to assess their satisfaction with the CCRB) and a series of focused discussions with line officers (designed to elicit their perceptions of and experiences with the civilian complaint review process).

Few complaints are "substantiated" – and few complaints can be. Vera's research suggests that the infrequency of substantiated complaints largely springs from the evidentiary weakness of the cases against officers, or from real ambiguity inherent in many underlying interactions between police and public.

Taken as a whole, the three research reports point up the limited ability of the adjudicatory process either to satisfy complainants or to influence police behavior toward citizens. The CCRB's difficulties in achieving these goals did not spring from an unfairness in the dispositional process. Rather, there were substantial barriers, inherent in the caseload itself, to any adjudicatory process reaching definitive disposition of the vast majority of complaints filed with the CCRB. The great majority of CCRB complaints simply cannot be definitively disposed by a process of investigation and adjudication. The "unsubstantiated" cases are clearly not all groundless in fact. But most of them are, for a variety of reasons detailed in Vera's reports, poor material for any process relying on formal investigation and formal determination of an action's propriety. Given these limitations, it becomes increasingly apparent that the CCRB dispositional process is not likely either to satisfy the objectives of most complainants or significantly to enhance the Department's efforts to reduce police misconduct.

Complainants and subject officers were found to be widely disgruntled with their experience of the CCRB – despite Vera's finding, after reviewing the dispositional process and

outcomes, that obviously flawed dispositions were rare, given the evidence available to investigators and to the Board. Few complaints are "substantiated" after full investigation – and few complaints can be. Vera's research suggests that the infrequency of substantiated complaints largely springs from the evidentiary weakness of the cases against officers, or from the real ambiguity inherent in many underlying interactions between police and public.

Vera's research also pointed up the dual nature of the problem that arises when complaints are disposed as "unsubstantiated" because evidence of complainants' allegations cannot be obtained or because it does not meet a reasonable standard of proof: This neither vindicates the complainant nor absolves the subject officer.

Vera researchers found that officers and complainants hold divergent views of the CCRB's caseload. Complainants usually imagine that the CCRB is handling mostly complaints that allege brutal police misconduct, while Vera's qualitative review of the FADE caseload shows it to consist principally of more mundane complaints of minor force, abuse and discourtesy. However minor complainants' cases were, in relation to their assessment of the typical CCRB case, they were generally convinced that they had been seriously wronged. Police officers, whether they had been subject to CCRB process or not, generally believed that the majority of CCRB complaints were utterly groundless or malicious.

Dissatisfaction was widespread among both groups. The views expressed by complainants and subject officers were often diametrically opposed. Both were convinced that the CCRB process was biased against them and that an "unsubstantiated" finding favored the other party. Complainants – particularly the minority of complainants whose cases were fully investigated – believed there is no way to "win" at the CCRB. Officers, whose views about the caseload suggested to them that officers should be "exonerated" in more cases, were convinced that cops couldn't win. Their views were deeply shaped by a widely-shared conviction that merely being the subject of a CCRB complaint is detrimental to an officer's career within the Department – no matter how the complaint is disposed.

Surprisingly, the levels of satisfaction with the CCRB process reported by complainants and by officers were not strongly associated with "winning" or "losing" in the dispositional sense. Complainants in "substantiated" cases were less frequently satisfied with their CCRB experience than were those who withdrew their complaints or accepted conciliation. Police officers, on the other hand, were convinced that complaints remained on their records and hurt their careers even when "exonerated" or "unfounded".

The composition of the Board itself – an issue that has dominated public debate about the CCRB for over 25 years – was not was not central for either the complainants or the officers whose views were gathered in this research. Of course, some complainants believed that the police dominate the CCRB process and were distressed by that; similarly, some officers complained about civilian domination of the CCRB and its process. But these were a minority in both groups, and many (in both groups) were simply unaware of the current composition of the Board.

Other issues were more powerful influences on attitudes. For complainants, satisfaction was largely determined by the dispositional stage reached before their complaint was disposed (*i.e.*, drop-out, conciliation, or full investigation) and by the "fit" between the complainant's objective and the dispositional stage reached. Many complainants reported that they just wanted to report the incident, receive an apology, or have the officer "spoken to." Relatively few complainants reported wanting the officer to be seriously punished. Very few whose complaints were subject to full investigation expressed any satisfaction with the CCRB process; many of them opined that they would have found more satisfaction in a more informal and quicker process of case resolution.

For officers, the central concerns were: (1) the Department's use of CCRB complaints (rather than dispositions, which are so often "unsubstantiated"), in career decisions, and (2) the Department's use of an apparently arbitrary cut-off number of CCRB complaints when targeting officers for special scrutiny by commanding officers. Police officers argued that, by using CCRB complaint histories in making career decisions, the Department's effort to shape

officer behavior is counter-productive – that it discourages some officers from engaging with the community and leads others to hesitate in dangerous situations.

Complainants and officers did agree on many points, though both groups characterized the CCRB experience as slow and confusing. Neither group appeared to be particularly well informed about how the CCRB worked or about the meaning of the various case outcomes. And, surprisingly, both groups expressed a strong preference for some form of face-to-face interaction – some opportunity to look their adversary in the eye. This preference, however, sprang from the strong conviction, expressed by both groups, that they were in the right: Thus, it remains unclear whether greater use of mediation and other informal, face-to-face methods of dispute resolution would really increase the satisfaction levels of either group.

CCRB in the Current Period

Vera's work on the CCRB continued into the beginning of the current contract period, to help Department officials work through the implications of the research findings, which had pointed up inherent incompatibilities among the three CCRB goals.

Generally, the research data showed the CCRB process to be fair, but not very credible (to complainants, to subject officers or to the general public). And the fact that so many complaints are poor material for any process relying on formal investigation and adjudication substantially undermines the utility of the CCRB process to Department managers trying to understand and to control officer misbehavior, whether by deterrence (punitive responses to individual instances of misconduct) or by preventive measures (*e.g.*, training, assignment). Some of Vera's research findings have already been used by the Department to improve CCRB policy and procedure.

The Feasibility and Desirability of Steady Tour Assignment

During the preceding contract period, Vera staff completed and submitted to the Department a final report of the Institute's evaluation of the Department's "steady tours" experiment. That pilot project, mounted in the 115th Precinct, aimed to reduce work-related stress among police officers by assigning them to permanent tours of duty. The conventional assignment method up until that time rotated officers through the three tours over the course of a few months.

Vera's final report concluded that steady tours did reduce stress – the primary objective for the project when it was launched. More important, however, were Vera's findings about the significant management gains realized in the experimental precinct. The precinct was better managed because, on each tour, all patrol personnel were placed under the supervision of a platoon commander, drawn from the otherwise underutilized lieutenant rank. These reporting relationships could be maintained across time, instead of changing with every rotation of tour assignment. This management structure is possible only with steady tour assignment of all police officers and sergeants in a precinct.

On the basis of Vera's findings in the pilot project, the Department expanded the steady tour program; the first expansion encompassed one precinct in each of the six remaining borough commands. Vera helped this initial expansion by preparing a policy memo, identifying the successful features of the 115th Precinct program that should be replicated and setting forth recommendations for how the expansion should be carried out. This memo was used by Department officials to frame the orders implementing expansion of steady tour assignments. Vera staff then assisted the Department to put it into effect in all precincts.

Study of the Department's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT)

The advent to crack cocaine markets in American cities sparked a nationwide renewal of interest in street-level narcotics enforcement by police. During the '70s and early '80s, this strategy was viewed as a labor-intensive, corruption-

prone and ultimately ineffective method of reducing the volume of drug trafficking, and consequently fell out of favor with law enforcement officials. But neither the federal effort to interdict drugs at our borders nor the assaults by police and prosecutors on domestic distribution networks prevented the rapid growth of crack cocaine markets across the nation. In focusing on the higher levels of drug distribution throughout the '70s and early '80s, law enforcement to some extent "lost the streets" to narcotics traffickers. The burgeoning crack trade of recent years further undermined order and eroded the quality of life in so many inner-city neighborhoods that local police departments across the country redirected their strategic attention – and their resources – to street-level narcotics enforcement.

The New York City Police Department's deployment of Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNTs) was the nation's most fully elaborated street-level drug enforcement strategy. TNT is designed as a mobile, concentrated overlay of plain-clothes and undercover narcotics officers, supplementing the normal police activity for about 90 days in each TNT target area. TNT saturates a target neighborhood with drug enforcement personnel, generating a high number of quality arrests with rapid "buy and bust" tactics in an effort to eliminate street-level drug marketplaces and interior drug locations. The TNT objective is to restore a target community's own capacity to preserve order and the quality of life, so that TNT personnel can move on to the next drug-infested neighborhood.

The community problems which TNT was designed to address are reasonably well known, and they are not limited to New York City: the crack cocaine epidemic; the encroachment of street-level drug markets into formerly stable neighborhoods; escalating property crime in areas where trafficking takes hold; record-breaking numbers of drug-related homicides; street-level warfare among dealers; and fear and intimidation levels that keep local residents off the streets and away from the parks and playgrounds of their own neighborhoods.

New York's deployment of TNTs attracted considerable national attention; its shortcomings and successes are likely to have a substantial influence on the evolution of drug enforcement

strategies elsewhere. But the useful knowledge that can be extracted from New York's experience with TNT has much broader applications – even within the New York City Police Department. TNT's design is grounded in a recognition that drug trafficking and a poor quality of life are mutually reinforcing problems: abandoned cars are used to stash drugs; abandoned apartments

TNT's shortcomings and successes are likely to have a substantial influence on the evolution of drug enforcement strategies elsewhere. But the useful knowledge that can be extracted has broader applications – even within the New York City Police Department. Because TNT's goals are defined, at least in part, in terms of a neighborhood's quality of life and its ability to reclaim its streets in partnership with police, knowledge about TNT's effects has utility beyond the field of narcotics enforcement itself – in the further development of problem-solving community policing.

become crack-houses; street-level drug traffic inhibits legitimate public traffic. Traditional narcotics enforcement strategies have allowed this cycle of decline to entrench itself in vulnerable neighborhoods, causing many communities to feel abandoned by the police. TNT was conceived as a way to disrupt and reverse this cycle, and to focus on some of the concrete problems associated with drug-trafficking in specific neighborhoods. Because TNT's goals are defined, at least in part, in terms of a neighborhood's quality of life and its ability to reclaim its streets in partnership with police, knowledge about TNT's effects has utility beyond the field of narcotics enforcement itself – in the further development of problem-solving community policing.

In 1989, Vera began a two-year study of these community-level effects of TNT. Funding for the research has come from the Department, from the National Institute of Justice, from the

Ford and Guggenheim Foundations, and from the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety. As the Deputy Mayor's Office has been the city funding agent during this contract period, full reports of the work during this period are made there. Here, the work is summarized.

Vera's research in this area is focused on the extent to which a complex enforcement strategy such as TNT can reduce disorderly conditions; reduce the street crime that often springs up around drug marketplaces; reduce fear of crime among community residents; increase their use of community amenities (e.g., streets and parks); improve attitudes toward police; and help the community "regain control" of its streets. Of course, it is not inevitable that TNT will achieve these benefits, nor that, if it achieves them, it will do so to the same degree in each of the rather different target neighborhoods; it is also possible that TNT creates new problems. Vera's research is designed to pick up important information about these effects as well.

The continuous presence of Vera's field ethnographers on the streets of the study neighborhoods provide a rich record of observations and interviews about the nature of the drug trafficking and street conditions that characterize these neighborhoods, and how they change over time as a result of TNT's intervention.

The research employs a longitudinal design in two Brooklyn neighborhoods which were early targets for TNT and, for comparison, in a third neighborhood whose drug market won it designation as a future TNT site. By documenting community-level activities before TNT began in the target areas, Vera developed baseline information on drug trafficking and associated community attitudes and perceptions. Vera then continued observing community activity and gathering data — during, and for months after, TNT's deployment in each target neighborhood.

The data collection techniques employed by Vera's TNT researchers over the fourteen-month data-collection period included: a multi-wave household survey of community residents; street ethnography which focuses on the local drug users and dealers; analysis of statistical record data; and a variety of qualitative research techniques, including panel interviews, which focus on community leaders, and interviews with and observations of the police themselves.

The household surveys tracked the community's perceptions, attitudes and behavior before, during and after TNT is deployed. The presence of TNT is expected to have direct effects on those who live or work in the target areas, but because TNT is expected to reduce non-narcotics crime and improve the quality of life in the target area, it is also expected to have indirect effects on local perceptions, attitudes and behavior. The statistical data Vera collected reveals community conditions, the volume and type of TNT activities, and the influence of TNT on criminal activity in the target areas. Vera researchers' interviews with TNT officers and other police officials, as well as Vera's field observations of their activities in the target areas, provide a detailed picture of how TNT operated in these neighborhoods and how it interacted with other units of the Police Department, other agencies of government, and community groups.

Most importantly, the continuous presence of Vera's field ethnographers on the streets of the study neighborhoods provide a rich record of observations and interviews about the nature of the drug trafficking and street conditions that characterize these neighborhoods, and how they change over time as a result of TNT's intervention.

Race, ethnicity and place of origin, socioeconomic class, and type of residence (homeownership versus rental) turned out to be major cleavages in the TNT target neighborhoods, despite the fact that none encompassed more than a few square blocks. In seeking to describe the community effects of street-level narcotics enforcement in the TNT target areas it was necessary to record the many varied "voices" that speak in (and sometimes for) each of these neighborhoods. While most observers of the inner city are mindful of the complex nature of

urban neighborhoods, policy makers addressing issues of drug enforcement often speak as though there were only one community, fully engaged in mortal combat with the ranks of drug traffickers. Vera's research is designed to record and document the underlying polyphony of several communities' responses to street-level drug enforcement, and to paint a picture of the complex position which drugs occupy in these neighborhoods.

Vera will make its final report to the city in the Summer of 1992, and will publish its final research reports shortly thereafter.

The Community Police Officer Program – CPOP

By the mid-1980s, the police agenda for Vera reached the heart of the matter – patrol. Most of the Department's patrol resources were committed to Radio Motor Patrol. And most of that patrol time was spent driving around, waiting for 911 calls or responding to them. Working under its technical assistance contract with the Department, Vera first surveyed the results of a decade of research into patrol, which made it difficult to believe that so much random preventive patrol was worth the effort: Many 911 calls were not emergencies, and random patrolling between 911 calls was not deterring much crime. Most important, radio-car cops had become strangers to the law-abiding as well as to the delinquent. Their lack of local knowledge and their constant movement had led to neglect of the traditional "order maintenance" function of police – keeping the streets fit for families, schools, churches and local businesses to get on with ordinary life.

In response to the city's growing need for a new style of policing, and guided by the research survey, Vera worked with the Department in 1984, to design the pilot Community Patrol Officer Program. It combined, in a single officer, the law enforcement duty to arrest, the deterrence functions of the old-style foot cop, the outreach and community organization responsibilities of community relations officers, and the crime analysis and strategic activities of police planners. Vera trained ten patrol officers and a sergeant to perform this community policing function in the 72nd precinct, which was chosen for the pilot, and

began to fine-tune the role by daily debriefing of the officers assigned to perform it.

Six months into the pilot Community Patrol Officer Program, the Police Department began to expand it. By September 1986, 367 Vera-trained officers were working in CPOP units out of 37 precincts. Two years later, CPOP units had been introduced to all 75 precincts and over 750 CPOs have been on patrol in the city's neighborhoods ever since.

What was happening on the streets of New York City was more than police officers walking beats again. CPOP cops were assigned responsibility for developing and implementing strategic plans to return neighborhood streets to their residents. They were as likely to organize a community group to prevent crime as to arrest a felon after a crime has occurred.

The arrests that CPOP officers make were not the random result of radio motor patrol: most of them are made in pursuit of strategic plans drawn up with community input and approved by their sergeants, and many of the arrests were the result of tips from local residents who learned from CPOP to trust their cops.

The CPOP officers proved to be unusually effective cops. They made more arrests per officer than almost any other unit in the Department, while still meeting with tens of thousands of the citizens who live and work on their beats. The arrests that CPOP officers make are not the random result of radio motor patrol: Most of them are made in pursuit of strategic plans drawn up with community input and approved by their sergeants, and many of the arrests are the result of tips from local residents who learn from CPOP to trust their cops. Each year CPOs participate in thousands of community meetings, organize scores of block associations, recruit thousands of civilian block watchers, and do whatever else is necessary to identify and eliminate the "quality of life" conditions that breed crime and fear in their neighborhoods. Despite their almost daily contact with all elements of the community, they

have been less likely than regular patrol officers to be complained about to the Civilian Complaint Review Board – the local knowledge they pick up from their new form of patrol appears to serve the city well in this regard too.

As part of its effort to assist the New York City Police Department to place CPOP units in every precinct in the city, Vera staff administered to hundreds of new CPOs the training program that the Institute designed to prepare officers for CPOP patrol; this training was also administered to officers serving as replacement or alternate CPOs and officers from the Housing Authority Police Department.

Refining CPOP's Design and Training Programs

When the city moved to extend CPOP to all of the city's precincts, Vera continued to train the new CPOs and their sergeants, to monitor implementation, and to help the Department use the results of Vera's monitoring to amend the program's design and the supervisory structure that supports it.

At a crucial point in the development of CPOP, Vera staff conducted a thorough review of the program's operations in the first twenty-one precincts to which the program had been expanded. The 110-page report of the findings from this review concluded with twenty recommendations for Police Department actions to strengthen the process of expansion and institutionalization. From 1987 through 1990, much of the work of Vera's police planning staff and the Department personnel assigned to CPOP matters was devoted to implementing this report's recommendations. Among the additional tasks falling to Vera were these:

- Preparation and dissemination of a CPOP Implementation Manual, for use by Precinct Commanders and Unit Supervisors in precincts to which CPOP has been expanded;
- Incorporation of materials on CPOP in the Police Academy's basic curriculum and its curriculum for in-service training;
- Development and presentation of a CPOP orientation program as part of the Department's Executive Development training for all command personnel.

As a follow-up to recommendations made by Vera in its operational review of CPOP implementation in the first twenty-one precincts, the Police Commissioner appointed an Inspector to act as the Department's city-wide coordinator of the Community Patrol Office Program and to liaise on a daily basis with Vera's police planning staff. With the assignment of this Inspector to the Office of the Chief of Patrol, and the staffing of his office with a Captain and four sergeants assigned as Borough CPOP coordinators, CPOP was given the solid base within the Department to move properly from demonstration project to a standard element of policing in New York. Equally important was the Department's agreement to Vera's recommendation that a Training Task Force be established, made up of representatives of the Office of the Chief of Patrol, Office of Chief of Department, Police Academy, and the Vera Institute. Vera's Associate Directors for Police Planning and for Research then assisted the Police Academy staff to design a CPOP Orientation Program for presentation to the Department's Command Staff as part of the Police Department's Executive Development Program.

By January 1991, when the current contract period commenced, Vera had transferred to Police Academy staff all of the standardized community policing training courses developed and tested by

By January 1991, Vera had transferred to Police Academy staff all of the standardized community policing training courses developed and tested by the Institute over the preceding six years.

the Institute over the preceding six years. The basic training modules have now been made part of the general training program for new recruits and part of the management courses for newly promoted sergeants and lieutenants. The Academy now delivers the training Vera designed for the Department's Command Staff.

Vera's operational review of the first twenty-one CPOP units, and early findings from the Institute's CPOP research suggested that

CPOP's capacity to benefit the community in the ways intended is in large measure a function of the problem-solving skills within CPOP units. Vera's field observations suggested as well that, if CPOP were to produce the benefits expected from it, the problem-solving dimension of the CPO role would require more developmental attention than it had received in the pilot and in the early stages of the demonstration project.

For patrol officers to put at the core of their role the task of identifying and analyzing neighborhood problems and then developing corrective strategies is more complex and demanding than the traditional role for which they were trained. And CPOP's course of development in the 1984-1986 period had not given individual CPOs or their supervisors adequate tools to perform this dimension of the role effectively, or to supervise effectively those who are trying to perform it.

To address these problems, Vera designed a Police Problem-Solving program with the following objectives:

- To strengthen the CPOP unit supervisors' ability to direct, teach and oversee officers in carrying out the planning and problem-solving dimension of the CPO role;
- To provide CPOs with realistic models of the planning and problem-solving process, more specific guidelines for carrying it out and some on-site assistance in applying those guidelines to the problems they encounter on their beats; and
- To provide Precinct Commanders and administrators with a broader and deeper understanding of how the CPO program can be most helpful to them and of how they can involve themselves with the program to realize its maximum benefits.

Vera staff contacted other police agencies where various problem-oriented policing programs were underway, and obtained training and orientation materials from them. Staff reviewed the literature, both on police problem-oriented program strategies, and on problem-solving strategies within the general field of management. Then, with funding from the Department and from several small local foundations, Vera

prepared the required training program and engaged the training staff to deliver it.

Vera's *Problem-Solving Guide* describes in detail the steps of the community policing problem-solving process. After it was reviewed and approved by Department officials, Vera administered it, as a pilot, to the supervising sergeants of the CPOP Units in Patrol Borough Brooklyn North. With some minor modifications suggested by the pilot, this problem-solving training program was then administered by Vera staff to all CPOs and CPOP Unit sergeants and to the precinct commander of every precinct in the city. In its final form, this training program is a sixteen-hour course in structured problem solving, aimed principally at community policing officers working at the precinct level, delivered in

For patrol officers to put at the core of their role the task of identifying and analyzing neighborhood problems and then developing corrective strategies is more complex and demanding than the traditional role for which they were trained

four-hour segments over a four-day period. Until responsibility for delivering this training program was transferred to the Police Academy's staff, Vera personnel presented the material from the *Problem-Solving Guide*, and Vera's training coordinator used problems raised by officers and supervisors attending the training to demonstrate the problem-solving process. At the end of each training session, the training coordinator returned to the CPOP Unit office and worked with individual CPOs on the crime and order-maintenance problems they were dealing with in their Beat Areas.

Once the problem-solving training program had been fully developed and the course had been delivered at least once in each precinct in the city, Vera helped Police Academy staff take direct responsibility for it and, by January 1991, transfer of responsibility to the Academy staff was complete.

Finally, all CPOP supervisors were given an additional one-day training program, designed by Vera to accomplish the following:

- To familiarize supervisory personnel with a structured approach to problem solving.
- To demonstrate the use of a structured approach to problem solving by reviewing and analyzing problems suggested by the sergeants.
- To prepare supervisors to introduce the basics of problem solving to field personnel.
- To instruct supervisors in how to guide CPOs in the use of problem solving skills.
- To assist the CPOP sergeants to adopt supervisory practices that foster the development of problem-solving skills among CPOs.

During this period, Vera staff worked with Department personnel to collect detailed information about strategies developed by scattered CPOP Units to deal with frequently recurring categories of the crime and order-maintenance problems they encounter – particularly, the problems of active drug locations. Information about the tactics and strategies developed by individual CPOs and CPOP Units throughout the city were collected, to inform the Department's management on which CPOP problem-solving tactics worked and which did not work, under what conditions. Upon completing these surveys, Vera staff created "case studies" which were then incorporated into the various CPOP training programs.

CPOP: The Research

Like most of the Vera program development efforts that preceded it, CPOP was an *action-research* project. Under contracts with the federal, state and city governments, Vera mounted a major research project to mine CPOP for answers to questions such as: What specific patrol tactics work, against what kinds of crime conditions or order maintenance problems, under what local circumstances? What kinds of officers and sergeants do best in this kind of policing? What relationships, if any, exist between recorded crime rates and the elimination of persistent local crime conditions or order maintenance problems? Practical answers are needed if community policing is to be done well in New York, and in the

many other cities moving in this direction. The research Vera undertook was also designed to help the Department begin incorporating the style and substance of community policing and problem-solving into all aspects of police operations.

The research design called for intensive study of the CPOP program in six precincts, for six months each. One precinct in each of six borough commands was selected – precincts representing a broad spectrum of racial, ethnic, and socio-economic groups, located throughout the city, that had reasonably well-functioning CPOP units at the time of selection. All the beats within each of the six precincts were included in the research, yielding a total of 54 beats (and an equal number of CPOs at the start of the research) and six supervising sergeants. The data collected for analysis is quite extensive, and includes the following:

- All CPOs were interviewed, at the beginning and at the end of the data collection period, about their prior experiences as police officers, their perceptions and assessments of the CPO program, their attitudes toward the communities in which they are assigned to CPOP patrol, their reasons for volunteering for the program, their expectations of CPOP, and the ways in which they distribute patrol time across the range of tasks that must be performed by a CPO.
- Detailed information was gathered, by direct observation and by interview, about the priority crime and quality-of-life problems that each CPO identified in his or her beat, the extent to which the CPOs actually analyzed those problems, the strategies they developed to correct them, the extent to which the strategies were implemented, the extent to which the problems were affected by the strategies, and the extent and manner of community involvement in the problem-solving process.
- The perceptions and assessments of CPOP held by non-CPOP officers working in the research precincts were collected and analyzed.
- Interviews with sergeants and Commanding Officers in the study precincts explored the nature of challenges posed to CPOP supervisors by the unusual features of this form of patrol, and the sergeants' responses to those challenges were observed and recorded.
- Community leaders in the research precincts were interviewed about their perceptions and assessments of CPOP design and operations.

In addition to this precinct-level data collection effort, Vera staff collected data about each research subjects' history of complaints lodged with the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), and searched out data about their Police Academy performance.

Techniques for evaluating the problem-solving performance of each of the officers in the research precincts were developed, along with the research instruments appropriate to those methods. These were pilot tested, refined and then applied to the more than one hundred problems identified as priorities by the CPOs who were subjects of this research. These problems became a separate database for analysis. Once these performance assessments of the CPOs' handling of the sampled problems were completed, these data were computerized as well.

Regular police officers were in fact able to apply problem-solving policing techniques, and they were able to forge crime-prevention and crime-control partnerships with neighborhoods The principles of community-oriented, problem-solving policing could, and probably should, be applied to functions throughout the Police Department

As findings emerged from this large research database, they suggested that regular police officers could, indeed, apply problem-solving policing techniques and could forge crime-prevention and crime-control partnerships with neighborhoods. But the data also revealed how different the role of the CPO is from traditional patrol, and that its proper performance requires substantial training – both for officers and for their supervisors. The research identified ways to improve the level of CPO performance and ways to strengthen and enlarge the program – in particular, by more closely integrating the work of CPOP units with the rest of the patrol force. The bottom line: the principles of community-oriented,

problem-solving policing could, and probably should, be applied throughout the Police Department. To do so, changes would have to be made to training curricula, supervision techniques, and assignment practices.

At the final meeting of the CPOP Research Advisory Committee, Professors Herman Goldstein, George Kelling and Jameson Doig met with Vera's research staff for two days to review the data collection methods, the data analysis designs and the findings of the research. The final report of this research was then submitted to the Department in draft form, and the Institute's staff met with the new Police Commissioner to brief him on its implications and to obtain his suggestions about its final editing and publication. The report is now in book form. *Community Policing: CPOP in New York* will be published shortly by Sage Publications. Drafts of the manuscript have already found an eager audience nationally, because police executives everywhere are struggling to find ways to move police practice to a community-oriented, problem-solving model and away from reactive random patrol.

Impressions and findings that emerged from the research over the years were shared with New York's police officials in monthly meetings, but they were also shared with police researchers and police commissioners in other jurisdictions. In New York, the preliminary research findings helped, early on, to identify some of the strengths and weaknesses of the CPOs' problem-solving performance, and they shaped the contents of Vera's *Problem-Solving Guide* and problem-solving training sessions for CPO's and their supervisors.

In short, CPOP – which, from 1984 through 1991, engaged more officers in community policing than were engaged in that work by any other department in the country – became firmly embedded in the standard operations of New York City's Police Department. When David Dinkins was running for office, a recurrent theme of his campaign was a commitment to enlarge CPOP and devote more resources to the style of policing it embodied. One of his first acts was to appoint, as his new Police Commissioner, Lee P. Brown, who had championed community policing in Houston, Texas. The tasks that lay before Vera and the Department at the beginning of his administration were three:

- To apply the lessons learned in successful CPOP precincts to the full scope of police activity – to make community policing more than a Community Patrol Officer Program.
- To devise better ways to monitor and assure quality performance of problem-solving within the community policing framework – to move beyond measures of response time and arrest volume in assessment of the performance of individual officers and precinct units.
- To make New York's experience available to other police agencies.
- To develop procedures and structures to encourage, facilitate, and monitor problem-solving activities by all patrol personnel.
- To determine any need for additional precinct staff to support such a problem-solving effort.
- To determine what Headquarters staff support precinct-based problem-solving activity requires.
- To determine a means for evaluating the results of these activities.

Problem-Solving Policing – Beyond CPOP

As CPOP was being transformed from a demonstration project to a standard feature of policing in New York, Vera's police planning staff and the Department's CPOP managers began to explore ways of extending into other areas of police work the principles and the problem-solving techniques developed for CPOP. At the end of 1988, with fiscal constraints and increasing workload militating against an increase in the number of police officers assigned to CPOP, Vera's attention turned to some experience in other jurisdictions suggested that personnel deployed in more traditional, more reactive patrol modes might be trained to work together with CPOs, employing problem-solving responses to the crime and order-maintenance conditions that officers encounter in both modes of deployment.

Beginning in 1989, Vera staff worked with the supervisory staff of the 62nd Precinct, to develop a pilot Problem-Solving Policing Project. The objectives of this pilot were:

- To determine the degree to which personnel assigned to traditional patrol duties (e.g., Radio Motor Patrol, Foot Patrol) could effectively participate in problem-solving activities.
- To determine the most appropriate methods of orienting supervisory and line personnel to the techniques of problem-solving in patrol work.
- To develop supervisory and management structures that support problem-solving policing throughout an entire precinct.
- To determine the manner in which existing CPOP Units could support problem-solving activities by other members of the patrol force.

The 62nd Precinct was chosen for the pilot because, at the time, it was one of only twenty-four precincts operating under the relatively new steady-tour program (which Vera had helped the Department develop in a previous contract term and is described above). Steady tours permit permanent assignment to sectors of the personnel in RMP cars. Vera and the Department viewed steady tour assignment (and the steady sector assignments it permits) as essential for effective problem-solving policing.

Vera began this project by administering a one-day problem-solving orientation and training program to all precinct personnel (both uniformed and civilian). Over the following months, Vera staff designed and implemented new procedures and devices to support problem-solving by the precinct's conventionally deployed personnel.

For example, Vera staff developed a computer database application which accesses the mainframe computer database at 1 Police Plaza, to download all incident reports and complaints from the precinct and to produce from that data daily "Hotsheets." The Hotsheets, which are distributed to all patrol personnel in the precinct, help identify problems at particular locations, and help them formulate strategies to address them. The daily Hot Sheet organizes, by location and sector: all calls-for-service (911 runs) in the precinct over the past 24 hours; all crime complaints for the previous day; information already gathered about specific problem locations in the various RMP sectors; identity of all persons residing in the precinct who are wanted on Criminal Court Warrants; all arrests made during the week; and any unusual occurrences in the precinct during the previous 24 hours.

Use of the Hot Sheets by all patrol officers in the 62nd precinct, and use by precinct managers of other reports Vera programmers designed to access the expanding down-loaded database, permitted the precinct to eliminate a series of recurrent problems that generated scores of calls-for-service and absorbed a disproportionate amount of patrol resources. That, in turn, freed up time of officers in the sector cars, which they could devote to problem-identification and problem-solving in conjunction with the precinct's CPOs.

To generate maximum participation by all patrol personnel in the problem-solving process, Vera staff helped the precinct's administrators develop a system in which officers assigned to RMP Sectors could nominate problems for priority attention. Each RMP team in the precinct regularly completed a "problem identification form" for review and comment by the officers' supervising sergeant, then by the platoon commanders – who set the priorities for all problem-solving by CPOs and by RMP officers in the precinct. These priority listings were communicated to the patrol force by a "Feedback Memorandum" which, in effect, established problem-solving goals for each sector team.

In the Fall of 1990, Vera submitted to the Department a status report on the pilot Problem-

Use of the Hotsheets by all patrol officers in the Problem-Solving Precinct, and use by precinct managers of other reports Vera programmers designed to access the expanding down-loaded database, permitted the precinct to eliminate a series of recurrent problems that generated scores of calls-for-service and absorbed a disproportionate amount of patrol resources. That freed up time of officers in the sector cars, which they could devote to problem-solving in conjunction with the precinct's CPOs.

Solving Policing project, including an analysis of lessons learned from it and a plan for restructuring the management and assignments of the patrol force at the precinct level.

THE MODEL PRECINCT

A laboratory in which to develop and test the practices and procedures necessary to perform all police functions within the community policing framework

In October 1990, after months of planning undertaken at the direction of New York City's new police commissioner (and shortly before the term of this contract began, the Police Department released its *Resource Allocation and Staffing Study*. This was a comprehensive review of the Department's resources, its plans for their allocation in a future centered on community policing and problem-solving functions, and the additional resources it would need to perform those functions properly in a city of New York's size and complexity. The study was the centerpiece of Mayor Dinkins' *Safe Streets, Safe City* plan, announced the same day.

The *Staffing Study* examined and proposed detailed revisions to the Department's organizational structure, and it identified ways of maximizing uniformed police presence at the neighborhood level. It committed the Department to making community policing its dominant style for delivering police services throughout the city. It was followed, in January 1991, by a second report, *Policing New York in the 1990s: The Strategy for Community Policing*, which detailed the plan for converting the entire Department to the new model of police work. The plan is complex and, as might be expected, will take years to unfold. But a key element of the plan is the creation of a "Model Precinct," in which to fully implement and fully staff the community policing model and in which to test all aspects of the plan under real life conditions.

The Model Precinct Project emerged from discussions between Vera staff and Department officials in September 1990. To extend CPOP practice and to engage more patrol officers in problem-solving, Vera proposed a pilot project in which one precinct's organizational structure would be altered by consolidating its Anti-crime Unit, its Street Narcotic Enforcement Unit (SNEU), its CPOP Unit, and its smaller specialty patrol units into a single Special Operations Unit. The idea was to abandon the Balkanized structure of the patrol force, so that *all* personnel pooled in the new unit would be assigned to neighborhood foot beats in uniform, and would be cross-trained in each of the three areas of patrol specialization. In essence, plain clothes Anti-crime and uniformed SNEU operations would no longer be

monopolized by **units**, which absorb manpower and supervisory resources whether or not a precinct needs that form of deployment during a particular period – instead, they would become **tactics**, available for use when (and only when) a priority problem in a beat area within the precinct requires that tactic.

Breaking down the artificial specialty barriers within the patrol force, Vera hypothesized, would greatly increase the capacity of a precinct to perform community policing functions and would permit the new Special Operations Unit to engage in far more robust problem-solving than an isolated CPOP Unit can. Vera proposed that the lessons learned in the Problem Solving Policing project, conducted in the 62nd Precinct (and described above) should be applied to the Model Precinct as well, so that the rest of its patrol officers (those in the sector cars responding to 911 calls) could be integrated in the problem-solving activity that characterizes community policing. The result, it was thought, would be a laboratory in which it would be possible to develop and test the practices and procedures necessary to perform all police functions within the community policing framework. The Department agreed to the proposal for a Model Precinct Project, and included it in the *Policing in the 1990s* plan.

Once the Department's *Staffing Study* and *Policing in the 1990s* were published, Vera suggested and the Department agreed that the Model Precinct be staffed at the levels called for by the former and that the Model Precinct project be enlarged to incorporate the full community policing design outlined in the latter. The 72nd Precinct (where Vera had designed and tested the CPOP pilot) was selected, and Vera staff began working with the command staff there in January 1991. A Project Development Team was constituted, consisting of the precinct's Commanding Officer, the Special Operations Unit Lieutenant, the Operations Coordinator, the CPOP Unit Supervisor, and two members of Vera's staff. The Project Development Team has, in turn, worked closely with the First Deputy Commissioner, the Chief of Department, and the Chief of Patrol (each of whom has been given direct responsibility for some aspect of the Model Precinct project.

Vera proposed a pilot project in which one precinct would be altered by consolidating its Anti-crime Unit, its Street Narcotic Enforcement Unit (SNEU), its CPOP Unit, and its smaller specialty patrol units into a single Special Operations Unit. The result, Vera hypothesized, would be greatly to increase the precinct's capacity to perform community policing functions and to permit the new Special Operations Unit to engage in far more robust problem-solving than an Isolated CPOP Unit can.

January – July 1991

Staffing the Model Precinct

The first task was to specify a precinct organizational structure that would facilitate the transition from traditional to community oriented policing on a precinct-wide basis. Before that could be done, closure was needed on some still-open questions about the staffing levels that the Department would ultimately achieve as a result of the *Safe Streets, Safe City* initiative. In the *Staffing Study*, the 72nd Precinct was rated as requiring 210 “sworn” personnel to handle the community policing job envisioned for the Department in the future. Subsequently, the New York State Legislature, when it passed the legislation necessary to fund the Department’s increase in manpower, reduced this precinct’s quota to 204 sworn staff: two captains, six lieutenants, 26 sergeants, and 170 police officers. To meet this staffing level, a total of 10 sergeants and 38 police officers were transferred to the 72nd Precinct by the time the project formally began, on April 8, 1991.

Once the Staffing Study and Policing in the 1990s were published, Vera suggested and the Department agreed that the Model Precinct be staffed at the levels called for by the former and that the Model Precinct project be enlarged to incorporate the full community policing design outlined in the latter. The 72nd Precinct (where Vera had conducted the CPOP pilot) was selected, and Vera staff began working with the command staff there in January 1991

The *Staffing Study* had also specified the functional distribution of personnel within the command. At the police officer level, six officers were to be assigned to administrative staff positions, 40 officers were to be assigned to CPOP-type foot beats, 13 officers to Anti-crime and SNEU Units, 8 probationary officers to the precinct’s field training unit, and the balance (103 officers) were to be assigned to “emergency response” units (essentially, the RMP sector cars) or to a few other conventional public safety tasks.

Because personnel assigned to the RMP emergency response units would be deployed differently than those assigned to the neighborhood patrol function, Vera helped design an organizational structure which places the precinct’s patrol personnel in three functional units: administrative, public safety, and neighborhood sector patrol. The Administrative Unit – the officers assigned to the six authorized staff positions – function under the direct supervision of the Precinct Commander or the Operations Coordinator. When patrol officers in the Model Precinct are assigned to the emergency response function, as “Community Sector Officers”, they are supervised by the Platoon Commanders for deployment much as the RMP units were deployed in the 62nd Precinct Problem-Solving Policing Project (described above). When they are assigned to the

neighborhood sector patrol function, as "Community Beat Officers", they are under the lieutenant commanding the Special Operations Unit (SOU) and are directly supervised by sergeants assigned to that Unit. Personnel assigned to the SOU also perform the functions of the former Precinct Warrant, Highway Safety, Crime Prevention and Fingerprint Units.

The most dramatic change was the elimination of the old ten-officer CPOP Unit and the emergence of a 60-officer Special Operations Unit consisting of all personnel authorized by the *Staffing Study* for assignment to the 72nd Precinct's CPOP, Anti-crime, and SNEU units. These seven sergeants and 53 police officers became a consolidated resource working under the direction of the Special Operations Lieutenant. Vera staff designed and oversaw a set of training programs to cross-train all of these personnel in the three specialities (CPOP, Anti-crime and SNEU), so that the SOU Lieutenant and his sergeants could deploy selected groups of them in any of these modes, as circumstances in any particular beat might require. Nevertheless, each SOU officer was given a primary assignment: to patrol a specific neighborhood Beat Area in uniform and to perform there the full range of community policing activities – problem-solving and the other activities characteristic of CPOP.

Organizing the Beat Areas

There had long been ten Radio Motor Patrol sectors in the 72nd Precinct, and while Vera and the Project Development Team envisioned making revisions to these sector boundaries to reflect deeper knowledge of naturally occurring neighborhood aggregations, that effort was postponed until some experience of operating in the new mode could be brought to bear on it. Thus, all sergeants and police officers assigned to the Community Sector patrol function were given specific geographic assignments, based on the old RMP sector boundaries, so that, within each platoon, there is a specific sergeant and a specific Community Sector emergency response team responsible for any given Community Sector, just as each Beat Area has one or more Community Beat officers permanently assigned to it.

Vera helped the Project Development team conduct a preliminary neighborhood analysis, from which 16 neighborhood Beat Areas were defined. The characteristics and

The most dramatic change was elimination of the old ten-officer CPOP Unit and the emergence of a 60-officer Special Operations Unit consisting of all personnel authorized by the Staffing Study for assignment to the 72nd Precinct's CPOP, Anti-crime, and SNEU units. These 7 sergeants and 53 police officers are now a consolidated resource for community policing, working under the direction of the Special Operations Lieutenant

Vera designed and oversaw a set of training programs to cross-train all of these personnel in the three specialities (CPOP, Anti-crime and SNEU), so that the SOU Lieutenant and his sergeants could deploy selected groups of them in any of these modes, as circumstances in any particular beat might require. Nevertheless, each Community Beat Officer was given a primary assignment: to patrol a specific neighborhood Beat Area in uniform and to perform there the full range of community policing activities — problem-solving and the other activities characteristic of CPOP

known problems within each Beat Area determined the initial number of personnel assigned to it from the SOU for neighborhood patrol. Two officers were assigned to each of three beats in primarily industrial areas of the precinct, to provide a combination of one and two tour coverage six days a week. Eight beats were allocated three neighborhood sector patrol officers each, to provide a combination of one and two tour coverage seven days each week, while the remaining five beats started off with four officers each to provide seven day two tour coverage. Because these SOU officers are expected to be deployed in groups, from time to time, to perform Anti-crime and SNEU functions, individual beat coverage will on those occasions be reduced, but the structure devised for this experiment should never leave a beat uncovered over the course of a week — one of the clear deficits experienced when community policing functions were limited to CPOP Units, which could assign only one CPO to each Beat Area. SOU sergeants have also been assigned specific geographic areas of responsibility. As a result, there is a specific SOU supervisor and between two and four SOU police officers responsible for every block within the precinct.

Establishing Problem-Solving Operations Precinct-wide

The second task for Vera was helping the Project Development Team develop operations that promote community oriented problem-solving policing by *all* members of the Model Precinct, regardless of functional assignment. The first step was to establish the functional and supervisory structures described above. The next step was to require each SOU sergeant to hold two meetings each month with the SOU officers assigned to each of the neighborhood beats within his or her supervisory zone, to discuss problems within the Beat Areas and what is being done about them, and to set goals and objectives for the coming period. The SOU Sergeants were made responsible for bringing into these meetings the Community Sector personnel (both sergeants and the police officers) who cover the Community Sectors that embrace the Beat Areas that are the subject of the meeting, so that they can participate in the identification of problems and the formulation of strategies to solve them. The SOU sergeant was also made responsible for bringing in other units and commands, when appropriate, including the member of the Precinct Detective Squad assigned to the area

in which the beat is located, representatives of the Narcotics Division, Public Morals Division, and Borough Task Force.

Some lessons from Vera's CPOP demonstration program were directly incorporated into the Model Precinct's SOU, to insure implementation of the problem solving process. Personnel assigned to the Special Operations Unit were required to maintain Beat Books, which record information of all kinds about the problems and resources on the beat, and which include monthly work plans identifying specific problems to be addressed and the strategies designed to address them. These work plans are developed by the neighborhood beat officers themselves, in consultation with their sergeants, who were made responsible for coordinating the efforts of all officers assigned to the same beat. The work plans also provide the focus of the twice monthly meetings, to keep the Community Sector patrol personnel (sergeants and officers) aware of problems being addressed by Community Beat Officers within their sectors, and to give them opportunities to participate in developing strategies to address these problems and to nominate other problems for the collective attention of all patrol personnel assigned to that area. SOU supervisors were also required to review the monthly work plans with the Special Operations Coordinator who, in turn, was made responsible for insuring that problem-solving efforts are coordinated with the Platoon Commanders and the emergency response officers working in radio cars under them.

Steps were taken to formalize the process — piloted in the 62nd Precinct — by which personnel assigned to Community Sector emergency response units can nominate problems for problem-solving attention and design strategies to address them. Implementation of this phase of the program began at the end of May 1991, with the designation of permanent sector teams by each Platoon Commander.

By July 1991, after the Community Sector patrol personnel had been assigned to their permanent sectors for approximately ten weeks, they were asked to identify and nominate problems for problem-solving attention by completing forms designed by Vera for the Project Management Team. The process put in place for this aspect of Model Precinct operations starts with the forms and proceeds to meetings between the emergency response personnel and their sergeant supervisors, in which the problems nominated and the solutions proposed are discussed. The sergeants

The structure devised for the Model Precinct should never leave a beat uncovered over the course of a week — one of the clear deficits experienced when community policing functions were limited to CPOP Units, which could assign only one CPO to each Beat Area. There is a specific SOU supervisor and between two and four Community Beat Officers responsible for every block within the precinct

then make written comments on the forms and submit them to the Platoon Commanders, who review them and submit the result to the Precinct Management Team. The Community Sector patrol supervisors can, of course, bring conditions and problems identified by their personnel to the attention of the SOU supervisor covering the area in which the sector is located, for inclusion and discussion at the next scheduled meeting of the Community Beat patrol team concerned.

Getting and Using Information in the Model Precinct

The Model Precinct's operations requires a different value to be placed on information, and new devices for its dissemination and use in identifying community problems and evaluating strategic responses to them. The principal devices introduced in the first six months are computer generated Hotsheets, and analyses of precinct calls-for-service. Vera worked with the Department's Management Information Systems Division (MISD) to develop these applications:

Personnel assigned to the Special Operations Unit are required to maintain Beat Books, which record information of all kinds about the problems and resources on the beat, and which include monthly work plans identifying specific problems to be addressed and the strategies designed to address them

- **Precinct Hotsheets.** In June, Vera staff began the preparation of computer generated daily Hotsheets and the distribution of them to all precinct personnel. The Hotsheet computer application Vera has developed for use in the 72nd Precinct builds upon the model Vera designed for the 62nd Precinct Problem Solving Policing experiment described above. However, the new version benefits substantially from technical advances made at Vera's request by staff of the Department's Management Information Systems Division. Beginning in June, the 72nd Precinct has been able to access directly a version of the Department's SPRINT database and download a file containing information on all of the 911 runs in the precinct for any 24 hour period. This provides the precinct with substantially more information than was available in the 62nd Precinct, and on a more timely basis.
- **Calls-for-Service Analysis: Hotspot Identification.** In addition to providing data for Hotsheet preparation, downloading data on 911 runs allows the precinct to build a Calls-for-Service (CFS) database which can be searched to identify locations that generate large numbers of radio runs for the Community Sector emergency response units. Once these locations or "hotspots" are identified, precinct personnel can be assigned — from Community Sector or from

Community Beat patrol resources, or both -- to attempt to identify the problems which lead to the radio runs and to initiate actions to correct them. In addition to working with current data, Vera helped the precinct obtain a CFS database containing all of the 911 runs in the precinct for the year 1990, which can be used both as a source of hotspot identification and as a base against which to evaluate the results of current interventions. Analyses of this database were made available to all personnel assigned to Community Sector emergency response units, to assist them in the initial identification of hotspots in their areas of assignment. Community Sector patrol officers were assigned to investigate conditions at specific hotspots within their beat, to identify and correct the problems which were causing the 911 runs.

- **On-line Complaint Preparation.** The Management Information Systems Division installed the On-line Complaint System (OLCS) in the 72nd Precinct. This system provides the precinct with the ability to enter complaint data directly into the headquarters computer from remote precinct terminals. It also provides an ability to download complaint data for crime analysis purposes, including the preparation of computer generated crime spot maps. MISD also made the resulting complaint database available to the Project Development Team for use in Hosheet preparation. Access to this database reduces the amount of data which must be manually input for Hosheet preparation, and has resulted in the creation of a complaint database which may be linked to the CFS database to provide additional information on precinct hotspots.
- **Mapping Calls-for-Service.** MapInfo, an off-the-shelf computer software program, had already been adapted by the Department's MISD to read the location at which a crime was committed, match it against a dictionary of locations, and assign X and Y coordinates to each complaint file. The X and Y coordinates then permit the preparation of plotter-driven crime spot maps. In the Model Precinct, Vera staff began experimenting with the application of MapInfo to the precinct's new Calls-for-Service database, to permit the plotting of CFS information.

Bringing Other Units into Alignment

Transformation of an entire police department to a new style of policing and defining an entirely new set of functions for all personnel is an enormously complex

Once "hotspots" are identified, precinct personnel can be assigned — from Community Sector or Community Beat resources, or both — to identify the problems which lead to the radio runs and to initiate actions to correct them

Vera helped the precinct obtain a Calls-for-Service database containing all of the 911 runs in the precinct for the year 1990. It can be used as a source of hotspot identification and as a base against which to evaluate the results of current interventions

undertaking: Even at the Model Precinct level, implications of the shift go well beyond the patrol force itself.

- **Administrative Support Systems.** Converting to a community oriented problem-solving style of policing substantially increases the need for administrative support at the precinct level, and adds new dimensions to those functions. The *Staffing Study*, recognizing this, increased by one person the number of Police Administrative Aides assigned to the 72nd Precinct's CPOP unit. Early on, experience with the Model Precinct's Special Operations Unit suggested that this is not enough to handle the new clerical tasks associated with the problem-solving model, particularly when personnel assigned to Community Sector emergency response units are expected to become heavily involved in problem-solving as well. As a result, Vera sought ways to automate some clerical functions, reducing the overall burden. By mid-summer, a number of administrative functions had been automated, including preparation of the administrative and daily roll calls for the Special Operations Unit. The applications designed for roll call preparation have reduced the time required for these tasks by over 50 percent. At the end of June, Vera's staff began evaluating the feasibility of computerizing other administrative functions, including the preparation and maintenance of Community Profile Records (Beat Books). The benefits of automating Beat Books could be enormous, both because of the time saved and because it would greatly increase officers' ability to share information across Beat Areas and across time.
- **Supporting the Warrant Function.** Project staff also automated clerical operations associated with the execution of warrants – a demanding function formerly performed by a specialized unit, but now folded into the consolidated SOU. It is of obvious importance that handling the flow of warrants not divert the individual Community Beat patrol officers from their core community policing tasks and the demands of problem-solving. Therefore, since June, when warrants are received at the precinct they are entered into a computerized warrant database which is used to generate letters to persons wanted and lists of persons wanted (broken down by Community Sectors and by Beat Areas). The computer now advises precinct personnel periodically on warrants, within their area of patrol responsibility, which should be returned to the Warrant Division. In addition, MISD arranged for the 72nd Precinct to have direct access to the Office of Court Administration

Warrant Database: this permits precinct staff to verify the status of warrants, without first going either to the Warrant Division Offices or the Brooklyn Criminal Court building.

- **911 Load-Sharing Between Community Sector Units and Community Beat Officers.** A critical task facing Vera in the Model Precinct project is to devise a system for sharing the 911 workload between Community Sector Officers assigned to the emergency response function and the Community Beat Officers patrolling the neighborhood beats. To integrate the activities of the Beat and the Community Sector personnel, it is essential that personnel assigned to these functions share the 911 work as well as the problem-solving workload — even though their principal mode of deployment is obviously best suited to one or the other of these basic precinct patrol jobs.

In a community oriented problem-solving police department, officers assigned to the Community Sector emergency response function cannot be used merely to go from job-to-job answering 911 calls. They must be given the time and opportunity to engage in problem-solving and other community policing activities. On the other hand, personnel assigned to Community Beat patrol have more time to spend on an individual call and can possibly do more than merely quickly deal with the immediate incident. In the early months of Model Precinct operations, opportunities for load-sharing between Community Sector and Community Beat personnel proved extremely limited. Of the 239 code signals used by the Police Department to assign personnel to 911 runs, only 60 permit the assignment of one-person units. The vast majority of assignments authorized for one-person response involve cases in which reports are required — either past property crimes or accident cases. Vera's analysis of the CFS database for the 72nd Precinct for the year 1990 shows that only 21 percent of all calls transmitted to the precinct fell into the one-person response categories.

Opportunities for the Community Beat officers to respond to this portion of the 911 workload are further reduced by their occasional deployment in Anti-crime or SNEU mode, and by the frequent lack of fit between the hours they work (a function of the priority problems in their Beat Areas) and the hours when eligible 911 calls are made. In its mid-year progress report on the Model Precinct, Vera lists this as a priority area requiring further work, with MISD and with Model Precinct managers, to find ways around the problems.

To integrate the activities of the Community Beat Officers and the Community Sector emergency response units, it is essential that personnel assigned to these functions share the 911 work as well as the problem-solving workload — even though their principal mode of deployment is obviously best suited to one or the other of these basic precinct patrol jobs

Cases are now assigned for detective investigation based on where in the precinct they arise rather than when they occur, which was the former basis for assignment

- **Bringing in the Precinct Detective Squad.** When it established the Model Precinct, the Police Department increased the number of personnel assigned to the 72nd Detective Squad by two sergeants and six detectives, bringing the size of the unit to three sergeants and 18 detectives. Detective Bureau supervisors, working in conjunction with the Project Development Team, developed a case assignment rotation schedule designed to limit the geographic area in which any individual detective would be assigned a case for investigation. Based on a workload analysis, the 72nd Detective Squad divided the precinct into three case assignment zones, assigning six detectives to each zone. Thus, on any given tour there are two detectives from each zone scheduled to work. Under the new plan of operations, cases are assigned for investigation on the basis of where in the precinct they arise rather than when they occur. Individual detectives were designated as liaison to the police officers assigned to each of the 16 neighborhood Beat Areas, and were required to attend community meetings in the those areas as well as the biweekly meetings conducted by the neighborhood sector supervisors responsible for them.
- **Bringing in the Organized Crime Control Bureau.** The Project Management Team also arranged with the Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) to integrate the efforts of OCCB with those of precinct personnel, particularly in the fight against local drug markets. Narcotics Borough Brooklyn South assigned a fully staffed module of its operations to the 72nd Precinct. Individual members of the module were designated as liaison to the six neighborhood sector supervisors, and began regularly to attend precinct team meetings, to develop strategies to address specific drug problems within the beat areas.

Training

Finally, Vera staff had to devise an appropriate training system to get the Model Precinct up and running – given the plan for assignment and supervision of its personnel. The training program grew naturally from the training programs Vera created for CPOP, which were adapted to the Model Precinct as follows:

- **All Uniformed Personnel.** As it is intended that there be no differences, except current assignment to function, between the mission of personnel assigned to Community Sector patrol and the mission of those

assigned to Community Beat patrol in the Special Operations Unit, all were required to attend the Basic Community Policing Training course and the Problem-Solving Training course – both designed by Vera for CPOP – for a total of 5 days of training. Having gone that far, the same training requirement was established for patrol personnel assigned to staff functions.

- **Crime Prevention Training.** The objective of the Department's Crime Prevention Training Course is to equip officers to conduct residential security surveys, a function delegated to Community Beat Officers under the Department's *Staffing Study*. With the elimination of the Model Precinct's specialist Crime Prevention Unit, all personnel assigned to Community Beat patrol were scheduled to take the Crime Prevention Training Course.
- **Community Beat Patrol Personnel.** As personnel assigned to the Community Beat patrol function will periodically be deployed in Anti-crime and SNEU modes, it was necessary to provide them with additional training in these specialities. The Department's one day SNEU training course, administered by the Chief of Patrol's Office, was given to all Community Beat patrol function who had not yet attended it. In addition, Vera staff, Model Precinct managers, and Police Academy staff designed and administered a one day training program in plainclothes Anti-crime tactics for Community Beat patrol personnel. And, as they have been made responsible for warrant execution and searching crime scenes for fingerprints, the Department's warrant execution and fingerprint training programs were administered for them.
- **Civilian Personnel.** Civilian personnel, too, are to be educated about community oriented policing and problem solving – they are an integral part of overall precinct operations. To accomplish this, they were scheduled to attend Day 1 of the Basic Community Policing Training Course, and a second day of training specifically geared to their roles in precinct operations.
- **Supervisory Training.** Precinct supervisors attended the Basic Community Policing and Problem Solving Training courses – together with the personnel they supervise. In addition, Vera and Model Precinct project staff designed and administered a one day training program for supervisory personnel, focusing on precinct operations under the Model Precinct concept, the development of the area team concept, and supervisory practices.

As it is intended that there be no differences, except current assignment to function, between the mission of Community Sector patrol personnel assigned to radio cars in the Public Safety Unit, and Community Beat personnel to neighborhood patrol in the Special Operations Unit, all attended the Basic Community Policing Training course and the Problem-Solving Training course – both designed by Vera for CPOP – for a total of 5 days of training

There are dozens of separate projects being pursued, each of which will contribute toward converting the entire Department to community policing, but the Model Precinct is the laboratory. Vera's job is to help the Department refine this model, to try things in the 72nd that might work but ought to be tested before being made standard features of community policing in New York, and to provide technical assistance to the other 74 precincts as they move — albeit, more slowly — toward the operations envisioned for them

In order to build neighborhood-based teams and to facilitate joint planning, personnel assigned to the Community Sector patrol function and personnel assigned to Community Beat patrol in the Special Operations Unit attended joint training sessions. The training was conducted on an area-specific basis. That is, the Community Sector emergency response teams and the Community Beat officers who work in the same areas of the precinct were trained together. This permitted trainers to use problem-solving exercises grounded in actual problems existing in the area patrolled by the officers.

The Model Precinct is Launched

By July, all of the precinct's personnel had been given community policing assignments either in Community Sector emergency response units or on Community Beats. All had attended a two day community policing training program, and the personnel assigned to the Community Beat function had received the additional skill training necessary for them to assume the Anti-crime, SNEU, Warrant, Crime Prevention, Fingerprint, and Highway Safety functions. The rest of the training program was scheduled for completion during the late summer and fall of 1991.

The purpose of this project is to develop useful knowledge about how the New York City Police Department can best move toward the mission and functions outlined in its *Policing New York City in the 1990s* plan. There are dozens of separate projects being pursued within the Department, each of which will contribute toward that objective — but the Model Precinct is a laboratory in which the Department can experiment with solutions to a number of the issues that must be satisfactorily resolved if the overall plan is to achieve its stated objectives. Vera's job is to help the Department refine this model, to try things in the 72nd that might work but ought to be tested before being made standard features of community policing in New York City, and to provide technical assistance to the other 74 precincts as they move — albeit, more slowly — toward the operations envisioned for them.

By mid-summer, it was far too early to draw any conclusions about the success of this venture. But it was possible to report some of the small lessons learned. One issue of importance to the Department's larger plan is whether the Model Precinct can be structured and managed so that patrol personnel assigned to Community Sector

emergency response teams in RMP cars can be freed up to do problem-solving work. In July, Vera staff reported the results of a preliminary look: The Department had set a 60 percent "utilization rate" of personnel assigned to RMPs as a goal for community policing operations, and the *Staffing Study* set precinct emergency response unit personnel levels with that in mind. Vera staff computed the utilization rate for a two week period in June, comparing the current year with the previous one and found that, although the 911 workload increased by six percent in 1991, the utilization rate of emergency response units decreased significantly, dropping from 107 percent in 1990 to 68.5 percent in 1991. But because the Department's formula for determining utilization rates ignores the fact that certain calls (included in the denominator) are actually handled by units other than the RMP sector cars, Vera measured the change in utilization rate of the RMP cars alone: it was 77.8 percent for 1990, and 51.9 percent for 1991. This was good news and it set the stage for concerted work toward making productive use of the time of emergency response personnel that has been freed up for problem-solving work.

Even in July, Vera staff were able to report some happy results from eliminating the Anti-crime, CPOP, and SNEU specialty units. Several early incidents suggested that the greater flexibility in a consolidated SOU is worth a lot. Here are two:

Police Officer Teddy Louie was assigned to Neighborhood Sector Beat 4 in the 72nd Precinct, a neighborhood composed primarily of Asian-Americans. As Officer Louie speaks several of the Chinese dialects, he was able to work quickly to establish good rapport with the residents and merchants there. Among his first priorities was to solicit merchants' cooperation in combating extortion by Asian youth gangs. On July 11th, Officer Louie was patrolling his beat in uniform when he was approached by a merchant, who told him that a young man had just attempted to extort money from him on threat of setting fire to his shop. The merchant told the young man that the owner was not present and that he should return in several hours to speak to the owner. Officer Louie immediately reported the problem to the Special Operations Unit supervisor, who immediately mounted a plain-clothes Anti-crime operation involving Officer Louie and three other SOU officers. They were there when the youth returned. As a result, within two hours of the merchant's approach to his neighborhood sector patrol officer, the arrest was made; the Grand Jury indicted for Grand Larceny by Extortion.

In both incidents, the flexibility provided by the consolidated SOU enabled the precinct to mount the most effective type of operation, to deal with the particular problem in the shortest period of time — and without needing to involve units which, in the past, might or might not have been available at all

The second section of this report, which summarizes the history of Vera's work with the New York City Police Department, is introduced with a description of the some early problem-solving done by Police Officer Robert Orazem – one of the patrolmen in the 72nd precinct's CPOP pilot project. His performance as a community police officer earned him a promotion to Detective rank, but he has continued playing a formative role in the development of community policing in New York.

Detective Orazem, as Coordinator of the Model Precinct's Special Operations Unit, was approached by a local resident with information about drug sales being conducted at a grocery store at 6108 3rd Avenue. He and one of the SOU sergeants went immediately to the area and conferred with neighborhood residents who gave them additional information about the time and method of the sales. The Sergeant then mounted a uniformed SNEU operation and quickly arrested three sellers, seizing a substantial quantity of drugs from the grocery store. The entire episode was successfully completed within four hours from the time Orazem got the word from the local resident. The Brooklyn District Attorney's Narcotic Eviction Unit has now begun eviction proceedings at the location.

To involve the other 74 precincts more deeply in the Department's transformation to community policing, even as the Department moves deliberately toward completion of the many detailed tasks set forth in Policing New York City in the 1990s, Vera suggested that a leaf might usefully be taken from the history of the Department's development and dissemination of the CPOP program

In both cases, the flexibility provided by the consolidated SOU enabled the precinct to mount the most effective type of operation, to deal with the particular problem in the shortest period of time – without any need to involve specialized units which, in the past, might or might not have been available at all.

July – December 1991

During the summer, Vera staff continued assisting the Model Precinct Project Team and other Department managers in the development of systems to support precinct-wide community policing operations. Vera also assisted the Department to develop a program to involve the other 74 precincts more deeply in the move to community policing, even as the Department moves deliberately toward completion of the many detailed tasks set forth in *Policing New York City in the 1990s*.

In advance of the Police Commissioner's August Executive Staff retreat, Vera staff met with the First Deputy Commissioner, other Department managers, and consultants from McKinsey & Co., to think through various ideas for

more closely involving precinct personnel in the larger Department effort to plan for a comprehensive move to community policing. Vera submitted the following concept for consideration at the Executive Staff retreat:

Technical Assistance Teams.

Vera suggested that a leaf might usefully be taken from the history of the Department's development and dissemination of the CPOP program. When the Department began expanding CPOP beyond the original pilot, the Office of the Chief of Patrol, the Office of Management Analysis and Planning, and Vera collaborated to assist each new CPOP precinct, in the following way:

- At each stage of CPOP expansion, a kick-off meeting was held, chaired by the Chief of Patrol, at which the commanders of precincts to which CPOP was being expanded were informed of the purpose of the program and the process by which it would be implemented in their precincts.
- The kick-off meeting was followed by a three-day orientation session for the sergeants who would head the new units, covering the details of beat design, personnel selection, supervision, and the like.
- Over the following weeks, the expansion precincts were required to submit status reports on the steps they were taking to prepare the precinct for CPOP, and members of the project team (Chief of Patrol's Office, OMAP, Vera) were made available to provide technical assistance as required.
- Finally, on the assigned date, the new CPOP Units appeared for training, and the program was underway.

In its August memo to the Department, Vera suggested that a similar process might both help advance the growth of community policing throughout the city, and increase precinct-level participation in the overall Department planning process. Vera suggested that:

- The Department should establish a Community Policing Technical Assistance Team and make it responsible for conducting a series of community-policing planning seminars throughout the city. The suggested team would be comprised of: A senior representative of the Chief of Patrol (Captain or above), a member of the Coordination and Review Section of the Chief of Patrol's Office

Vera suggested that the Department establish a Community Policing Technical Assistance Team (TAT) and make it responsible for a series of community policing planning seminars for precinct command personnel throughout the city

What ideas and recommendations do the precinct personnel in attendance have for the Department's overall planning effort?

- (Sergeant of Lieutenant), a representative of the patrol borough concerned, and a Vera staff member.
- The Technical Assistance Team (TAT) should conduct a series of half-day or one-day seminars for small groups of precinct command personnel. The suggested seminars would be organized by Division and would include the Division Commander, the Precinct Commanders, and the Administrative Lieutenants and Special Operations Coordinators from the precincts concerned.
 - The agenda suggested for the seminars was:
 - Review of the Department's Community Policing objectives (*e.g., Policing New York City in the 1990s*).
 - Review of the organization and operation of the Department's Model Precinct project.
 - Review, by each Precinct Commander, of his precinct's community policing status.
 - Examination of some of the specific issues precinct commanders must consider and schedule for implementation. (*E.g., When will the precinct have sufficient resources assigned to Community Beat Areas for those officers to assume warrant, fingerprint, and crime prevention functions?*)
 - In the roughly 40 precincts where officers assigned to Community Beat patrol already cover the entire precinct area, can any of the specialized functions listed above be absorbed by those personnel now?
 - Have all precinct personnel been given permanent patrol assignments (*e.g., permanent RMP sectors, Community Beat Areas*)?
 - What are the precinct's plans for involving emergency response personnel in problem-solving activities? Are personnel patrolling in RMPs scheduled to attend community meetings?
 - How do precinct commanders intend to deploy personnel assigned to the precinct from the next Police Academy class? From the class after that?
 - What ideas and recommendations do the precinct personnel in attendance have for the Department's overall planning effort?
 - Review a reporting format for precinct commanders to report periodically on the status of community policing in their commands.

Finally, Vera proposed that the TAT be made available to render technical assistance to precincts, as requested, as they pursue matters raised in the seminars, and that the TAT prepare periodic reports on the status of community policing

activities in the precincts (with a view towards initiating a second seminar series as patrol resources increase over time and as more is learned about the emerging shape of the Department's community policing activity).

This proposal was adopted for the most part, and Vera staff met with representatives of OMAP, the Chief of Patrol and McKinsey & Co. to flesh out the details. Over the following months, Vera staff participated in a series of 19 TAT meetings throughout the City – one at each Patrol Division level, attended by the Division Commander, the Precinct Commanders, and their community policing supervisory staffs.

During these months, Vera staff continued to assist staff of the Police Academy by taking on assigned roles in the Basic Community Police Training course and in the training and orientation session administered for Division Commanders. Vera also began work on performance measurement systems suitable for a community policing department, and shared some of its early ideas with Department managers and with representatives of McKinsey & Co. who were assisting the Department in this area.

Calls for Service (CFS) and Load-Sharing in the Model Precinct.

In the Model Precinct, where Vera staff maintained a continuous presence, attention turned to calls-for-service. The management of calls-for-service (CFS) at Headquarters and at the precinct level will be a central influence on the direction community policing takes in New York City. If all members of the Police Department are to become involved in problem-solving community policing, members of the uniformed patrol force assigned to emergency response units as Community Sector Officers must be relieved from spending their entire tours of duty going from call to call. Similarly, methods must be found to permit and encourage officers assigned to Community Beats to share in the responsibility for answering calls-for-service originating in their Beat Areas. Load-sharing by the Community Beat officers would not only reduce the workload of emergency response personnel (freeing up some of their time to participate in problem-solving activity), but would also allow beat officers to learn more about conditions on their beats.

It was, in part, recognition of these factors that led the Department to suggest, in the *Staffing Study*, that the number

The management of calls-for-service (CFS) at Headquarters and at the precinct level will be a central influence on the direction community policing takes in New York. If all members of the Police Department are to become involved in problem-solving community policing, officers assigned to emergency response units (radio cars) must be relieved from spending their entire tours of duty going from call to call

The goal specified in the Staffing Plan was to keep below sixty percent the portion of time spent by Community Sector personnel in answering emergency calls (the RMP Utilization Rate)

of personnel assigned to Community Sector emergency response units be increased in each precinct — the goal specified was to keep below sixty percent the portion of time Community Sector personnel spent in answering emergency calls (the RMP Utilization Rate).

But freeing up forty percent of Community Sector personnel time for problem-solving would not, by itself, be enough. To the extent that the Department's dispatching procedures remove RMPs from assigned sectors to answer calls-for-service originating in other areas of a precinct, the officers assigned to emergency response functions will lose the connection to beat areas and to the persons and problems within them that is thought essential for problem-solving — virtually all of the activity characteristic of community policing would default to the Community Beat officers.

Because management of CFS demand is so important to the Department's plans for community policing, Vera staff in the Model Precinct, and the Precinct command staff there periodically reviewed the 72nd Precinct's CFS workload pattern and the precinct's response. Vera staff arranged for downloading the data on all 72nd Precinct 911 runs stored on the Department's SPRINT computer, and subjected them to analysis. Thus, in November, Vera was able to report to the Department the pattern of 911 calls arising in and handled by the 72nd Precinct during the months of July and August, 1991.

Volume and Geographic and Temporal Distribution of the 911 Workload

During the sixty-two day period between July 1 and August 31, 1991, a total of 12,056 calls-for-service arose in the 72nd Precinct. These calls resulted in the dispatch of 9,844 jobs to units in the precinct. While the volume of calls increased 3.8% over the 11,615 calls during the same period of 1990, the number of 911 runs resulting from the calls decreased by 2.8% from the 10,113 runs in the previous year. (72nd Precinct 911 dispatches during the first nine months of 1991 decreased by 4.4% from the previous year, dropping from 40,921 to 39,113.)

The Table below presents the distribution of 911 workload in the 72nd Precinct by platoon. Approximately 25% of the 911 jobs arise on the First Platoon, 30% on the Second Platoon, and 45% on the Third Platoon. The

distribution of calls between platoons during these months did not vary appreciably between the two years. (For the first nine months of 1991 the 911 workload was distributed as follows: First Platoon, 24.0%; Second Platoon, 31.1%; Third Platoon, 44.8%.)

Table 1
Distribution of 72nd Precinct 911 Workload by Platoon
July 1 through August 31, 1990 and 1991

Platoon	1990		1991	
	<u>Jobs</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Jobs</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
First	2,578	25.5%	2,390	24.2%
Second	3,052	30.2%	2,904	29.5%
Third	4,483	44.3%	4,450	45.2%

Table 2 presents the distribution of 911 workload among the RMP Sectors in the Precinct. Again, there is little variation across the years.

Table 2
Distribution of 72nd Precinct 911 Workload by Sector
July 1 through August 31, 1990 and 1991

Sector	1990		1991	
	<u>Jobs</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Jobs</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
A	938	9.3 %	876	8.9 %
B	969	9.6 %	973	9.9 %
C	963	9.5 %	1,098	11.2%
D	717	7.1 %	568	5.8 %
E	1,241	12.3 %	1,106	11.2 %
F	1,190	11.8 %	1,218	12.4 %
G	1,444	14.3 %	1,282	13.0 %
H	676	6.7 %	682	6.9 %
I	1,184	11.7 %	1,201	12.2 %
J	791	7.8 %	840	8.5 %

In November, after analyzing data downloaded from the Department's SPRINT computer, Vera was able to report the pattern of 911 calls arising in and handled by the 72nd Precinct during the months of July and August, 1991

Distribution of the 911 Workload

Table 3 presents the distribution 911 runs between the various response units in the Precinct during July and August, 1990 and 1991. It shows that personnel assigned to Community Sector emergency response units handled 7,857 calls in 1991, or 79.8% of all calls dispatched to the precinct a 1.1% increase over the 7,768 calls handled in 1990.

The Department's Standard Utilization Rate (SUR), is derived by multiplying the number of Community Sector units fielded by 6 hours and 40 minutes (to determine available patrol time), multiplying the number of jobs assigned by 30 minutes (to estimate total time on jobs), and dividing job time by available time. The computation assumes that jobs are handled only by Community Sector teams in RMP cars, and that each job takes 30 minutes. Neither assumption is completely accurate. A precinct's 911 workload is shared by a number of response units other than Community Sector units, and actual time spent on individual jobs varies greatly.

Community Beat officers handled 745 or 7.6% of the calls, a 150% increase over the 297 jobs the CPOP Unit handled in 1990. Personnel assigned to supervisory units handled 548, or 5.6% of the jobs – a 27.5% decrease from the 756 calls handled in 1990. All other responding units handled a total of 694 calls or 7.0% of the workload in 1991 – a 46.3% decrease over the 1,292 jobs handled in the previous year.

Table 4 presents the 1991 distribution by response unit and platoon. The distribution of work between Community Sector personnel and other units varied by platoon. Community Sector personnel in RMPs handled 85.8% of the 911 jobs on the First Platoon, 71.8% of the jobs on the Second Platoon, and 81.8 % on the Third Platoon.

Table 3
Distribution of 72nd Precinct 911 Workload
by Response Unit
July 1 through August 31, 1990 and 1991

Unit	1990		1991	
	Jobs	% of Total	Jobs	% of Total
Community Sector	7,768	76.8%	7,857	79.8%
Community Beat	297	2.9%	745	7.6%
Sergeant/Lieutenant	756	7.5%	548	5.6%
Others	1,292	12.8%	694	7.0%

Table 4
Distribution of 72nd Precinct 911 Workload
by Response Unit and Platoon
July 1 through August 31, 1990 and 1991

Platoon	Total Jobs	Handled by RMPs	Handled by Others
First	2,390	2,051 (85.8%)	339 (14.2%)
Second	2,904	2,086 (71.8%)	818 (28.2%)
Third	4,550	3,720 (81.8%)	830 (20.2%)

Community Sector Unit Utilization Rates

The method used by the Police Department is called the Standard Utilization Rate or SUR, and it is derived by multiplying the number of Community Sector units fielded by six hours and 40 minutes (to determine available patrol time), multiplying the number of jobs assigned by 30 minutes (to estimate total time on jobs), and then dividing

job time by available time to produces the utilization rate. While this is an effective method of estimating the workload of personnel patrolling in RMPs, the computation assumes that jobs are handled only by Community Sector units and that each job takes 30 minutes. Neither assumption is completely accurate. A precinct's 911 workload is shared by a number of response units other than Community Sector team (see Table 4, above), and actual time spent on individual jobs varies greatly. As SPRINT records provide sufficient data with which to compute actual job time, it was possible for Vera staff to compute RMP utilization rate for the 72nd Precinct, using the actual time spent by RMP cars on jobs handled by them (the Actual Utilization Rate or AUR). But this calculation shares with the Department's Standard Utilization Rate the assumption that each unit fielded is available for six hours and 40 minutes during the tour. Tables 5a and b present the result of this analysis.

Table 5a
72nd Precinct 911 Workload Indicators
July 1 through August 31, 1991

Platoon	Sector Cars in the Field	Jobs on Platoon	Jobs Handled by Sector Cars	Minutes On Jobs
First	253	2,390	2,051	52,923
Second	351	2,904	2,086	67,856
Third	407	4,550	3,720	107,831

With the SPRINT data, Vera used actual job time to compute an Actual Utilization Rate (AUR). The Actual Utilization Rates for the Model Precinct were: First Platoon, 52%; Second Platoon, 48.3%; Third Platoon, 66.7%

The 72nd Precinct fielded a total of 1,011 Community Sector Units during the 62 day period. This represents 81.5% of the 1,240 Community Sector Units the precinct should have fielded to meet the precinct's ideal minimum manning staffing levels, which were set in the *Staffing Study* at a level designed to produce a 60% Utilization Rate. (When the Model Precinct Project was implemented in the early months of the year, 38 police officers were transferred to the 72nd Precinct and 30 other officers were transferred between squads within the precinct: Each retained the vacation selection made in his or her previous precinct or squad, so an above-average number of personnel were on vacation during the months of June, July, August, and September, 1991. The reduced manning level was approximately equal on all platoons.) Computation of the utilization rates described above produces the following results:

Table 5b
72nd Precinct 911 Utilization Rates
July 1 through August 31, 1991

Platoon	<u>Standard</u> <u>Utilization Rate</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>Utilization Rate</u>
First	70.8%	52.3%
Second	62.1%	48.3%
Third	84.5%	66.7%

With the exception of Unit 1 on the First and Third platoons, all units handled more jobs outside of their sector of assignment than within

Cross-Sector Dispatching

Table 6 presents a picture of how cross-sector dispatching affected performance of the 72nd Precinct's Community Sector Units between July 1 and August 31, 1991. With the exception of Unit 1 on the First and Third platoons, all units handled more jobs outside of their sector of assignment than within. In some instances the ratio of out-of-sector to in-sector assignments was as high as 3:1 and 4:1. In every instance, more than half the jobs less serious than Priority 3 were out-of-sector.

Table 6
Cross Sector Dispatching in the 72nd Precinct
July 1 through August 31, 1991 *

First Platoon (Average, 4.01 Community Sector Units per tour during period)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Total Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Jobs in Sector</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Jobs Out of Sector</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Out-of-Sector Jobs Below Priority 3</u>	<u>Lower than Priority 3 as % of Out-of-Sector</u>
1	483	288	59.6%	195	40.4%	104	53.3%
2	244	101	41.4%	143	58.6%	81	56.6%
3	420	202	48.1%	218	51.9%	117	53.7%
4	352	171	48.6%	181	51.4%	92	50.8%

Second Platoon (Average, 5.7 Community Sector Units per tour during period)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Total Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Jobs in Sector</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Jobs Out of Sector</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Out-of-Sector Jobs Below Priority 3</u>	<u>Lower than Priority 3 as % of Out-of-Sector</u>
1	396	187	47.2%	209	52.8%	110	52.6%
2	167	72	43.1%	95	56.9%	57	60.0%
3	197	87	44.2%	110	55.8%	63	57.3%
4	438	194	44.3%	244	55.7%	142	58.1%
5	342	118	34.5%	224	65.5%	123	54.9%
6	202	45	22.3%	157	77.7%	99	63.1%

Table 6 (cont'd)
Cross Sector Dispatching in the 72nd Precinct *
July 1 through August 31, 1991

Third Platoon (Average, 6.6 Community Sector Units per tour during period)							
<u>Unit</u>	<u>Total Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Jobs in Sector</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Jobs Out of Sector</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Out-of-Sector Jobs Below Priority 3</u>	<u>Lower than Priority 3 as % of Out-of-Sector</u>
1	585	300	51.3%	285	48.7%	152	53.3%
2	350	98	28.0%	252	72.0%	151	59.9%
3	458	139	30.8%	313	69.2%	173	61.7%
4	654	169	25.8%	485	74.2%	253	52.2%
5	615	199	32.4%	416	76.6%	210	50.5%
6	410	71	17.3%	339	82.7%	189	55.8%
7	263	66	25.1%	197	74.9%	64	32.5%

* To construct the table, cross-tabulations were made in which, for each unit identified as the disposing unit, the number of jobs and the sectors in which they arose were identified and tabulated. A second set of cross tabs were constructed for low priority jobs. Sector groupings were then constructed based on the average number of Community Sector Units fielded, by platoon. For example, an average of 4 units per tour were fielded on the First platoon. This results in the following sector groupings: ABC, DEJ, FI, and GH. As a result, all jobs handled by Unit 1 on the First Platoon that arose in sectors A, B, and C were considered "in sector," while jobs arising in other sectors handled by Unit 1 were considered "out of sector." While this method of computation only approximates the impact of cross sector dispatching, the results are consistent with observations conducted by Vera staff of individual units responding on individual days.

Individual Community Sector Unit Workloads

Table 7 compares activity level of the various Community Sector emergency response units. Personnel assigned to these units on the Third Platoon had the heaviest workloads, averaging between 6.5 and 11.1 jobs per tour. Third Platoon personnel also had the highest percentage of tours on which units handled more than 9 jobs per tour, with several units experiencing double-digit assignments on over 50% of their tours.

Officers assigned to the First Platoon's Community Sector Units ranked second, with workloads ranging between 5.6 and 9.8 jobs per tour. But a relatively large number of First Platoon tours had more than 9 jobs assigned to a unit – most units handled more than 9 jobs on one-third of their tours.

By comparison, officers assigned to Community Sector patrol on the Second Platoon were the least busy, averaging between 4.8 and 7.1 jobs per tour. And the Second Platoon had the lowest percentage of tours with more than 9 jobs assigned – only one unit had double-digit assignments on more than 20% of its tours.

Third Platoon Community Sector response teams had the heaviest workloads (averaging between 6.5 and 11.1 jobs per tour) and had the most units handling more than 9 jobs per tour. Several units experienced double-digit assignments over 50% of the time.

Table 7
Sector Workload Indicators in the 72nd Precinct *
July 1 through August 31, 1991

First Platoon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Days Fielded</u>	<u>Total Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Average Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Low Range</u>	<u>High Range</u>	<u>Tours With Over 9 Jobs Assigned</u>	<u>% Tours with Over 9 Jobs Assigned</u>
A	61	482	7.9	3	19	17	27.9
C	16	90	5.6	3	8	0	0.0
D	32	325	7.3	2	14	11	34.4
E	37	289	7.8	3	19	11	29.7
F	50	413	8.3	3	24	18	36.0
G	46	346	7.5	3	24	15	32.6
H	14	137	9.8	3	19	7	50.0

Second Platoon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Days Fielded</u>	<u>Total Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Average Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Low Range</u>	<u>High Range</u>	<u>Tours With Over 9 Jobs Assigned</u>	<u>% Tours with Over 9 Jobs Assigned</u>
A	61	385	6.3	3	13	8	13.1
C	30	153	5.1	2	9	0	0
D	50	298	6.0	2	11	1	2.0
E	39	193	4.9	2	11	2	5.1
F	61	436	7.1	2	13	13	21.3
G	58	339	5.7	2	14	5	8.6
H	39	189	4.8	1	11	1	2.6

Third Platoon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Days Fielded</u>	<u>Total Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Average Jobs Handled</u>	<u>Low Range</u>	<u>High Range</u>	<u>Tours With Over 9 Jobs Assigned</u>	<u>% Tours with Over 9 Jobs Assigned</u>
A	60	583	9.7	2	16	37	61.6
C	43	343	8.0	3	20	11	25.6
D	26	212	8.2	1	16	10	38.5
E	50	444	8.9	1	19	19	38.0
F	59	652	11.1	4	20	34	57.6
G	61	615	10.1	3	22	32	52.5
H	54	410	7.6	2	14	16	29.6
I	35	261	7.5	2	14	8	22.9
J	25	162	6.5	3	13	4	16.0

* Adjustments were made to the data, to prepare this table. SPRINT data occasionally reflect data input errors. For example, Sector "B" is sometimes identified as the unit assigned to and disposing of a job, despite the fact that Sector B is always coupled with Sector A and, no matter how many cars are assigned on a given platoon, Sector B is never fielded as an individual unit. SPRINT data also periodically demand some interpretation. For example, the data may indicate that Sector A only handled one job, for a total job time of six minutes on the tour, when all other units on that tour handled multiple assignments. A reasonable explanation would be that Sector A was taken off the queue as a result of the job it handled, possibly as a result of an arrest or some other occurrence which precluded the unit from answering additional jobs. Thus, to assemble a table designed to illuminate the relative workload of individual units, data were eliminated from the table when they suggested that a unit handled only one or two jobs on a tour and that the total time for them was less than 60 minutes.

Table 8 presents the distribution of 911 jobs by hour. Except on the First Platoon, 911 jobs tend to be spread out fairly evenly across time. On the First Platoon, 65% of the jobs arose during the first four hours of the tour, and 35% arose during the last four hours.

Table 8
Distribution of 72nd Precinct CFS Workload,
by Platoon and by Hour
July 1 through August 31, 1991

<u>First Platoon</u>		<u>Second Platoon</u>		<u>Third Platoon</u>	
<u>Hour</u>	<u>% of Jobs</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>% of Jobs</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>% of Jobs</u>
<u>Beginning</u>	<u>During Hour</u>	<u>Beginning</u>	<u>During Hour</u>	<u>Beginning</u>	<u>During Hour</u>
0000	22.0	0800	9.2	1600	10.3
0100	18.2	0900	12.2	1700	12.4
0200	14.0	1000	12.1	1800	12.3
0300	11.2	1100	12.9	1900	12.0
0400	9.6	1200	13.6	2000	12.4
0500	8.2	1300	14.2	2100	13.7
0600	8.2	1400	13.2	2200	13.8
0700	8.6	1500	12.6	2300	13.1

How Good are the Data?

The data on 911 runs during the two month period was downloaded from the SPRINT computer. It represents the Police Department's official records of the calls studied. Limitations on the amount of data which can be stored at the precinct level preclude the precinct from obtaining the entire record of each call, although sufficient information is obtained for the precinct's operational purposes and to permit analysis similar to that presented above.

In one sense the data tend to understate the workload of individual Community Sector emergency response units, because it does not provide information on the calls to which a unit responded when it was not the unit credited with the final disposition. On the other hand, observation of the experience of individual units on selected tours indicates that, in many instances, the amount of time credited to a unit for handling a particular job is grossly overstated. Thus, if there is a bias in the data, it appears to be over-statement of the amount of time emergency response units actually spend on job assignments. Appendix B to the full report submitted to the Department on this study shows individual Community Sector Unit activity on a daily basis, giving the

If there is a bias in the data, it appears to be over-statement of the amount of time Community Sector Units actually spend on job assignments.

number of jobs handled and the total time expended in handling them. A review of these data discloses at least 30 instances in which a unit is credited with expending more than the 480 minutes available to a unit working without a meal period. Examination of individual units' activity for tours with excessive job times discloses that in every instance the unit is credited with multiple jobs over the same time period which, when summed, add up to more time than was available to handle them. (See Appendix C to the full report) This phenomenon is not limited to instances in which units' job time exceeds 480 minutes. (See Appendix D) On balance these defects in the data may negate each other and the data may be sufficiently accurate and complete to permit the inferences drawn here.

Vera proposed a pilot project, to test methods for reducing the frequency of cross-sector dispatching.

Reducing Cross-Sector Dispatching

After meetings with Department managers to think through the implications of these analyses, Vera proposed that a pilot project be implemented in the Model Precinct, in February 1992, to test methods for reducing the frequency of cross-sector dispatching. It was agreed that, without some relief in that area, there would be little opportunity to take advantage of the problem-solving training provided to the Community Sector personnel whose primary assignment is emergency response, little opportunity to remove the remaining barriers to precinct-wide community policing, and little opportunity to capitalize on the reductions achieved in Utilization Rates.

Vera proposed that the pilot start with a one-week experiment to see if the precinct could mount a system of differential response sufficiently robust for the Communications Division to reduce the frequency with which it dispatches emergency response vehicles across sector boundaries.

The experiment was proposed for the Second Platoon. The Communications Division would assign a Police Communications Technician to the 72nd Precinct to act as an SP9 Terminal Operator. The precinct would field an SP10 Car during the period. No additional resources would be assigned to the platoon, even though fielding the SP10 car might result in one less sector car being available. The Communications Division would provide a cellular phone for use by the SP10. The Communications Division Radio Dispatcher would divide calls-for-service in the 72nd Precinct into three categories, as follows:

Category 1: Immediate Dispatch. Calls falling into Category 1 would be immediately dispatched to the first available Community Sector Unit in the precinct, regardless of sector assignment, although preference would be given to the unit assigned to the sector in which the call originates. (All code signals not specified for Category 2 and Category 3 response would fall into Category 1.)

Category 2: Deferred Response Possible. Calls falling into Category 2 would be immediately dispatched to the Community Sector Unit assigned to the sector in which the call originates if that sector is available for assignment. If that unit is already on an assignment, the Dispatcher would announce that Radio is holding a job for the sector concerned, and would give the sector a brief period to acknowledge its ability to accept a second assignment. If the acknowledgement is not forthcoming, the job would be placed in the dispatcher's deferred queue, reviewed by the PAR unit, and deferred to the precinct's queue.

Category 3: Precinct Activated Response. Calls falling into Category 3 would be referred to the precinct's queue via the normal PAR process.

Radio dispatchers would retain the authority to immediately dispatch a call in either of Categories 2 or 3 if they deem it necessary to do so. The proposed response to calls referred to the precinct's queue was as follows:

Category 3: PAR Calls. Calls falling within the code categories authorized for the Precinct Activated Response (PAR) program would be handled according to the provisions of Operations Order 39, s.1990. The SP9 terminal operator would dispose of the call either by telephoning the complainant and taking a complaint report (where authorized) or by referring the call to the SP10 or other precinct resource (e.g., foot personnel).

Category 2: Deferred Non-PAR Calls. Upon receipt of a deferred call, the Precinct SP9 Terminal Operator would first determine if any precinct resources are available to which the call might be assigned (e.g., SP10, foot personnel) and, if so, assign the call for disposition. If no precinct resources are available, and the job includes a call back telephone number, the SP9 would immediately telephone the complainant, acknowledge receipt of the call at the precinct, and determine the current status of the condition. If appropriate, the SP9 Operator would take a complaint report over the telephone. If a unit must ultimately be dispatched, the SP9

Without some relief from cross-sector dispatching, there would be little opportunity to take advantage of the problem-solving training provided to the Community Sector personnel whose primary assignment is emergency response, little opportunity to remove the remaining barriers to precinct-wide community policing, and little opportunity to capitalize on the reductions achieved in Utilization Rates

Operator would inform the complainant of the delay; if the complainant at that point supplies information indicating that a unit should be immediately dispatched, the SP9 Operator would make an appropriate entry on the terminal and immediately return the job to the radio dispatcher for dispatch.

Deferred jobs not disposed by assignment to precinct resources or by the SP9 Operator taking a complaint over the phone would be held on the precinct queue until the emergency response unit assigned to the sector is again available to accept the assignment. The SP9 Operator would monitor the precinct queue to determine unit availability and would, when the appropriate unit is available, return the job to the radio dispatcher to be dispatched.

During the months of July and August, 1991, when a total of 9,844 calls were dispatched to units in the 72nd Precinct, 3,796 (or 38.6%) would have been deferred to the precinct queue (1,744 under the PAR program, and 2,052 as deferred calls), if the experimental differential response procedures had been in effect

- No deferred call would remain unassigned on the precinct queue in excess of 60 minutes, unless the SP9 has spoken to the complainant on a call-back and determines that a further delay would be permissible. Otherwise, calls held in excess of 60 minutes would be returned to the radio dispatcher for dispatch.
- No more than two calls for any individual sector could be deferred at a given time. If a third call is received at the precinct queue, the oldest call would be returned to the radio dispatcher for immediate dispatch.
- Precinct desk officers would be instructed in the details of the experiment and would monitor the activities of the SP9 Operator throughout.
- Precinct patrol personnel would be instructed in their roles in the experiment. Supervisory personnel would monitor operations throughout.
- Vera staff would collect the necessary data to evaluate the experiment and report the results to Precinct and Department managers.

The year ended with some enthusiasm about the likely effects of the proposed experiment, in part because of what the earlier workload analysis showed. During the months of July and August, 1991, when a total of 9,844 calls were dispatched to units in the 72nd Precinct, 3,796 (or 38.6%) would have been deferred to the precinct queue (1,744 under the PAR program, and 2,052 as deferred calls), if the experimental differential response procedures had been in effect.

Other Work in the Model Precinct

New Analyses of CFS Data. While continuing to support the production of daily Hot Sheets in the Model Precinct, Vera staff further explored the potential of timely access to the SPRINT system's calls-for-service database. In August, detailed analyses of each Beat Area's 911 activity for the first half of 1991 were presented to team meetings of beat personnel. Each analysis included breakdowns of the beat's activity by signal code, high frequency locations, and time, as well as responses to specific queries requested by beat supervisors. Beat supervisors' queries ranged from the temporal distribution of burglary calls to the pattern of unfounded disabled vehicle calls. In addition, locations generating more than three domestic dispute calls in the six month period were identified and were provided to the precinct's Victim Services unit.

Enhancements to the Hotsheet Application. In an effort to involve more officers more deeply in problem-solving analysis, the Hotsheet application previously developed by Vera staff was modified to be responsive to walk-in inquiries from officers. Officers used the feature to investigate community problems and to provide information at community meetings.

Mapping CFS Data. In parallel with the Department's use of computer mapping software for the On Line Complaint System, Vera staff assessed the utility of mapping the Model Precinct's calls-for-service data. Maps were produced for beats, squads, and the precinct as a whole, varying the type and times of calls plotted. Geographic views of the calls-for service data proved less enlightening than maps of complaint data, but they did highlight clusters of moderate frequency locations and they seemed to hold potential value for resource allocation decisions.

Testing and Refining MISD Procedures. MISD has been assigned the task of modifying the mainframe's programs to suit to the community policing mission towards which the Department is moving in the 1990s. Driving the need for change in information systems is the increased demand, in a community policing context, for timely information at the precinct level. The Model Precinct, as the heaviest user of file transfer and connectivity procedures in the Department, serves as a proving ground for this MISD task. Vera staff worked closely with MISD in its efforts to refine the mainframe's ability to transfer data down to the precinct

MISD has been assigned the task of modifying the mainframe's programs to suit to the Department's community policing mission.

Driving the need for change in information systems is the increased demand, in a community policing context, for timely information at the precinct level.

The Model Precinct, as the heaviest user of file transfer and connectivity procedures in the Department, serves as a proving ground

level and to connect to remote computer systems. Vera staff also consulted with MISD on the problem of how to provide comparable information access to the other 74 precincts.

Hotsheet Production. At Vera's request, MISD started to include the narrative section of each complaint, when downloading data to the Model Precinct's Hot Sheet application. This further reduced the data entry time required for Hot Sheet production at the precinct.

Administrative Support Systems. Automation of administrative tasks continued in the Model Precinct with the introduction of an Activity Report application, developed by Vera staff. The application substantially reduces time and effort in calculating the precinct's activity statistics and reviewing personnel performance.

A Local Area Network for the Model Precinct. A primary goal of Vera's work in the Model Precinct has been to develop the resources, skills, and managerial support that encourage problem-solving at the beat level. Towards that end, Vera staff have focused on developing and disseminating relevant, beat-specific information to officers. A natural extension of this effort is to provide officers with direct computer access to beat information – and to other automated information that helps illuminate beat conditions and resources. In July Vera worked with MISD to seek funding from the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance, for installation of a Local Area Network (LAN) in the Model Precinct, which would present opportunities to test MISD's plan for installing LANs in every precinct. Vera staff have undertaken to design and implement software applications for the LAN, including a database version of the Beatbook. Vera staff worked closely with MISD in reviewing and planning the technical and operational supports required by this first precinct-based computer network.

An Electronic Beatbook Application. Officers have found that documenting their work in the Beatbook is tedious and cumbersome. Consequently, information actually recorded in Beatbooks tends to be abbreviated and, once recorded, difficult to review or analyze – even by the officer who entered it. But some structure for data, problems, plans, and activity is essential to the problem-solving community policing model, and Vera staff concluded that a database application would ease the process by automating routine entries, cross-indexing valuable information, and providing powerful search and reporting

Vera staff has undertaken to design and implement software applications for a Local Area Network, to be intalled in the Model Precinct, including the development of an electronic database version of the Beatbook

tools. In an Electronic Beatbook application, officers would have the power to retrieve records by keyword search or by special category (Problem, Condition, Organization, Person, and so on). Properly designed reports would provide officers with clear, vivid pictures of the recent activities related to a condition. Vera staff began developing such an application in October, using FoxPro2 (a database development tool that MISD is using for other applications). With LAN installation scheduled for mid-summer, Vera staff aimed to have the Electronic Beatbook ready for beta testing shortly thereafter.

Collecting and Disseminating Illustrative Cases of Successful Problem-Solving by Officers

Whenever staff time was available during this period, work continued on the collection of exemplary material for the planned "how-to" manual for community policing in New York. The concept for this manual is to interweave example and analysis, somewhat in the fashion of the *Problem-Solving Guide* that Vera developed to fill out the training programs some years ago and that is still in use throughout the Department. But this manual would seek to convey, to Community Beat Officers and emergency response personnel, certain tactics and problem-solving techniques already proven effective, in the experience of other NYPD officers, against certain recurring types of problems.

During July, August and September, Vera staff compiled and reviewed responses to a questionnaire previously distributed to Community Policing Unit Supervisors throughout the Department. The analysis showed that drug trafficking (cited by 90% of the 60 supervisors responding) was the problem about which advice was most needed. Disorderly youth problems were cited with about the same frequency, followed by burglary (63%), robbery (60%), auto theft (48%), illegal parking (43%), peddling (28%), and prostitution (27%).

The questionnaire requested supervisors to offer up to five examples of effective problem-solving by their units. The descriptions provided were circulated and reviewed within Vera's staff, as were a number of case descriptions gathered over the years by Police Academy personnel. Additional examples worthy of further exploration were identified from a survey of the *Beat Book* newsletter since its inception and from a survey of other publications (e.g., from

Vera staff began developing an Electronic Beatbook application in October, using FoxPro2 (a database development tool MISD is using for other applications). With LAN installation scheduled for mid-summer, Vera staff aimed to have the Electronic Beatbook ready for beta testing shortly thereafter

Vera staff are developing a manual that interweaves example and analysis, somewhat in the fashion of the Problem-Solving Guide that Vera developed for the CPOP training programs. But this manual would seek to convey, to Community Beat Officers and Community Sector emergency response personnel, some of the tactics and problem-solving techniques already proven effective, in the experience of other NYPD officers, against certain recurring types of problems

PERF, NCCP), of other jurisdictions (*i.e.*, the INOP sites), and of the analytic literature on problem-solving (*e.g.*, *Problem-Solving Policing*, by Herman Goldstein).

While the examples offered by supervisors in response to the questionnaire were impressive in quantity, the details and dynamics of the problem-solving process were not sufficiently captured in their accounts to permit intelligent selection of examples for further research and write-up. In November, it was decided that a Senior Research Associate would have to tour beats and interview officers in depth; in addition, if the manual was to offer the kind of richly-textured picture of problem-solving that would be likely to capture officers' imagination and stimulate their own efforts, interviews would have to be conducted with merchants and residents in the area of problem-solving successes and, in some cases, additional data would have to be secured from agencies other than the Police Department.

In November, Vera staff developed and field-tested an interview format for these purposes. Discussions were then held with the Coordination and Review Section of the Office of the Chief of Patrol, to narrow the focus on particularly imaginative community policing units and particularly successful officers. Field work re-commenced in December, with site visits to six precincts targeted through these discussions: the 62nd, the 76th, the 28th, the 90th, the 103rd and the 34th. Supervisors and beat officers were interviewed at each precinct, and in some cases Vera staff working on development of the manual toured locations with officers working on problems. At some sites, Vera staff interviewed individuals in the neighborhoods and representatives of other city and federal agencies who are working with precinct officers in their problem-solving efforts.

January – April 1992

As the 1992 calendar year began, Vera staff continued to help the Model Precinct Project Team and other Department managers in their development of systems to support precinct-wide community policing operations in the 72nd Precinct. Vera staff also continued to assist in the Department's efforts to involve the other 74 precincts more deeply in the move to community policing, in a period of transition to the plan set forth in *Policing New York in the 1990s*. During this four-month period, Vera staff met on

three occasions with representatives of McKinsey and Company, who were helping the Department to formulate strategies for evaluating its progress. Vera staff also participated in four cycles of the basic community police training program, now administered by the Police Academy staff. And Vera staff participated in the Police Commissioner's executive retreat.

Model Precinct Development and Implementation

Vera's Model Precinct project staff worked with precinct personnel on analyses of data that facilitate problem-solving at the beat and sector level. Using the calls-for-service database for the 12 months of 1991, Vera staff identified locations in each community beat and community sector which generated the largest numbers of 911 runs. To provide this information to Community Beat and Community Sector Officers in the most useful manner, Vera staff provided printouts that summarized the activity at each location by code signal, and provided printouts that listed each job. These analyses were provided to individual beat and sector officers, to assist them in problem identification and problem analysis.

Report on Arrest Activity.

Vera staff obtained data from the Department's on-line booking system for an in-depth analysis of arrest activity in the 72nd Precinct during 1991. A report of this analysis was submitted to the Department on February 20, 1992. The report focused on arrest activity between April 9th and December 31st, 1991, when the Model Precinct experiment was operational (the Project Period).

It was expected that arrests would increase in 1991, as thirty-eight police officers and ten sergeants had been added to the 72nd Precinct on April 9, 1991, to bring the personnel complement of that command to the level recommended for precinct operations by the Department's *Staffing Study*, as incorporated in the Mayor's *Safe Streets, Safe City* program. During 1990, there had been a monthly average of 120 police officers assigned to the precinct, but the number had increased at the end of 1990, bringing the average to 132 officers during the months immediately prior to project implementation. Thus, while the 38 new assignments in April represented a 29% increase over the number of officers

It was expected that arrests would increase, as thirty-eight police officers and ten sergeants had been added to the 72nd Precinct on April 9, 1991, to bring the personnel complement of that command to the level recommended for precinct operations by the Department's Staffing Study, as incorporated in the Mayor's Safe Streets, Safe City program

Research literature offers little help in predicting the impact on arrest volume of increases in personnel. Nor does the literature help specify the role arrest activity should play in community policing. Some commentators suggest that implementation of community policing will reduce the need for and the volume of arrests, as alternative strategies are invoked to solve community's crime and quality-of-life problems. While this may turn out to be true, there appear to be circumstances under which the implementation of community policing should be expected to increase arrest activity, at least initially.

assigned to the precinct earlier in the spring of 1991, the new total of 170 officers represented a 42% increase over the average number of officers assigned to the precinct during the previous year.

The research literature offers little help in predicting the impact on arrest volume of increases in personnel. Nor does the literature help specify the role arrest activity should play in community policing. Some commentators suggest that implementation of community policing will reduce the need for and the volume of arrests, as alternative strategies are invoked to solve a community's crime and quality-of-life problems. While this may turn out to be true, there appear to be circumstances under which the implementation of community policing should be expected to increase arrest activity, at least initially. For example, the Precinct Management Team at the 72nd Precinct had identified illegal drug activity on 49th Street between 3rd and 6th Avenues as the most serious crime problem facing the residents of their Sunset Park community: While precinct personnel recognized that they would have to assist in organizing the community's resistance to that market (through the formation of tenant and block associations in the area), they reasoned that the magnitude of the existing drug problem made residents fearful of organizing or offering overt resistance, even as they surreptitiously supplied useful information to police personnel. For this reason, enforcement was identified as the essential first step in reclaiming the neighborhood from drug dealers. It was the precinct's hope that vigorous enforcement by precinct and Borough Narcotics Division personnel would both reduce the scope of the problem and encourage residents to band together to resist drug markets openly.*

Quantitative Measures. Total arrests increased in the 72nd Precinct by 36.3% over the previous year. During the 12 months of 1991, arrests for felonies increased by 43.6%, and arrests for misdemeanors and other offenses increased

*The value of arrest as an initial problem-solving strategy is suggested by the 72nd Precinct's experience with the building at 5915 4th Avenue. In 1990, the location had the second highest number of 911 runs in the 72nd Precinct – 188 runs, the majority of which were for drug activities. Community Beat and Community Sector personnel made a concerted effort to deal with the condition, and during January and February 1991, they made five drug-related arrests at the building. As a result of these arrests, the Community Beat Officer was able to seek and obtain eviction of the drug dealer. Consequently, during 1991 there were only twelve 911 runs at the location, none of which were for drug activity.

by 28.1%. These increases resulted almost exclusively from gains made during the Project Period, when arrests increased by 50.1% over the same period in the previous year – arrests for felonies increased by 58.5% and arrests for misdemeanors and other offenses increased by 40.3%.

Table 9
72nd Precinct: All Arrests
January 1 through December 31 (1990 vs. 1991)

January 1 through December 31

<u>Category</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>Variance</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Felonies	1,779	2,554	775	43.6%
Misdemeanors	1,494	1,938	444	29.7%
Other Arrests	74	70	-4	-5.4%
Total Arrests	3,347	4,562	1,215	36.3%

January 1 through April 8

<u>Category</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>Variance</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Felonies	499	525	26	5.2%
Misdemeanors	446	465	19	4.3%
Other Arrests	30	11	-11	-63.0%
Total Arrests	975	1,001	26	2.7%

April 9 through December 31

<u>Category</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>Variance</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Felonies	1,280	2,029	749	58.5%
Misdemeanors	1,048	1,473	425	30.6%
Other Arrests	44	59	15	34.1%
Total Arrests	2,372	3,561	1,189	50.1%

Arrests by uniformed personnel increased substantially in 1991. During the Project Period arrests increased by 55.8% over the previous year. Felony arrests by precinct uniformed personnel increased by 50.6%, while their arrests for misdemeanors and other offenses increased by 53.9%.

As expected, arrests by uniformed personnel increased substantially in 1991, and the increase was primarily in the Project Period. From January 1 through April 8, 1991, arrests by precinct uniformed personnel increased by 1.3% over the previous year. During the Project Period arrests increased by 55.8% over the previous year – the overall gain was 40.5% for the calendar year. Felony arrests by precinct uniformed personnel increased by 50.6% during the Project Period (and 33.7% for the year), while their arrests for misdemeanors and other offenses increased by 53.9% during the Project Period (and 50.3% for the year).

Excluding arrests for violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (8.0% of all arrests), 84% of all of the arrests made in the 72nd Precinct in 1991 were for violation of ten sections of the Penal Law. These were:

Table 10
72nd Precinct Arrests in 1991, by Penal Law Article

<u>Penal Law Article</u>	<u>Number of Arrests</u>	<u>% of Total Arrests</u>
220 - Drugs	1,651	36.2 %
240 - Public Order	539	11.8 %
155 - Larceny	326	7.2 %
120 - Assault	299	6.6 %
140 - Burglary	218	4.8 %
160 - Robbery	214	4.7 %
230 - Prostitution	201	4.4 %
165 - Theft	144	3.2 %
265 - Firearms/Weapons	110	2.4 %
145 - Criminal Mischief	101	2.2 %

Arrests by members of the uniformed 72nd Precinct officers were fairly evenly divided between Community Beat and Community Sector Officers. However, as there are fewer Community Beat Officers, the arrest-to-officer ratio was substantially higher for them. In 1990, when 12 police officers (about 10% of the precinct's patrol personnel) were assigned to the CPOP Unit, those officers made 26.2% of the arrests by precinct personnel. During the Project Period, the 53 Community Beat Officers assigned to the Special Operations Unit (31% of the precinct's police officers) accounted for 52.9% of the arrests made by precinct personnel.

Almost all members of the precinct's uniformed force made at least one arrest during the year (153 of the 171 officers assigned, or 89.5%). Fifty-eight police officers, or one-third of those assigned to the precinct, made at least 12 arrests (an average of one per month) during the year, accounting for 81.13% of the 2,400 arrests made by precinct personnel. These fifty-eight officers were equally divided between those assigned to Community Beat Areas (29) and Community Sectors (29). Eighteen officers made at least 43 arrests during the year (an average of three or more arrests each month), accounting for 51.2% of all arrests made by precinct uniformed personnel. Of the eighteen, thirteen were assigned to Community Beat Areas and five were assigned to Community Sectors.

A review of felony arrest activity discloses that 140 police officers or 81.9% of the uniformed force assigned to the precinct made at least one felony arrest during the year 1991. Of these, 34 officers or 19.9% of the personnel made at least 12 felony arrests (one per month) during the year, accounting for 66% of the arrests made in this category. Of the 34 officers, 19 were assigned to Community Beat Areas and 15 were assigned to Community Sectors. On the high end, eight police officers – five assigned to Community Beat Areas and three assigned to Community Sector units – made at least 36 felony arrests each, accounting for 392 arrests or 29.1% of all of the felony arrests made by precinct uniformed personnel.

Numerically, arrests made by members of the uniformed force of the 72nd Precinct were fairly evenly divided between officers assigned to Community Beats and

Community Sectors. However, as there are fewer Community Beat Officers, the arrest-to-officer ratio was substantially higher for them. In 1990, when there were 12 police officers (about 10% of the precinct's patrol personnel) assigned to what was then termed the CPOP Unit, those officers made a total of 448 arrests, or 26.2% of all of the arrests made by precinct personnel. During the Project Period, there were 53 Community Beat Officers (31% of the precinct's police officers) assigned to the Special Operations Unit (SOU), and they accounted for 1,014 arrests, or 52.9% of the arrests made by precinct personnel. Members of the 72nd Precinct assigned to Community Sectors on the three platoons made 11.2% fewer arrests in 1991 than in 1990 (1,260 vs. 1,119), despite the fact that during the Project Period there were about 9.3% more officers assigned to Community Sector units than had been assigned to RMPs in the previous year (108 vs. 118). As a result, while officers assigned to Community Sector Patrol accounted for 73.8% of arrests by precinct personnel in 1990, they accounted for only 47% of the arrests made by precinct personnel in 1991. This reduction in arrest activity is due, in part, to the fact that some of the more productive officers assigned to RMPs in 1990 were reassigned to Community Beat patrol in 1991. It is also partially due to the fact that Anti-Crime and SNEU were discrete units during 1990, and the high rates of arrest activity associated with Anti-crime and SNEU deployment were credited to platoon personnel. In 1991 (during the Project Period), Anti-crime and SNEU operations were conducted by Community Beat Officers assigned to the Special Operations Unit.

Qualitative Assessment. Substantial evidence exists that a large number of the 1991 arrests were made specifically as part of the precinct's problem-solving response to priority neighborhood conditions. In addition, where the condition concerned illegal drug activity, there is evidence in these data (which reveal the locations of all arrests) that personnel assigned to Brooklyn South Narcotics (both the District and T.N.T.) coordinated their arrest activities with those of precinct personnel in executing plans for addressing the priority problems. During 1991, personnel assigned to Brooklyn South Narcotics (both the District and T.N.T.) not only made substantially more arrests in the 72nd Precinct, but they also increased the number of arrests for sales as opposed to possession. Arrests by Narcotics Division personnel increased by 76.7% in 1991, rising from 536 in 1990

Substantial evidence exists that a large number of the 1991 arrests were made specifically as part of the precinct's problem-solving response to priority neighborhood conditions.

Vera staff searched the arrest database, to associate arrests with specific problem locations. The 1990 arrest data base was also searched to identify arrest activity at these locations in that year. Comparison of location-specific arrest activity between the two years, detailed for 16 locations of priority problems in the February report to the Department, suggests that the higher arrest activity in 1991 was in fact targeted in the way that would be expected in a problem-solving community policing precinct.

to 947 in 1991. Arrests by Narcotics District personnel for criminal sale of controlled substances increased by 98.7% in 1991, rising from 159 in 1990 to 316 in 1991.

There is consensus among members of the Precinct Management Team, including both the Community Board District Manager and the Precinct Community Council President, that the two most significant crime problems facing community residents there arise from illegal narcotics activity and from prostitution. As a result, it is not surprising that almost 50% of all arrests made by precinct personnel were for drug or prostitution related offenses, and that over 55% of arrests made by non-precinct personnel fell into these categories. Of 2,400 arrests made by precinct personnel in 1991, 676 were for narcotics offenses (492 felonies and 184 misdemeanors) and 507 were for loitering for the purposes of prostitution. Of 2,162 arrests made by non-precinct personnel during 1991, 1,196 were for drug offenses (975 felonies and 221 misdemeanors) and 221 were for prostitution or loitering for prostitution.

A review of precinct records – primarily the individual Community Profile Records (Beat Books) maintained by SOU officers and the problem-identification reports submitted to higher authority by the Precinct Commander – reveals a set of specific conditions and locations which are the significant community problems in the Model Precinct. While these same records disclose that a variety of strategies have been adopted to deal with these conditions, enforcement is normally identified as an essential police response. In an effort to correlate arrest activity with specific precinct conditions, Vera staff searched the arrest database to associate arrests with specific problem locations. While this method cannot properly identify all of the arrests that were actually made in connection with a specific condition, and while it may in some instances include arrests made at a location which were not made as part of a strategy to deal with a priority problem or condition, the method does help provide a sense of the degree to which arrests in the 72nd Precinct were targeted at identified priority problems during 1991. The 1990 arrest data base was also searched to identify arrest activity at these locations in that year. The comparison of location-specific arrest activity between the two years, detailed for 16 locations of priority problems in the February report to the Department, suggests that the higher arrest activity in 1991 was in fact targeted in the way that would be expected in a problem-solving community policing precinct.

Experiment in Reduction of Cross-Sector Dispatching.

Vera Staff continued to work with Department managers and precinct personnel on the development of systems to reduce the percentage of time that Community Sector Units spend out of their sectors of assignment on 911 calls (cross-sector dispatching). The experiment outlined under this heading in the report for the last six months of 1991 was conducted over the ten weekdays between March 16th and March 27th, 1992; it involved the use of SP9/SP10 resources at the 72nd Precinct* and the adoption of a new category of calls which could be deferred to the precinct queue if the Community Sector Unit assigned to the sector of occurrence was not available for immediate assignment. The experiment was limited to calls arising on the Second Platoon. The results were analyzed by Vera staff and a report was submitted to the Department on April 27, 1992.

- During the ten-day period, the 72nd Precinct averaged 45 calls per day on the Second Platoon, which is only three fewer calls than during the peak summer months of July and August.
- The SP9/SP10 resources handled a total of 90 calls during the ten-day period, or 20.2% of the tour's workload.
- As a result of the experimental operations, Community Sector Units only handled 51% of the tour's jobs as compared to 71% in July and August and 70% in a 20-day comparison period from March and April. The percentage of jobs handled by other resources remained virtually unchanged.
- The reduction in workload reduced the Actual Utilization Rate of the Community Sector Units to below 35% for the ten-day period.
- During the ten-day test, 92 PAR-eligible jobs arose during periods when the SP9/SP10 resources were available for assignment. Of these, only 60 were deferred to the precinct queue and handled by the SP9/SP10 resources. Of the 31 deferrable jobs not deferred, eight resulted in cross-sector dispatches.
- During the test period, 67 deferrable calls arose during periods when the Community Sector

The experimental procedures reduced cross-sector dispatching of Community Sector Units, but not to the degree that would have been possible if all PAR and Deferrable Jobs had actually been deferred to the precinct queue. But the procedures reduced the Actual Utilization Rate of the Community Sector Units (the AUR) to below 35% .

*Because the 72nd Precinct was never part of the Precinct Activated Response (PAR) Program, there were no civilian personnel assigned as SP9 operators at the precinct. As a result, the Communications Division manned the SP9 position at the precinct with a Police Communications Technician during the term of the experiment.

concerned was not available for dispatch. Of these, only 22 were deferred to the precinct queue and handled by the SP9/SP10 resources. Of the 45 which were not deferred, 20 resulted in cross-sector dispatches.

- As the above data show, the experimental procedures succeeded in reducing cross-sector dispatching of Community Sector Units, but not to the degree that would have been possible if all PAR and deferrable jobs had actually been deferred to the precinct queue.

Scope and Distribution of the 911 Workload. During the ten-day period, a total of 445 calls for service arose during, or were disposed by personnel assigned to, the Second Platoon. The average of 45 calls per day during the ten-day period is only three fewer than the average 48 calls per day during the peak summer months of July and August. However, the percentage of calls handled by Community Sector units (51.2%) is significantly lower than the 71.8% of calls the Community Sectors units handled during July and August.

During the ten-day experiment, the SP9 and SP10 resources handled 90 assignments (20.2% of the total workload for the period): 60 in the PAR category, 22 in the Deferrable category, and eight which were in neither category but which were assigned to and disposed of by the SP10. The daily workload of the SP10 Unit ranged from a low of four jobs on two of the ten tours to a high of twelve jobs on another two days.

Table 11
72nd Precinct
911 Calls, by Disposition Unit
March 16 to 20, and March 23 to 27

<u>Responding Resource</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Community Sector Units	228	51.2%
SP9/SP10	90	20.2%
Community Beat Officers	59	13.3%
Other Commands	34	7.6%
Other Motorized	18	4.0%
Supervisors	16	3.6%

Utilization of the SP9/SP10 Resources. Under the terms of the project, the SP9 and SP10 resources were to handle two distinct workloads: PAR-eligible jobs for which these units would be the primary resource, and a new category of deferrable jobs for which these units would be a secondary resource if the Community Sector concerned was temporarily unavailable for assignment. During the ten-day period, the SP9/SP10 resources handled a total of 90 assignments (20.2% of the total workload for the period): 60 in the PAR category, 22 in the Deferrable category, and eight which were in neither of those categories but which were assigned to and disposed of by the SP10. The daily

workload of the SP10 Unit ranged from a low of four jobs on two of the ten tours to a high of twelve jobs on another two days. The unit averaged nine jobs per day during the ten-day period and, although an SP10 Unit may be assigned up to five jobs at any given time, the SP10 in the 72nd Precinct never carried more than three jobs at any time during the test period.

PAR Calls. During the test period there were a total of 103 PAR-eligible jobs in the precinct (23.1% of the total workload). Of these, 60 were assigned to and handled by the SP9/SP10 resources. Twelve PAR-eligible calls arose during the hours when the SP9/SP10 resources were on meal, leaving a total of 31 jobs which could have been assigned to SP9/SP10 but were not. Of the 31 jobs, eight were handled by the Community Sector Units concerned, seven were handled by foot personnel, six were handled by units from other commands, and two were handled by supervisors – leaving eight which resulted in cross-sector dispatches of Community Sector units.

Deferrable Calls. Under the terms of the experiment, 25 individual code signals in 6 code categories were designated as deferrable calls. All were call priority 5 or 7, with the exception of code signal 65-S9 (Utility Trouble/Transit) which is priority 2 and code signal 10-Y3 (Other Serious – Drugs) which is priority level 3. Calls falling within these code signals could be deferred to the precinct queue if the sector concerned was not available for assignment at the time the call was received at the Communications Division. The precinct then had the option of disposing of the call by assigning it to the SP10 or other precinct resource, or holding the call until the sector concerned was available for assignment, at which time the call would be returned to the dispatcher for dispatch. No deferrable call could be held at the precinct terminal in excess of 60 minutes without being assigned to a precinct resource for disposition, and no more than two deferrable calls in the same Community Sector could be held at the same time without dispatch.

During the ten-day period, a total of 99 deferrable calls were received at the Communications Division (22.2% of the total workload). Of these, 32 were immediately assigned to the Community Sectors concerned leaving 67 calls for possible deferral to the precinct queue. Of the 67 calls, 22 were deferred to the precinct queue and were disposed of by the SP9/SP10 resources. Ten of the 22 calls were immediately

A total of 76 calls (17.1% of the total workload) could have been deferred to the precinct queue and assigned to the SP10 or other precinct resource, but were not. Thirty-one of these were in the PAR-eligible category and 45 were in the deferrable category. SPRINT data do not provide an answer to the question why these calls were not deferred, but there are several possible causes: e.g., other resources volunteered for the jobs when they were announced by the dispatcher, the dispatcher determined that the job should be immediately assigned to a response unit because of some unique factor, or dispatcher error was caused by the novelty of the experiment.

In July and August, 1991, Community Sector Units on the Second Platoon responded outside of their sector of assignment for about 60% of their jobs. Vera conducted a more precise study of the Second Platoon during the two week periods surrounding the experiment (March 2 through March 13, and March 30 through April 10, 1992). During those periods, 59% of the jobs handled by Community Sector Units were outside their assigned sectors. During the ten days of the experiment, 55.7% of the jobs handled by Community Sector Units were out-of-sector.

assigned to the SP10 unit for disposition when received at the precinct, and the length of time the remaining 12 calls were held at the terminal pending assignment to the SP10 varied from 1 to 32 minutes, with an average time of seven minutes. No deferrable calls were returned to the dispatcher as all were assigned to the SP10 unit for disposition within the prescribed time limits.

Of the 45 deferrable calls not deferred to the precinct queue, 16 were handled by foot personnel, four were handled by members of other commands, three were handled by other motorized units, and two were handled by supervisors – leaving 20 which resulted in the cross-sector dispatching of Community Sector Units.

These data show that a total of 76 calls (17.1 % of the total workload) could have been deferred to the precinct queue and assigned to the SP10 or other precinct resource, but were not. Thirty-one of these were in the PAR-eligible category and 45 were in the Deferrable category. SPRINT data do not provide an answer to the question why these calls were not deferred, but there are several possible causes: *e.g.*, other resources volunteered for the jobs when they were announced by the dispatcher, the dispatcher determined that the job should be immediately assigned to a response unit because of some unique factor, or dispatcher error was caused by the novelty of the experiment.

Cross-Sector Dispatching. The principal purpose of the experiment was to test the impact of SP9/SP10 operations on cross-sector dispatching of Community Sector Units. It had been previously noted that cross-sector dispatching remains the single largest obstacle to full involvement in problem-solving community policing by personnel assigned to Community Sector Units. Yet experience indicates that not all cross-sector dispatching can be eliminated, even under ideal conditions: Priority jobs must be assigned in a timely manner, and when a Community Sector Unit is not available (because, *e.g.*, the unit is already on an assignment, the unit is on meal), cross-sector dispatching will result.

The calls-for-service distribution for July and August, 1991, suggested that Community Sector Units on the Second Platoon responded outside of their sector of assignment for about 60% of their jobs. Vera staff conducted a more precise study of job distribution on the Second Platoon during the two week period preceding the experiment (March 2 through March 13, 1992), and during the two week period

following the experiment (March 30 through April 10). Data from those periods disclose that Community Sector Units handled a total of 644 job assignments, 265 or 41% of which were in their sectors, and 379 or 59% were out of sector. During the ten days of the experiment, Community Sector Units handled a total 228 job assignments, 101 or 44.3% of which were in their sectors of assignment, and 127 or 55.7% of which were in other sectors.

Thus, while the impact of the SP9/SP10 operation on cross-sector dispatching was positive, it was not large. However, had the 28 SP10-eligible assignments which were not placed on the precinct queue and which resulted in cross-sector dispatches been assigned to the precinct for disposition, the SP9/SP10 operation would have produced a significantly greater reduction in cross-sector dispatching. Further, the SP9/SP10 program and the development of the deferred call category had other benefits: a comparison of the percentage of calls handled by the various resources during the experimental period with the percentages they handled in July and August, 1991 and in the four weeks of March and April for which additional data were collected discloses that the SP9/SP10 drew its workload directly from the workload of the Community Sector Units during the experiment. During July and August, Community Sector Units handled 71.8% of all calls directed to the precinct; during the March and April pre- and post-test periods these Units handled 70% of the calls. But during the experimental period, Community Sector Units handled only 51.2% of the calls, while the percentage of calls handled by the other resources stayed about the same. As a result, the Actual Utilization Rate (AUR) – the percent of time Community Sector Units were actually involved in disposing of the jobs which they handled – was reduced to below 35%. That represents a major gain in time for problem-solving involvement of officers assigned to Community Sector patrol.

Vera's April 27 report concluded with a recommendation that the experiment be replicated in the 72nd Precinct on the Third Platoon. Personnel assigned to Community Sector Units on the Third Platoon handle a substantially heavier workload than do personnel on either of the other platoons. In addition, there are fewer other resources with whom the workload on that platoon can be shared. If replication of the experiment produces similar results on the Third Platoon, and if the deferred queue and SP9/SP10

While SP9/SP10 operation reduced cross-sector dispatching, the reduction was not large. If the 28 SP10-eligible assignments which were not placed on the precinct queue and which resulted in cross-sector dispatches been assigned to the precinct for disposition, a significantly greater reduction in cross-sector dispatching would have resulted. And the experimental procedures did reduce the Actual Utilization Rate (AUR) for Community Sector units to below 35% – a major gain in time for problem-solving involvement of officers assigned to Community Sector patrol.

Early efforts to engage the officers assigned to Community Sectors in the problem-solving process centered on the Community Beat. Beat team meetings were convened on a regular basis by Beat Supervisors, and Community Sector personnel were invited to attend. But their attendance was sporadic and they tended to defer to the Beat personnel on the nomination of problems for priority attention and on the design of strategies to address those problems. The focus of these problem-solving planning meetings has been changed from the beat to the sector, with mandatory attendance required of sector personnel, all Community Beat Officers assigned to the two beats within the sector, and the beat and sector supervisors. The meetings will be convened by sector and beat supervisors on a rotating schedule.

resources can be more efficiently deployed than they were during the March experiment, the Department might wish to consider the formal implementation of these procedures in the Model Precinct to reduce cross-sector dispatching so that Community Sector Units can be more effectively engaged in problem-solving with Community Beat Officers within their sectors of assignment.

Further Work on Problem-Solving by Model Precinct Personnel

Vera's staff continued to work with the precinct's managers on the development of procedures and practices appropriate to the problem-solving model. The greatest challenge facing the Precinct Management Team on this score is to develop systems which actually engage the officers assigned to Community Sectors in the problem-solving process. Early efforts centered on the Community Beat as the unit on which coordinative efforts were to be focused. Beat team meetings were convened on a regular basis by Beat Supervisors, and Community Sector personnel were invited to attend. Attendance by Community Sector personnel at these meetings was sporadic, however, and those who attended tended to defer to the Beat personnel and supervisors on the nomination of problems for priority attention and on the design of strategies to address those problems.

Therefore, at the end of April, the focus of these problem-solving planning meetings was changed from the beat to the sector. The precinct's sector boundaries were changed in December, reducing the number of sectors from ten to eight so that two Beat Areas are now included within each sector. The meetings are now held on a sector basis, at 1530 hours, with mandatory attendance required of sector personnel (Second and Third Platoons), all Community Beat officers assigned to the two beats within the sector, and the beat and sector supervisors. The initial round of sector meetings were led by the beat supervisors, but sector and beat supervisors will rotate as leaders of future meetings. Efforts were made to secure input from Community Sector Officers on both the nomination of problems and the design of strategies to address them. It is hoped that the new format will encourage sector personnel to recognize their role in identifying and dealing with problems as part of a problem-solving team.

Information Systems Activity in the Model Precinct

Electronic Beatbook. In conjunction with MISD's long-term plan to install computer networks in all precincts, the Vera staff continue to work on development of an officer-oriented information system, known as the Electronic Beatbook, for the Model Precinct's new computer network.

The Electronic Beatbook is a "street-level" database application that gives Community Beat Officers the ability to tap into the shared experience and expertise of the entire precinct. The Electronic Beatbook will allow officers easily to enter information about their beats, their daily activities, and their problem-solving plans directly into the computer network. Similarly, teams of Community Beat Officers will be able record and exchange information about chronic beat problems, problem-solving goals and progress, and new problems nominated for priority attention.

The key attraction for officers is expected to be the system's ability to answer questions that draw upon information entered by other personnel in the precinct. Using a powerful information retrieval capability, the electronic Beatbook will respond to such queries as:

- Have any officers made contacts within the Sanitation Department that would help me clear an abandoned lot on my beat?
- Does anyone have any information about a particular suspicious vehicle?
- When was the last meeting of the 49th Street Block Association? Were any officers present? What was said about the persistent disorderly conditions at 52nd and Greenwood Streets?

Relevant information may then be printed out, saved for future review, or included in a new Beatbook entry. Reports can be generated – in either standardized or customized formats – to be shared with other Community Beat or Community Sector Officers, supervisors, or members of the community involved in a particular problem or set of problems. Reports can be tailored and formatted to reinforce the problem-solving methodology in which officers have now been trained.

In addition to helping officers find information, the Electronic Beatbook's reporting feature assembles widely scattered scraps of information into a meaningful whole. For the convenience of the officers, and to reduce data entry

The Electronic Beatbook is a "street-level" database application that gives Community Beat Officers the ability to tap into the shared experience and expertise of the entire precinct. Teams of Community Beat Officers will be able record and exchange information about chronic beat problems, problem-solving goals and progress, and new problems nominated for priority attention

Foundation programming for the Electronic Beatbook was completed in late March, producing the first prototype of this software application. On March 25, Vera staff demonstrated the Electronic Beatbook prototype to a meeting of Model Precinct command staff. In the second phase, Vera staff will refine the application by incorporating officer reactions and responses to prototype demonstrations into the application's design.

time, information may be entered into the system in any order. Activities, observations, meeting notes, and results are later combined by the system to produce Electronic Beatbook reports: clear, logical histories of problems, locations and issues over time.

Vera's information systems activities for this period focused on software programming for the Electronic Beatbook. Building on research begun in October, Vera staff developed the foundation of database programs and tables necessary for the precinct-wide Electronic Beatbook system. This foundation programming was completed in late March and produced the first prototype of the Electronic Beatbook software application.

The completion of a working prototype marked the beginning of a second phase of Electronic Beatbook development. In the second phase, Vera staff will refine the application by incorporating officer reactions and responses to prototype demonstrations into the application's design.

On March 25, Vera staff demonstrated the Electronic Beatbook prototype to a meeting of Model Precinct command staff. The meeting participants contributed a number of suggestions and useful critiques that will be addressed by Vera staff in the next period.

The second phase of development for the Electronic Beatbook will continue throughout the summer. Pending installation of a local area network in the Model Precinct, Vera will conduct an informal testing period with officer volunteers during July and August. Vera staff will work with the officers to beta-test a variety of Electronic Beatbook features, and use the resulting version of the application for precinct-wide implementation during the fall.

Collecting and Disseminating Illustrative Cases of Successful Problem-Solving by Officers

Vera staff continued to devote some time, during these four months, to collecting stories useful for inclusion in a manual describing model problem-solving techniques developed by Community Police Officers throughout the Department. Using samples of successful problem-solving, the manual will draw lessons for officers who face problems on their beats that have features in common with problems encountered and addressed successfully on other beats.

During this period, attention was focused on the chapter devoted specifically to examples of problem-solving approaches to various drug conditions. Following up information gathered from members of a community task force based in Jamaica, Queens, Vera staff paid initial visits to the 105th and 113th precincts in January. Follow-up visits and interviews were also held with Community Police Officers and community representatives in the 28th, 103rd and 113th precincts. In April, additional Vera staff was assigned to this task, and drafts of case studies for this chapter were prepared. These focused on exemplary strategies for indoor, largely residential drug problems, and for outdoor locations (including a useful example of problem-solving to attack a mobile, vehicle-based drug market).

At the end of this period, Aric Press, general editor of *Newsweek* who in the past has written several useful case studies of community policing in New York for Vera, was engaged to prepare certain of the materials for the manual over the summer months.