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Report of Technical Assistance and Program Development Tasks  
Undertaken and Completed During the First Year of the Two-Year  
Contract Between the New York City Police Department and the  
Mayor's Coordinator for Criminal Justice.

and

The Vera Institute of Justice

Submitted for Board of  
Estimate Review

Vera Institute  
October 11, 1984

The Specifications of this contract contemplated expenditures for planning and implementing pilot projects and research studies, for providing technical assistance to the agencies whose activities affect operation of the New York City criminal and juvenile justice systems, and for the "match" necessary to apply federal and private funds toward demonstration and research projects designed and piloted under this agreement.

This is a summary report of the work carried out with whole or partial support from this contract. As indicated below, there are reports available, should further information be desired, covering in greater detail tasks summarized here. This report is organized under the headings found in the Contract Specifications.

**I. Program to Enhance Crime Control Impact of Police Patrol,  
to Reform the Planning, Implementation and Assessment of  
Patrol Strategy and Tactics.**

**(1) Police Patrol Action-Research--General Parameters**

Police patrol is at the center of New York City's efforts to control crime, and substantial amounts of increasingly scarce local tax dollars are devoted to it. Yet, police officials everywhere now recognize that the effectiveness of most patrol operations, the rationales offered for various patrol tactics and strategies, and the crime control impact of deployment choices available to them are matters informed mostly by tradition and myth. They are also matters which have been largely inaccessible to outsiders whose research and technical specialties might be helpful to the development of useful knowledge about the patrol function.

During the past several years, as a result of close collaboration between the Department and Vera in the design, testing, evaluation and institutionalization of the Felony Case Preparation Project (see Section II), senior officials in the Department requested that Vera engage in a similar research and program development effort focused on the patrol force and on the issues of resource allocation, deployment, and crime control impact that bedevil this area of police work.

The resources--both uniformed and investigative personnel--which the Department deploys to control crime and to respond to citizen calls for service are, for the most part, what may be termed "committed resources." That is, they are assigned to the patrol precincts, investigative units and other line commands, where they are deployed principally in response to the enormous number of individual calls flowing through the 911 system and in response to the hundreds of thousands of individual crime complaints that call for at least some kind of follow-up detective investigation.

To the extent that the modern deployment methods and patterns leave any patrol resources for "discretionary" deployment, the Department attempts to use them to ameliorate particular crime conditions or to reduce the general incidence of particular crimes. The two essential problems are: (1) how to increase the amount of "discretionary" patrol resources available, and (2) how to direct whatever discretionary patrol resources are available to achieve more effective crime control. To some extent, because the Department lacks solid information about how best to utilize police officers in "directed patrol," and about what crime control impact can be expected from any of the many possible discretionary deployment choices, it is reluctant to divert resources to directed patrol from random "preventive" patrolling and responding to 911 calls.

In the eight years prior to 1982 the New York City Police Department lost over 9,000 sworn officers due to budget constraints reflecting the City's dire fiscal condition. Over the same period, the volume of calls for service received by the Department increased greatly, reaching approximately 6.25 million calls in 1981. Given this explosion in demand, and the constraints on supply, the Department has been forced to commit an even greater proportion of its patrol force to answering citizen crime and service calls. As a result, even fewer resources are available to field commanders for deployment against specific crime problems and conditions on the local level. When patrol officers are used in these ways, it is generally by taking them off other assignments for limited periods. As a result, the officers' and the Department's ability to execute directed patrol strategies suffers, and specific crimes or problem conditions are not given the dedicated attention which the Department would like and from which it could learn. Further, with a larger proportion of the patrol force engaged in motorized response to calls, individual officers at the precinct level have less opportunity to develop genuine familiarity with local crime problems, precinct conditions, and community anti-crime resources; they are thus less equipped to devise and execute tightly targeted crime control patrol than they were in the days before central radio dispatch technology.

A substantial body of research over the last decade has been aimed at finding and detailing in useful ways the crime-detering impact of conventional "preventive patrol." But because the probability that a randomly patrolling radio car will intercept a crime in progress is about zero, variations in the quantity of patrol cars in an experimental area, for example, are not likely to lead to variations either in the apprehension rate or in local criminals' perception of their risk of apprehension. As a result, the research to date, in New York City and elsewhere (e.g., Kansas City), has been neither particularly encouraging to those hoping to improve crime control through better management of the patrol function, nor particularly illuminating about how they might go about building more effective patrol strategies and tactics for future testing.

Early in 1982, under this technical assistance contract, the Vera Institute began a long-term effort which had as its starting point a thorough review of the literature on patrol research, on techniques for more efficient management of the "calls for service" function, and on crime analysis. With some products of these efforts in hand, Vera and the Department undertook a series of projects intended: (1) to free up for directed patrol some of the resources now committed to the 911 system and (between radio runs) the random preventive patrol function; (2) to detail the content of particular tactics and strategies employed in directed patrol efforts, where those efforts now occur; (3) to assess the relative crime control benefits and the relative manpower and supervisory demands of

of these various tactics and strategies; (4) to explore the possibilities of a micro computer crime analysis system for use at a precinct or zone level, by which flexible patrol resources could be deployed in light of the knowledge developed about the relative merits of the various directed patrol tactics and strategies; and (5) to construct a demonstration project, for formal research evaluation, in which all of the knowledge generated in the first four efforts is applied to the design of a flexible deployment capacity for crime control.

The first of the action projects resulting from this research is the Community Patrol Officer Program which is reviewed in section I(7), following.

## (2) Literature Reviews

The last 15 years have witnessed an explosion of research literature, focused on the various dimensions of policing. In the past several years, Vera staff have reviewed in detail several hundred articles and research reports pertaining to policing. Work has been completed and submitted in several areas, among which are: calls for service, police patrol tactics, and order maintenance.

The review of literature on the service function of the police, Calls for Service: Recent Research on Measuring and Managing the Demand, looks at the various experimental programs, conducted throughout the United States during the past two decades, which deal with attempts to manage service demand. The significant research in this area was carried out during the last 8 years, when a number of innovative programs were implemented and evaluated. The Vera paper summarizes what has been reasonably well demonstrated, identifies the major questions and issues which remain open, and serves as the annotated bibliography on the major research and theoretical discussions in this area.

The paper focuses specifically on early workload studies, which pointed to calls for service as a central part of the police role; studies of police response time to calls for service in relation to arrests and citizen satisfaction; and recent literature evaluating calls for service demand management programs. Given the recent awareness of ways in which service calls can be managed and controlled, the paper also pays considerable attention to literature reviewing alternative patrol strategies (split patrol, directed patrol) suggested by the calls for service literature.

A second literature review, Police Patrol Tactics: A Review of Recent Experiments and Research, concentrates on the body of knowledge developed in the past decade concerning the effectiveness of various patrol strategies to deter crime, increase apprehensions, or improve police-community relationships. Primarily, it considers experimental research concerning the effectiveness of various types of patrol--from random preventive patrol, to directed or structured patrol efforts.

The paper focuses specifically on assessments of the impacts of increased patrol presence; research on "community-oriented" patrol strategies; and recent reviews of directed or structured patrol. It attempts to define the state of the art in patrol literature--to wit, general, although qualified belief in the ineffectiveness of random preventive patrol and an increasing interest in various forms of directed patrol. Knowledge about these forms of patrol remains limited. The report also summarizes what is known and not known in the field and serves as an annotated bibliography of key patrol research and theory.

### (3) Order Maintenance and Patrol

Within the police patrol function is a responsibility for the "quality of life" problems, the "precinct conditions," the disturbances of the peace and the breakdowns in the social order of the neighborhoods that make up what is termed the "order-maintenance function." In some instances, although the problem involves violation of law, it is not the crime itself that creates the demand for police intervention. In other instances, the problem may not be directly addressed by any statute or ordinance, but is disturbing and potentially threatening to the community nevertheless.

In dealing with these situations, police officers may or may not make arrests. The need for police response arises from ambiguous, often chronic situations which must be "handled" rather than settled. More often than not, they involve conflicts or disputes in which the question of individual culpability is not meaningful and the need to "enforce the law" or make an arrest arises only if the situation further deteriorates. The officer is called upon to act on behalf of an amorphous sense of communal welfare, rather than to enforce a specific, universally applicable law or to render assistance to a needy individual who has sought his help. Thus, the police "order-maintenance function" is distinct from the "law enforcement" or "service providing" functions; although better order maintenance ought to have beneficial effects on crime control, performance of the function calls for its own set of tactics, strategies, analyses, and management tools.

Vera's review of literature and practice in this field suggests that the order-maintenance activities of the police and the relationship between order maintenance and crime-control are not well understood. While a fair amount of empirical research has been undertaken, and a growing body of knowledge about police law enforcement and police service providing activities has been produced in the last fifteen years, virtually no attention has been given to the nature of order-maintenance problems, the manner in which police agencies deal with them, and the consequences of action or of inaction for both the police and citizenry involved. This is a serious deficiency, given the fact that a substantial proportion of the calls received by police, and of the situations addressed by officers on patrol call for order maintenance--not arrest or service--responses. There are studies showing that order-maintenance activities constitute a larger portion of the officers' workload than do conventional law enforcement activities,<sup>1</sup> and there is a commonsensical view that effectively addressing order-main-

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<sup>1</sup>See, James O. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968).

tenance problems in a neighborhood is likely to depress the level of street crime there.<sup>2</sup>

For many years, the police have been thought of as existing principally to suppress crime through enforcing the criminal law; police work has been characterized by its more visible elements--"preventive" patrol and arrests. In this view, the essential and legitimatizing actions of the police are those aimed at the control of crime. But this view is seriously flawed: It oversimplifies the objectives of the police; it leads to inappropriate limits being placed on police resources; and, it can result in imposition of certain constraints on all police activities which ought really apply to only a portion of them. For example, the criminal justice system is merely one of several systems to which the police relate in performing their varied functions. To the extent that the varieties of patrol and the management of the patrol force are determined by efforts to arrest criminals and to preserve evidence and testimony for their prosecution in court, the order-maintenance function is bound to suffer<sup>3</sup> and the skills and knowledge needed to perform and manage it well are likely to be lost.

An individual police officer, when performing order-maintenance functions, needs to select and pursue one strategy out of many for the resolution of conflicts of all kinds, arising in tense (often hostile) street encounters, and involving questions of local morality, constitutional constraint on police action, and individual citizens' competing claims for respect and self-esteem. And the need for knowledge about the possible strategies from which the officer must choose, and about their consequences, arises from the very ambiguity of the police role.

There is often real question about whether or not the police should intervene at all, and about what the objective should be when the need for intervention is obvious. The nature and extent of the intervention is often subject to dispute after the fact, and it is not clear what set of principles or criteria are appropriately applied in rendering those judgments. The administrative systems are not typically geared to collecting and analyzing information about order-maintenance incidents, nor are the managers in as good a position as they would like to be to issue directives and guidelines for officers to use in handling them. We know that the "order" the police are required to maintain is highly relative. A joyful block party in one neighborhood is a disruptive annoyance in another. Public drinking may be absolutely offensive in one community, but

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<sup>2</sup>See, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, "Broken Windows," The Atlantic Monthly (March, 1982), 24-38.

<sup>3</sup>See, Herman Goldstein, Policing in a Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977).



acceptable under specific circumstances in another. Congregating teenagers may be tolerable on one corner, but intolerable on another. Thus, effective order maintenance presumes, especially in a culturally and economically diverse city like New York, that police judgments and actions are congruent with the concerns and mores of local communities (which may, of course, not be congruent with the liberties constitutionally guaranteed to troublesome minority interests in a particular community).

Different precincts and different police officers respond to the demands of the order-maintenance function in different ways, with different attitudes, and with different results. There are undoubtedly numerous factors influencing responses to disruptions in or threats to local order. But there is virtually no research relating any of these variables to different methods of performing the order-maintenance function; there is not even a conceptual scheme available within which to organize relevant descriptive information and useful hypotheses regarding the emergence, persistence and effects of different patterns of order-maintenance activities by the police.

There appears to be a need to develop some means for describing and assessing the effects of order-maintenance activities on the problems they are intended to address, on the ability of the Department to carry on the law enforcement and service functions, on the level of street crime and on the level of citizen fear of crime.

Vera's review of the literature on order maintenance points to the gradual reduction of order-maintenance activities throughout the past century, as police departments underwent a series of reforms designed to increase professionalism. In recent years, however, scholars and practitioners have expressed concern that professionalization weakened ties between private citizens and police and have urged a return to neighborhood-based order-maintenance activities in the belief that such activities will strengthen social control generally in high-risk areas.

The literature review suggests that the order-maintenance function of the police has not been well understood. There has always been difficulty in establishing community consensus about what behaviors should be controlled, and what forms of police action are appropriate toward that end. Although some order-maintenance theorists argue that increased order-maintenance can improve the quality of life in a community, others point to potential abuse inherent in the order-maintenance function (e.g., under- and over-enforcement; corruption stemming from contact with order-maintenance offenders such as gamblers, drug-sellers, prostitutes; harassment and brutality towards minorities).

The literature on the tactics of order-maintenance generally supports mediation over arrest; informal rather than

formal controls; a tailoring of actions to the cultural characteristics of the neighborhood; and accumulation by the police of extensive knowledge of specific beats. Recent explorations of various tactical efforts to deter domestic disputes recommend increased use of arrests in this area, and find such an approach consistent with a comprehensive strategy for order maintenance. In fact, the literature suggests that policing should respond flexibly to transformations in community response to specific conditions. Such flexibility, informed by police-community interaction, would be necessary to determine appropriate levels of enforcement in specific order-maintenance situations. The major challenge of effective order-maintenance orientation lies in determining "applicable norms" by which to judge neighborhood conditions and to forge cooperative police/citizen actions to correct them.

This document is being edited at the present time and it is expected that the final version will be delivered to the Department by the end of November.

Concern with the function of order maintenance is growing both nationally and in the City. In the coming year we will consider with Department officials the desirability and feasibility of undertaking a more long term effort to expand knowledge of how the Department can best deal with order maintenance demands throughout the City. If such an effort is desirable, Vera would begin by applying what is known about order maintenance to the development of a theoretical framework that could dictate the questions that need to be asked, the order in which the answers need to be received for the next round of questions to be asked, the kinds of programs that must be implemented to answer these questions, and the characteristics of the precincts that would be desired for locating a series of action-research projects. This framework would also identify environmental and organizational variables that are likely to be most useful in explaining how a precinct perceives and defines the problems, and how it designs and implements its intervention strategies. Finally, the framework would specify hypothesized relationships among problems, program variables, environmental variables and program outcome variables.<sup>4</sup>

The creation of this theoretical framework is a prerequisite to the success of an action-research effort,

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<sup>4</sup>There are likely to be at least four classes of outcome variables with which the action-research program would be concerned: those that measure a program's effects on particular order-maintenance problems; those that measure impact on the resources, performance and morale associated with other police functions in the precinct; those that measure impact on the volume and character of local crime; and those that measure impact on the citizens' fear of crime in experimental areas.

especially one that envisions experimentally manipulating programs. The framework permits discovery of the additional descriptive information that is needed before a useful experiment, or a useful series of related experiments, can be constructed. The theoretical framework also helps decide whether or not formal controlled experimentation is the most effective and efficient way in which to address any particular question and, if it is, helps identify the variables to be manipulated and those to be controlled.

For example, when the principal question is what impact successful order-maintenance operations have on crime volume, citizen fear and police morale, it would be desirable to construct a multi-precinct demonstration in which measurements of those variables are standardized for all the sites, while the nature of the problem and design of the program are permitted to vary across the sites. (But to control for the effect of environmental variables, it would be desirable to select precincts that are reasonably similar with respect to selected characteristics of demography and organization.) Alternatively, when the goal is to measure the impact of a particular kind of program on a particular type of order-maintenance problem, it would be desirable to standardize the program and vary the precinct characteristics. (But this constrains the program operators, and removes variation in the program design and implementation process.)

Vera's research on the order maintenance function informed the Department's decision to implement the Community Patrol Office Pilot Project in the 72nd Precinct. (See Section I(7) following.)

#### (4) Analysis and Evaluation of Patrol Deployment Strategies.

The very size of New York City, the variety of its crime problems and precinct conditions, and the constraints that force police managers to shift their limited "discretionary" patrol resources from problem to problem and from location to location, make it possible for Vera and the Department to hope to develop useful generalizable knowledge about patrol issues from a "natural experiment" approach. After all, even with the size of the police force greatly reduced, patrol resources are deployed--sometimes in innovative ways--in attempts to ameliorate a local crime condition or to reduce the general incidence of a particular crime. Thus, in response to a concentration of crime in particular precincts or sectors, or in response to marked city-wide increases in specific crimes, the New York City Police Department deploys and gives various assignments to anti-crime patrols, neighborhood stabilization units, foot patrol forces, etc. Individual commanders are encouraged to experiment with tactical variations on the basic patrol strategies (e.g.: vertical patrol vs. perimeter patrol, to suppress burglary in a housing project; coordinated mixes of foot patrol, for deterrence and displacement, and anti-crime patrol for apprehension; etc.). Thus, at any given time, there may be a dozen or more experimental patrol operations being undertaken throughout the City. Some may be initiated to test a particular response or crime-prevention tactic intended to enhance the general impact of patrol operations, while others may be designed to concentrate an innovative mix of patrol tactics on a particular crime. A few of the experiments involve tactical deployments in an entire patrol zone or borough.

A familiar problem in patrol experiments is the probable existence of "displacement effects." That is, if the police patrolling in some experimental or demonstration area succeed in creating a perception that engaging in crime (or in a particular crime) is more likely to lead to apprehension than previously, then the measured incidence of crime (or of the particular crime) should go down; but the deterrent effect of the special patrol tactic may only have displaced the crime to another area where the risk of apprehension remains unchanged. Clearly, it is desirable for this program development effort in the patrol field to develop useable knowledge about the dynamics and the magnitude of the displacement effects associated with various anti-crime patrol tactics.

Operation Proteus is a particularly interesting example of a "natural experiment" of the type from which useable knowledge might be extracted; it is unusual precisely because it depends, for its intended crime-control impact, on the existence of a powerful displacement effect from a concentration of uniformed foot patrol. Proteus involves a randomized rotation of uniformed and civilian-clothed anti-crime officers, within a specified target area, to reduce the incidence of robbery there;

on some days the core of the target area is patrolled by uniformed officers while the perimeter, at which robbery is presumably concentrated by displacement, is patrolled by the anti-crime personnel; and on the other days, the uniformed force is made visible at the perimeter and the anti-crime personnel are assigned to the core in the expectation that robbery arrests can be made there, where displacement should concentrate the crime problem.

The "natural experiments" occurring in precincts around the City, if combined with appropriate data-gathering and analytic work, present opportunities not only to test specific patrol tactics and strategies but also to draw together the lessons learned (what works and what doesn't work, against which kinds of crime problems, under what kinds of local conditions) and thereby to inform police managers (at the city-wide, borough, zone and precinct levels) about how best to deploy and assign discretionary patrol resources for crime-control objectives.

One of the "natural experiments" reviewed by Vera was the Robbery Identification Program in the 90th Precinct. This program, implemented by the Commanding Officer of the 90th Precinct in the fall of 1981, was designed to facilitate the identification and apprehension of persons committing robberies in that precinct. Vera's analysis and evaluation of the program, delivered to the department in April, 1982, focused on each of the sub-elements of the program's operation, as well as on its impact, to identify the specific tactical and operational strategies which, combined, produced what were found to be remarkably favorable results.

The program began when the Commanding Officer of the 90th Precinct, working with his anti-crime unit, obtained photographs of the persons he believed were likely to be committing a substantial number of robberies in the precinct. The photos were of those persons arrested in the precinct over the previous two years for robbery, grand larceny from the person and gun possession. These mug shots were assembled into easily transportable books, and supporting files were created. These were used by the anti-crime unit and by members of the uniformed force in the preliminary investigation of robberies occurring within the precinct. Because of their portability, the mug-shot books could be immediately taken to the scene of a robbery and shown to the victim and witnesses. Indeed, during the first month of operation the books were used on 35 occasions and resulted in the identification of 18 perpetrators.

Because of its initial success, the project was reviewed by the Central Robbery Division, and on December 1, 1981 an experimental program was implemented which combined the forces of the Central Robbery Division with those of the 90th Precinct Anti-Crime and Detective Units in a coordinated effort to identify and apprehend the perpetrators of robberies.

The program's initial supervisor, assigned by the Central Robbery Division, implemented a new case management system which insured prompt, thorough and flexible follow-up investigations, and facilitated supervisory control of the process. The management system, which freed the investigators from paper-work by providing for a civilian typist to transcribe their reports, provided for an immediate preliminary investigation to be completed on each case on the day it was reported. Under normal conditions, the initial follow-up investigation may be stretched over several days because the investigator to whom it is assigned goes off duty. Under the new system, if the investigator cannot complete the preliminary follow-up investigation before the end of his tour, it is passed on to another investigator on the following tour for completion.

The program also provides for the active participation of the precinct's uniformed force. If the investigator succeeds in identifying the perpetrator, but is unable to apprehend him, a photo of the wanted person is placed on a bulletin board for the information of the uniformed force. If a uniformed member apprehends a wanted robber, he is able to turn the arrest over to any member of the unit for processing. (Under normal conditions, a uniformed member making an apprehension of a wanted person would be required to conduct the post arrest processing steps himself unless a detective actually assigned to the case is available to take it over.) Further, any member of the uniformed force who makes two apprehensions of persons wanted by the robbery unit is recommended for departmental recognition by the Precinct Commander.

Vera's analysis and evaluation of the program indicated that in addition to it being successful in reducing the number of robberies in the 90th Precinct (robberies decreased in that precinct by 39.8% during the first 6 months of 1982) the investigative management system utilized in the program appeared superior to the normal system used by the Department, and a recommendation was made that further experimentation be conducted with a view towards implementing this management system for all categories of crime.

The program has since been extended to additional precincts, producing preliminary results comparable to those experienced in the original demonstration. Because the 40% drop in robberies in the 90th Precinct was the greatest drop experienced by any precinct in the City, and because the data from surrounding precincts powerfully suggest that there was no displacement of robbery to adjacent areas, the extension of the basic program techniques to more precincts may present an opportunity to test the deterrent impact of police tactics designed to raise the perceived risk of apprehension for a particular crime. It appears, at this point, that the drop in robberies in the 90th Precinct was achieved principally through the deterrent effect that flowed from quickly-circulating knowledge about the

existence and content of the mugbooks. If so--and the hypothesis might be tested in precincts where robbers' perceptions of the risk of apprehension have not yet been affected by introduction of the new program--then the dynamics of crime control through deterrent strategies can be explored as the program expands: knowledge about these dynamics would help inform the design and management of new police tactics that seek to take advantage of deterrent effects.

## (5) Precinct Use of Patrol Resources

Each precinct commander throughout the City deploys his personnel as best he can to addressing the service, the order maintenance and the crime control demands on essentially scarce resources. While he does this within the Department's general framework for patrol operations, he is given some flexibility in creating specific deployment strategies within his command. Thus there exists an opportunity to systematically learn what strategies are currently being employed throughout the city and with what results.

To begin the task of identifying and categorizing the different deployment strategies, Vera distributed a survey instrument to each patrol precinct commander during the fall of 1982. This questionnaire asked a series of questions about the frequency with which foot and scooter patrols were mounted, the types of problems they were designed to deal with, and the strengths and limitations of these patrol strategies. In addition, the Commanders were asked to identify and describe any directed patrol strategies they were using.

The following highlights some of the survey findings:

With the exception of the 41st Precinct in the Bronx and the 111th Precinct in Queens, every precinct deploys foot patrol. There is, however, considerable variation in the number of foot patrol posts manned, and the frequency with which these officers are deployed. Specifically, 62 of the 71 precincts that deploy foot officers do so on a routine basis; that is, these posts are covered five or more days per week. In the remaining nine precincts, the coverage is infrequent or sporadic. Coverage is generally limited to one or two posts, one or two days per week.

City-wide, approximately 320 posts are manned on the day tour, and 215 on the evening tour. The highest concentration of foot patrol coverage is in the borough of Manhattan, where approximately 108 posts are routinely covered. Midtown Precinct North, Midtown Precinct South, and the 6th Precinct collectively account for approximately 56% of the foot patrol units deployed in Manhattan on the day tour.

Foot patrols are primarily assigned to business and commercial districts with a high concentration of pedestrian and vehicular traffic. These patrols are designed to serve a number of purposes including addressing street conditions, "quality of life" problems, enforcement of traffic laws and vendor/peddler regulations, and special conditions. In 28 precincts, foot officers are assigned to fixed school posts.

Special patrol tactics are used in 32, or approximately 45%, of the 71 commands that deploy foot patrol. Twenty-two



respondents reported that they used fixed posts, while ten stated that they used vertical patrols primarily to patrol public and private housing complexes and other areas with high robbery and/or burglary complaint rates.

When the 71 commanders who deployed foot patrol were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of this patrol strategy, eight respondents rated foot patrol as "excellent", 44 as "very good", 16 as "satisfactory", and 3 others were ambivalent. Thus, the vast majority of the commanders reviewed this patrol technique very favorably. The consensus was that foot patrol is very effective in addressing emerging or chronic quality of life conditions, and for handling specific conditions such as school posts, peddler and vendors license violations, prostitution, and traffic enforcement.

The most frequently cited advantages of foot patrol over other patrol techniques were "high visibility" and "community contact." However, several noted that foot patrol is labor intensive and therefore expensive. Additionally, foot officers have limited mobility and therefore they can only respond to incidents occurring in their immediate vicinity.

At present, foot patrol officers are not listed with Communications Division dispatcher as a unit that may be available to respond to a 911 call for service. Seventy one of the seventy-three precinct commanders believe that these units should be on the 911 queue. In describing the types of calls for service appropriate for foot officer response, seven commanders indicated that these officers should be assigned to all calls arising on their posts, while thirteen stated that they should be assigned to all calls arising on their posts with back-up as necessary. Nevertheless, the majority, that is 51 commanders, indicated that foot officers should only be assigned to low priority, one-man RMP type calls.

Scooter patrols are mounted routinely in 62 precincts. In three precincts, they are deployed occasionally, and the frequency of the coverage depends primarily on manpower availability. Eight precincts do not employ this method of patrol.

Scooters are frequently used to handle situations similar to those assigned to foot officers: special conditions, quality of life problems, peddling, and traffic enforcement. Scooters, because of their mobility, are also used to patrol large geographical areas, such as parks, and large public and private housing projects-- areas which because of their size and terrain are not suitable to coverage by foot officers.

When the 65 commanders who deployed scooters were asked to assess the effectiveness of these units, seven rated these patrols as "excellent," 41 as "very good," and 14 expressed some reservations. Overall, the consensus was that scooter patrol is

an effective police tactic. Fifty-three of these commanders indicated that the chief advantage of scooter patrol over either RMP or foot patrol was maneuverability.

While few commanders expressed opposition to the concept of scooter patrol, several were opposed to the use of two-wheeled scooters because they believe these vehicles pose officer safety hazards.

Among the frequently cited disadvantages of scooters were mechanical failures and resulting repairs which produced considerable "down-time," the hazards posed by poor road conditions (potholes), and the fact that scooters cannot be used in inclement weather. Six commanders mentioned that they simply did not have enough trained personnel to mount scooter patrol as often as they would like.

Thirty-six (55%) of the 65 commanders who reported that they deployed scooter patrols indicated that these units were listed as an available resource for 911 calls for service. In 27 of these precincts, scooter units are only allowed to be assigned to low priority, one-man RMP type calls. In five precincts, scooters may respond to any type of call, and in two they may respond to any call with back-up as necessary. Thus, the survey results indicate that scooters are primarily used to handle non-emergency calls for service.

The commanders who routinely mount scooter patrols but do not list these units with the Communications Division were asked whether these units should be available to respond to 911 calls. The commanders were almost equally divided over this issue. Thirteen respondents stated that scooters should be on the 911 queue, while fifteen indicated that they should not.

The survey produced a number of insights into the ways in which foot and scooter patrols have and may be used to address a variety of precinct conditions. These findings assisted us in planning and implementing the Community Patrol Project. Unfortunately, however, the survey was not as successful in identifying specialized, directed patrol efforts being mounted by the precinct commanders. This seems to reflect different perceptions in what constitutes directed patrol.

(6) 115th Precinct Evaluation - The Effects of a Steady Tour on Police Officer Stress

At the Police Department's request, Vera began work on an evaluation of the experimental procedures introduced by the Department with the opening of the new 115th Precinct in January, 1984. The opening of this new precinct afforded the Police Department the opportunity to test several innovative practices. From the outset, personnel assigned to the precinct, which was created by combining portions of the existing 110th and 114th Precincts, were given permanent tour assignments with rotating days off. This feature, (the elimination of rotating tours) was implemented in an attempt to reduce stress levels among members of the command caused by the weekly rotation of hours of duty, and marked the first time in recent years that the entire personnel of a precinct were so assigned.

This innovation made possible several management changes, which, under normal operating conditions, are either not possible or undesirable. Three lieutenants were assigned to the 115th Precinct as Platoon Commanders. Each lieutenant, under supervision of the precinct commander, has total responsibility for the operations of the precinct during one of the three daily tours (days, evenings, or midnights). This effectively reduces the operational span of control of the precinct commander to three, and clearly places responsibility for precinct operations during each of the three daily tours. All personnel assigned to field duty in the precinct (lieutenants, sergeants, and police officers) have been divided into three teams, assigned one each to the three daily tours. This has resulted not only in the personnel working steady tours, but also in continuity of supervision as the police officers always work with the same sergeants and lieutenants. This feature, which is seen as a desirable plan of operation, is not possible under normal operations because of the manner in which tour rotation takes place under the working charts for police officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. The permanent tour assignments make it possible to assign the police officers to steady sectors and foot posts, a feature also made difficult in normal operations because of tour rotation.

Through these changes, the Police Department hopes to achieve several objectives, including: reducing the levels of stress experienced by operational personnel; delivering police services within the precinct in at least as effective a manner as was the case before the precinct opened (but with the expectation of improving the delivery of services within the command); and increasing the citizens' sense of safety and positive valuations of police services in the precinct.

To assist the Police Department in the evaluation of this experimental program, the Vera Institute has implemented a four-phase research strategy. Briefly, the four areas in which work has already begun and will continue, are as follows:

a. Documentation of Project Implementation: Vera staff have secured all written materials regarding the precinct's organization and operation, and will continue to do so throughout the first year of its operation. Vera has begun monitoring the manner in which personnel are selected for assignment to the command, and has conducted on-site observation both in the station house and in the field during various tours at various times during the first year of program operation. While on site, Vera staff has conducted essentially unstructured interviews with Precinct personnel. The documentation effort is focused on particular dimensions of the project, which includes the following:

- procedures for recruiting and selecting precinct personnel.
- evidence that personnel were actually assigned to their tour of choice and given a steady assignment to that tour; the extent to which continuity in partner assignments and sector and post assignments was actually achieved.
- a description of how the Police Officers actually patrol their sectors and posts, how they react to and handle various types of calls for service, how they established and maintained contacts with the community, how they deal with supervisory and command personnel and their perceptions of how the conduct of supervisors and command officers in this precinct differs from what they experienced elsewhere, and their views on operational and management needs in the 115th.
- a description of how the patrol sergeants actually carry out their supervisory functions, how they react to the role of the Platoon Commander, their perception of how their role differs from what they had experienced elsewhere, and their views on operational or management needs in the 115th.
- a description of how the Lieutenant Platoon Commanders actually carry out their role; the duties they tend to delegate and those they retain; how they monitor operations in the field and the criteria by which they choose calls on which to respond; how they manage their patrol sergeants; how they assess the effectiveness of the Precinct chain of command; how they use Precinct staff resources; how and with whom they identify problem areas on the tour and develop and implement strategies for attacking those problems; their assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Platoon Commander's role and the operational and management needs of the 115th.

- a description of how the staff functions are made operational and how they are used by command and supervisory personnel.
- a description of how the precinct commanding officer uses his chain of command; any difficulties that might arise in the command structure and how those issues are resolved; nature and frequency of meetings with lieutenants and sergeants; how the Platoon Commander's responsibilities are actually articulated, monitored and enforced by the Precinct Commander; how he uses staff resources, his perception of the operational and management needs of the 115th.
- a description of how relationships with the community are established and maintained; the nature of Precinct policy and strategy in this area; the actual activities of the Precinct's Community Affairs Officers, the Precinct Commanding Officer, the Platoon Commanders, Sergeants and Police Officers in the Precinct.

b. Stress Assessment: Vera staff are in the process of measuring the stress levels among police officers assigned to the Precinct at the time of its opening in January, 1984. Specifically, on January 2, a standardized stress measuring instrument adapted for this purpose was administered to 133 Police Officers assigned to the 115th Precinct. Although the questionnaire only requires approximately twenty minutes for completion, it is comprehensive and asks the respondent a series of questions related to: 1) job stress; that is, the degree to which various aspects of the job are a source of frustration or stress (e.g., inadequate equipment, the promotion system, P.D. bureaucracy), b) major pressures in personal life (e.g., marital problems, financial problems), c) whether the respondent enjoys being a police officer, d) health problems, e) the effect that working steady tours has on various aspects of private life (e.g., family life, sleep, social life), f) the officer's perception on stress related problems among his/her three closest friends who are police officers (e.g., problems with spouses, excessive worrying, excessive complaining), g) strategies that the officer uses to reduce stress (e.g., exercise, listening to music, hobbies), and h) the ways in which being a police officer may cause problems in the household (e.g., communication problems between husband and wife, police officer brings work problems home).

In order to determine how stress changes over the course of the project, the instrument was re-administered during May and June, and will be administered again during December and January.

While this strategy will indicate the changes in stress levels that occur during the project, it will not demonstrate

that the changes were attributable to the officers' working in the new precinct on steady tours. For example, it would be possible that stress levels among Queens police officers generally were rising or falling during the same time period, and that the observed changes in the 115th force were not significantly different from the general trend in the borough. Thus the general trends might be a response to changes in borough-wide procedures or to changes in external pressures on the Department. Therefore, to provide some basis for inferring a relationship between the new program and observed changes in the stress levels manifested by the 115th Precinct staff, a stratified, random sample of police officers from six other Queens' precincts was selected. The comparison sample of a total of 147 officers from the 103rd, 105th, 109th, 110th, 113th, and 114th Precincts completed the questionnaires during February and March, 1984. The questionnaire will be re-administered to the control group during December and January.

The comparison sample was stratified by seniority level to resemble the seniority distribution of the officers assigned to the 115th. Because the members of the comparison sample have been selected from six Queens precincts, we may assume that the effects of specific working environments would be neutralized. The extent and nature of change in measured stress levels will be compared for the two groups. Change in stress levels of the 115th Precinct sample that is not observed in the control sample might reasonably be attributed to the program. This strategy also provides some insight into how the actual stress levels of a totally volunteer force (the 115th) compare with those of a random sample of officers in the same borough command.

As a secondary measure of stress, Vera staff will collect data from Department records relating to certain performance measures that may be reflective of variations in stress levels experienced by the officers. These indicators include: sick reports, civilian complaints, corruption complaints, command discipline, department vehicle accidents, alcohol or drug abuse reports, psychological referrals, and requests for emergency excusals. These will be collected periodically for the 115th Precinct and compared with some form of borough-wide measure. Where the incident information is strictly confidential, such as referrals for psychological services, Vera would ask the office in question to provide aggregate statistics for the Precinct. In any event, all personally identifiable information acquired by the Vera staff will be used for research purposes only and will not be shared with anyone not a member of the research staff.

**c. Measuring Service Delivery:** The evaluation will attempt to describe and measure the delivery of police services in the area using a variety of standard indicators. Vera staff will utilize standard Department records where available, and when necessary will create new data bases. Among the indicators which are under review, are the following: the handling of the

calls-for-service workload by the Precinct personnel; crime complaint and arrest performance; general effectiveness indicators (e.g. sick reports, civilian and corruption complaints, command disciplines, maintenance of property and equipment, citizens complaints regarding police service); precinct anti-crime unit activity; utilization and effectiveness of special patrol efforts; and the extent and nature of the precinct community relations and crime prevention programs.

**d. Measuring Community Attitudes and Reactions:**

In recent years, an increasing number of police research projects have studied citizens' fear of crime, perceptions of safety and assessment of local police services. These studies are important for two reasons. In the first place, citizen fear of crime and sense of vulnerability has become a source of major concern in its own right, and recent research has indicated that it can and often does fluctuate quite independently from the actual volume of crime in the local neighborhood. Secondly, more police agencies now believe that their crime control and order-maintenance functions cannot be performed effectively without the substantial, cooperative involvement of the people. For both of these reasons, the community's reaction to a police initiative has become an important dimension of its perceived effectiveness.

As part of the evaluation of the 115th Precinct, Vera reviewed community survey instruments that have been used in recent studies and adapted one for use in this program. During November and December, 1983, just prior to the opening of the 115th Precinct, Vera conducted a telephone survey of 300 randomly selected households. During the twenty minute interview, one adult respondent from each household was asked a series of questions related to: a) the quality of conditions, facilities, and services in their neighborhood (e.g., shopping facilities, crime problems, schools, disorderly people, traffic); b) the extent to which they were worried about crime problems; c) how safe they felt in their neighborhood; d) whether they believed that the crime rate had increased, decreased, or stayed the same in their neighborhood in the last year; e) the extent to which fear of crime prevented them from walking, socializing, or going to local entertainment in their neighborhood as much as they would have liked; f) any interactions they had had with the police during the last year; g) their assessment of police officers' fairness, helpfulness, and politeness; and h) their assessment of the Police Department's ability to control crime, maintain order, and enforce traffic laws. Demographic information about the respondents was also collected. This survey will be repeated during December and January.

Thus, during the first half of 1985, Vera will present the Department with a report that assesses the impact of the operational changes on police officer stress, describes how the changes were implemented and how these changes effected service

delivery and productivity, and considers the extent to which and manner in which citizens' sense of safety and attitudes toward the police services changes, if at all, during the first year of the program.



**(7) The Community Patrol Officer: Creating a New Role for the Police Officer**

In the mid-1970's, the fiscal crises hit the City of New York and, by the end of the decade, the Police Department had lost approximately nine thousand sworn personnel. Even while available resources declined precipitously, the demand for police services increased dramatically so that in 1982 the Department received approximately six and a half million calls-for-service over the 911 Communications system.

Under these circumstances, an ever increasing proportion of the patrol force were committed to radio cars dispatched centrally in response to those calls. Uncommitted resources that could be deployed flexibly at the discretion of the Precinct Commander to address local crime conditions or quality of life problems became extremely rare. Partly as a response to these resource limitations and the priority accorded to crime reports and emergency service calls, meaningful contact between patrol officers and the residents of their beats declined. The officers had less time to spend helping residents to deal with matters of concern in the neighborhood. Quality of life, or order-maintenance problems such as prostitution, street drug trafficking, public intoxication and associated panhandling, and roving groups of unruly and intimidating youths got beyond the control of residents in many of the City's neighborhoods.

In this context, the Department has become increasingly desirous of reducing the physical, social and psychological distance between precinct patrol officers and the residents of the neighborhoods to which they are assigned. Of course, Community Relations units help in this regard. But the real challenge facing the NYPD, and most other large, urban police departments, is to develop strategies for more effectively and efficiently orienting the basic patrol operation to the particular needs of local communities. The challenge is both conceptual and fiscal.

Conceptually, the strategy must enable the Department to move into troubled neighborhoods and persuade the residents that the police are a concerned, responsive and powerful resource that can provide the people with significant assistance in their efforts to reduce the threat of crime and to control the order-maintenance problems that diminish the quality of life in the community. The strategy must be feasible even while the Department continues to make the massive resource commitments needed to respond to the calls-for-service, provide emergency services, investigate open cases, prepare arrest cases for prosecution, and provide security and order at the hundreds of public events that take place in the City.

The fiscal constraints are obvious. The strategy must permit the Department to meet its existing responsibilities and improve its services on the neighborhood level without any

realistic expectation of significant increases in manpower in the years to come.

The Department is acutely aware of and in sympathy with the increasing emphasis on community-oriented patrol that one finds in today's literature on police policy and research. Indeed, the NYPD evidenced its commitment to the principles of community-oriented policing in the early 1970's when it experimented with the use of Neighborhood Police Teams (NPT) in selected precincts. The experiment sought to establish more supportive relationships between the police and the citizenry and to encourage greater police responsiveness to the needs of the community, and to make clearer the delegation of field responsibility within the patrol force. These objectives are as important today as they were a decade ago, but the NPT is not the proper vehicle to embody them in the NYPD. The concept faded in the face of political demands from hundreds of neighborhood organizations for their own teams. The NPT would have required vast resources and massive departmental reorganization for it to have been widely implemented in a city as large as New York.

In the last few years the Department has made several efforts to expand the use of foot patrol officers in the precincts and has asked the Vera Institute of Justice for assistance in developing a strategy for encouraging more community-oriented patrol. Toward that end, the major pieces of research on patrol conducted during the last dozen years or so were reviewed. Three of those studies seem particularly pertinent to our current program design efforts. The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment\* provides evidence regarding the program's impact on citizens' sense of safety and has spurred emphasis on the need to address order-maintenance problems on the neighborhood level.\*\* The foot patrol program conducted and evaluated in Flint Michigan\*\*\* offers a useful model for constructing a patrol beat and several operational suggestions for extending the influence of the patrol officer even when he or she is not physically available. And the Community Profile Experiment in San Diego\*\*\*\* provides very specific training curricula and operational techniques through which an officer can develop a substantial knowledge of his or her beat and a heightened sensitivity to the needs of the residents.

\* Police Foundation. The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1981.

\*\*See James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. "Broken Windows," Atlantic Monthly. March, 1982, pp. 29-38.

\*\*\*Trojanowicz, Robert. An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan, Michigan State University, 1983.

\*\*\*\*Boydston, John E., and Michael E. Sherry. San Diego Community Profile: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1975.

Our review of existing patrol operations and structures in the NYPD, augmented by our review of recent experimentation in the field, has led us to focus on creating a new role for individual patrol officers--the Community Patrol Officer (CPO). The concept recognizes a need to increase officer accountability for his or her beat. Present patrol practices, whether foot or motorized, do not foster beat accountability. The vast majority of the Department's patrol resources are committed to responding to calls-for-service in radio motor patrol cars. During those times when the officers are not on call, they're expected to randomly patrol their sectors and, on occasion, they are given directed patrol assignments. Tour rotation on the Department's current duty chart does not permit assigning the same officers to the same beats or sectors on a daily basis, and in a given week an RMP officer may be assigned to three or four different sectors. All of these factors mitigate against an officer either amassing a great deal of knowledge about conditions on a given beat, or being held accountable for correcting or at least properly handling conditions.

But accountability is not the only value which the CPO concept is designed to advance. We want the officer to identify with the community he or she patrols and to pursue creative solutions to the problems that are found there. Current practices are essentially reactive. Generally, there is little continuity in the assignment of officers to specific beats. Typically the officer and his or her partner drive from call to call attempting to address the immediate conditions presented. The officer's knowledge of beat conditions is limited to the identification of problem locations and problem people. He or she is neither required nor encouraged to form relationships with residents of the community. In reality, the officer has little time to do so. The patrol officer is evaluated on what are essentially quantitative work output standards and his adherence to traditional police techniques.

Finally, we seek to create a patrol officer role through which the residents of troubled neighborhoods can link into the resources of the Department. This means the officer must be personally known by and accessible to the people. He or she must convey the Department's sincere interest in helping the people improve living conditions in the neighborhood. The officer must be able to use his or her authority toward that end in the street and to advise other patrol units on the precinct and borough levels on where, when and how best to deliver their services in the neighborhood.

In short, the Department seeks to become a more active participant in people's efforts to improve the quality of their lives on the neighborhood level. Its general patrol, investigative and crime preventive services are resources that can be used more effectively toward that end. To do so, however, the Department must provide a visible, reliable and knowable presence in

the neighborhood on a continuous basis. Reorganizing and re-deploying the entire patrol force in the form of neighborhood teams is not financially feasible and may not be operationally desirable in the context of a massive, centralized communications and dispatch system such as the City possesses. The alternative is a new role that embodies the on-site law enforcement activities of the traditional foot cop, the outreach and community organizational activities of the Community Relations officer and the problem analysis, strategy development and tactical specification activities of the police planner. It is that role, which we are calling the Community Patrol Officer, which the Vera Institute recommended that the Police Department pilot.

The major elements of the role and the design of the pilot project were as follows:

- a. Community patrol officers would be assigned to a sizable beat area on a permanent basis. The pilot program suggested would create about 10 foot beats of between 8 and 16 square blocks each, depending upon population density, geographic and neighborhood boundaries, etc. Within each beat area, locations would be identified where the CPO could be contacted or where messages could be left for him or her. The name of the officer and the location and phone number of these contact points would be widely publicized in the beat area.
- b. The officer would be accountable for the identification of crime, order-maintenance, and community problems within his or her beat area, and would be responsible for devising strategies for responding to these problems. The community patrol concept places an emphasis on patrol planning and goal-setting by the officer and the supervisor. Both the planning and goal setting are based upon a continually growing knowledge of beat problems. As in the San Diego experiment, the individual officer would be made responsible for systematically acquiring and recording information about the beat area. This would include information regarding: community demography, socio-economic conditions, institutional structure, community organizational structure, community leadership, beat patterns and trends in criminal, non-criminal, traffic and police-community problems. Over a period of time this beat profile would provide the basis for establishing the goals of the patrol.
3. Community patrol emphasizes community involvement. The beat officer would be required to meet regularly with residents and business persons in the beat area and discuss community problems in an effort to determine the nature and extent of crime and order-maintenance problems of concern to the community. The officer would be responsible for attempting to involve the community

in the solution to those problems. Where citizen action groups currently exist, he or she would work with them on the design, implementation and evaluation of the neighborhood crime prevention programs. Where such organizations did not exist, the officer would assist the community residents in organizing them to implement crime prevention activities.

- d. The CPO would play an active role in crime prevention efforts in the community. He or she would attend neighborhood group meetings as a police resource person, conduct public education programs on crime prevention specifically geared to the various groups in the beat area, and conduct residential and business premises inspections, making recommendations to improve physical security. In performing these duties the CPO would not replace the crime prevention specialist assigned to each precinct, but would augment that officer's activities, and coordinate crime prevention efforts through him.
- e. The CPO would patrol some portion of the beat each day, covering the entire beat at least twice each week. While it is important that this be a high visibility patrol effort, it is equally important that it be planned and directed at focusing on community problems. Community patrol efforts would be based on each patrol officer's planning and organization of his or her everyday activities with a view toward long-range peace keeping and crime control objectives in the beat area. CPOs would be encouraged to replace the common practice of random preventive patrol with more responsive and effective patrol strategies based on their growing knowledge of the community they serve.
- f. As beat knowledge includes a thorough understanding of crime conditions within the beat area, individual CPOs would be required to engage in crime analysis activities. Working with the precinct crime analyst, they would be required to maintain accurate records regarding crime incidence within the beat area. To accomplish this, the beat officers would be furnished with information on reported crimes and arrests within their beat areas. The officers would be encouraged to visit complainants, not to duplicate the work of the detective assigned to the case, but to counsel the complainant on methods to avoid being victimized in the future and to assist the person to establish contact with the Victim Services Agency. The officers would also advise community residents of crime trends in the area, and based on their analysis, suggest methods of combatting them.
- g. CPOs would work with other members of the precinct force in dealing with problems and conditions within the beat

area. Individual officers would confer with their supervisors in planning coordinated approaches to dealing with beat problems, and would work with personnel assigned to radio motor patrol and anti-crime patrol units in the execution of such plans. Community Patrol Officers would be required to respond to calls-for-service within their beat areas when deemed appropriate. Sharing the CFS workload with the RMP units would foster cooperative attitudes between the CPO and the motorized units.

- h. The CPO would act as a resource person for community residents in other than criminal matters. He or she would be knowledgeable regarding both community and city-wide resources for addressing various kinds of community needs, and would assist residents in contacting the proper agencies or, in some instances, initiate that contact on behalf of the community.
- i. The community patrol officers in a given precinct would be supervised by a Community Patrol Sergeant. The sergeant would act as coordinator for the program at the precinct level, conduct daily rollcalls for the patrol officers, supervise their activities within their beat areas, work with the officers on the establishment of patrol goals for each beat, and assist the officers in the design of patrol strategies to attain these goals.
- j. The community patrol would function as an integral part of the precinct. Personnel assigned to the community patrol would be assigned to the precinct and under the direct supervision of the precinct commander.

In the process of developing the conceptual framework for this initiative in community-oriented patrol, Vera and Departmental staff members visited the National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center in Michigan and examined some of the program descriptive literature pertaining to the San Diego and Newark experiments. We considered how the operational characteristics of this program might be adapted for testing in the NYPD. Based on those considerations, we offer the following recommendations for implementing a pilot project in one of the City's precincts.

1. Organizational Structure: We recommended the establishment of a Community Patrol Unit consisting of 1 Sergeant and 10 Police Officers in one precinct for a pilot testing of the concept. The personnel would be assigned directly to the precinct, and would be under the command of the precinct's commanding officer. While existing staff of the target precinct would be augmented by this number of personnel, it was hoped that most members of the Community Patrol Unit would be selected from existing personnel in that precinct who are already familiar with precinct conditions and who are known to the other personnel in the command. It was strongly felt that if the program was to be

effective, it must be structured as a part of the precinct's operations, with the personnel being assigned directly to that command.

2. Supervisory structure: Direct supervision of community patrol officers would be provided by a Community Patrol Sergeant. He would be responsible for conducting daily rollcalls of Community Patrol Officers, coordinating the activities of the officers with the other members of the command, supervising the officers in the performance of their patrol and community service duties, supervising their crime analysis and beat planning activities, and maintaining program records. While the Community Patrol Sergeant would be the primary supervisor of the CPOs, they would also be subject to the functional supervision of other precinct supervisors on patrol. The CP Sergeant would be responsible for evaluating the performance of the CPOs and, under the supervision of the precinct commander, would devise an evaluation system responsive to the duties performed by the officers.

3. Tour Assignments: The initial thoughts on tours of duty for the CPOs were that the officers would be assigned to the individual beats on the basis of an analysis of the needs of the beat, and that as a result, the individual beat tours might start at different times during the day. Observations in Flint and further thinking on the matter lead us to question the wisdom of a wide variety of multiple tours during the day. Effective development of the program during pilot operations would depend, in large measure, on the supervisory contact between the CP Sergeant and the beat officers. For this reason, while there could be some variation in the starting hours of the beat officers, the tours should be constructed so that the CP Sergeant is in a position to conduct almost all of their rollcalls, and has the opportunity to supervise the officers during the major portion of their tours.

4. Personnel Selection: Personnel for the pilot program would be volunteers selected from among the personnel of the target precinct. Recruitment of volunteers would take place during the on-site planning phase, and would be subject to the approval of the precinct commander. At a minimum, CPO personnel would be required to have three years in the Police Department and one year in the pilot precinct.

Applicants would be requested to volunteer for a one year period, and agree to be somewhat flexible with respect to work hours. While steady tours would be provided, there would probably be some need to periodically reschedule the officers to attend community meetings, etc.

5. Training: Program operations would be preceded by a two week training program for the officers involved. It was suggested that in addition to the 10 program officers, 3 additional officers from the test precinct receive the initial training in order to provide a pool from which replacements may be selected

in the event that one or more of the original volunteers requested reassignment or was otherwise removed from the program during the pilot period.

6. Target Precinct Selection: As envisioned, the community oriented patrol approach would be applicable to almost every precinct in the city. Pilot testing, however, should be conducted in a precinct which would afford the Police Department the greatest opportunity for developing the concept under conditions which neither inhibit its development nor overly simplify it. In essence, the extremes should be avoided. Little would be learned if the program were piloted in a small, quiet, residential precinct without significant crime or order-maintenance problems. Similarly, if the pilot were conducted in an extremely high hazard precinct with high levels of crime and order-maintenance problems, the sheer weight of the volume of those problems may well prevent the proper development of the concept. These problems would also make impact measurement more difficult over a short period of time. For these reasons, the following was suggested as criteria for the selection of a target precinct for the pilot testing of the program.

a. The precinct should contain a core residential population and not be transient in nature. As one of the purposes of the program is to foster community crime prevention efforts, the existence of a stable residential population is necessary, regardless of the ethnic or economic makeup of that population.

b. The precinct should be one in which there are at least several high density residential areas. Ideally, the precinct would be one which contains several different types of neighborhoods, some containing apartment house type buildings, and some containing one and two family homes. This would provide an opportunity to test the concept in different types of neighborhoods within one pilot project.

c. The precinct should have substantial crime and order-maintenance problems, but of a nature which are amenable to police-community solution. For example, skid row areas, such as the Bowery, should be avoided for pilot testing.

d. If possible, the precinct's residents should reflect various ethnic backgrounds, with a high representation of minority groups. For pilot testing, it might be wise to avoid a precinct which contains residents of only one ethnic background. Similarly, it would be wise to avoid precincts made up primarily of new arrivals to the United States, such as the large Russian population in the 60th Precinct.

e. The precinct's residents should represent a wide range of ages, with an appreciable youth population.

f. The precinct selected should have some existing community organizational structure. While one of the functions of



the community patrol is to assist in organizing the community for crime prevention, it would be advisable to begin in a community which already has some semblance of organization to act as a starting point.

g. The following police related factors should be considered:

- i. The precinct commander should support the experiment.
- ii. The commander of the precinct selected should be someone who is expected to remain in that command for at least the first year of the experiment.
- iii. While all precincts are, to some extent, undermanned, the precinct selected for the pilot project should be one which is not chronically short of personnel. If the integrity of the community patrol is to be maintained during the experiment, it cannot be viewed as a pool from which to fill RMP cars to meet minimum manning levels.
- iv. The precinct selected should be one which currently operates at an acceptable level of operational efficiency, not one which experiences operational problems on a regular basis, i.e., continual radio backlogs, etc.

In response to Vera's proposal, the Police Department agreed to implement a pilot Community Patrol Program in one patrol Precinct. During the months of April and May, 1984, Vera and Department staff met with patrol commanders throughout the various command levels of the Police Department, and reviewed recommendations regarding selection of a site for the pilot project. As a result of these efforts, the Department selected the 72nd Precinct in Brooklyn, which covers the Sunset Part and Windsor Terrace areas, as the host precinct for the program.

Between May and mid-June, project staff worked with precinct personnel on the development of the final plan of implementation. The Precinct commander sought and obtained a volunteer sergeant to supervise the program, and the sergeant in turn sought and obtained volunteers from among the police officers in the precinct. Project staff worked with representatives of the Police Academy in the Development of a training program for the Community Police Officers. In devising the training program, the assistance of non-police agencies was obtained and portions of the training were administered by these agencies. In addition to Vera, training was provided by representatives of Community Board 7, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, the Human Resources Administration, the Victim Services Agency, the Boy and Girl

Scouts of America, and representatives of several private social service providers active in the community.

Vera's project coordinator worked with the Precinct Commanding Officer and the CPO sergeant in the design of the beat areas to be covered by the Community Police Officers. Precinct complaint records were reviewed to insure that the beat areas would include those areas in which significant crime and order maintenance problems existed. In addition, Precinct and Patrol Borough Community Relations personnel assisted in the development of the beat areas by identifying existing community organizations and those areas in which community development work would appear to be desirable. Finally, meetings were held with representatives of community groups and their input was solicited. As a result of these efforts, 9 patrol beat areas were designated, ranging from 9 to 15 square blocks in area. Care was taken in the design of the patrol beats to insure that wherever possible, community needs were served. While it was recognized that the limited personnel available for the project would not permit inclusion of every block in the precinct within a beat area, efforts were made not to exclude areas in which the need appeared the greatest. For example, after the initial beat designations were made, project staff met with various community groups and reviewed the proposed areas of assignment. At one of these meetings, representatives of the block association covering 45th Street between Second and Third Avenues requested that consideration be given to including their block within one of the beat areas. The original beat designs did not include any of the territory west of Third Avenue because of its commercial nature. The block association representatives pointed out that although the area was primarily commercial, their block consisted solely of one and two family homes. In addition, because of deterioration of some of the neighboring commercial blocks, the area was the focus of large scale street-level narcotics activity, making it extremely difficult for these residents who were attempting to maintain the residential character of their block. As a result of their request, the block was included within the confines of beat area number 4. (See beat map, following.) The beat areas were also designed to permit expansion of the territory within each beat, should this eventually prove feasible and desirable.

Personnel were assigned by the Department to the 72nd Precinct to assume the duties formerly performed by the officers assigned to the project. The total complement assigned for program operations was: one Sergeant as program supervisor; nine police officers for beat coverage; one police officer as program coordinator and Sergeant's operator; and one Police Administrative Aide to perform the clerical duties relating to the program's operation. Space was provided to establish a program office within the precinct, and special telephone lines were installed to service the communications needs of the officers. Flyers were printed in English and Spanish which announced the implementation of the program and described the duties of the officers assigned to it (copy attached). These were distributed

by each of the officers to residents and businesses within their beat areas. The flyer encourages community residents to contact the officers with respect to community problems, and provides instructions on how to do this. To provide for a message reception capability during the hours when the program office is closed, telephone answering machines were installed.

The training program was administered between June 11th and 29th, and routine patrol operations began on July 2, 1984.

#### Appropriate Research Concerns for the Pilot

Ultimately, the CPO program seeks to: control the volume of street crime, especially robbery, burglary, larceny and gang assaults that occurs in the beat area; correct, or at least reduce, the effects of some of the order-maintenance problems there; and contribute to the residents' sense of control over local conditions that diminish the quality of life in their communities. Using official crime reports, CFS statistics, CPO reports on beat problems and activities undertaken to address them, and interviews with police personnel and beat residents, we would attempt to estimate the extent to which those impact objectives are realized.

However, no effort would be made at this time to measure impact within the framework of an experimental design. We believe that such a design would be premature. The immediate purpose of the pilot is to design and implement a role not now performed in the precincts of the NYPD. The actual content of that role can only be specified conceptually at this time. Until the pilot is well under way, we will not know empirically how the abstract specifications are actually enacted. For that matter, it is conceivable that some dimensions of the role will defy implementation and simply be abandoned.

We have no way of estimating, at this point, the extent to which the actual role performance will be effected by particular kinds of variations in neighborhood conditions, or variations in the characteristics and experience of the officers involved. We don't know how the residents of a community will take to the activities of the CPO, or the kinds of problems on which they would seek his or her assistance. Just as importantly, we don't know how this new role would fit into the existing structure of a precinct. Finally, we must determine how the training and activities of the CPO actually affect his or her perspective on the community, the precinct, the Department and the satisfaction he or she derives from being a police officer.

Thus, much must be learned about the independent variable before it is reasonable to test its impact in an experimental design. For that reason, we propose to devote our research resources to detailing the role as it unfolds, analyzing the variety of ways in which the CPOs attempt to establish links to the

community, examining how the police structure at the precinct and borough levels reacts to the role, and studying how the CPOs themselves define their role and assess its rewards and its shortcomings.

Research of this kind will provide Department policy makers with much of the information they need to decide on the potential utility of further experimentation with the concept and on the particular conditions under which they would like to see that testing carried out. It would also provide the kinds of detailed information managers need to effectively use and supervise people performing the CPO role in the future. Finally, such research would generate detailed descriptions of role content, organizational context and neighborhood conditions. These are the kinds of details that police managers invariably seek out when considering a program for adoption in their own department.

## II. Programs to Improve the Efficiency and Strength of Felony Case Preparation.

The Vera research monograph, Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City's Courts (New York: revised ed., Longman, 1981), was the first systematic description of the behavior and the circumstances that constitute the felony arrest caseload of an American city court system, and it described in detail the (sometimes surprising) characteristics of this caseload that tend to explain the pattern of dispositions reached in court. Much of the deterioration of felony arrests is explained by the finding that in 50 percent of the felony arrests coming to court (excluding victimless crimes) the defendants and the victims had prior personal or commercial relationships. The data revealed that these prior relationships are atypical of felony crime in many respects (the street crime thought of as "felony" is stranger crime), and that complainants in these prior relationship cases refuse to cooperate with the prosecution at a very high rate. Prior relationship cases end in dismissal and reduction of the charges far more frequently than other cases; but, as the research showed, the dispositional pattern for the remaining stranger-to-stranger felony arrests is more what one would expect from a responsibly administered criminal justice system, though not what is desired from a law enforcement perspective. By carefully matching up court results with the underlying fact and evidentiary patterns presented in the Police Department's arrests, and through analysis of the reasons for dismissal and charge reductions in the large representative sample of cases, this research showed that a substantial shift in the dispositional pattern of felony arrest cases probably could not be achieved except through efforts to increase the number of arrests in stranger-to-stranger felonies, or through efforts to improve the evidentiary base from which prosecutors make their decisions. Section I of this report, above, summarizes current work that pursues the first line of thought; here, current efforts to improve the evidentiary base for felony prosecutions are reported.

From August, 1979, through June, 1981, the Police Department conducted an experiment--designed, coordinated and evaluated by Vera--which introduced new procedures to provide immediate post-arrest investigations by detectives in all felony arrest cases. The investigations and the presentation to prosecutors of written reports of the results were expected to change dispositional patterns for felony arrests made in the experimental precinct and, from a law enforcement point of view, improve them.<sup>1</sup> The impact of the experimental procedure was measured by Vera, which collected, coded, computerized and

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<sup>1</sup>The results of Vera's quasi-experimental research on this project are reported in Felony Case Preparation: Quality Counts (New York: Vera Institute, 1981).

analyzed data from four city and state agencies on 5,000 cases. It was clear from the evaluation that timely gathering of facts and the careful written reporting of them to prosecutors had led to substantial improvement in the indictment rate, the conviction rate, the incarceration rate and the felony-time sentence rate. The evidence of this impact was confirmed when data from the experimental precinct were controlled for changes in the criminal justice system that might independently affect these rates.

The improved dispositional pattern was evident across all categories of the experimental precinct's felony arrests, but improvement was most dramatic for robbery and burglary arrests--where improvement was most fervently desired. The indictment rate for arraigned robbery arrests shot up from 39% to 66%; the conviction rate rose from 51% to 74%; and the incarceration rate rose from 30% to 44%. Sentences of five years or longer more than tripled, rising from 8% to 30%. Among burglary arrests presented to the court for disposition, the indictment rate more than doubled, rising from 10% to 24%; and the conviction rate rose from 56% to 68%.

The Felony Case Preparation Project has operational complexities, but can be simply described. It is rooted in an assumption, derived from the Felony Arrests research, that lack of timely investigation and preparation of felony arrest cases has two undesirable consequences: First, police officers, witnesses and defendants often waste months as some cases progress through the system only to be dismissed when their unprosecutability becomes obvious. Second, other cases which should and could be prosecuted, as serious felony charges against serious criminals, are dropped or pled out on low charges and with non-incarcerative sentences because prosecution and court decisions are inadequately informed. The normal procedure by which the police present their felony arrest work-product to the courts ends when an Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") in the Complaint Room receives a booking report (which does no more than present, often in a single sentence, those facts necessary to show that the officer had probable cause to make the arrest). For any other information the ADA must rely on Complaint Room interviews with the officer and the complainant; if there are other witnesses whose testimony bears on the evidentiary strength of the case, they will not normally be produced in the Complaint Room. Cases are not ordinarily investigated in detail (if they are investigated at all) until months after the arrest, when it is often too late and when most of the important decisions have already been made.

Under the experimental Felony Case Preparation Project, all adult felony arrests (except those made by special units

such as Homicide, Narcotics, and Organized Crime<sup>2</sup>) were referred to the Precinct Detective Unit ("PDU"), which assigned a detective to conduct an immediate follow-up investigation. The detective interviewed all parties--the arresting and any assisting officers, the victims, the witnesses--and, if necessary, visited the crime scene to search for additional evidence or to locate and interview additional witnesses. He might request assistance from forensic technicians, and he might conduct one or more line-ups where proper identification of the defendant was at issue. During the course of the follow-up investigation, the detective would call upon the arresting officer to assist him, a procedure which involved the officer in developing the case and served as a training vehicle to improve the investigatory skills of the patrol force.

The follow-up investigation captures at the earliest moment all evidence that would be useful to a prosecutor either for pressing cases forward or for identifying and dropping cases in which the evidence for prosecution cannot be had. The result of these investigations, reduced to a written Arrest Investigation Report ("AIR") and delivered to the Complaint Room together with the defendant, serves to inform initial prosecutorial decisions (e.g., whether to nolle prosequere, to seek criminal court conviction, or to seek indictment). As the experiment matured, these AIRs became the backbone of the prosecution's files.

Vera conducted evaluative research to determine the impact of the experimental case-preparation procedures. The 43rd Precinct in the Bronx was selected as the first site; under a grant of LEAA funds secured with Vera's assistance, additional detectives were assigned to the Precinct Detective Unit there to cover the expected increase in PDU workload. (In fact, the post-arrest investigations consumed only 7 percent of the hours detectives were available in that unit.) Vera then set up systems for the collection, coding and analysis of the data necessary to monitor charging and voiding decisions at the precinct, non-prosecution and indictment-tracking decisions by ADAs in the Complaint Room, and dismissals, convictions and sentences in the Criminal and Supreme Courts.

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<sup>2</sup>Thus, the measures such as "indictment rate" and "felony-time sentence rate" presented and discussed in these pages are calculated from a felony-arrest base which excludes arrests for homicide, narcotics and organized crime offenses. As the excluded categories of arrest enjoy higher conviction, indictment and incarceration rates than most of the remaining categories of felony arrest, the experimental and control precincts obviously had better over-all dispositional patterns than those shown in these pages, where the purpose is to evaluate the impact of the project on arrests that were subjected to its case-building techniques.

The design of this evaluative research permitted comparison of results obtained in 43rd Precinct felony arrests for any time period in the "test year" (beginning August 1979) with results for the same period in the preceding year (the "base year," beginning August 1978). But evaluative research is on shaky ground when, after observing change at an experimental site, it points to the new procedures as the cause of the change; the project can be credited with causing the change only if the research can show there is no other factor, external to the project, that caused the change. For this reason, Vera selected the 46th Precinct in the Bronx (similar, in relevant respects, to the 43rd) as a control precinct, and collected the same data, for the same periods, on project-type felony arrests originating there. That way, if a jump in the 43rd Precinct's indictment rate was in fact caused not by introduction of the project but by a change in District Attorney policy, for example, a similar change of the same magnitude would show up in the control precinct and the apparent impact of the project would be seen as an illusion. If, on the other hand, there were no change (or no similar change) in the control precinct, the impact of the project would be confirmed. (The question was not, of course, whether one precinct had, for example, a higher or lower indictment rate than another. Indictment rates, conviction rates and the like are the products of a variety of factors, such as crime conditions, that themselves vary from precinct to precinct. The question is whether a change in these rates in the experimental precinct can be attributed to the experimental procedures applied to felony arrest originating there; the answer is "yes" if the change is not found in another, similarly-situated precinct.)

The results were impressive. The dispositional pattern for arrests originating in the control precinct remained virtually unchanged, but the pattern changed dramatically--in the expected direction--in the experimental precinct. Conviction rates and indictment rates surged upward. And this improvement in the dispositional pattern for the experimental precinct was achieved with notable efficiency. There was no increase in arresting officers' overtime; there was no net increase in arrest-to-arraignment delay; and, the investigations and report-writing consumed only 7.2 percent of the hours of detective manpower available to the Precinct Detective Unit. There were other efficiencies as well: the increase in overall conviction rate was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of cases that were screened out before they reached formal court hearings in which they would, after wasted court appearances, have been dismissed. That is, the proportion of felony arrests voided at the experimental precinct (without any resources being devoted to them in the Complaint Room, pre-arraignment, and court process) increased from 3.4% to 13.2% over the first six months. (The control precinct's voiding rate rose too, but only from 4.5% to 5.1%.) As the new precinct screening procedures matured, and standards for determining the "quality" of arrests



became generally familiar to the patrol force in the experimental precinct, the rate at which it was necessary to void felony arrests declined--it fell below 5 percent in the first half of 1981. The efficiency of the police in screening out cases which investigation showed not to be prosecutable was matched, in the experimental precinct, by a drop in the proportion of cases in which the Complaint Room ADAs declined prosecution; the nolle prosee rate fell from 7.4% to 5.1% during the first six months, and fell further--to about 2 percent--in the first half of 1981. (Declination of prosecution in the control precinct cases rose slightly during the first six months, from 5.6% to 5.9%.)

If all these effects of the project are combined--an increased conviction rate and an increased rate at which unprosecutable cases are identified and screened out prior to arraignment--it is obvious that the proportion of felony arrests carried forward in the system only to be dismissed by the court declined dramatically in the experimental precinct. Indeed, court dismissals declined from 44% to 30%, a relative change of 35%. (In the control precinct, court dismissals remained constant at 40% of felony arrests.)

The clearest evidence of how much felony arrests are strengthened by this project's modest infusion of detective attention comes from an examination of the dispositions in arraigned cases. Across all project-type felony arrests, the highlights are:

The Indictment Rate for arraigned felony arrests rose from 13% to 22%--a relative change of 69%. (In the control precinct it rose from 15% to 18%, a relative change of only 20%.)

The Conviction Rate rose from 51% to 63%--a relative change of 24%. (In the control precinct, it remained virtually unchanged--54% and 55%.)

The Incarceration Rate rose from 16% to 21%--a relative change of 31%. (In the control precinct it fell from 23% to 19%--a relative change in the opposite direction of 17%.)

The Long-Term Sentence Rate (sentences with maximums of 5 years or longer) more than doubled--rising from 1.8% to 4.8%. (In the control precinct, this rate decreased from 5.1% to 3.9%.)

The magnitude of the project's impact on dispositional patterns is particularly evident in the robbery category. The highlights are:

The Robbery Conviction Rate rose from 51% to 74%, a relative change of 45%. (In the control precinct it fell from 60% to 56%, a relative change of 7% in the opposite direction.)

The Robbery Indictment Rate rose dramatically, from 39% to 66%--a relative change of 69%. (In the control precinct it rose from 44% to 50%, a relative change of only 14%.)

The Robbery Incarceration Rate increased from 30% to 44%, a relative change of 47%. (In the control precinct, it dropped from 44% to 34%, a relative change of 23% in the opposite direction.)

The Felony-Time Sentence Rate for Robbery rose from 21% to 36%, a relative change of 71%. (In the control precinct it dropped from 29% to 23%, a relative change of 21% in the opposite direction.)

The Long-Term Sentence Rate for Robbery (sentences with maximums of five years or longer) more than tripled, rising from 8% to 30%. (In the control precinct, the long-term sentence rate fell from 19% to 14%, a relative change of 26% in the opposite direction.)

In January, 1981, after these preliminary data on dispositions for arrests made in the first six months of the project had been analyzed by Vera and the Police Department, the experiment was extended to two additional Bronx precincts. Fortunately, one of the new experimental precincts was the 46th, which had been serving as the control precinct against which initial impact in the 43rd had been measured. The other new precinct was the 50th. After three months, results of these comparisons made it even more evident that the project was transferable--that its impact was not a by-product of some peculiarity of the original experimental site. For the first three months of 1981, after introduction there of the Felony Case Preparation Project procedures, the indictment rate in the 46th Precinct was 24.6% (compared to 15.5% for these months in the preceding year); similarly, the 50th Precinct's indictment rate rose from 9.2% to 23.6%.

When it presented these data to the Police Department, Vera attempted to respond to the Department's special interest

in any impact the project could have on robbery arrests. Because there had been such a sharp focus on robbery cases in New York for several months, and because the attention of the media and City Hall could have had an influence on dispositions, independent of the project, Vera was not comfortable making a comparison of the current robbery dispositional pattern with that of the preceding year. Instead, Vera collected robbery arrest and disposition data, for the early months of 1981, from three Bronx precincts which were not operating the Felony Case Preparation Project but which have similar arrest volumes and are located close by the three experimental precincts. (The proportion of the sampled robbery arrests that were still pending in Criminal Court at the time of the report to the Police Department was virtually the same for the two sets of precincts, so the bases for rates of conviction and indictment were roughly comparable.) In the experimental precincts, 64.7% of these robbery arrests had resulted in indictment and an additional 7.2% of them had reached conviction in Criminal Court, for a combined conviction/indictment rate of 71.9%. This was substantially higher than the 59.4% conviction/indictment rate in the comparison precincts.

With a view to institutionalizing the project on a city-wide basis, the Department requested that Vera analyze the project's operational data, and make recommendations about how such an expansion might best be accomplished. During the two years of operations, the project's police staff had maintained detailed records on each phase of its development, under the day-to-day direction and oversight of Vera's Project Coordinator. Using these records as a data base, Vera projected for the Department the anticipated caseload in each of the city's 73 precincts, and the number of investigative hours that would have to be supplied in these precincts. Using other data supplied by the Department, Vera analyzed the existing detective resources and current workloads of each precinct and projected the number of additional detectives each unit would require if the project were to be institutionalized without draining resources from other tasks.

On September 18, 1981, the Police Commissioner announced the Department's plan for city-wide implementation of the Felony Case Preparation Project. To accomplish this, and in recognition of the impact of recent years' attrition on the detective units (an impact detailed in Vera's reports over the preceding months), 430 members of the Department were transferred to the Detective Bureau; these transfers restored the individual Precinct Detective Units to their established quotas and supplied additional personnel to follow the procedures developed in the Vera pilot project. In the last quarter of 1981, Vera assisted the Department to design the necessary operational orders and procedures, to establish a monitoring and on-going evaluation capacity, and to train the new detective personnel. In mid-January, 1982, the first phase of city-wide institutionalization

got underway with routine use of the felony case preparation procedures in the 22 precincts showing the highest volume of robbery arrests; the new procedures are to be applied, during this phase, to all robbery arrests arising in these precincts.<sup>3</sup> Gradually, the scope of this institutionalization of the pilot project is to be broadened to cover the other indictment-prone felony arrests and the remaining precincts.

At the Department's request, Vera remains involved in data collection and in monitoring this wider application of the procedures developed in the pilot project, and provides technical assistance as required. By June, 1982, Vera was able to report to the Department on the disposition of robbery arrests made in the 22 Robbery Case Enhancement Precincts during the first quarter of 1982. Vera's review presented the dispositional pattern for the 854 eligible robbery arrests that were in fact subjected to the case preparation techniques Vera had developed, and compared that pattern with the dispositional pattern for the 620 eligible robbery arrests that were not subjected to those techniques. This comparison group consists of robbery arrests, made in the same precincts during the same period, which were not subjected to follow-up PDU investigations and the preparation of AIRs for reasons unrelated to the merits or strength of the cases (e.g., cases were "waived" by the PDU because of a bulge in other workload, because the arrest came in on the midnight tour, etc.).

The principal differences between the dispositional results achieved for these two groups of arrests are as follows:

Robbery arrests subjected to the RCEP follow-up investigations and preparation of AIRs had an indictment rate of 59%, while the comparison group's indictment rate was 42%.

RCEP arrests resulted in either a Criminal Court conviction or an indictment at a rate of 72%, while the comparison group's conviction/indictment rate was 59%.

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<sup>3</sup>The Department is conducting a related program in which special case-preparation procedures and close liaison with the District Attorney's Offices are brought into play whenever a person on the Department's "hit list" of career criminals is arrested for a felony. This program is managed and staffed by detectives on a borough rather than on a precinct basis. Thus, the Robbery Case Enhancement Program in the 22 designated precincts excludes robbery arrests of "hit list" targets--these arrests are passed along to the borough teams for case preparation and case enhancement.

RCEP arrests were dropped by prosecutors or dismissed in court at a rate of only 28%, while comparison group arrests were dropped or dismissed at a rate of 41%.

A comprehensive evaluation of the Robbery Case Enhancement Program (RCEP) during its first 7 months of operation, January through July, 1982, was conducted by Vera and the results reported to the Police Department in March, 1983. Data was collected on about 3,000 robbery arrests made in the 22 Precincts where the program is operating, and court records were searched to determine case dispositions. The study compares the Police, District Attorney and Criminal Court disposition of arrests which were subjected to the enhancement process (RCEP-arrests) with the dispositions of arrests made in the same precincts during the same period but which were not enhanced because they were waived, missed, or arose on the midnight tour (comparison group arrests). Principal observed differences between the two groups are as follows:

- A significantly higher proportion of RCEP-arrests result in indictment (60.2%) than do comparison group arrests (46.7%). Enhancing robbery arrests appears to increase the probability of indictment by almost 30%.
- A higher proportion of RCEP-arrests result in either a Criminal Court conviction or Indictment (73.0%) than do comparison group arrests (60.9%). This positive impact is primarily the consequence of the higher indictment rate achieved by RCEP-arrests.
- A lower proportion of RCEP-arrests result in ACD's or dismissals in the Criminal Court (18.0%) than do comparison group arrests (24.8%).
- A significantly higher proportion of RCEP-arrests survive District Attorney screening (are not 343'd or declined for prosecution) and enter the court system than do comparison group arrests. The 343/DP rate for RCEP-arrests was 6.7%, while the 343/DP rate for comparison group arrests was 14.3%.
- These findings, taken together, indicate that enhancing robbery arrests produces indictments or Criminal Court convictions in many cases that would otherwise result in non-convictions.

Vera was also requested to conduct a management audit of both the Robbery Case Enhancement and Felony Augmentation Programs (FAP). The object of the study was to determine the

degree to which program effectiveness was effected by city-wide institutionalization. Many programs which are successful as pilot projects are negatively impacted by being integrated with routine operations on an agency-wide scale. Pilot operations sometimes give priority to experimental procedures. Upon institutionalization, however, those procedures must compete with other priority operations for scarce resources and as a result, the new procedures are sometimes less effective than they were during pilot operations.

Vera staff conducted the audit over a six month period between September 1982 and March 1983, and delivered its report to the Police Department in March 1983. In conducting the study, Vera staff performed the following analyses:

- a. The records of both programs were reviewed for the first 10 months of their operation, January through October, 1982. Data bases were established and analysis conducted to determine the degree of program utilization over the ten month period.
- b. Each of the FAP borough units was visited and unit records were reviewed. One month's caseload in each borough was analyzed by reviewing each individual case handled during the month, and conducting a case content analysis. The results of this analysis were quantified and included in the report.
- c. One month's caseload in each of the 22 RCEP precincts was also read and analyzed, and a case content analysis conducted.
- d. Upon review of all of the data, recommendations were made to the Department for some modifications of the procedures utilized in both programs.

Vera staff has worked with department managers over the past 18 months, reviewing the findings of the audit, and estimating the feasibility and desirability of further extending the utilization of case enhancement practices. As a result of this work, the department will begin a city-wide expansion of enhancement in the late fall of this year. In addition to the geographic expansion (to all precincts), the department will also increase the number of categories of crimes in which enhancements will be undertaken.

Vera will continue to assist the Department in monitoring, evaluating and shaping the changes in police practice and court outcomes which have been provoked by the Felony Case Preparation Project.

### III. Programs to Improve Sentencing and the Enforcement of Sentences

A general enthusiasm for "alternatives to incarceration" arose in the 1960s; it continues today, in an uneasy co-existence with hardening views on penal policy and growing fascination with incapacitation as an organizing principle for sentencing policy. In the last couple of years, as the City's jails have become more overcrowded and the public purse has been affected, the City's search for real alternatives has intensified. Nevertheless, the track records of programs that aim to provide alternatives to jail have not been very good; the reason is that it has proved very hard to prevent the alternatives from being used exclusively for first (or minor) offenders for whom the prospect of being sentenced to jail is, in any event, unlikely. Using the alternatives for cases to which the courts would not ordinarily attach punishment makes the alternative unenforceable (when offenders refuse to comply); this quickly becomes obvious--to offenders and judges alike--and, in turn, makes it all the more difficult to move the courts toward using the alternative in cases that are serious enough for enforcement to be an issue and jail a likely outcome. The first subsection below outlines current efforts to secure systematic use of a workable alternative sentence.

#### (1) The New York City Community Service Sentencing Project

For several years now, Vera has been designing, implementing and expanding a program of community service sentencing in the Criminal Courts of the City. Begun in the Bronx as a pilot project, it is now operating in Manhattan and Brooklyn as well. The program has been supported with a combination of funding from the City, State and private foundations. Those funds have also supported an extensive and sophisticated evaluation designed to measure the extent to which the program is serving people who would otherwise have been incarcerated, and to estimate the cost savings which the City experiences through the project.

The program operation has been refined over the last year or so as data from the research has become available. Some funds from this contract have been used to support the work of the researcher as he completes the final report. It is expected that the report will be available for transmittal by the end of the calendar year.

The material presented here is taken from the CSS program's fourth interim progress report. It summarizes the development of the program, the changes wrought on the basis of the research findings, and the major features of what we have learned about the program's effects.

## Executive Summary

This report is the fourth in a series of interim reports on the impact of the New York City Community Service Sentencing Program. The program, to which 1,028 adult property offenders were sentenced in 1983, is intended to enforce a sentence (70 hours of supervised, unpaid labor for the benefit of community groups) imposed as an alternative to short jail terms in cases where the New York City courts typically punish by jailing because no enforceable alternative punishment is available. These cases are, for the most part, property misdemeanor cases involving offenders with prior records of recidivism in the property misdemeanor category.

The program and the research methodology are described more fully in the text. But, because most "alternative" sentencing programs do not, in fact, achieve substantial displacement of jail sentences, this summary focuses on the highlights of the impact analysis.

- oOf the 1,028 property misdemeanor recidivists sentenced to the project in 1983, 588 (57%) would have drawn jail sentences if the project had not been operating.

- oIn 1983, program operations reduced the demand for jail cells by 114 cells.

- oThe jail terms that would have been drawn by those sentenced to community service are short jail terms, but the number of cells that would have to have been reserved to incarcerate the 588 is significant; with Rikers Island at and over capacity, the economic value of reducing demand for cells is substantial.

The jail-displacement impact of this program is now better than the goal of 50 percent (already an ambitious goal in a field where research has shown it to be exceedingly difficult for "alternative" projects of size to displace jail terms at a rate of even 10 percent). The economic benefits of reduced demand for cells, together with the economic benefit to distressed inner-city communities from the supervised, unpaid labor, much more than offset the costs of program operations. And, of course, the cause of justice is served not only by the effective non-custodial punishing of the 57 percent who would have gone to jail, but also by the program's administering of a cost-effective punishment to the other petty recidivists who would have "walked".

At the current level of funding, the New York City Community Service Sentencing Project has stabilized with an intake rate of about 1,000 sentences per year. The program elements -- screening, supervision and enforcement -- have been



tested and, although continuously under revision, have been refined during the five years of development; it is now clear that a large number of recidivist property offenders can be effectively and constructively punished without jailing. Almost nine out of ten offenders comply with the court-ordered term of service. For those who fail, it has been demonstrated that most can be located and returned to court for resentencing. The research effort (from which some of the preliminary findings on impact have been taken for this interim report) has found that only six percent of those sentenced to community service escape punishment; 94 percent either completed their term of unpaid, supervised community service or were jailed upon being returned to court after the violation. In addition, the follow-up studies show that, although a community service sentence does not often make a responsible citizen out of a petty recidivist, short jail terms don't do that either -- rearrest rates are virtually the same for similar groups sentenced to jail and sentenced to community service.

## Background: The Difficulty of Finding Real Alternatives

The general enthusiasm for "alternatives to incarceration" persists in an uneasy co-existence with hardening views on penal policy and growing fascination with incapacitation as an organizing principle for sentencing policy. In the last couple of years, as the jails have become more overcrowded and the public purse has been strained, New York's search for real alternatives has intensified.

Nevertheless, the track records of programs that aim to provide alternatives to jail have not been very good. The reason is that it has proved very hard to prevent "alternatives" from being used exclusively for first (or minor) offenders for whom the prospect of being sentenced to jail is, in any event, unlikely. Using the alternatives for cases to which the courts would not ordinarily attach punishment makes the alternative unenforceable (when offenders refuse to comply); this quickly becomes obvious--to offenders and judges alike--and, in turn, makes it all the more difficult to move the courts toward using the alternative in cases that are serious enough for enforcement of the sentence to be an issue and jail a likely outcome.

## The New York City Community Service Sentencing Project

### (a) The Pilot

One of the most promising ideas for alternative sentencing is the imposition of a certain number of hours of unpaid work for the community's benefit, in lieu of incarceration. In practice, this concept has been widely embraced but has at the same time been diluted to the point where thousands of such sentences are imposed yearly in this country and virtually none of them are imposed in cases where jail would otherwise have been used. Convinced that there was nothing wrong in the concept of community service sentencing--and much to recommend it--Vera and the Bronx District Attorney launched a pilot project in 1979, to demonstrate how to target this alternative on jail-bound cases and how to administer the sentence when dealing with the much more difficult offender group that actually gets jail: the unskilled, unemployed Black or Hispanic offender who faces multiple personal problems and has a prior record.

From the inception, the project has stood outside the mainstream of community service sentencing in this country. Community service sentences customarily go to middle class, white first offenders who require little supervision and little support and who face little risk of jail. But by excluding first offenders, by proving to the court that the project could and would directly supervise the offenders' performance of their service obligations, and by proving to the court that staff

could and would (either themselves or through their close working relationships with the Police Warrant Squad) secure the re-sentencing of offenders who refuse to perform their community service or who disobey the rules for behavior at the community sites, the New York City project seems gradually to have won recognition from most prosecutors and judges that it is possible to administer a punishment--at least this punishment--without jailing.

The Bronx pilot ran from the end of February, 1979, through September, 1980. In the pilot phase, 260 offenders were sentenced by the Bronx Criminal Court to perform 70 hours of unpaid service for the benefit of the community, under the supervision of project staff. They cleaned up badly neglected senior citizens' centers, youth centers and neighborhood parks; they repaired appliances and installed smoke alarms for the elderly; they helped to staff recreational programs for retarded children, and painted and repaired community facilities and playgrounds; and they performed other useful work in one of the most service-needy areas of the city. Some continued to volunteer their services after completing their court-imposed obligations.

The evidence was strong that the pilot met its goal of restricting the use of this new sentence to those who would have served short jail terms. Eligibility criteria, established before the pilot began, ensured that all of the 260 had been convicted as adults at least once before; as a group they averaged 2.5 prior convictions; a third had been convicted of a felony some time in the past; over half received the community service sentence in a prosecution commenced by arrest on felony charges (all property offenses); 95 percent were Black or Hispanic; and almost all were unemployed at the time of the arrest and conviction that led to their being sentenced to the project. This is the profile of the jail-bound group in New York City. Additional evidence that the pilot project reached a group of offenders who faced a substantial risk of jail emerged from the re-sentencing data: although almost 90 percent completed the community service sentence, the rest were referred back to court to be re-sentenced; almost all were given jail sentences on the underlying convictions.

For the nearly 90 percent who satisfied the conditions of their community service sentences, the pilot project staff offered assistance in finding jobs, housing, and educational or other social services. This appears to have been essential for the offenders who did use the experience of making restitution by community service as a starting point for a change from petty property crime to a legitimate income and life-style. Few of the 260 had any past experience of steady employment, though most were in their mid-20s (they ranged in age from 16 to 45); at least a third were having evident problems with drugs, and others needed treatment for alcoholism; some were illiterate and few scored above elementary grade levels on reading and math tests. (The case summaries appended to the full report of the

pilot project more clearly convey the need of this Criminal Court population for basic services of all kinds.<sup>1)</sup> Staff provided emergency assistance to those who could not perform the sentence without it. In addition, two-thirds of the project participants accepted help in formulating and carrying out post-sentence plans; each was referred to at least one agency or employer (half had two or more appointments set up for them). Although only 50 percent of these appointments were kept, many participants went on to get jobs, stipended training, or treatment.

The pilot showed that in many cases which would otherwise end in jail time of up to 90 days, the court could view the community service sentence as a suitable alternative penalty for the offense, and that nearly all who got the sentence would, if properly supervised, perform it. The result was to introduce into regular use a new penal sanction--one that is more positive, less burdensome and less costly than jail time, but more burdensome, more likely to be enforced, and, thus, more credible than the previously existing "alternatives" to jail (e.g., pre-trial diversion, probation, fines).

#### (b) The Demonstration

As a result of the pilot, the City asked Vera to manage a formal demonstration project in community service sentencing. It began on October 1, 1980, with a slight expansion of the Bronx operation and the laying of groundwork for a Brooklyn replication. The Brooklyn office opened in December. In the Spring of 1981, when the swelling volume of short-term prisoners presented the City with an over-crowding crisis on Rikers Island, Vera was asked to expand the project further to handle 1000 sentences per annum, and to adapt it to the Manhattan Criminal Court as well.

The City allocated up to \$610,000, matched by \$150,000 from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, for this larger effort. Expansion in the Bronx and Brooklyn began and a Manhattan project got up and running at the end of September, 1981. For Fiscal Year 1983-84, the City held its financial support constant, and New York State added \$250,000. The financing has permitted the projects to build to a supervision capacity sufficient to handle the growing intake which, since mid-1983, has been running in excess of 1,100 sentences on an annualized basis; the average cost of a community service sentence stands at \$750. It is probable that this cost per sentence, which is already quite favorable when compared with the far less intense

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<sup>1</sup>The New York City Community Service Sentencing Project: Development of the Bronx Pilot (New York: Vera Institute, 1981).

probation supervision sentence, will decline further as the boroughs continue to expand and stabilize their operations.

Although caseloads have tripled over the past two years, the rate at which project staff have secured compliance with the terms of the sentence from persons sentenced to community service is holding in the 85 to 90 percent range. To protect the integrity of the community service sanction and to ensure its usefulness to the courts, project staff are rather vigorous in their enforcement efforts. First, all reasonable assistance is offered to offenders to aid them in completing their 70-hour terms (e.g., emergency lodging, detox, nutrition and health services). Phone calls, warning letters and visits to the homes of participants who fail to report as ordered to the service sites exact compliance in most cases; when these efforts fail, a letter is presented to the court alleging non-compliance, and asking that the case be restored to the calendar for resentencing. Close cooperation from the Police Department Warrant Squad helps to bolster the project's ability to return most violators to court. In the majority of delinquent cases, project staff are able to arrange to have the offender brought back before the original sentencing judge.

Once violation of the community service obligation has been established, the judge resentsences; the new sentence may be chosen from the full array of sentencing options the law provides for the original conviction. Because almost 9 out of 10 offenders sentenced to community service complied, because at least two-thirds of the offenders who failed to comply were returned to the court for resentencing, and because 8 out of 10 of those so returned received jail terms, the program's enforcement record continues to encourage compliance by a difficult-to-manage offender group and this, in turn, encourages continued use of the sentence in cases where punishment is a priority for the court. Only six percent of the offenders sentenced to perform community service under project supervision have so far escaped full punishment; 94 percent have either completed their term of unpaid, supervised community service or have been jailed upon being returned to court to answer for the violation.

### c) The Impact Analysis--Method Used

Vera's Research Department has been studying the impact of this project on the demand for jail cells at Rikers Island. However successful project operations may be, the bottom line questions are: how many of the offenders sentenced to community service would, if the projects did not exist, have been sentenced to jail, and for how long? And, to what extent has the operation of this alternative sentencing program affected the level of crime in the City?

From the beginning of the pilot project through December, 1983, almost 2,500 offenders had been sentenced to perform community service under the project's supervision. The profile is

still that of a jail-bound group: those sentenced to community service average 8.7 prior arrests and 5.3 prior convictions, and 44 percent had received a jail or prison term on their last conviction.

But knowing that the profile is similar to the profile of offenders drawing short jail terms is not enough. The most certain method of determining how, if the community service sentence had not been available, the courts would have disposed of the cases of offenders sentenced to community service would be to establish randomly-selected experimental and control groups. Although this method would yield the least ambiguous results, it would also require randomizing the sentencing options available to judges in paper-eligible cases. In the Criminal Court sentencing context, such a procedure raises problems that would be at least difficult to overcome, and implementing such a procedure might so distort the normal decision-making process as to render any findings questionable.

In lieu of a classical experimental approach, the Research Department undertook a retrospective statistical analysis to determine how the courts reached the decision to jail or not to jail in cases similar to those in which community service sentences were in fact imposed. With the aid of a computer, a number of statistical models were developed to find the set of statements which most closely predicted the actual proportion of defendants jailed, out of a test sample of defendants who were, on paper at least, eligible for sentencing to the program. These models were then used to estimate the proportion of community service participants who would have received a jail sentence if the community service sentencing option had not been available to the court.

The population used to develop and to test these statistical models consisted of a pool of criminal court defendants who were initially screened as eligible for community service by project court representatives, but who were subsequently dropped from consideration for a variety of reasons. The utility of a model that predicts the sentences of "rejects" can be seen more clearly by examining the screening process that generates the pool of defendants from which rejects and project participants are both ultimately drawn. Initially, cases are culled from the daily court calendars on the basis of appropriate charges--these being the basic range of property and theft offenses which lack elements of threat or violence against the person. The court papers for such cases are then searched for a variety of factors which help to determine first-cut eligibility: indicia of jail-boundness (e.g., a record of prior conviction, pretrial detention status, markings by judges or assistant district attorneys as to the plea offer); reliability of the defendant, indicated by his or her community ties; and a determination that the defendant does not have a recent and significant record of violent criminal behavior. Once this check of threshold eligibility had been made, the data about eligible candidates are

entered on the project's MIS forms, from which they enter the research data base.

Discussions are then held with defense attorneys, assistant district attorneys and defendants. At any of these stages, the case may be rejected from further consideration. Eligible defendants wind up in the reject pool for many reasons: ADAs may indicate that a case is not substantial enough to warrant a community service sentence or may so strongly insist on a heavier sentence that community service is effectively barred. Some defendants may be dropped because they have pending Supreme Court cases which ultimately yield a negotiated settlement to cover the Criminal Court case. Other defendants, or their counsel, turn down the suggestion of community service because they prefer to try for a more favorable disposition. Probation officers may object to a defendant taking the plea offer if he is already on probation, demanding that the court impose a stiffer sanction. Judges sometimes reject plea recommendations involving community service and impose other sentences, both lighter and heavier. The project's court representatives themselves may decide to reject a defendant because, upon further investigation, they decide he has a pattern of past violence or a current problem with drugs or alcohol that is severe enough to pose an unacceptable risk on the work sites. Some cases are simply lost: the case may be held over for a night arraignment or a defendant who had been released from detention may fail to show up at the next court date.

Because of the complex way the pool of eligibles is separated into the two separate pools (participants and rejects), those who end up as rejects do differ in various ways from those who are ultimately sentenced to community service. Therefore, a simple projection onto the participant pool of the dispositional pattern found to occur in the cases of rejects is not the soundest method of measuring the proportion of participants who would have drawn jail sentences in the absence of the project.

But the research strategy followed here does not require an identical composition of the participant pool and the reject pool. What matters is that there be a good deal of variation in the reject pool, both in the characteristics of the defendants and in the types of dispositions reached in their cases. This variation is needed so that one can construct statistically the set of predictive statements (expressed in mathematical form) that best predicts how the cases were disposed by the courts. Fortunately, the program's reject pool was sufficiently varied for these purposes.

The predictive models were built by testing many "what if" propositions to find the one that best fits the actual pattern of jail/no jail dispositional decisions. For example, what

if the courts systematically imposed more severe sanctions upon defendants who had heavier criminal records, higher charges, more recent convictions, and were older? Furthermore, what if the prior record were 5.7 times more influential in this result than the level of the charge and 3.2 times more important than the recency of last conviction? Obviously, there are hundreds of such possible combinations. Fortunately, using a computer speeds up this modelling process; one can quickly test a number of different combinations of predictive variables, and the computer is programmed to generate for each combination the estimated weight given to each variable.

The first step was to identify factors found to be associated with going to jail so that they could be included in the modelling process. Rejects whose cases were screened by project court representatives in the three boroughs between October 1, 1981, and September 30 1982, were measured along a number of different dimensions, and the statistical correlation between each of these dimensions and the disposition reached was examined. For the purpose of this analysis, outcomes were categorized either as "jail" or as "non-jail" (i.e., all other dispositions combined, including dismissals). "Time served" was conservatively classified as a non-jail disposition. Cases not reaching final disposition in the Criminal Court (those transferred to other courts) were omitted.

Dozens of characteristics were tested for their association with jail sentences, including numerous features of the prior criminal records, the charges, the socio-economic backgrounds of defendants, as well as various characteristics of the adjudication process (such as the time between arraignment and disposition, the defendant's pretrial detention status, and the type of court part where the case was disposed). Many of these factors were correlated with going to jail, but were also correlated with each other. By a process of elimination, a statistical model was built to predict the sentences for each borough's rejects which was both parsimonious (having the fewest number of predictive variables) and most strongly predictive of actual dispositional outcomes.<sup>2</sup> Although the models vary from

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<sup>2</sup>In technical language: a best-fitting linear logistic regression model was constructed using a procedure developed by Frank Harrell (SAS Institute, Inc.: Cary, N.C., 1980). This general class of multivariate techniques was originally developed by economists to model the way the economy works, although the sub-species used here was elaborated by bio-medical statisticians interested in determining the effects of drugs on various kinds of physiological actions. Logistic models are best suited to situations in which what is being explained has a dichotomous form, such as jail/no jail. The mathematical form of the model is as follows: Y denotes the dependent variable (jail=1, no jail=0) for the nth observation. The vector of the independent, or predictive variables, for the nth observation is  $X_{n1}, X_{n2}, \dots, X_{np}$ . Furthermore,  $X_n B = X_{n1} * B_1 + X_{n2} * B_2 + \dots + X_{np} * B_p$  in



borough to borough, the variables found to be useful included: number of prior arrests, time since last conviction, time between arraignment and disposition, whether or not the last prior conviction resulted in a jail sentence, and pretrial detention status at the time of sentence on the current charge. In Brooklyn, a model was developed that predicted 80 percent of the actual decisions; in the Bronx, the model predicted 87 percent of the decisions; and the best model that could be developed for Manhattan predicted 78 percent of the jail/no-jail decisions.

The models were then applied to the pool of eligibles who became participants, to estimate the proportion of those sentenced to community service who would have gone to jail in the absence of the program. The computer went through each participant's case, weighing each predictive variable as specified in

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which  $B=(B_1 \dots B_p)$  denotes the vector of regression parameters. The assumption of the model is that the probability that  $Y_n=1$  is  $1/(1+\exp(-X_n B))$ . Here  $X_{n1}=1$ , so that  $B_1$  is the intercept parameter.

For simplicity's sake, the methodological description in the text above omits a step of some importance. The reject pool was randomly divided into two halves, and models were constructed using only one-half of the pool. What appeared to be the best model was then tested on the other half to see if, indeed, the models did have substantial power to predict successfully whether the reject was or was not sentenced to jail. Models were developed in each borough which were successful predictors, and they were then used to estimate what would have otherwise happened to community service project participants.

The models were constructed in each borough using only those rejects whose cases were disposed of in the post-arraignment parts. The 10% of rejects whose cases reached disposition at arraignment could not be folded in with the post-arraignment rejects because they differed in two important respects. First, almost all defendants were held in pretrial detention at arraignment, and there was consequently no relationship between detention and sentence. Second, because arraignment and disposition always occurred on the same day for this group, no correlation could exist between the time to disposition and the severity of sanction. What the researchers derived, therefore, was a model in each borough which best predicted the outcomes of the majority of the cases which were disposed of in post-arraignment hearings. This probably has no bearing on the utility of the model for predicting what sentences participants would have received had they not been sentenced to community service, because most of the participants who were sentenced to community service at arraignment would have had their cases put off for subsequent appearances had they not taken the plea to community service. It is likely that, in these later hearings, their cases would have been disposed of in the same fashion as were the rejects' cases.

the model for the borough in which the case originated, thereby producing an estimated probability of that offender being sentenced to jail.

Some adjustments were applied to the estimates created in this fashion to account for error. This was necessary because the models developed to predict dispositions in rejects' cases were correct only in 78 percent to 87 percent of the examined cases. The probability and direction of error in the original model were measured, and a procedure derived from Bayes' law was devised to account for the errors in these models and in their derived estimates.

#### (d) Impact Analysis - Calendar Year 1982 Results

When these models were applied to the offenders sentenced to community service in calendar year 1982, it appeared that 44 percent would have been sentenced to jail. (Ignored in this estimate of jail displacement were the additional offenders who would have received "time served" jail sentences had they not been sentenced to community service.)

Having fixed, at 44 percent, the program's rate of displacing jail sentences in calendar year 1982, it was possible to use the same data base to estimate the average length of the jail terms that would have been received (and the average time that would have been served after taking account of credits for pretrial detention and good time) by the project participants who would have been sentenced to Rikers Island. In calendar year 1982, the program freed up an estimated total of 48 cell/years in the Department of Correction's supply of cells for sentenced inmates.<sup>3</sup> The project's operations also reduced

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<sup>3</sup>A reliable estimate of the jail time community service participants would have served was developed from a simple analysis of the sentences imposed on the jailed rejects who were in the data base from which the jail displacement models were developed. During the October 1, 1981 - September 30, 1982 period, rejects who were sent to jail were given sentences that averaged 68 days in the Bronx, 70 days in Brooklyn, and 115 days in Manhattan. For the sake of deriving an estimate of time actually served, it was assumed that all inmates were given full credit for "good time" at the rate of one-third off the definite sentence. (This yields a conservative estimate of time actually served, for a portion of those sentenced to jail lost good time credits for misbehavior and thereby serve a larger portion of their court-imposed sentence than is being counted here.) The number of pre-trial detention days which were served before sentencing were computed and subtracted from this definite sentence-minus-good-time figure. After these adjustments were made, the time actually spent in jail by jailed rejects, subsequent to sentencing, in 1983, was estimated at an average of

demand for detention cells because defendants sentenced to community service spend less time in the system waiting disposition. An estimated 17 cell/years were freed up in calendar 1982 by the project's impact on time to disposition.

Thus, the total number of cell/years saved by the project's displacement of defendants from Rikers Island can be estimated, with reasonable reliability, at 65 cell/years in calendar 1982. Attaching a dollar value to this reduced demand for jail cells is difficult. With Rikers Island at capacity, the easiest method (but one that inevitably overstates the economic value to the city of this impact) is to reckon the costs avoided as 65 new cells not built, at roughly \$100,000 per cell, or \$6.5 million. In addition, the services provided to the community through the unpaid labor of offenders sentenced to the project in 1982 can be valued at roughly \$200,000.

#### (e) Impact Analysis--Calendar Year 1983 Results

With the 1982 impact analysis in hand, the underlying body of new knowledge about the dispositional process in each borough (and the factors most powerfully predicting jail sentences there) permitted each project manager to try to adjust the program intake procedures so as to meet or better the program objective of 50 percent displacement. The computer modeling process had revealed marked differences in the rate of jail displacement between the boroughs--the City-wide rate for 1982 was actually the result of jail displacement rates ranging from 20 percent in the Bronx, to 28 percent in Brooklyn, to 66 percent in Manhattan. In 1983, the focus of efforts to make the program even more efficient as a mechanism for reducing pressure on the jails fell on the two boroughs with the lowest jail displacement rates.

Research staff provided the project managers with profile data, from each borough's reject pool, which helped enormously to distinguish (within the class of recidivist property misdemeanants) those likely to get jail sentences and those likely to "walk". More detailed case screening criteria were drawn from these profiles. For example, because very few of the 1982 jailed rejects had been at liberty at the time of sentencing, the projects' court representatives were instructed to avoid

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38 days in the Bronx, 49 days in Brooklyn, and 63 days in Manhattan.

It is valid to assume that those program participants who would have been sent to jail in the absence of the community service sentence would have been given sentences of similar lengths. This is because the reject and participant populations were nearly identical in those characteristics which were found to be at all correlated with sentence length.

initiating project consideration of defendants who had been ROR'd or who had made bail. Similarly, where factors such as length of time since last conviction, or length of prior record had been found to be powerfully predictive of dispositional outcome, borough-specific standards for these factors were developed to assist court representatives to weigh the likelihood of a jail sentence in a particular case.

As was hoped, the new screening standards soon resulted in a marked shift in the profiles and case characteristics of offenders receiving the community service sentence in the Bronx and Brooklyn. As a result, the 1983 program participants' profile more strongly resembles the profile of the jailed rejects from the research pool. To test whether these changes in intake procedures did, in fact, improve the jail displacement impact of the program in Bronx and Brooklyn, the researchers have undertaken a second modelling process which--when completed--will result in a reliable estimate of the extent of the improvements city-wide. The new model for one borough--the Bronx--has already been executed, and the results show substantial success. The jail displacement rate rose from 20 percent to 52 percent.

Following the research strategy discussed in some detail in section (e), above, the researchers gathered all the necessary data about a pool of 221 eligible-but-rejected Bronx defendants whose cases were screened between July 1 and December 30, 1983. Again, the characteristics statistically associated with a jail disposition were identified through statistical tests, and these characteristics were used to build a statistical model that could predict the sentencing outcome of the reject-pool cases within a reasonably small margin of error.<sup>4</sup> As before, the model was then applied to each case in which an offender had been sentenced to community service in the Bronx between July 1 and December 30, 1983. The result--a reliable estimate of the proportion of project participants who would have drawn jail sentence--is a 52 percent jail displacement rate for the Bronx project. Estimates of actual cell/years saved in 1983, after introduction of the new screening procedures and the resulting improvement in displacement effect, jumped even more dramatically over 1982, because the terms that would have been received by the jail-bound participants has grown longer, and because the Bronx project intake volume increased in 1983. The Bronx project was responsible for 7 of the cell/years saved in 1982; it was responsible for the saving of 20 cell/years in 1983.

Until the remodelling process is completed for the other two boroughs, the overall gains in displacement and cell/year

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<sup>4</sup>See, section (e), above.

savings cannot be projected with accuracy. A conservative estimate can be made now, however, as follows: we know the improved jail displacement rate for the Bronx project to be 52 percent. As the Brooklyn project was refocused, through a similar process of refining the screening criteria and since this has also resulted in a marked shift of the participant profile (in the desired direction--to conform to the profile of jailed rejects), it is probably conservative to estimate that the displacement rate in Brooklyn has gone from the 28 percent in 1982 to, at least, 50 percent in 1983. Assuming the rate in Manhattan, where the 1982 displacement effects were satisfactory and no major efforts to increase it were undertaken in 1983, has held at 66 percent, we can extrapolate a new city-wide displacement estimate by applying the borough displacement rates to each borough's intake volume.

The result of these estimating calculations is that, in 1983, community service sentences displaced jail sentences in 57 percent of the cases where the offender was sentenced to community service. Thus, of the 1,029 offenders sentenced to community service in 1983, 588 would have drawn jail sentences. Although we already know that the length of the jail sentences they would have drawn increased between 1982 and 1983 in the Bronx, we have not yet analyzed the data from the other two boroughs to permit a uniform recalculation of this variable. But, for the purpose of estimating the number of cell/years saved by program operations in 1983, we can use the most conservative measure--the 1982 average time served by jailed rejects. The result of these estimating calculations is a saving, by jail sentence displacement, of 91 cell/years. In addition, the saving of pretrial detention time can be calculated (using the conservative measure, again, of the pretrial detention days saved on each community service sentence in 1982) at 23 cell/years.

Thus, the projected savings in jail space resulting from operation of the New York City Community Service Sentencing Program in 1983 was 114 cell/years. (Again, with Rikers at capacity and new cells being built at roughly \$100,000 per cell, the easiest way to state the cost benefit, but a way that inevitably overstates it, is \$11.4 million in capital outlays.)

#### f) Impact on Crime

Meanwhile, research attention has also been devoted to recidivism data. The pattern of offending for the petty recidivists who draw short jail terms in New York City is pretty clear. About half are re-arrested within six months of release from jail. It turns out that these rates are not much affected by the nature of the punishment imposed: Being punished by community service does not make boy scouts and virgins out of petty recidivists, but neither does jailing them.

The computerized files of the New York City Criminal Justice Agency were searched for data on all new court cases against persons sentenced to perform community service between January, 1981 and March, 1982 in Brooklyn and the Bronx, and all those sentenced to the project in Manhattan between September, 1981 and March, 1982. Of all these project participants, 494 had been at risk of rearrest for at least 180 days at the time City-wide data were last collected. Forty-six percent had been re-arrested.

That 46 percent of project participants were arrested again within six months of being sentenced to perform community service was disappointing, but not surprising; it would have been unreasonable to expect a short, punitive alternative sentence to reverse (through some unsuspected, powerful, "rehabilitative" impact) the underlying pattern of recidivism that characterizes the group of chronic petty offenders who conventionally get short jail term after short jail term and who were targeted by project staff for this sentencing alternative.

But what would have been the effect on crime if these offenders had received jail terms instead? To answer this question, a comparison was made between participant rearrest data and rearrest data on similar offenders actually sentenced to jail. A comparison group of 358 jailed offenders, whose profiles consist of similar prior histories and current charges, was assembled for this purpose, and rearrest information was obtained on each offender for the period running 180 days from his release from jail. By the end of six months of being at risk of rearrest, the proportion of the city-wide comparison group rearrested (44 percent) was statistically indistinguishable from the proportion of participants rearrested (46 percent). Although more than half of each group were not re-arrested, these recidivism rates are high; they suggest that property offenders who receive short jail terms in New York Criminal Courts tend to remain petty recidivists and that being given short jail terms--as opposed to serving a community service sentence--makes no significant difference in the subsequent rearrest pattern. Put another way, jail seems no better a deterrent than is the enforced punishment of community service.

It is impossible to develop an accurate estimate of how much crime would have been averted had the project and its jail displacement effects not been operating. The best that can be done is to project the most unfavorable comparison--the "worst case"--by contrasting the rearrest pattern of the participant group (as before) with the rearrest pattern (from date of sentence) of the offenders who were actually sent to jail. This is a "worst case" comparison because it assumes that all of those sentenced to community service would have been incapacitated by jail if the program had not been operating--despite the research finding that only about half of them would actually have been jailed. The worse case comparison measures the proportion rearrested from the time of sentencing (so that the short jail

sentences get the benefit of their incapacitative effect). The city-wide proportion of jailed offenders rearrested, 180 days from sentencing, was 35 percent (as compared to 46 percent for participants), presumably because all of the jailed offenders in the comparison group had been removed from the streets for at least a portion of the time after sentencing. This 11 percent spread provides one measure--albeit an overstated measure--of the crime control benefit (reduced property misdemeanors) of jailing this population.

But this does not end an inquiry into the relationship between community service sentencing and crime. Two other questions--more difficult to probe--remain. First, does the apparent crime-reduction effect from incapacitating jailed offenders persist, if the measurement period is extended (to twelve months, for example)? Second, are those offenders who are rearrested arrested more or less frequently, depending on which sentence (jail or community service) they get?

Because the proportion of program participants rearrested was highest in Manhattan, and because the difference 180 days from sentencing was greatest there in the "worst case" comparison (51% of participants rearrested, compared to 39% of jailed offenders), a second look at Manhattan recidivism data was undertaken. Contrasting the proportions rearrested over a full year from date of sentence (making, again, the "worst case" comparison), the proportion of those sentenced to jail in Manhattan who were rearrested within the year reached 59 percent. The gap, presumably caused by the incapacitative effects of short jail terms at the beginning of the year, was narrower than when measured at six months, but the proportion of this jailed group rearrested was still ten points lower than the 69 percent of community service participants rearrested--the crime control advantage of short term incapacitation appeared to persist.

However, those who had originally been sent to jail were much more likely to be arrested more than once. The jailed offenders were rearrested an average of 2.1 times each over the twelve months following their release from jail, while the offenders sentenced to community service were rearrested an average of 1.5 times each over the twelve months at risk. As a result of this lower frequency of offending among the group sentenced to community service, the average number of rearrests over the year following sentencing was identical for the two groups (1.5 for each), despite the early incapacitation of the jailed offenders. The program staff believe that this may be explained, in part, by the service provided, at the end of their performance of the sentence, to those sentenced to community service (e.g., link-up with paid employment, help finding shelter or treatment for substance abuse, etc.). Whatever the explanation, the crime control advantage of jail sentences seems to disappear when one examines the total number of rearrests rather than the proportion rearrested.

These rearrest data do not permit certainty of interpretation--the two groups of offenders whose post-sentence behavior is being compared are not, after all, perfectly comparable. Nevertheless, the data give little comfort to those who assume that the incapacitative effects of short jail terms offer a lasting crime control advantage over punishing these same offenders through community service sentences. Further research on rearrest patterns after jail sentences and after community service sentences is underway. The principal objective of this new research is to reduce rearrest rates, either by screening out offenders whose propensity to continue petty theft is markedly greater than the bulk of petty recidivists, or to provide better-targetted services to those whose recidivism is most likely to be affected by them.

### **(b) Use of Fines as a Criminal Sanction**

With all the research done on the American criminal justice system over the last twenty years, including a great deal of work on criminal penalties, the fine as a sanction has been virtually ignored despite indications that it is used a great deal for a wide variety of offenses and offenders. As a result, in New York City, it is neither known how the fine is used nor whether the experience of other jurisdictions suggests it could be used, or enforced, more effectively.

In collaboration with researchers at the Institute for Court Management in Denver, and at Vera's London Office, Vera has been examining laws related to fining, court practices in the use of fines, attitudes about fine use and enforcement, and the administration of fine collection in American state and local trial courts, in U.S. District Courts, and, in a more limited way, in the courts of England, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. (The research in the United States has been funded by the National Institute of Justice, the European research has been carried out with support from the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a separate grant from the National Institute of Justice, and only the New York City empirical research was supported from the contract with the City of New York.)

The statutory law of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, federal statutes, Congressional proposals for revisions of the law, and the body of relevant case law were reviewed. Extensive site visits were made to more than thirty courts across the country, including three U.S. District courts, to observe sentencing and enforcement activities and to interview key actors in this process about their procedures, their problems with these procedures, and their attitudes toward fine use and enforcement. In addition, the Institute for Court Management conducted a telephone survey of 126 courts in 21 states, interviewing court clerks and administrators about the extent of fine use in their jurisdictions, the types of offenses



for which fines are used, their collection and enforcement practices, and their attitudes toward the fine as a criminal sanction.

Because the use of fines as a criminal sanction has increased dramatically in Europe during the last century, particularly in England, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany, the available English and foreign-language literature on fine use and collection practices in these countries was reviewed, with particular emphasis on the innovative day-fine system in Continental Europe.

The more detailed examination of the use of fines in New York City's Criminal and Supreme Courts was undertaken by sampling all sentences imposed in these courts during a one week period in 1979, analyzing the data on all cases in which a fine was imposed, and examining the collection efforts undertaken in these cases over a one year period after sentencing.

Separate, detailed working papers have been prepared on each of these efforts; together they represent the most extensive body of written material on fine use and enforcement practices available in the criminal justice and legal literatures. They are being compiled as a set of three companion volumes to the Final Report of the American project to the National Institute of Justice. The NIJ has reviewed the report for possible publication. The report on the New York City data was submitted to the Office of the Coordinator for Criminal Justice for review in October, 1982.

The main volume of the Final Report discusses the major issues raised by the materials collected in the working papers, recommends changes in law and practice, and outlines potential pilot efforts to improve operations of the fining system. The report focuses on analysis of the way fines are currently used, in relation to the other sentencing options, and the various philosophical and theoretical perspectives and legal and practical constraints that affect the use of fines as punishment. The report explores the issues surrounding imposition of fines on poor and indigent offenders, including a review of the law, theory and practice affecting monetary penalties for the indigent and the experience of various jurisdictions with the use of work programs, property seizure and prison committal as responses to default. Because the day-fine system of several European countries is often cited as an innovative method for imposing fines with equity, this approach is discussed at length and new data on actual operation of day-fine systems is reviewed for the first time in the English language. The report also discusses the use of monetary restitution, because it raises some of the same problems as the use and collection of fines.

Important in the context of the sentencing function is the extent to which fines have proved to be, or could be made to be, enforceable sanctions. The Final Report discusses what has

been learned about fine collection practices in American courts and the extent to which our courts have effectively focused their efforts on enforcement and on the variety of enforcement methods statutorily available. The role of jail as a fine enforcement tool (the "miracle of the cells"), and its use as an alternative punishment in cases of fine default, is important in this context--and problematic. But by describing the extent to which various court systems are currently attempting to enforce fines without recourse to jailing defaulters, some ideas for policy and pilot programs are beginning to surface, and the report contains a full chapter presenting recommendations for improvement of practice both in the use of fines and in their enforcement.

This work is of continuing interest to New York City, not only because fines are widely used, for a great variety of offenses, but also because their enforcement presents a serious administrative problem as well as an important source of revenue. In New York City, the sample of Criminal Court cases showed that 31 percent of all sentences are (excluding summons and most traffic offenses) fines, including 66 percent of sentences for those convicted of gambling offenses, 40 percent of those convicted of disorderly conduct and loitering, 39 percent of those convicted of drug offenses, 27 percent of assault convictions, 20 percent of the prostitution convictions, 16 percent of the theft convictions, and 14 percent of the trespass convictions. Only about five percent of all Supreme Court sentences are fines, and that these cases tend to be non-violent felonies involving drug sale and possession, destruction of property, gambling, driving while intoxicated, assault without serious injury, and possession of a weapon when there are mitigating circumstances.

This fining is big business. In 1980, New York City Criminal and Supreme Courts collected almost \$4.5 million in fines, not including fine collections for parking violations and minor traffic offenses. (And much of the fines revenue is produced by relatively small fines; in Criminal Court, fines range from \$25 to \$250 with \$50 being the modal amount.)

It is harder to know how efficiently the revenue collection is administered. No American court studied in the course of Vera's research routinely generated information on the amount of fines collected as a proportion of the amount imposed; none had a record-keeping system that permitted it to do so; and no more than a handful of courts have even the most primitive automated record-keeping systems to monitor fine collections and fine enforcement efforts. However, the one week research sample of New York City courts permits a calculation of the collection rate for the Criminal Courts, at one point in time. In this sample, 74 percent of the total fine amount imposed was collected by the courts within one year of sentence; of the defendants fined, 67 percent paid in full (46 percent without issuance of any warrant for failure to appear in court to pay

the fine). These are stunningly high collection rates, given the popular perception that a fine is neither enforceable nor enforced, and is not a workable punishment.

Because so little systematic information exists on fine enforcement and revenue collection in the United States, Vera has been conducting empirical research in this area in England. This study, funded under a separate grant from the National Institute of Justice and carried out in conjunction with Vera's London Office, will describe in detail the fine enforcement strategies used by four magistrates' (or lower) courts in England. Drawing upon systematic samples of fined cases and upon extensive, in-depth interviews with all the court and court-related participants in the enforcement process (including the police), the study is documenting how these courts set fine amounts, monitor payments, serve subpoenas, and enforce the fine sentence in the event of nonpayment.

Because the English lower courts use fines with defendants who are often repeat offenders charged with relatively serious offenses, many of whom are unemployed or on public relief, this study should provide us with potentially useful insights into the administrative problems of fine collection with a population at high risk of default. It should also document in considerable detail, the operation of various enforcement strategies and their relative success with this population, including the effectiveness of property seizure and the threat of imprisonment as methods of enforcement. These coercive techniques are of particular interest to us because the English criminal justice system has experimented with them more than the American system has. In conjunction with the work already done in the United States and in New York City, we believe this study, which is nearing completion, will usefully inform policy and practice in the area of fine enforcement specifically in the area of lower court sentencing more generally.

The final report of the American fines study has been accepted for publication and dissemination by the National Institute of Justice. The Executive Summary, entitled "Fines in Sentencing: A Study of the Use of the Fine as a Criminal Sanction," will also be distributed to jurists and policy makers around the country. (A copy of that document is being transmitted as an attachment to the report.)

The study of fine enforcement in Europe has been completed. The final report is being reviewed and edited now. We expect to transmit a copy within the next few months.

We have had, and will continue to have, discussions with Criminal and Supreme Court judges in New York City about the use and collection of fines here.

#### IV. Crime Control and Crime Prevention Programs

(a) Incapacitation -- Research on Practical and Policy Problems, with Juvenile Delinquency Patterns as a Focus.

Over the last few years, prosecutors, police officials, and crime researchers have shifted public and political attention away from deterrence, which depends on raising apprehension rates, as the principal crime control strategy, to "selective incapacitation." Increasingly, police activity, prosecutors' "career criminal" programs, and legislatures' enhanced sentencing provisions for repeat offenders have given practical expression to the widely-held belief that substantial crime control benefits would flow from locking up for long periods a relatively small number of criminals--those whose very high frequency of offending makes them responsible for most (or much) of the crime. The growing enthusiasm for selective incapacitation flows from the findings of researchers who have devised schemes which appear to permit fairly discriminating identification of high-rate offenders and which, in theory at least, offer the possibility of substantially lower crime rates without massive increases in prison capacity.

Yet, important questions abound: Can it be done? (That is, is it in fact possible to predict which offenders present an unusually high probability of committing serious crimes in the future?) Is it possible to do so early enough in their criminal careers for the policy to have its theoretical impact? If we incapacitate the high-rate offenders, will crime rates in fact go down? (That is, will others commit the crimes for which our incapacitated offenders would have been responsible if they were not incapacitated?) Can we, without unacceptable violation of other values, ignore "just deserts"? (That is, can we imprison one armed robber, who is predicted to be a low-rate offender, for six months while imprisoning another, whose crime is otherwise the same, for 16 years because he is predicted to commit armed robberies frequently in the future?) If it is acceptable to introduce disparities of penalty to accomplish crime control objectives, does it matter what characteristics are used to identify those chosen for the incapacitating terms? (That is, does the strategy become unacceptable if the distinguishing characteristic is past drug addiction? Age at first arrest? Recent employment history? Race?) What risk is there that, by re-focusing police, prosecutorial and penal resources on the (presumably) few high-rate offenders, we will lose the general deterrent impact of the system on the many who are now low-rate offenders (or who are not offenders at all) because they feel the system's deterrent effect? (That is, can we afford to trivialize further the behavior that is criminal but is not now viewed as "dangerous"?) Can we re-focus the relevant agencies to pursue a "selective incapacitation" strategy for high-rate offenders whose crimes are particularly dangerous (e.g., rob-

bery) without those agencies also trying to "selectively incapacitate" the very much larger number of high-rate offenders whose crimes are comparatively trivial (e.g., shoplifting, joyriding, graffiti-writing)?

Increasingly, in recent years, empirical research on habitual offenders has been cited in support of the proposition that a relatively small group, repetitiously committing crimes and being arrested, is responsible for a disproportionate share of the behavior with which the criminal justice system must routinely deal, and especially for many of the predatory crimes of violence about which the public is extremely concerned.<sup>1</sup>

In practical terms, the central issue that emerges is whether or not habitual (or "career") criminals can be identified relatively early, at or before reaching the peak of their criminal activity (which, according to many studies, may be as early as 16 or 17). Although several retrospective studies of older offenders indicate that many adults arrested for serious crime had long (and often serious) juvenile records, there has been little predictive, prospective research designed to differentiate between those youths who will later become the chronic, serious adult offenders and those who will not. One reason for this knowledge gap is the two-track criminal justice system. Not only are juvenile and adult offenders typically processed in different court systems, but official records are rarely linked, either because of legal protections given youthful offenders or because of the inefficiency of the record-keeping systems, or both.

Thus, although our knowledge has expanded considerably in the past ten years: (1) We do not yet have prospective studies

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<sup>1</sup>See, Peter W. Greenwood, The Rand Habitual Offender Project: A Summary of Research Findings to Date (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Institute, 1978), and "Tradeoffs Between Prediction Accuracy and Selective Incapacitation Effects," Paper Presented at the Conference on Public Dangers, Dangerous Offenders, and the Criminal Justice System, Harvard Law School, February 1982; Marvin E. Wolfgang, Robert M. Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972); Marvin E. Wolfgang and Paul E. Tracy, "The 1945 and 1958 Birth Cohorts: A Comparison of the Prevalence Incidence and Severity of Delinquent Behavior," Paper prepared for The Conference on Public Dangers, Dangerous Offenders and the Criminal Justice System, Harvard Law School, February 1982; Paul Strasburg, Violent Delinquents: A Report to the Ford Foundation from the Vera Institute of Justice (New York: Monarch Press, 1978); Susan B. Estrich, Mark H. Moore, and Daniel McGillis, Report of the Project on Public Dangers, Dangerous Offenders and the Criminal Justice System (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, 1982).

for testing the power of the leading predictive models in the field, or for developing more refined models that identify precisely what criteria from Family Court records (or from other sources of background information) would be likely to help prosecutors target high-frequency serious offenders in adult court. (2) We cannot fully describe, despite recent analyses of delinquent and of adult criminal careers, complete criminal career patterns, which follow offenders across the transition from Family Court to adult Criminal Court. (3) Finally, we have very little information about just how selective juvenile and adult courts already are in their separate treatment of serious offenders, and whether, because of disjunctions between the courts, there really is a "free ride" in adult court for youths who arrive there with serious juvenile records; that is, we know little about whether juvenile court history already influences decision-making in adult court despite formal restrictions on access to juvenile records.

Much of the knowledge now being used to advance the "selective incapacitation" strategy is based upon retrospective analyses of adult offenders. For example, Rand's scale for identifying high-rate serious offenders, based upon retrospective interviews with convicted and incarcerated adults, includes three juvenile variables--conviction before age 16, placement in a juvenile facility, and juvenile drug use--as predictive of intensive adult criminal involvement. A major problem with knowledge of this kind is that, while we can know what characteristics of juvenile records distinguish low-rate from high-rate offenders among prisoners whose criminal careers extend into their late 20s and early 30s, we do not know which of the universe of juveniles who now have these (or other) characteristics will in fact proceed far enough into the adult system to become career criminals of the type Rand studied. That is, the research on which current policy is being based offers no assurance that we can identify appropriate targets for selective incapacitation prospectively, at an earlier point in their criminal careers. Nor can we be sure from such retrospective research that, if prediction is possible, it can avoid overpredicting chronic serious criminality (i.e., it may be that the selection criteria developed by such methods will generate far too many "false positives").

In order to shape policy, as police and prosecutors try to focus more and more on high-frequency adult offenders, more information is needed. We need to know how best to identify "chronic" delinquents, in terms of Family Court record and personal history. We need a database rich enough to help us estimate the power of criminal history and juvenile delinquency variables in predictive instruments, and to estimate if predictive power will be lost by limiting such instruments to criminal history variables alone. We need an overall sense of the criminal career patterns, which such records might define, at the point when juveniles are about to enter adult jurisdiction. We

need information to determine whether prosecutorial access to such records might be limited to knowledge of convictions only, or if too much predictive value would be lost if such a limitation were imposed. And finally we need to develop more information on what the early adult criminal records of the universe of juvenile delinquents look like, to assess whether the adult careers of chronic and non-chronic delinquents groups differ, and to permit a reasoned consideration of whether the early adult offenses of identified chronic delinquents are serious enough and frequent enough to warrant limitations of the confidentiality of Family Court records and to justify a special focus of police and prosecutorial resources on them when they first appear in adult court.

There is a need for prospective research that combines detailed official criminal history data on habitual offenders' period as juveniles with similar data from their years as young adult offenders. In addition, while the chronicity of the juvenile's delinquency may be predictive of high-rate adult criminality, other background factors may make at least as great a contribution to the prediction of serious criminal behavior in the "high-crime" years.

The City asked Vera to help cut through some of the difficulties researchers have had in developing databases that permit prospective examination of such a wide range of potentially predictive variables. Vera could help because, in 1981, it completed an extensive study of a representative ten percent sample of 1,890 juvenile delinquents processed by the New York City Family Court. The extraordinarily rich data base, created for the purpose of describing the business of the Family Court, was subjected to some re-examination at the end of 1981, in response to a request from the Police Department. The Department requested assistance in determining what crime control gains could be expected if prosecutorial decision-making (and police case-building--see Section II)--was informed by making available the delinquency histories of first adult offenders when they come to majority in the criminal justice system with a (hidden) pattern of repeated felony activity in Family Court.

This initial inquiry was limited to searching for the frequency of juvenile crime patterns of the kind used by the Police Department to target adult felony recidivists for special case-building efforts. The Department was aware that the criteria it was introducing to select targets for special detective efforts and for prosecutors' career criminal units often failed to identify high-rate serious criminals until after they passed through the high crime years.

A preliminary look at the Family Court Disposition Study data showed that certain juveniles had, indeed, established fairly substantial records of serious charges before they turned 16 and entered the adult system. There were 714 fourteen and

fifteen year olds in our sample who had had at least one prior delinquency charge brought against them; 417 (58%) of these had more than one and 153 (21%) had five or more such prior court contacts. The majority of these juveniles still had more than a year "at risk" of further juvenile arrest before they would pass beyond the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Within the group of 417 who had more than one prior arrest, there were 396 who had at least one relatively serious prior arrest (e.g., for robbery, a sexual offense, assault or burglary), and 231 (or 18% of all the fourteen and fifteen year olds) had had more than one such serious prior charge brought against them. Looking more closely at the 161 juveniles who entered the Vera sample on a robbery arrest, over half were found to have had a prior robbery arrest.

Early in 1982, Vera's researchers narrowed the focus of this inquiry and began production of a computerized case history of all fourteen and fifteen year olds in the study sample, in order to make possible the testing of various selection criteria based on Family Court history.

In March, 1983, the National Institute of Justice awarded the Institute a grant to transform this small research effort into something more likely to provide real help. The goal of the NIJ-financed study, which began in May, 1983, is to increase understanding of the relationship between juvenile and adult criminal careers, and to generate information useful for the assessment of concrete crime control strategies including those directed at the selective incapacitation of adult offenders. Vera will study, prospectively, the 1,251 fourteen and fifteen year old youths identified in the original Vera random sample of 1,890 juvenile delinquents who entered the New York City Family Court during 1977-1978. The records of this sub-group's Family Court contacts have now been updated through the end of their 15th year, and the data base has been extended through the high-crime years by adding information on all their subsequent adult arrests (from their 16th birthday through ages 18 to 20, depending on their age at intake into the original sample).

The statistical analysis of this expanded database began in mid-1984; it will permit: (1) development of a detailed picture of the criminal career patterns of this cohort as it moves from Family Court to Criminal Court; (2) prospective testing of the leading predictive models in the field which attempt to identify chronic, serious adult offenders; (3) construction of additional predictive, prospective models built on the relationship between a juvenile's Family Court record, personal and family background characteristics, and his or her subsequent early adult criminal career; and (4) comparison of the treatment given by the adult system to individuals with less serious juvenile records, when they first enter the Criminal Court jurisdiction.



By extending the Family Court Disposition Study in these ways, Vera will be able to develop increased knowledge about what juvenile records (and other background data collected from those records) can tell us about early adult criminal activity. Such information would help establish the kinds of information prosecutors would need, from access to Family Court records, to focus most effectively on incapacitation of high-frequency adult offenders. Such a database, combining information from both halves of the "two-track" criminal justice system, would also fill in a number of gaps in the knowledge about the development and cessation of criminal careers.

The research will also explore the kinds of offenses which characterize the juvenile and the adult careers of the cohort, in an attempt to discover whether there are statistically discernible career patterns and criminal specialization or whether crime-switching is prevalent. But the most important work in this project is its search of the Family Court records for the criteria that are most predictive of high-frequency, serious adult crime.

Because there is currently a view that the chronic delinquent is the potential adult career criminal, and because of the resulting desire on the law enforcement side to develop methods of identifying and targeting such individuals, expensive and complex reorganizations of juvenile and adult criminal records systems are being proposed, many of which also require controversial changes in the legislation governing juvenile records. The Vera research should help resolve the empirical uncertainty about how predictive such data can be, if applied prospectively, and (if they are not sufficiently predictive) what alternative information, available in the juvenile system, might be useful in better differentiating among young adult offenders so as to identify the high-frequency serious criminals. Once these empirical matters are more fully defined by this gathering and analysis of data, it should be possible to assess both the justice and the crime control interests that comprise the context for the current debate about the merits of a crime control strategy based on selective incapacitation.

The data analysis will continue into 1985, and a report of the research should be available in the Spring.

**(b) Research on the Relationships Between Employment and Crime.**

Is a job an antidote to crime? Does it matter what kind of job it is? Are the crimes of some easier to control than the crimes of others through employment policy and employment programs? There are, as Vera is discovering in this research project, a remarkable variety of relationships between employment, crime, and unemployment. Some of these relationships are obvious, but not as powerful as commonly thought; others are complex but more important. All of them suggest that a crime control policy that fails to take account of employment variables will miss the mark.

Beginning in the early 1960s, several federal departments and agencies encouraged and supported programs designed to expand employment opportunities for people enmeshed in the criminal justice system and for groups in the population considered to be at high risk of becoming criminally active. By strengthening ties to the world of legitimate work, these programs hoped to reduce recidivism and facilitate adoption of more conventional life styles. Many programs in New York City have been devoted to these aims.

In recent years it has become apparent to Vera and to others in the City that the assumptions upon which Vera (and others) had built employment programs for offenders and for groups at high risk of involvement in crime were too simplistic--at least in their initial design. Research on these programs did, from time to time, produce evidence that crime could be averted through employment strategies, but the programs being evaluated did not have as powerful an impact on crime as was expected. On closer examination, it seems that the programs that had little overall effect (or, in some cases, no overall effect) on subsequent crime failed because, at least in part, they had little or no effect on participants' subsequent experiences of employment. (Where the program hypothesis is that entry into and retention in the labor market will avert crime, it is not surprising to find recidivism unaffected when the target group fails to get jobs or to retain them.) The proper conclusion to draw is not that crime is unrelated to or unaffected by employment, but that, at least, much greater care must be taken to devise programs that actually improve the employment status and experience of individuals subject to them.

The experience suggested that labor market strategies in general, and employment programs in particular, can reach "high-risk" groups effectively only if they are built on a sounder theoretical and empirical base. First, if employment programs are to have any prospect of affecting employment status, they must take account of whatever employment experiences and opportunities already characterize the lives, families and neighborhoods of the target group, and particularly, the

rather different role that employment plays in the lives of adolescents from the role it plays in the lives of young adults. Second, missing altogether from past attempts to aim employment policy and employment programs at averting criminality has been an understanding of the relationships that the target group itself perceives between crime opportunities and employment opportunities. With an understanding of this perspective, however, it becomes possible to develop more promising program hypotheses about the sorts of jobs, the kinds of training, and the sequence of interventions that are most likely to influence the choices each age group makes for and against crime.

Vera's exploratory research, under a previous technical assistance contract with the City, was beefed up in 1978 with the start of a formal, five year study, supported by the National Institute of Justice to look closely at relationships between employment and crime and to develop knowledge with which to assess past accomplishments and future policy and programs in this area. This work is now in its fourth year.

In addition to publication and wide distribution of a review of relevant literature,<sup>2</sup> the project is pursuing two research strategies. First, for a 1979 sample of 900 Brooklyn Criminal Court defendants, detailed information on employment and arrest histories are being collected, over time, and being enriched with follow-up interviews on the sample's more recent experiences of employment and of crime. Second, Vera has placed ethnographers in three "high-risk" Brooklyn neighborhoods to make an intimate study, over eighteen months, of the development of criminal and of legitimate lifestyles among the local youth. From these efforts, the project aims to construct a model of employment and crime that accounts for youths' simultaneous exploration of both illegal and legal opportunities and that accounts for the widespread lessening of street crime as youths move from their late teens to their early and mid-twenties. To understand these phenomena better, and to ground that understanding in empirical study of this kind, should make it possible to devise more effective policies and programs that take advantage of the crime-averting potential of employment.

The research addresses the full array of relationships between "employment" and crime rather than the narrower set of relationships between "unemployment" and crime. This is because the work to date suggests that policy is too narrow and takes too little advantage of the crime-averting potential of employment if it rests on an assumption that any sort of employment

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<sup>2</sup>James W. Thompson, Michelle Sviridoff, and Jerome E. McElroy, Employment and Crime: A Review of Theories and Research (New York: Vera Institute, 1981 and Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1982).

will have an impact (or the same impact) on all those whose criminal behavior might be curtailed by some form of participation in the labor market.

Similarly, the research addresses both the direct relationships between employment and crime, and the indirect relationships. A direct relationship exists if crime and employment operate as different and competing sources of income, so that more of the latter results in less of the former; there are, as suggested below, variations within this "direct" category of relationships and few of them operate in this sort of pneumatic way. While it is not necessary to deny the importance of direct links between labor market participation and reduction of crime, the current research points increasingly to the greater importance of myriad indirect relationships: Crime arises from and is sensitive to many factors and processes which are, in turn, influenced by employment variables. These indirect relationships include the impact of eroding economic opportunities on the whole range of institutions that shape individual behavior, including family life, schooling, and neighborhood stability. For example, improved employment opportunities in the neighborhood and examples of successful labor market participation by older neighbors and relatives directly affect the ease with which young "high-risk" males get into job-finding networks (which are commonplace in middle class and stable blue-collar neighborhoods), and affect the age at which they form families, and the stability (economic and otherwise) of the families they form; the stability of the families they form, in turn, affects the type, frequency, and cessation of their criminal behavior.

In a process such as this, enhanced employment contributes to reduced criminality, but not through a direct, income-tradeoff effect. And the research--particularly the "high-risk" neighborhood studies--discloses a host of non-employment variables that contribute in indirect ways both to the employment difficulties of criminally involved youth and to their criminal behavior. The quantity and quality of jobs available to various groups living together in local neighborhoods influence the ways that people form households, regulate public behavior, and use public services such as schools, welfare, police, and social programs. The resulting neighborhood atmosphere shapes the incentives for residents to engage or not engage in income-oriented crime.

What ties this detail together and suggests a more refined policy and program approach to crime-reduction through employment is the persistent finding that the various direct and indirect linkages between crime and employment bear a strong relationship to age. For example, the Project's ethnographic studies suggest that teenage car thieves may quit stealing cars and turn to the less risky business of stripping and marketing stolen auto parts as they get older. The high risks of injury and violence (not, particularly, of arrest) for youths engaging

in robbery and burglary seem, in time, to induce most of them to seek reduced risks (and better returns) from whatever other opportunities are open to them--some will return to school, if they see a connection between schooling and future prospects; others will take even dead-end low-paying jobs, if they are available; others will shift to less risky (and less violent) crime. There is general moderation in frequency and severity of crimes--just as there is a general shift into the labor market--with increasing age, although the causal relationship between age, crime and social stability are still imperfectly understood. For most, street crime ceases altogether by the mid-twenties.

The challenge is to move these youths more quickly along the spectrum of activity, from high-risk crimes, to low risk crimes to steady employment, and from high frequency criminality to crime-free lives.

In part, the difficulty of this challenge arises from the evident importance, in the movement of high risk youth from crimes to jobs, of the quality of employment opportunities available in their home territory, as well as the quantity. Some labor economists have described a "dual" or "segmented" labor market consisting of "primary" jobs, which have good pay, prospects for advancement, benefits and stability, and secondary jobs, which are low-paying, unskilled and dead-end. It is the "secondary" jobs which are expanding in the U.S. economy, and changes in the U.S. labor market during the last decade highlight the problem. The employment expansion of the 1970s was concentrated in sectors which have minimal skill requirements, unstable hours, few prospects for advancement and low pay. (For example, McDonald's now employs almost two and one-half times as many workers as U.S. Steel.) Entry-level blue collar manufacturing jobs are disappearing from the economy, especially in older urban areas such as New York. The suburbanization of employment also adds to the problems of inner city male youth. And many of the new urban jobs are female stereotyped, relatively low-paying, and concentrated in sectors such as health care, food service, clerical work and cleaning services. At a time when there are even more unemployed young males--especially minorities--in declining urban areas, the traditional labor market routes used by their inner-city predecessors are contracting.

This research offers no solace to the tendency to view the employment problem of these youths as no more than a lack of interest in working or a difficulty obtaining some sort of job; similarly, there is little to support program advocates who assume that no more than some kind of "work experience" is required to move high-risk youth into legitimate, stable lifestyles. Both views ignore important structural changes in the economy, and both ignore the age-related progression of these youth through occasional jobs, work of increasing quality, and

(with few exceptions) cessation of street crime. After all, many underemployed and criminally involved youth do work (when the opportunity presents itself) at secondary jobs, although they increasingly face stiff competition for them. Indeed, only six percent of Vera's sample of 900 accused felons (most of whom were youths) had had absolutely no paid work of any kind. It was the sporadic, unstable and financially unrewarding nature of their employment experiences that characterized this side of their histories. Changes in the overall labor market structure make it less likely that the jobs they can get--or the jobs conventionally created for them in employment programs--will lead, without more, to stable employment careers.

Many of the urban poor supplement occasional, low-paying secondary employment with a variety of other income sources: government transfer payments, support from family and friends, off-the-books labor, barter, and crime. Policy and programs built on assumptions about a strict dichotomy between unemployment and employment are misleading and less than fully effective. The research suggests, instead, that the focus should be on underemployment, and on how people actually cope with the world of intermittent, low-paying secondary jobs. The injection of a few low-level, temporary jobs into the communities Vera has been studying, and into the lives of the high-risk youths whose behavior is of concern from a crime control perspective, is unlikely to transform the structure of their opportunities or the prominence and relative appeal of crime opportunities in that structure. The structural changes in the labor market are drying up the primary sector jobs that traditionally permitted high risk youth to move completely out of crime and into full-time labor market participation at around 20 years of age. While an increase in the proportion of jobs that are in the secondary segment of the labor market affords a continuing opportunity to these young adults to get some work, some of the time, it frustrates their "aging out" of crime and it puts them in competition with the 16-18 year olds who need access to the secondary labor market jobs if they are to have any work experience at all in their formative years.

The effectiveness of employment programs in improving the behavior (including the employment activity) of participants depends heavily on individual, social and structural economic factors. This suggests that, in the future, a better matching of programs to specific population groups and to conditions of the local economy would lead to increased program effectiveness. For example, about half of property arrests are of male youths, 15 to 19 years of age. Since this group is (or ought to be) heavily involved in schooling and is tied to the income flow of the parental household (however meagre), their employment and income needs differ markedly from those of older people seeking employment in order to support their own households. Perhaps programs providing secondary labor market opportunities for this young criminally active group should not be designed to produce

full-time stable employment, nor be judged on achieving it. Part-time work that does not compete with schooling but provides an income alternative to crime and serves as part of a long-range socialization into the labor market would be a more realistic program goal for this group, particularly when, as now, jobs of this type are scarce in neighborhoods where high-risk youth are concentrated.

On the other hand, a temporary part-time program which is appropriate for school-age teens would not be appropriate for older workers and ex-offenders. In their 20s, most of this group has different income and employment needs from teenagers. Often removed from effective job-finding networks, and carrying the stigma of criminal records, this group needs direct links to primary job networks, and would be more likely to benefit from programs emphasizing direct on-the-job training. Public service employment may be an important work sphere for this group.

Thus, as this research proceeds to its conclusion, evidence is mounting to support the belief that expanded economic opportunities, including enhanced employment and earnings, should remain a significant element in a crime control strategy. The very program evaluations that have produced such mixed over-all results have also pointed to the strong association between a continuing employment status (when it is secured) and reduced crime and recidivism. Participants who stay in programs have fewer arrests than those who drop out, and members of untreated control groups who find employment on their own have fewer arrests than those who do not work. The challenge is to learn more about how job opportunities of various kinds can be made available and how employment prospects can be improved through programmatic interventions, and to learn how to identify, magnify, and capitalize on the innate strengths and personal resources that participants bring to employment programs.

This research on employment and crime has been supported by the National Institute for almost six years. Additional funds were supplied by the Ford Foundation in the spring of 1983. The Foundation's support is being used: to examine more closely, with the help of sophisticated econometric techniques, the labor market experiences of different age groups in different samples available to us; to articulate more fully the social psychological dimensions of an individual's decision to commit crime and use this to modify the simple model of rational economic choice which underlies policy emphases on either deterrence or simple job placement mechanisms; and to complete work on a publishable manuscript that sets forth the implications of our research for policies and programs designed to enhance the employment experiences of the urban poor, control their criminal activity, or both.

During the last few months, work has been focused on completing the reports of the project, and some funds from this contract have supported that work. Three major reports are being edited finally at the present time. One reports on the findings of the defendant survey. A second reports on the ethnographic study of the three neighborhoods. A third report merges the major findings from both research efforts and considers their implications for policy and program design in this area. All three reports will be available for distribution before the end of the calendar year and will be used for policy and program discussions with City officials thereafter.



(c) The Neighborhood Work Project--The Crime-Averting Effects of Immediate, Earned Cash Upon Release from Prison.

In New York State, prisoners leave the upstate institutions with \$40 "gate money," from which they must pay transportation costs to New York City; Rikers Island jails provide City inmates with only \$1.50 when they leave. Out of prison and out of work, with no desire to go on welfare, an ex-prisoner, who doesn't choose to accept welfare, has an immediate need for cash, but, unless he is one of the very few who has lined up a job before release, the labor market cannot respond to that immediate need. And, even if illiteracy, lack of skills and employment experience, the stigma of recent imprisonment, and racial discrimination were not standing in the way of finding a source of legitimate income, conventional jobs usually pay at least two weeks in arrears. It seems obvious that the market's inability to provide earned income on an immediate basis to persons coming out of prison stimulates crime.

Vera has attempted, in the Neighborhood Work Project, to provide prison releasees the immediacy of a day's pay for a day's work that characterizes the casual labor market, while eliminating the exploitative and uncertain features of it. With \$1.25 million of federal block grant funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Vera launched the pilot Neighborhood Work Project (NWP) in November 1978.

NWP offers to any prisoner coming into New York City from city, state or federal prisons an opportunity to earn legitimate income on a flexible work schedule, for up to six months following release from custody. The project provides temporary, unskilled, part-time employment on closely-supervised work sites for persons over 18 who register within one month after release. No skills are required and the only entrance requirement is a willingness to work hard at strenuous physical labor. There is, in principal, no waiting two weeks for the first paycheck--even the first day on a site, pay comes at the end of the day's labor.<sup>3</sup>

NWP is financed by the sale of its services to public and non-profit organizations. The primary customer to date has been the N.Y.C. Department of Housing Preservation and Development,

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<sup>3</sup>As described below, the number of persons arriving in the City from prison who have heard about NWP and come to register has, in recent months, far exceeded NWP's supply of positions; as a result, many of those coming into the project in the current period are, in fact, forced by the backlog to wait two weeks for their first day of work; this is likely to continue until NWP can find some way to expand the size of the daily work force it sends into the field.

which purchases NWP's services to renovate City-owned housing stock.

Workers can choose which days they work and are assigned to work-sites on a daily basis. To schedule work, a worker calls NWP the day before, or by 8:30 the day he wants to work; the shape-up that gives him an appropriate site assignment is done by computer, while he's on the phone.

To continue in NWP, workers must work at least two and not more than four days a week. They are entitled to a total of seventy-five days of employment, to be used within six months of registration. At an hourly rate of \$4.15, workers take home approximately \$23.50 a day. Workers are paid at the end of every work day, enabling them to meet immediate financial needs. The financial limitations and time constraints imposed by the program are intended to reinforce the notion that NWP is a transitional employment program, not a permanent or conventional job.

An NWP participant can, if he chooses, get help in his search for permanent conventional employment from the Vocational Development Program--an allied project offering employment and training services, also designed and operated by Vera (and described in the next subsection of this report).<sup>4</sup> For those NWP workers who want help, VDP's job developers will assess their needs, desires, and skills and will assist them to find appropriate work or training. NWP, as an employer, can provide potential employers with performance evaluations and recommendations.

NWP does not attempt to meet all the needs of people released from prison. Other programs exist (albeit, in insufficient numbers) to provide assistance such as intensive personal counseling, treatment for drug problems, residence in a therapeutic community and supported work. But a substantial number of individuals returning to the community from prison do not require such supports; they are ready for demanding tasks against which to test themselves and from which to earn cash.

The Neighborhood Work Project aims to provide exactly that. The work is hard; the work rules are clear and strict; failure to follow the rules results in dismissal; and a day's work ends with a day's pay. The program does not seek to rehabilitate people, but to provide an opportunity for people to get on with their own rehabilitation. The staff (many of whom are ex-offenders) are succeeding in tough and demanding jobs; they accept no less from the workers.

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<sup>4</sup>By June, 1982, the Vocational Development Program had absorbed what was originally the job development unit of NWP. The two operations were merged to provide a stronger base of services and to avoid duplication of effort.

In these respects, the program can be seen as an attempt to create a conventional, unsupported working environment. It is comparable to conventional employment in that the demands made on the worker while on the job are at least equal to those in private sector work. It is also comparable to conventional employment in that there exists a real demand for the product of the labor. N.Y.C. faces a severe shortage of low-income housing; the City owns thousands of vacant units. NWP helps turn these into habitable apartments. In addition, NWP meets the needs of neighborhood-based organizations for a range of community improvement projects, including: removing debris from boiler rooms; cleaning out rat-infested alleys and yards; painting hallways and apartments in tenant-managed buildings; and clearing vacant lots for playgrounds and gardens.

Despite NWP's similarity to the private sector in the difficulty of and demand for the work, it does have important unconventional aspects. The most obvious--and, for the recently-released ex-offender, the most important--is that there are no entry criteria; anyone eighteen years or older who has been out of prison one month or less can register and earn cash-in-hand the very first day he works.

NWP is also unlike normal employment in that it need not be just a job. Most of the recently-released ex-offenders who stay with NWP for more than a few days have shown that they understand and are willing to accept the basic requirements of working, and that they are committed to work as an alternative to welfare dependency, crime or prison. Many of them, however, do not know how to find a job or have no clear idea of what choices are available to them. For workers who seek assistance, NWP--through the Vocational Development Program--assists them to secure a job, to find a place in a stipended skills training program or in an evening high school equivalency program, or to meet other needs related to employment. But workers are not required to use VDP. A worker may simply work two or three days per week, be paid, and have no other connection with NWP. When viewed alongside many other programs for ex-offenders, NWP is passive; it presents a take-it-or-leave-it opportunity.

Further distinguishing NWP from conventional jobs is its adoption of the structure of the casual or day-labor sector of the labor market. The flexibility of this type of employment is appropriate for many (but, again, by no means all) returning ex-offenders, who often have medical, governmental, or personal obligations which make a rigid five-day-a-week schedule difficult or impossible to manage.

However, unlike private sector day-labor operations, NWP workers cannot work more than six months at NWP. This is the key to the most important difference between working at NWP and working at a conventional job: NWP is short-term transitional

employment; workers are constantly reminded that NWP is only a bridge between prison and permanent employment, and that the only way to improve their situations is to find conventional work and leave NWP as soon as possible. Experience with other employment programs suggests that many participants find it difficult to accept the fact that, as their entitlement expires, they must leave the job that they have devoted so much time to and in which they have done well. It is partly for this reason that work at NWP is not full time and workers are limited to a maximum stay, to reinforce the fact that NWP is not a career. In addition, this carves time out of the week for workers to look for full-time jobs.

Since the NWP pilot project began in November, 1978, the program has served several thousand people returning from State and City correctional facilities. Participants have included several hundred people who are members of the work-release program of the City's Department of Correction. The program has clearly demonstrated that an unscreened and relatively unskilled work force of ex-offenders can achieve market levels of productivity if provided with proper supervision, reasonable pay levels and clear work assignments.

During the past year, the program has been more successful in its attempt to diversify its customer base. Such diversification should provide for greater stability in the face of fluctuating demand from HPD. In addition, customer diversification is designed to offer NWP participants greater opportunity for longer term "casual" employment or skills training.

**(d) The Vocational Development Program--Fashioning a Flexible Employment Training and Placement Service for Ex-Offenders, From the Rigid CETA Models.**

There is a point of some importance hidden in the fact that NWP has been financed principally by contracts backed with HUD money. Department of Labor funds (CETA, as they were known through 1982 and then Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) funds beginning in 1983) were the more logical source, but upon examination proved wholly unworkable. Although the CETA legislation appeared to permit substantial flexibility of program design so that innovative program models might be developed to meet the varying needs of various unemployed and unskilled groups, CETA regulations and administrative practices introduced a number of rigidities that made it difficult or impossible to apply these monies where they might be most useful. NWP's model of two or three days of work a week, for example, was not possible under most localities' rules for CETA programs. (References below to CETA are also applicable to the new JTPA program.)

There were other difficulties with CETA that generally got in the way of good programming for ex-offender groups. Usually, CETA programs were required to produce a certain number of job placements. This required "service" is antithetical to the operating principal of NWP (which capitalizes on the considerable capacity of many to pursue job placement directly, with only occasional or initial help), and is unwanted by a substantial number of those who make use of NWP's transitional employment structure. The high priority given to job placements, in the CETA models, was usually translated to contractual performance requirements which made it foolish for program operators to adopt a no-questions-asked, no-skills-or-experience-required approach to intake. (Thus, in conventional CETA-funded programs, most ex-offenders tend to be screened out.)

CETA also inhibited sound program development by regulations that seemed to require separation of programs offering on-the-job-training, programs offering work experience, and programs offering classroom training. These rigidities were neither statutory nor regulatory in nature, but program operators' inability to secure CETA financing for projects that offered individualized packages consisting of varying amounts of each type of basic service made the ex-offender population (and other groups with multiple needs) an unattractive group to serve. The tendency was for CETA contractors to offer one or another of the specific services (e.g., classroom training in clerical work, or work experience in building rehabilitation), and to select clients who could be matched with the one service provided. Such a result is not a problem for an individual who has made a clear vocational choice, who needs only one kind of CETA service, and who can shop around for a program offering

what he wants. But this is not typical of the ex-offenders who need CETA-type services. For example, a 25 year old high school drop-out may need to earn his high school equivalency diploma before proceeding to an on-the-job-training position to learn a trade. If he can do both within a single program, it is more likely that he will develop a sense of short- and long-range goals, a trust in one set of vocational counselors, and the security which might enable him to organize his life around an activity that is not one or two months in duration, but 6 or 8 months.

In 1979, Vera staff met, over a period of several months, with relevant officials in the Department of Employment, New York City's CETA prime sponsor. These meetings were aimed at fashioning a pilot project that would permit a test of the utility and the impact of equipping a single program operator with the flexibility to make use of all types of CETA services and the authority to tailor individual packages of these services for multiply disadvantaged ex-offenders. The basic idea was to permit each ex-offender to select, with professional guidance and after vocational assessment, the mix of "work experience," "on-the-job training," "skills training" and classroom courses suitable to his needs. The hypothesis was that this participatory, flexible approach to vocational development within a single CETA program would permit ex-offenders facing serious and multiple vocational deficits to gain a more competitive posture in the labor market, and to get and keep significantly better jobs. That fall, a contract was awarded to Vera to operate the Vocational Development Program (VDP).

Funded through the CETA program until September, 1982 and through JTPA currently, the Vocational Development Program can, for example, arrange for a participant to spend two days per week in a college curriculum and three days per week earning a stipend at a job in a non-profit or public agency. Alternatively, VDP can arrange for on-the-job training in a private company and reimburse the employer for fifty percent of the trainee's wage. VDP organizes the program around the needs of incoming participants rather than referring them sequentially to one after another single-purpose project. This program is intended as a laboratory in which techniques for individualizing employment and training offerings can be developed, and in which the value of this flexible approach can be tested and demonstrated. The program served 1,300 ex-offenders through FY '84.

The Vocational Development Program's ability to provide effective vocational services to ex-offenders was soon recognized by the New York City Department of Correction: as a result, in December 1981, the City contracted with VDP to take on the task of providing vocational counselling and job placement assistance to inmates on New York City Work Release. (The City's experience in the previous year, with facility staff on CETA lines providing these services, had not been successful.) The Department of Employment and the Department of

Correction determined that the most promising set of vocational services would be the Neighborhood Work Project (for immediate, temporary work in the early stages of work-release participation) and the Vocational Development Program (to help secure longer term post-release employment). VDP began to provide services to work-release participants in January 1982.

During the past year, the program has secured a substantial funding commitment from the New York State Department of Labor.

(e) NWP Research Project--Developing Knowledge about the Work and Crime Choices Made by Persons Recently Released from Jail and Prison.

NWP presents an opportunity for unusual and important research. NWP's transitional aid comes from guaranteed, immediate post-release employment rather than from transfer payments of one sort or another; its almost total absence of intake criteria make it available to anyone released from confinement; its operating assumption is that returning ex-offenders are adults, capable of understanding what is expected of them and of using the financial benefits of employment to help themselves adapt to stable life in the community.

Despite these and other interesting dimensions, NWP has not yet been the subject of any systematic research effort. At the beginning of the program the meager research resources that were available were used to develop forms for collecting data describing participant characteristics at intake, program operations and the extent of worker participation. Vera has developed, under this contract, a research design to generate the block of knowledge needed to build on the findings of LIFE and TARP.

The need for more knowledge about the choices recently released prisoners make between work and crime, and about the reasons they make the choices they do, will not diminish. And, if prison and jail populations continue to rise, and they have been in recent years, increasing numbers of ex-prisoners will be facing these choices.

The major questions to be addressed fall into two general categories: a) those dealing with NWP as a program model for transitional aid to ex-inmates returning to the community; and b) those dealing with the meaning and impact of paid work in the lifestyles of recently released, highly crime-prone ex-prisoners. For example, what are the demographic characteristics of the ex-prisoners who voluntarily register for the guaranteed (but low-wage) work offered by NWP, and how do they differ from those released to the City from correctional facilities who do not seek such aid in the transitional period? What resources are available to them in the community, and are these more substantial for the ex-prisoners who make use of NWP? What proportion of NWP participants secure employment upon or after leaving the program; how long does it take them (with or without the help of job developers) from program entry and from program exit to first regular employment; and what kinds of jobs do they secure, with what remuneration and benefits?

Through extended interviews with and case studies of successful and unsuccessful users of NWP, it will be possible to find out how they perceive and value their prior work experiences, which jobs they define as useful and important, and why. Questions such as these cry out for answers: What perception do



they have, upon release, of the job market and their prospects within it, of the personal qualities and skills that enhance or limit prospects, of ways successful job-finders emphasize their skills and de-emphasize their limitations? To what extent are their views of legitimate employment shared by their friends and families? How do they think legitimate employment, whether of a desirable kind or an undesirable kind, is secured by others? How have they gone about their personal job search? What connections do they see between their prior criminal histories and their employment histories and prospects? What kinds of crime are they engaging in while working, if any, and what kinds of crime do they engage in when not working, if different? Do they view present, prospective, or any kind of employment as a better choice than, or a deterrent to, criminal activity?

Answers to these questions--and questions like them--will be provided by the research that Vera will carry out over the next twelve months or so. The Ford Foundation recognized the potential utility of conducting such a study and awarded us a grant for fourteen months support. We expect to finish data collection by the end of the calendar year and we hope to have a report on our findings by the summer of 1985.

## V. Programs for More Efficient Operation of the Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems

### (a) The Speedy Disposition Program

The Institute has undertaken an evaluation of the progress and outcome of the New York City District Attorney Speedy Disposition Program announced by the Mayor on 13 January 1984. The purpose of this City program is to reduce the number of detainees and old Supreme Court cases through faster disposition of cases. District Attorneys will implement projects to expedite case processing and it is the City's intention to allocate funds in future fiscal years to expand and enhance programs found to be effective in achieving speedier dispositions. The Institute's research is to be an independent assessment of how the City's program is implemented by the District Attorneys' Offices in the various boroughs and how it affects the operation of the criminal justice system. The work to be performed by the Institute in connection with this evaluation will be conducted in cooperation with the Office of the Coordinator of Criminal Justice, the Office of Management and Budget, the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, and other criminal justice agencies and research professionals as the work requires. The work to be performed is as follows:

#### I. STATISTICAL INFORMATION

The City is providing an additional \$1.5 million to the District Attorneys' budgets in the current fiscal year to establish programs within their respective Offices to reduce detainee time awaiting disposition and thereby relieve jail overcrowding. Each District Attorneys' Office will receive funds to develop whatever program it feels will be most effective and appropriate to reduce the time to disposition of Supreme Court cases, with a particular emphasis on jail cases. The performance of each Office will be measured and additional funds will be allocated by the City in succeeding fiscal years, based on that performance.

As part of the Institute's formal evaluation of the City's program, it will collect and analyze quantitative data which will be used for three primary purposes: (1) to provide the City with performance data on the measures it has selected as the basis for allocating budgetary supplements; (2) to permit the Institute to ascertain how key aspects of the dispositional process in each borough are affected by the new programs introduced by the District Attorneys (e.g., bail practices, charging and sentencing levels); and (3) to provide statistical support for the more descriptive parts of evaluation discussed in Sections II and III below.

#### A. Performance Measures

Two performance measures have been selected by the City as the basis for determining the relative effectiveness of each District Attorney's efforts to reduce detainee jail days through faster case disposition. The City will measure their performance by the percentage reduction in older pending jail and Supreme Court cases. Although the emphasis of the program is on jail cases, the City has included the Supreme Court measure to ensure there is no deterioration in overall disposition time. Each Office's performance at a given point in time will be compared to its own previous performance. The two specific measures are as follows: (i) the percentage decrease in the number of jail cases pending disposition and sentence beyond six months (180 days) and nine months (270 days) from the date of last admission; and (ii) the percentage decrease in the number of Supreme Court cases pending disposition and sentence beyond six months (180 days) and eleven months (330 days).<sup>\*</sup> Cases pending beyond the older cutoff points (nine and eleven months) will receive twice the weight of the cases pending beyond the six month cut-off dates. (A case will be defined as a defendant-arrest.)

The Institute will provide the City with the detainee and pending caseload data in the form of statistical summaries of data collected principally from the Department of Corrections and from the Unified Court System, respectively, for the following time periods: two days in the period October through December 1983 (baseline measure); one day in June and one day in September 1984 (interim measures); and two days in November and December 1984 (first outcome measure). In the second year of the program, the Institute will provide similar data for one day in June and one day in September 1985 (interim measures), and two days in November and December 1985 (second outcome measure). For all periods, the specific dates will be chosen by the Institute.

Based upon current caseloads, it is estimated that each of the ten pending Supreme Court samples will average between 12,000 and 13,000 cases, and that each of the ten detainee samples will average about 10,000 cases. This is a total of approximately 225,000 case records to be gathered, verified and analyzed over the two year period. (The actual sample sizes, of course, will depend upon the flow of cases through the courts.)

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<sup>\*</sup>For Richmond, with its much smaller overall caseload, somewhat different cut-off dates will be used: jail cases pending over two months (60 days), and Supreme Court cases pending over eight months (240 days).

## B. Impact Measures

The data on these performance measures will enable the City to assess the impact of the District Attorneys' efforts on two indices that are, by design, relatively simple. By themselves, however, these data do not provide a full picture of the changes that may occur in the time to disposition of pending cases and in detention time. Furthermore, the performance data cannot indicate changes in other aspects of the disposition of criminal cases that may be associated with the District Attorneys' efforts, such as changes in sentencing practices, in the mode of disposition (e.g., by dismissal, plea or trial), in charging, bail setting or indictment practices, or in the number of appearances needed to dispose and sentence cases.

To generate reliable and timely data that go to those broader issues of the program's impact on the criminal justice system is a difficult research task, given the open-ended nature of the City's program. District Attorneys' Offices are likely to introduce changes at a variety of points in the court process. The nature of their efforts may change as the program period proceeds. In addition, initiation of many of the cases that will be processed through the courts during the program period will not coincide with the beginning of the District Attorneys' efforts, nor will their dispositions necessarily coincide with the interim or final points of measuring their performance. For these reasons, the Institute will provide the City with a series of statistical "snapshots" of key points in the court process at intervals throughout the program period.

Specifically, to provide a detailed picture of changes in the composition of cases being disposed in each borough over the course of the program, the Institute will draw a sample of cases disposed in the Criminal Court and a sample of cases disposed in the Supreme Court at three points in time: November 1983 (before the program begins); June 1984 (after it has been underway for six months); and January/February 1985 (after it has been in operation about one year). The precise definition of these samples will be determined by the Institute in accordance with standard statistical requirements for the analysis of a large number of case record variables. It is anticipated that each of the three samples will contain approximately 20,000 cases, for a total of about 60,000 Criminal and Supreme Court records. The Institute's analysis of these samples will provide evidence of changes occurring in the length of time to disposition and to sentence, changes in the mode of disposition (including, for Criminal Court cases, Transfer to Supreme Court), and changes in other aspects of these caseloads (charges, number of appearances, bail status, sentences and so forth).

Focusing on samples of dispositions has distinct advantages in identifying impacts of the District Attorneys'

initiatives that occur at the very beginning of the program while at the same time permitting the Institute to track effects that may not show up for many months. This approach, however, has the drawback of including, in each sample, cases that came into the court system at widely varying points in time. (This is especially a problem in the Supreme Court samples.)

As a remedy, the Institute will augment the evaluation by drawing two samples of cases entering Supreme Court after the Speedy Disposition Program has begun. Prospective samples of Supreme Court filings will be drawn near the beginning of the program (December 1983/January 1984) and approximately six months later (June/July 1984); the precise definition of these samples will be determined by the Institute. Depending upon the actual size of Supreme Court caseloads, it is anticipated that each of the two samples to be in excess of 2,200 cases, for a total of over 4,500 Supreme Court records. The sample cases chosen will be tracked by the Institute as they proceed through the Supreme Court, until their disposition and sentence or until approximately June 1985. Based upon a statistical analysis of these prospective samples, the Institute will provide the City with a detailed picture of changes in the manner of case processing and disposition resulting from the initiatives undertaken by the District Attorney's Office in each borough. The Institute will compare these data with comparable data from an existing sample of cases that entered Supreme Court in early 1981 compiled by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency.

Based upon analysis of these various types of statistical data (the samples from which the performance measures will be drawn, the samples of dispositions, and the prospective samples of Supreme Court filings), the Institute will provide the City with a reasonably comprehensive picture of the changes that occur at key points in the dispositional process in each borough during the course of this program. In conjunction with the more qualitative material to be gathered by the Institute from research interviews and observations (discussed below), these samples should provide a rather detailed understanding of what the District Attorneys initiate and the impact of their efforts.

## II. PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

A central purpose of the Institute's evaluation is to document how the District Attorneys chose to respond to the City's program of performance-based budgetary supplements: what (if any) specific initiatives were set in place; how were they implemented; and how were they actually operated? Some of these issues can be addressed inferentially from analysis of the statistical data. However, the quantitative data alone cannot fully describe systems as complex as these, particularly when they are in a state of change.

Thus, the Institute will undertake regular visits to each borough in order to become informed about developments in the various District Attorney programs. During these visits, researchers will interview staff of the District Attorneys' Offices, defense attorneys, judges, and other relevant people. (In addition, research staff might select a few individual cases to examine in-depth and to follow to disposition and sentence.) The information gained from the interviews and case examinations will be used both to supplement the quantitative data and to suggest additional useful statistical analyses. Time and resources preclude intensive, in-depth analysis of every innovation in each borough (although a few would be selected for such examination as suggested in Section III below). But using interviews, observations, and statistical analysis, the Institute will compile for the City a reasonably full, detailed picture of what happens in each borough over the course of the program.

## III. IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES

In addition to a hoped-for reduction in the proportion of long-term detainees and old Supreme Court cases, the City's program may provide each District Attorneys' Office with opportunities to experiment with techniques that prove applicable elsewhere. The Institute will attempt to identify the most promising techniques, innovations, or managerial reforms that are introduced, by drawing on both the qualitative and the quantitative indicators described above, and then to study them in depth. Several case studies of successful initiatives will be carried out, again using both qualitative and quantitative materials. The quantitative data will be based, where possible, on the impact measures described in Section I(B) above. Again, qualitative data will be derived from interviews with practitioners and through observation of formal and informal court proceedings.

## IV. WORK PRODUCTS

The Institute will produce three types of work products. First, data on the performance measures will be

collected and provided to the City in the form of statistical summaries. Second, the Institute will produce interim reports on the statistical analysis of the impact measures collected during the course of the program. These materials will be provided to the City as part of bi-monthly progress reports of the project to be produced by the Institute.

Finally, the Institute will prepare a final report for the City at the conclusion of the two year period. Of course, preparation of the final report will entail consultation with the District Attorneys' Offices (as will each element of the research during the two year period) regarding relevant parts of the document and relevant findings.

Although the specific structure of the report will emerge in response to the shape taken by the City's program and to the preliminary findings of the study, it will include the following: (1) introductory materials detailing the origin of the City's program and reviewing the literature on court delay and on budgetary incentive programs in the public sector; (2) descriptions of how each District Attorney responded to the program, what initiatives each set in motion, at what point, and how other relevant actors in the system responded; (3) a report of changes in the gross indicators of delay for each borough (i.e., the performance measures); (4) a more detailed borough-by-borough analysis of the program's impact over time on various aspects of the criminal justice system and the dispositional process (drawing upon both qualitative and quantitative materials); (5) specific examples or case studies of techniques that appeared to be particularly successful and potentially applicable elsewhere; and finally (6) a more general assessment of the City's program as a strategy to change complex processes, and a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications that may be drawn from this experiment.

**(b) The Bail Bondsmen and Bail-Making Project of the Pro Bono Publico Foundation**

In March of 1983, the Institute received an award from the Pro Bono Publico Foundation for investigating the role bondsmen play in the bail-making process in New York City. The funds were used to make arrangements with court, criminal justice and correctional agencies to review bail-making records, and then to compile a unique data base regarding this matter and run some initial analyses on that data base. During the last few months, funds from this City contract have supported additional analyses and report writing. It is expected that a final report will be available for distribution and for discussion with City officials before the end of the calendar year.

The report will provide information on the following matters: the ways in which defendants post bail, including the use of a bail bondsman; the points in the disposition process at which bail is posted; the distribution of bond amounts posted by bondsmen; the extent to which bondsmen are available to defendants with low bails; the overall impact of the bondsmen on the liberty of those on whom bail is set in the courts of New York City; the relative importance of cash alternative options and bail bond options in bail-making activity at different bail amount levels, and the impact of such options on detention length; and the implications of our findings regarding bail-making practices for bail-setting and bail-making policies in the City's courts.



V. Programs for Diverting Individuals and Disputes from the Criminal Justice System

(a) The Manhattan Bowery Project -- Controlled Research on the Costs and Benefits of Different Approaches to Detoxification

Vera created the Manhattan Bowery Project in 1967, in an early and successful demonstration that voluntary, medically-supervised detoxification could be effectively used in lieu of arrest -- with life-saving effect for the persons treated. Many other jurisdictions followed suit, and public drunkenness was subsequently decriminalized in New York and elsewhere.

The Manhattan Bowery Project has been an independent non-profit corporation for some time now. Several years ago, it opened a second detoxification center in Manhattan, not in the Bowery but in Midtown on the West Side. The approach to detoxification taken at this center, the Social Setting Alcohol Treatment Center, differs from the Manhattan Bowery Project's earlier model. The latter still provides constant medical attention during the participant's 5-day stay in the detox ward, to treat injuries and ailments as well as to assist him to withdraw from alcohol by administering drugs during that period. In contrast, the Social Setting detox center, after screening out and referring to hospitals those who need immediate medical treatment or appear likely to experience medical complications during the period of withdrawal, does not administer any drugs during the detoxification period and does not provide round-the-clock medical attention.

Clearly, the social setting model is less expensive than the medical model for detoxification, but little or nothing is known about how the two approaches differ with respect to participants' experience and handling of physical withdrawal, or with respect to the nature and frequency of their encounters with alcohol and alcoholism treatment programs after they complete the detox period. These concerns are now widely shared by professionals engaged in providing detox services, as well as by those responsible for developing public policy to deal with the problem.

Discussions between Vera and MBC about possible research strategies produced a meeting with officials from the National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, within the Department of Health and Human Services. It was agreed that virtually no well-designed research exists by which to compare the costs and effects of the two detox methods, and that such research is badly needed.

Spurred by the National Institute, Vera and MBC solicited the collaboration of the Detoxification Unit at Beth Israel Medical Center in Manhattan. While Beth Israel provides a medical program of detoxification, as does the MBC center on the

Bowery, there are sufficient differences between the two to make comparison between the hospital-based Beth Israel program and the free-standing center on the Bowery both interesting and useful -- particularly from the national perspective. With Beth Israel's tentative agreement to participate, Vera research staff worked under this technical assistance contract to design, and then re-design, an appropriate research project.

Vera proposed to conduct controlled research on the different effects and cost/benefits of social setting detoxification, free-standing medical detoxification, and hospital-based medical detoxification programs. The research would compare the impacts of the three New York City programs on a population of public inebriates who seek entry to the free-standing detoxification units; consenting applicants for detox would be randomly assigned to one or another of the three treatment programs and transported there. Research would measure the relative effectiveness of the programs in providing safe and complete detoxification treatment, identifying and treating (or securing treatment) for any accompanying medical disorders, promoting referrals to after-care, and suppressing rates of readmission for detoxification. In addition, the research would provide a broader context, within which to consider the models studied, by conducting a survey of representative detoxification programs throughout the country.

Review of this research proposal by NIAAA was held up pending clarification of how the scope of that Institute's work would be affected by the Administration's budget cuts and its proposals to transfer some programs to state block grant format. In December 1981, the Department of Health and Human Services notified the Institute that NIAAA could not sponsor research of the kind Vera had proposed because New York State had opted to receive federal alcoholism funds in block grant form. But because NIAAA's Special Review Committee had already reviewed the Vera proposal, had unanimously approved it for funding, and had found it to be "well designed and focused upon one of the most important and unsolved questions in the field both economically and programmatically," Vera was asked, in June 1982, to re-submit the proposal to different administrative unit within NIAAA. The revised proposal was re-submitted and reviewed in the early part of 1983. As a result, Vera has been given a two year research grant which commences in October of 1983.

We have now completed one year of that research effort. Intake into the research sample was a good deal slower than anticipated. However, satisfied with our progress, NIAAA has approved continuing into the second year. It is expected that the project will be extended to accommodate the extended intake period and that a complete report on the research will be available at the end of 1985. Our findings should be useful to the City in reviewing the impacts and cost-effectiveness of the detoxification services available for public inebriates.