

Vera Institute of Justice
is a private, non-profit
organization dedicated to
improving the quality of
urban life and to fostering
efficiency, accountability and
economy in public agencies.
Vera works with government
to introduce innovations
in policy and practice
that reduce crime,
raise the quality of justice,
conserve scarce resources,
and remove obstacles
to productive lives
for those who have
become dependent on
the public purse.

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TWENTY-FIVE
YEAR
REPORT VERA INSTITUTE
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THE
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OF
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1961-1986

CONTENTS

2	Mission and Method
5	Beginnings
7	Police
12	Courts and Prosecution
16	Victims
18	Sentencing
20	Corrections
22	Going Beyond Crime
23	Self-Sufficiency for the "Unemployable"
25	Housing for the Homeless and Mobility for the Homebound
28	Wider impact
29	Replications
30	Technical Assistance
31	Grants and Contracts

Mission and Method

Cities are complicated, exhilarating, stressed and very difficult to manage. Their vitality flows from the commercial, intellectual, social and cultural activity concentrated in them. But their vitality is threatened by crime and the fear of crime, and the public purse is drained by welfare dependency which puts self-respect and self-sufficiency beyond the reach of far too many. These problems burden ordinary citizens and public officials alike, and inspire demands for innovation by the bureaucracies charged with policing the streets, administering justice, employing the “unemployable,” caring for the disabled and elderly, and housing the homeless.

Public officials are much more likely to know that something is awry with current policy and practice than to know precisely what is wrong and what can be done about it. Daily crisis is the norm in city government, and an understandable fear of failure inhibits innovation by those held publicly accountable; they need confidence that a plausible, tested solution is at hand before they can reasonably be expected to redefine a problem. They need help from the private sector, but they need it in a form they can use. They do not need advice, they need solutions.

Over the past twenty-five years, through more than one hundred experiments and demonstration programs, the Vera Institute has combined direct action with sustained research to provide government with just such practical assistance. It has been our experience that private citizens, with the patience to probe the roots of problems and with freedom from the constraints that crisis management regularly imposes on public officials, can often break down complex policy dilemmas into manageable problems. By staying with a problem until the effort yields workable solutions, by taking responsibility for field-testing the new approaches, by accepting the risk of failure which makes innovation difficult for public officials, and by insisting that the inevitable disappointments be analyzed and used to refine program design, a private agency can help bring about specific, practical changes for the better. As an independent partner with

government and with service-providers in the voluntary sector, Vera has been such a catalyst.

Vera’s quarter century of action-research shows that, when innovative solutions are designed, tested and refined in partnership with government, they can be introduced for systematic use by existing public or private agencies or by newly created non-profit enterprises. Following these steps in New York, Vera has seen its projects adapted to other urban settings across this country and abroad. Diffusion of Vera’s practical knowledge has been fueled by publications which document the underlying problems common to most cities, detail the trial-and-error process of the Institute’s New York projects, and report the results of research on the effects these reforms have had.

We have kept Vera’s mission broad, so that the Institute may assist wherever the need for its particular approach—practical action combined with sustained research—matches its capacities and policy concerns. Yet, at any given time, Vera’s portfolio of program development efforts contains a careful selection of sharply defined issues. The Institute chooses to work on problems when it appears that a solution would reduce taxpayers’ expenditures, or make more efficient use of scarce resources (police officers, prosecutors, judges, social workers), while at the same time helping to relieve injustice or hardship among the chronically out-of-work, the handicapped, the homeless, the infirm, or the victims and offenders enmeshed in the criminal justice system.

Our aim has been for Vera to serve as a catalyst for change, a demonstrator of innovative approaches, and a source of practical knowledge. Because conventional wisdom so often obstructs imaginative approaches, and because existing information systems tend to make proper problem definition difficult, Vera takes the time to research for itself the problems it tackles. It takes responsibility for testing and refining the ideas that emerge from its work and for institutionalizing the resulting reforms.

We have kept Vera from settling into the conventional role of a consulting firm or a “think tank.” To be sure,

Vera has built solid working relationships with top officials and line workers in the agencies with which we collaborate, and this gives responsible public officials access to independent judgment on matters about which the Institute's staff are informed and experienced. But Vera does not do a quick study, offer advice and move on. Vera changes things. The focus of all its work, including its research, is on action.

We have taken care to preserve the Institute's essentially entrepreneurial character and its independence from government. But we have fashioned a way to work quietly and collaboratively with public agencies so that, when a new approach has been satisfactorily demonstrated, officials can redefine their policy problems and can respond positively to pressure for reform arising from whatever quarter. The Institute does not come to this partnership with an agenda of preconceived solutions. It is not burdened with an ideology. It works through private partnership with government, not public pressure against it.

Vera's allegiance is to the future, not the past. By "spinning off" reforms when they are ready, Vera has freed its core staff from open-ended operational responsibilities so they can devote their energies to further innovation. Most of the new approaches Vera has developed, field-tested and refined in its more than one hundred projects have been turned over to government or to existing private service-providers, to make standard operating procedures of them. Some innovations do not lend themselves to this form of institutionalization; they deal with problems for which no government agency has sole responsibility, or they can be carried on more efficiently by the private sector. Vera has so far created ten independent non-profit agencies for sustained implementation of new approaches of this type.

Other jurisdictions have followed the same pattern, in adapting to their problems and circumstances the practical knowledge generated by Vera in New York. Over one hundred jurisdictions have created independent non-profit agencies to replicate Vera projects. Far more have amended the operating procedures of their existing public and private agencies to take advantage of the approaches reported in Vera's publications. (This report closes with a partial list of the cities and countries that have replicated Vera projects or have received technical assistance from the Institute's New York staff.)

Since its birth in 1961, in a borrowed office, the Institute has matured into a substantial and complex organization. Thanks to the confidence expressed in Vera by general support grants from the Ford Foundation and the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, the Institute has been able over the years to develop and maintain an experienced central staff. Upon that permanent core, the Institute builds contractual relationships with the federal, state and local agencies responsible for addressing the

social and fiscal problems for which Vera's action-research approach is suitable. These grants and contracts for specific projects number over 100 at any given time; the general support grants that have sustained Vera's core functions make up five percent of the roughly ten million dollar annual budget.

Today, Vera is pursuing twenty-five program development efforts, ranging from a city-wide experiment with a new form of police patrol to several demonstrations of new financial and management models for the development of permanent housing for the homeless. The Institute's 235 full-time staff range from former prosecutors to former convicts, from social workers to economists, from anthropologists to former cops. The core staff work out of our new headquarters at 377 Broadway in lower Manhattan; the others work out of ten separate offices scattered about the City.

At twenty-five, the Vera Institute of Justice is making a substantial contribution to the quality of urban life and is fostering efficiency, accountability and economy in public agencies. We believe it is time to make Vera a permanent institution. To date, its resources have been its personnel, its experience, its reputation, and the action-research techniques it has developed. Vera has not possessed an endowment with which to ensure its survival. The Trustees are embarking on a campaign to raise an endowment of sufficient size for income from it to replace the annual general support grants on which the Institute has depended to maintain its core staff and to carry forward its agenda of action-research.

All of Vera's work is financed with public or tax-exempt funds. It is appropriate to offer an accounting of what we have done and how we have done it. The following summary report begins with a description of Vera's first experiment, the Manhattan Bail Project, in 1961-64. This story of how, within five years, a simple idea transformed court practices across the country remains a good illustration of the techniques Vera has applied to all of its subsequent work. Over the years, each new project has flowed from the experience and data gathered in the projects that preceded it. Thus, this report moves from descriptions of Vera's work with the police, with victims of crime, with courts and with corrections agencies, to descriptions of Vera's techniques for employing the "unemployable" and for providing mobility to the homebound and housing to the homeless.

We present this summary of Vera's first quarter-century with some pride, with deep gratitude to our partners in the public and private sectors, and with a determination to push on.

Burke Marshall
Chairman

Michael E. Smith
Director

"Our nation stands today at the threshold of a new era in our system of criminal justice . . . This [bail] system has endured—archaic, unjust and virtually unexamined—since the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . What is most shocking about [the] costs—to both individuals and to the public—is that they are unnecessary. First proof of that fact came because of one man's outrage against injustice. I am talking of Mr. Louis Schweitzer, who pioneered the development of a substitute for the money bail system, by establishing the Vera Foundation and the Manhattan Bail Project . . . Our task is to rise above the debate between rights of the individual and the rights of society, by securing and protecting the rights of both."

—President Lyndon Johnson, on signing the Bail Reform Act of 1966.



Beginnings

The work of the Vera Institute began one evening in 1960, during a conversation between Louis Schweitzer and an official of New York City's Department of Correction. Schweitzer learned the local jails were dangerously overcrowded. He was told that thousands were being detained for long periods, at high public expense, on minor charges for which they were not likely to be jailed even if they were eventually found guilty. He was told that many were not, in fact, convicted and that they were subjected to pretrial imprisonment not because a judge ordered it, but because they were unable to pay the fees of bail bondsmen or to put up the collateral bondsmen require.

Schweitzer was an immigrant chemical engineer who had prospered in this country and had become an active philanthropist. It shocked him to think that poverty had in effect become a punishable offense. The way he saw it, decisions about an individual's liberty should be made by judges not by insurance agents. He sensed that a man with no collateral might be as good a risk as many men with a great deal of it. And he thought it wasteful to build more jails if the real problem was the bail system.

As former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach put it some years later, "Louis Schweitzer believed passionately in the ability and obligation of ordinary men to make the Constitution work. He would not leave the law to lawyers and he was right." Schweitzer quickly arranged to talk with guards and inmates in one of the City's jails. This confirmed his impression that the crisis was not in the supply of jail cells but in the money bail system that was filling them. In search of a solution, he turned to Herbert Sturz, a 30-year old magazine editor who had already impressed Schweitzer by managing a successful youth project so efficiently he was able to return a portion of the philanthropist's grant. Sturz quit his editing job and began working on the bail problem out of a spare office at Schweitzer's company.

Sturz discovered that all major studies of the American bail system since 1920 had exposed the same defects. His interviews with New York judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, bondsmen and prisoners made it clear that a substantial proportion of those imprisoned for inability to post bail had strong family ties, stable residence, and current or recent jobs in the area and would be good bets to return to court voluntarily if released on their own recognizance. Yet he found that, in 1960, the court's statutory power to release on recognizance (ROR) had been used in less than one percent of cases.

As neither forty years of academic research nor the informed opinions of practitioners had changed the system's reliance on money bail, Sturz and Schweitzer set out to design a project that would both release defendants who could be relied upon to return to court voluntarily, and give judges the confidence to ROR such individuals in the future.

They at first thought they should create a bail fund, bail out a substantial number who had verifiable community ties but were too poor to pay bondsmen, and track the subsequent behavior of these defendants to prove that setting money bail had been unnecessary. But before they acted on this plan, Sturz and Schweitzer realized that judges' automatic reliance on bail was a practice too deeply rooted to be reformed by so indirect an approach. Using philanthropic cash to help the poor buy freedom, they reasoned, was more likely to encourage a belief that money bail can be made "to work."

They changed course and persuaded the City's administrative judges to cooperate in a direct test of whether defendants would be released on their own recognizance, without bail, if judges were given verified information showing strong ties to the community, and whether defendants released this way were any less reliable than those who made bail.

To conduct the experiment, Schweitzer created the Vera Foundation in October 1961, naming it after

his mother.* He provided the financial support necessary to get Vera underway and served as its President until his death in 1971. Sturz, as Vera's first Director, set the Manhattan Bail Project in motion, recruiting local law students to staff it. The law students administered a four-page questionnaire to everyone arrested in Manhattan (except those brought in on the most serious charges), prior to their appearing before arraignment judges. The questionnaire elicited details about criminal record, financial resources, residence, employment and dependents, and other indicators of the depth and quality of a defendant's community ties. A point scale was devised so that, after the community ties information was independently verified, project staff could make uniform, objective assessments of the strength of these ties. Defendants with scores at or above the threshold established for reliability were eligible for a recommendation, from the project to the judge, that they be granted release on their own recognizance (ROR).

But the project forwarded ROR recommendations and verified community ties information to arraignment judges in only half the eligible cases. The other half, randomly selected as "controls" after ROR eligibility had been determined, went before the judges in the customary way. By comparing judges' decisions in the experimental cases with their decisions in the control cases, Vera could know the extent to which providing verified community ties information makes a difference in the willingness of judges to ROR instead of setting bail. By comparing the subsequent behavior of the two groups, Vera could know whether defendants ROR'd on the basis of verified community ties are less reliable than those released because they can afford to make bail.

The Manhattan Bail Project was the first controlled experiment in a court setting. Sturz and Schweitzer knew that lasting reform of the bail system would require irrefutable evidence both that the project reduced judges' reliance on money bail and that no injury resulted to the interests of justice. So they coupled the new but simple ROR procedures to the rigorous logic of experimental research.

The experiment began in October, 1961, and ran for three years. The judges ROR'd 3,505 defendants on the project's recommendation. Only fifty-six (1.6%) willfully failed to return to court, and less than one percent were rearrested while free on ROR. As time passed and the judges saw that setting bail was not the only way to assure a defendant's presence for court hearings, the rate of ROR rose in the control group too; but over the entire three years, judges were four times as likely to ROR an eligible defendant when they had the project's recommendation and the verified community ties and prior record information to guide them. The 1.6 percent "skip rate" for ROR'd defendants who met the project's criteria remained less than half the skip rate for defendants

released by posting bail. The results spoke for themselves: a bail bond is often a less effective guarantee for the court than verified information about prior record and community ties.

In 1964, New York City's Mayor institutionalized the Manhattan Bail Project. Having calculated that the project, operating in only one of the City's five counties, had already saved over a million dollars in the Department of Correction's operating budget, he charged the Department of Probation with city-wide operation of the new ROR procedures. Meanwhile, press reports of the transformation in New York's bail system inspired a replication project in Des Moines, Iowa, and attracted the interest of Robert Kennedy, then Attorney General of the United States. He instructed all U.S. Attorneys to adopt the new ROR techniques to guide individual prosecutors at federal arraignments. Over the next two years, the federal ROR rate rose from 6 percent to 39 percent without any increase in the "skip rate." To assist the country as a whole to take advantage of what had been learned in the Manhattan Bail Project, the Justice Department and Vera co-sponsored a National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, which brought more than 400 judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and police and prison officials to Washington for three days in May, 1964. By the spring of 1965, replication projects had sprung up in forty-four counties and cities. Starting with Des Moines, Vera staff provided technical assistance in as many of these jurisdictions as they could get to.

By October, 1965, sixty projects were underway in cities and counties around the country, 25,000 defendants had been ROR'd, and their "skip rate" was still lower than for defendants released on bail. The President signed the Bail Reform Act of 1966 the following June. The first reform of the federal bail system since 1789, it required that information about defendants' prior records and community ties be routinely provided at federal arraignments, and it directed judges to ROR or to fashion suitable, non-monetary conditions of release in appropriate cases.

In less than five years, Vera had designed an innovative remedy for a pressing problem, proved its practicality and worth in a pilot project, measured its effects through sophisticated research, and saw its systematic use extended across the nation. The action-research techniques Vera developed and refined in this first project remain at the core of its work today. Chief Justice Warren seems to have been right when, addressing the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in 1964, he foresaw that "possibilities for the application of these methods are many and the prospects of solution outside the traditional confines of the law are great." The following chapters summarize Vera's application of action-research techniques to a great many of the problems confronting urban America.

*The name was changed to the Vera Institute of Justice in June, 1966.

Police



Officer Jack Cambria working his beat in Brooklyn. In the Community Patrol Officer Program, developed by the Vera Institute and the New York City Police Department, each officer is permanently assigned to a neighborhood, working with local residents and merchants to solve the crime and disorder problems on his beat.

Police Officer Bob Orazem, like most patrolmen, spent frustrating years racing around unfamiliar neighborhoods, responding to radio calls from the 911 operator. Radio motor patrol, the conventional method for policing urban America since the advent of cars and radios, permitted him to respond swiftly to crime scenes—but usually after the suspects had fled. In June, 1984, he and nine other officers of the 72nd Precinct in Brooklyn were taken out of their cars and given a radically different assignment. Under the supervision of a Vera-trained sergeant, they became the pilot for New York's Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP), an effort to put the police back on foot and in touch with the neighborhoods they are charged with protecting. In the seventeen square blocks that became his steady beat, Orazem was required to get to know the residents and merchants and to work with them to identify, attack and eliminate the conditions that bred crime and the fear of crime in what was to become *his* neighborhood.

This approach to policing at first stunned the people of the 72nd Precinct. Seven called the stationhouse in the first week of the CPOP pilot to report that someone impersonating a police officer was introducing himself around. Orazem soon established his credibility with

the law-abiding and the delinquent on his beat and, able for the first time to follow through on "citizens' complaints, he experienced professional satisfactions that are denied to officers who respond by car to an endless string of 911 calls.

Orazem made more than 100 arrests over the next fifteen months. But something more was required to get rid of the drug pushers who hung out in an abandoned lot at the heart of his neighborhood. His new assignment made him accountable, both to the community and to his sergeant, for eliminating what he and they had identified as the priority problem on his beat. He tried the conventional tactic: he arrested junkies as they bought and sold dope in the open-air drug market. But the next day others would take their place. So he and the local block association president organized neighbors to clean the debris from the lot. Then Orazem negotiated the maze of bureaucracy to get two separate city agencies to cooperate in hauling away the trash and building a fence. Finally, with the help of more local volunteers, Orazem landscaped the lot, built some benches and erected a swing set. The addicts disappeared, some of them to the drug-rehabilitation centers to which Orazem had referred them. They left behind the fruits of a new form of urban policing—a place where children are safe at play.



Community Patrol Officer George Sabando now knows just about everyone on his beat in the 72nd Precinct.

New York's Community Patrol Officer Program, described in more detail later, is the most recent of a score of programs developed jointly by Vera and the New York City Police Department. For twenty-two years, this collaboration has spawned programs for the more efficient and effective deployment of police resources. The first was the Manhattan Summons Project, launched in 1964. Until that time, the thousands of suspects brought to precincts on minor misdemeanor charges were routinely held in police custody until arraignments where most were routinely fined, given some other non-custodial sentence or released on their own recognizance. And the police? Arresting officers were kept on duty—off patrol—throughout the many hours of processing. Vera staff discovered that state law gave the courts authority to allow the police to issue summonses in these cases. The Department wasn't prepared to ask the court for that power until it had some objective way to know which suspects could be relied upon to show up for arraignment on their own. Vera agreed to try adapting, to the precinct setting, the decision-making tools it had developed for arraignment judges in the Manhattan Bail Project.


Court approval was secured for the experiment and, starting in one pilot precinct, Vera staff gathered and verified information about the community ties of misdemeanor suspects as arresting officers brought them in. When the weight of a suspect's community ties met

pre-determined eligibility criteria, and his prior record did not exclude him from further consideration, project staff recommended to the precinct desk officer that the suspect simply be issued a summons to appear at court on a fixed date.

The pilot project so quickly and substantially cut into the waste of police patrol resources that, after five months, the Department began expanding it to other precincts. By July, 1967, the new procedures were in place city-wide. An audit showed that each of the 32,000 summonses issued over the next four years freed up an average of 10 hours of police time—a savings valued at \$6.7 million, most of which was invested in more patrol by the police officers. Thousands of citizens, charged with minor violations of the penal law, were enabled to keep their jobs, remain with their families, and prepare their defenses before going to court. Ninety-five percent appeared voluntarily for arraignment.

The procedures developed in the Manhattan Summons Project soon became standard operating procedure in the New York City Police Department, and police departments across the country followed suit. In 1971, the Vera guidelines and the court orders that made the Manhattan Summons Project possible were codified in New York law.

The Manhattan Summons Project gave the Police Department confidence in Vera as a partner and whetted its appetite for further innovation. In 1967, the Department



As he walks his beat, Officer Sabando is given leads to help identify and track down a man who is frightening children and angering adults by repeatedly exposing himself around the neighborhood. Officer Sabando finds the alleged flasher, summons a back-up radio car, and makes the arrest.

formalized the partnership with the first of the string of technical assistance contracts that has governed the relationship ever since. In the previous year, the Department had stationed two lieutenants to work at the Institute in a Police Liaison Office. Establishing this office at Vera signalled to the rest of the law enforcement community the seriousness of the Department's commitment to reform, and the police personnel who have rotated through the office over the past twenty years have helped shape and sharpen the Institute's work. There has been plenty of work to do:

Hispanic prisoners held in precinct lock-ups could not communicate with the cops on duty because of language barriers. In 1966, when suicide attempts were rising, Vera developed a system for the quick transfer of Spanish-speaking defendants from the precincts to the Correction Department, which employed more bi-lingual personnel.


New York, like other cities in the 1960s, experienced an increase of incidents in which white police officers shot and killed black youngsters. In 1967, Vera helped the Department draft stricter rules on deadly force. Vera's explanatory *Guidelines On the Use of Deadly Force* were distributed to every officer, together with the Department's new and more restrictive rules. Then, in 1969 Vera designed and published detailed procedures for all the agencies that would be involved in the *Administration of Justice Under Emergency Conditions*. Put into practice in New York City several times over the following years, these plans helped minimize violence to and by police

officers; other cities used the book as a blueprint for constructing their own procedures.

In 1969, Vera and the Police Liaison office launched a pilot project to speed up and modernize the process of getting defendants arraigned, once they reached the courthouse. This permitted arresting officers to be released—to go back on patrol, or to go off duty if their tours were over—except in cases where their testimony would be required at arraignment. A recent audit showed that this Pre-Arraignment Project (now institutionalized city-wide) saved the Department \$27,150,000 in police time in 1985.

Even after arraignment, criminal cases wasted patrol resources. Police officers spent thousands of hours each year waiting in court to testify on days when cases were adjourned or dismissed. Starting in 1967, Vera persuaded prosecutors and judges to cooperate with the police in a series of pilot projects aimed at keeping cops on patrol. Vera developed a city-wide "alert" system by which police stayed on the street but could be called in to the courthouse on short notice. A 1977 audit showed that, in Brooklyn, the Appearance Control Project was avoiding an average of 70 police court appearances each day, an annual savings of \$2 million in that borough alone.

By the mid-1970s, as these and a half dozen other police/Vera programs became permanent fixtures, the Department was hit by the city's fiscal crisis. Between 1974 and 1982, the city lost over 9,000 police officers, at precisely the same time that reports of crime and




demand for police services were growing. The question every police manager wanted answered was how to get more results from fewer troops. One answer came from Vera's *Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City's Courts*. That seminal book documented why some felony arrests, but not others, result in convictions, and it led to the identification of things the police can do to prevent the collapse of stranger-to-stranger felony cases. The first and most important: work harder on preparing the felony arrests that the officers were already bringing into the system.

Vera designed a Felony Case Preparation Project and tested it in the 43rd Precinct in the Bronx. The basic idea was to have precinct detectives conduct a thorough follow-up investigation immediately after a felony arrest, before the case reached the prosecutors in the Complaint Room. The Vera-trained detectives searched for additional evidence, recorded witnesses' statements, searched out additional witnesses to beef up the case and, after proper warnings, took formal statements from the suspect. As Vera expected, detectives following these "case enhancement" steps in the pilot precinct were able, in almost all felony arrests, to present prosecutors with a full written report of the evidence before the suspect reached the District Attorney's Office. The results were impressive. In the test precinct, the percentage of felony arrests indicated by the District Attorney increased by 53 percent. Sentences to "felony time"—more than a

year in prison—increased by more than 45 percent, and prison terms of five years or more doubled. In September, 1981, after Vera helped test the new case preparation procedures in several other precincts, the Department began expanding the program to every precinct in the city.

By the mid-1980s, the evolving police agenda for Vera called for creation of the Community Patrol Officer Program. Most of the Department's patrol resources were committed to Radio Motor Patrol. And most of that patrol time was spent driving around, waiting for 911 calls or responding to them. Vera surveyed the results of a decade of research into police patrol: the findings, from all over the country, made it difficult to believe that so much random preventive patrol was worth the effort. Many 911 calls were not emergencies, and random patrolling between 911 calls was not deterring much crime. Most important, radio-car cops had become strangers to the law-abiding as well as to the delinquent. Their lack of local knowledge and their constant movement had led to neglect of the traditional "order maintenance" function of police—keeping the streets fit for decent people to walk without fear.

In response to the City's growing need for a new style of policing, and guided by the research survey, Vera worked with the Department in 1983-84 to design the pilot Community Patrol Officer Program. It combines, in a single officer, the law enforcement duty to arrest, the de-



terrence functions of the old-style foot cop, the outreach and community organization responsibilities of community relations officers, and the crime analysis and strategic activities of police planners.

Six months into the pilot Community Patrol Officer Program, the Police Department began to expand it. By September, 1986, 367 Vera-trained officers were working in CPOP units out of thirty-seven precincts. By the end of this year, forty-three of the City's seventy-two precincts will have CPOP. What is happening on the streets of New York City is more than police walking beats again. CPOP cops are responsible for developing and implementing strategic plans to return neighborhood streets to their residents. They are as likely to organize a community group to prevent crime as to arrest a felon after a crime has occurred.

The CPOP officers have proved to be unusually effective cops. They made more arrests per officer last year than almost any other unit in the Department, while still meeting with tens of thousands of the citizens who live and work on their beats. They attend community meetings (2,483 last year), organize block associations (47 last year), recruit civilian block watchers (1,333 last year), and do whatever else is necessary to identify and eliminate the "quality of life" conditions that breed crime and fear in their neighborhoods. Despite their almost daily contact with all elements of the community, they have been less likely than regular patrol officers to be

complained about to the Civilian Complaint Review Board. The 3,900 arrests that CPOP officers made last year were not the random result of radio motor patrol: most of them were made in pursuit of the strategic plans, and many were the result of tips from local residents who have learned to trust their cop.

As CPOP is expanded to cover all of the City's precincts, Vera trains the new CPOs and their sergeants, monitors implementation, and helps the Department amend the program's design and the supervisory structure that supports it. Meanwhile, under contracts with the federal, state and city governments, Vera has mounted a major research project to mine CPOP for answers to questions such as: What specific patrol tactics work, against what kinds of crime conditions or public order problems, under what local circumstances? What relationships, if any, exist between the elimination of local crime conditions or order maintenance problems and crime rates? What kinds of officers and sergeants do best in this kind of policing? Will the best officers seek the assignment? Practical answers are needed if community policing is to be done well in New York, and in the many other cities that are moving in this direction. We have one answer already: When Police Officer Orazem got a commendation for his work in the 72nd Precinct pilot project, he told the Police Commissioner, "I got more out of a year in CPOP than I did in the four years I rode a sector car."

Courts and Prosecution




Young men are sent by the courts to the Court Employment Project for remedial education, training in construction trades, and employment on work crews. Here, two CEP clients learn how to cut metal studs to size—a skill they will put to use for pay on CEP's construction sites.

Our courts are under almost intolerable stress. Last year, a quarter million arrests were made in New York City. Over 900,000 cases entered the criminal justice system by arrest or summons, not counting traffic summonses. For judges to do justice and preserve the appearance of justice, for prosecutors to balance their desire for convictions with their responsibility to see that justice is done—for courts to be courts of law—the daily press of business must be managed. It's Vera's job to help judges and prosecutors do that.

Vera's efforts to relieve court congestion began almost by accident, on the Bowery. In that district of New York City, the streets were filled by day with a vigorous wholesale trade in lamps and fixtures; at night they were littered with down-and-out drunks. Derelict drunks do not have "community ties," so Vera and the Police Department were not able to make the Manhattan Summons Project work in this precinct. Like skid rows everywhere in 1964, the Bowery presented a different kind of challenge to the criminal justice system: Police would round up derelicts lying in doorways or sprawled unconscious across the sidewalk, charge them with public drunkenness, vagrancy or disorderly conduct, toss them into precinct "drunk tanks," and transport them to court. The judges, of course, had no plausible solution; they were forced each year to process thousands of sick and disoriented alcoholics through the court and, in short order, back to the Bowery where they resumed drinking and drifting. Some died during the criminal justice process.

In 1967, after several years searching for a way to break the cycle of despair on the Bowery and to end the parade of derelicts that clogged court calendars, Vera and the Police Department pioneered a new response to the street alcoholics. Vera opened a fifty-bed detoxification center on the Bowery. Two-man "rescue teams"—a plainclothes police officer and a recovered Bowery alcoholic—patrolled the area in unmarked cars and coaxed the most deteriorated drunks off the street to spend five days drying out. Vera had medical personnel on hand to help them through detox and to deal with the illness and broken bones from which they suffered. The result: New York had a medical response to a medical problem, and the court was freed from an inappropriate burden as arrests for public drunkenness on the Bowery went from 4,000 in 1967 to twenty-nine in 1968. In due course, jurisdictions across the country moved their primary response to public drunkenness from "drunk tanks" and arraignment courts to detox centers and after-care referral.

The Manhattan Bowery Project moved quickly to expand its services to include after-care and outpatient treatment aimed at extending the periods of sobriety for the Bowery drunks who went through detox. Some escaped their addiction entirely, and a few of these became rescue aides and counselors in the program. Today, as an independent non-profit agency, the Manhattan Bowery Corporation sends rescue teams into other areas of the City to bring street alcoholics into detox and to provide psychiatric treatment to the homeless. It



A Manhattan Bowery Project rescue aide coaxes a derelict alcoholic to come in from the Bowery for five days of medical detoxification.

also operates residential centers where recovered alcoholics can live in an atmosphere of sobriety and work in MBC business ventures until they graduate to the regular labor market.

Even before the Manhattan Bowery Project was a year into its pilot phase, Vera launched a second project aimed at diverting defendants out of the criminal courts. It was an article of faith in the 1960s—in the Justice Department, in academe, and in the New York City courts—that too many youngsters were brought to court, stigmatized, and punished when something different would work better. The 1967 Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice called for development of programs to divert selected young adult offenders from court processing and jail cells to counseling, training and job placement. Vera responded, in 1967, with the Court Employment Project (CEP), the first pre-trial diversion project in the country. Within three years, CEP had become a free-standing non-profit corporation and a model for over two hundred other jurisdictions which wanted to divert salvageable youth and to reserve full prosecution and sentencing for more serious cases.

But, as CEP's influence spread, crucial questions remained unanswered: Were these pretrial diversion programs in fact diverting their clients from full prosecution and punishment, or were they merely imposing on these youth—without taking the time to convict them—a new form of punishment, when their cases would have

been dismissed or discharged anyway? Was the "treatment" administered by these programs less criminogenic than prosecution and punishment? In short, was the rationale for pretrial diversion sound? It was not until the mid-1970s that the Justice Department provided funds for rigorous, controlled research of the kind that can answer such questions. Vera, which had pioneered this kind of research in the Manhattan Bail Project, was chosen to conduct the study. CEP was the logical place to look.

Vera came up with a disappointing answer. Pretrial diversion did not result in more lenient treatment from the courts, because the cases diverted would have been dismissed or the offenders would have been sentenced to discharges anyway. Nor did it provide long-term benefits to clients. Pretrial diversion programs may have accomplished something valuable in the court context of the late 1960s, but by the late 1970s CEP was being used as a dumping ground for the "light" and unprosecutable portion of the court's felony caseload.

Vera's action-research approach to problem-solving can lead to wrenching adjustments over the course of program development. The CEP research had a dramatic effect of this kind all across the country. In New York, under the guidance of Vera's core staff, CEP re-emerged as an agency to which judges could sentence convicted young adults who would otherwise spend substantial time behind bars because probation could not adequately control them. By employing them in CEP's own work crews, by requiring them to attend remedial classes




The New York City Police Department loaned unmarked cars to the Bowery Project, to bring alcoholics in for treatment. Arrests of drunks on the Bowery fell from 4,000 in 1967 to 29 the next year.

at its on-site school, by surrounding them with required and productive activity throughout the day, and by bringing absconders back to the sentencing judges for imprisonment, CEP has been able to assure the courts that the high-risk youth sentenced to its program will not go unsupervised. Judges use the new CEP program because they know that sentencing these youths to prison will just make them tougher when they emerge in their early twenties but that, without supervision as tight as CEP now delivers, there is no place but prison to send them. The intensity of CEP's new program and its threat of immediate imprisonment for failure to comply with supervision conditions hold much greater promise for turning young offenders away from crime than did the rather thin and casual contact typical of pretrial diversion programs.

CEP was not the only Vera project that required mid-course correction. The Institute's first program, the Manhattan Bail Project, had been turned over to the City's Department of Probation in 1967. It was not a good marriage: Probation's overworked staff had other statutory priorities and could not keep up with the Bail Project workload. More and more defendants arrived at arraignment without anyone having gathered the required community ties information. Too often, the information was not verified before it was presented to the arraignment judges. In 1973, the City asked Vera to take back the functions of interviewing all defendants before arraignment and recommending release on

recognizance when verified community ties were sufficiently strong. Vera created a pilot PreTrial Services Agency (PTSA) in Brooklyn. Much more sophisticated techniques were developed, including an on-line computer data base to track current cases and retrieve prior court appearance history. The systems developed in the Brooklyn PTSA pilot were then extended to the entire City and, in 1977, Vera spun PTSA off as a free-standing non-profit corporation, the New York City Criminal Justice Agency. Under its annual contract with the city, CJA handles bail interviewing for every arrest coming into criminal court. Its computerized records have become the principal source of reliable data for management of the criminal justice system by the City's Coordinator of Criminal Justice and for research into the operations of the system and the effects of new policies.

The courts are not simple and, although conventional wisdom and convenient prescriptions abound, few of the problems courts face can be successfully attacked without a lot of preliminary gathering and analysis of data. In 1978, Vera published the landmark monograph *Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City's Courts*. This was the first systematic look, across a large and representative sample of the serious crime cases that are presented to urban courts, at the circumstances lying behind the cases and at what actually happens to them as they proceed through the court to conviction or, almost as often, to dismissal. Two of its most telling findings: Strong cases involving serious crimes lead



After three days in detox, he has a chance at a new life.

to conviction and imprisonment more often than even criminal justice professionals believe; and in half the felony arrests involving victims there are prior relationships between victim and defendant—a previously overlooked factor that explains a great deal of the dismissal rate.

The findings from *Felony Arrests* helped pinpoint ways to dispose earlier of weak cases that clog court calendars and to strengthen and accelerate the prosecution of strong cases. The Early Case Assessment Bureaus created with Vera's help by New York City's District Attorneys have been widely replicated elsewhere, for example, as have the improved case preparation techniques developed by Vera, the Police Department and the Bronx District Attorney.

In 1978, as Vera's study of the facts and dispositional process in adult felony arrests was beginning to pay off, another Vera team applied research techniques developed for *Felony Arrests* to study the history of Family Court cases. The results of this work proved equally provocative—maybe more so, as the prosecution of juveniles is shielded from public and even professional view by the confidentiality of Family Court proceedings. Contrary to popular myth, the study showed that the vast majority of criminal cases against children do not involve violent behavior of any kind.

But the Family Court study also helped define some severe problems that this court faces. Chief among them: most children brought to Family Court leave without receiving *any* help for their physical, emotional

or psychological problems. Yet, these children are overwhelmed by problems which cry out for effective response, and the system seems to offer the least response to the "worst" kids. Agencies that offer the necessary combination of supervision and services will not accept them, and the Family Court is powerless to insist. Vera has been working with state and local officials to design some remedies for the Family Court's problems. These efforts will get a boost from the publication next year of *The Court of Tears and Misery*, a general audience book drawn from the Vera study.

Courts send people to jails, and cities across the country are desperate to find responsible ways to get relief from the fiscal burdens of a national jail overcrowding crisis. In New York, the crisis has been more a product of delay in the disposition of criminal cases than the consequence of any increase in arrests or jail sentences. In 1984, after Vera researchers helped the city identify court delay as a major cause of local overcrowding, the Institute was asked to set up data systems to track backlog in the courts and to assist prosecutors and judges in the development and testing of new administrative techniques to dispose of cases more quickly. So far, the city's Speedy Disposition Program has produced successes in some boroughs but has met with frustration in others. No one doubts the difficulty of changing the "local legal culture." But justice delayed is justice denied and, as Louis Schweitzer understood when he founded the Institute, some problems are too important to grow tired of.

Victims



Her apartment was burgled before this year. The thieves have just picked her lock again. This time the cops told her to call the Victim Services Agency. Irving Smoot, a VSA locksmith, installs a pick-proof lock. The immediate service from VSA is free.

Americans have learned about crime the hard way, through personal experience. They've come home to ransacked apartments. They've had their purses snatched and their wallets lifted. They've lost car radios to teenagers and life savings to white collar embezzlers. And, if they've been especially unlucky, they've been physically hurt, the victims of muggings or worse. According to federal surveys, roughly one-third of the nation's households are victimized each year.

This Everyman factor poses an important challenge for any criminal justice system. How does it treat victims? There's a larger challenge too: What is done about victims when there's no defendant caught to put through the criminal justice system? Twenty years ago, the short answer to how victims fared in the system was—badly. The larger question was not even asked. No one was opposed to helping victims, but no one had a mandate—or a budget—to try. In New York, that is no longer the case. Now, thousands of victims get help each year from the Victim Services Agency, a Vera "spin-off" that grew out of a typical action-research project. Last year, VSA's counselors helped 22,000 victims, and its 24-hour-a-day Crime Victim Hotline was used by 44,000. VSA found emergency beds, food and financial aid for almost 10,000 victims and it made emergency repairs of 3,500

premises left vulnerable after burglaries. The agency interceded on behalf of 12,000 battered women and it collected about \$700,000 in restitution payments.

Less dramatically, VSA eliminates some of the hassle victims endure when the criminal justice system uses them as witnesses. In 1985, the agency prevented 75,000 needless courtroom appearances, using the "alert" procedures Vera had developed in the early 1970s to keep police officers on patrol. VSA also made 9,000 trips to and from court, to make testifying easier, and assisted 4,000 victims to recover stolen property that was being held as evidence.

The history of VSA begins with the surfacing of a problem. In the mid-1960s, when rising crime rates focused national attention on criminal justice, researchers noticed that a surprising number of crime victims were refusing to cooperate with police and prosecutors. This worried prosecutors and policy analysts who believed that the failure of victims to appear in court to testify was a leading reason for persistently high dismissal rates in criminal prosecutions. Why were victims opting out? The principal reason, further research suggested, was that the system treated all witnesses in far too cavalier a fashion.

By 1974, enough evidence was available on the extent of victim-witness non-cooperation, its consequences and its apparent causes, for the Law Enforcement As-

sistance Administration to intervene. LEAA awarded grants to nineteen jurisdictions for programs to test the hypothesis that better treatment of victims would keep them involved in their cases and that their involvement would reduce the dismissal rate. The first and most comprehensive attempt to eliminate victim "disaffection" with the criminal justice system was Vera's Victim/Witness Assistance Project. Working out of offices on the second floor of the Brooklyn Criminal Court, the V/WAP pilot project staff provided victims with the full range of services called for by the "disaffection" hypothesis. The project risked something by inserting itself between the prosecutors and the victims, the source of precious testimonial evidence. But the staff gained credibility, and a measure of gratitude, by helping the prosecutors too—they designed and maintained a computerized data base so they could inform the District Attorney's office daily about the availability of witnesses to testify the next day.

Charged with eliminating the mundane obstacles that defeat even devoted witnesses, the staff began attending to victims' basic needs. They kept in touch with them between court dates and put them on "alert" whenever possible, so they wouldn't waste time coming to testify on days when no action would be taken. They opened and staffed a day-care center where victims' children could be safely deposited when their parents were needed in court. They provided free round-trip transportation to the courthouse for those who wanted it. They replaced locks and repaired the doors for the victims of night-time burglaries, so they would not be burgled again that night. And they ran a victims' hotline to provide something the rest of the system too often overlooked: an understanding listener and knowledgeable guide.

How well did V/WAP work? The results were mixed. The project saved thousands of wasted hours and provided services that victims consistently told Vera researchers they wanted. But about half of the victims continued to drop out of their cases. Why? The main reason, further research disclosed, was that many victims sought solutions to their complaints which they did not believe would be provided by the criminal justice system—and they were often right. For example, a large proportion of crime victims either knew or were related to the defendants who had assaulted them or stolen from them. While these victims wanted and needed help, the help they needed was not forthcoming from a court process designed to establish guilt or innocence and to apply penal sanctions. What this group of victims wanted, the surveys showed, was mediated resolution of long-standing conflicts, or a court-ordered end to harassment, or a quick return of stolen property, or a round of therapeutic counseling for themselves or for the former friend or family member who the system saw only as a defendant.

At that point, Vera faced a dilemma. The Institute's research showed that V/WAP's founding hypothesis

was flawed: improving the lot of victims did not end the problem of uncooperative witnesses. It did not reduce the dismissal rate that haunted prosecutors. But V/WAP did meet the pressing needs of an under-served and often ignored group of citizens who have a special claim on just treatment from society.

In pursuit of justice rather than prosecutorial efficiency, Vera expanded the range of services to victims: V/WAP added a unit to mediate cases—even felony cases—where the victims knew the defendants and wanted a mediated settlement. It added a unit to collect restitution payments. It added staff to help victims communicate with prosecutors, because the research showed that the prosecutors' tight focus on the evidence, rather than on the person who could give it, was a primary source of victim disaffection. And it started individual and group counseling for victims suffering special trauma. Perhaps the most needy of these were not victims at all, as the system defines victim. In a homicide case, it is too late to help the victim, and grieving family members usually play no formal role in the criminal justice system except to identify the body and, perhaps, to serve as initial suspects. Through group counselling at V/WAP, the families of homicide victims were able to help each other deal with their grief and rebuild their lives.

In 1978, the Mayor and New York City's other political leaders embraced V/WAP and funded it as a city-wide, non-profit corporation known as the Victim Services Agency. What has become known as the "victims' movement" had been launched. The course it has followed has been much influenced by the continuing stream of research reports about the effects of V/WAP and VSA services.

As a free-standing institution, VSA continues to maintain close ties to prosecutors' offices and continues to encourage and assist witnesses to testify. But cooperation with the authorities is often irrelevant. When a victim returns to find a home or store burglarized, or when a citizen is mugged by someone coming from behind, at night, there is usually no arrest that can be made. The majority of victims are not witnesses—there's no one to testify against. So VSA emphasizes practical assistance such as food, shelter, and counseling and has opened field offices in high-crime areas throughout the City. Recently, VSA has turned to what may be called victim-prevention work. VSA staffers patrol the nasty underworld of Times Square, trying to spot and divert teenagers who are ripe to be victimized. VSA's hotline has a separate number for runaways, another set of troubled teens who are easy pickings for pimps and scam artists. And VSA keeps open a string of safe houses where battered spouses and their children can retreat before they are attacked again. These efforts are logical extensions for an agency that has learned that humanizing the prosecution process is necessary, but is not a sufficient social response to victims' bitter experiences of crime.

Sentencing



Richard Battle stole an \$85 suitcase from Bloomingdale's in 1982. He had been arrested for theft more than thirty times before and served nine short jail terms in recent years. For the suitcase theft, he was sentenced to perform 70 hours of unpaid community service under the supervision of Vera's project staff. After he served his time for the community, the staff helped him get drug treatment and a job. Battle hasn't been arrested since—and he's been promoted in his job.

Most of the small-time thieves, hustlers, reefer-peddlers and prostitutes paraded by big-city judges have been there before. Many have been jailed before, and the majority will be back. They present only one of the sentencing dilemmas confronting the criminal justice system today. What are judges to do? In practice, after a guilty plea is taken, the dozens of sentences listed in the statutes reduce to two: maximum security confinement, which strains the public purse even at current levels of imprisonment, or doing nothing at all, which mocks justice and risks public safety. "Nothing at all" is how most judges see, and most offenders experience "probation," "conditional discharge," and the standard array of non-jail sentences which have been rendered unenforceable by huge, undifferentiated caseloads.

Vera's efforts to restore the powers of the sentencing judge began in 1968, with the development of techniques for more effective probation practice in misdemeanor cases—the Bronx Sentencing Project. Today, the work runs the gamut: One member of Vera's staff has secured a bail bondsman's license to test a form of intensive supervision in which the most promising offerings from the "alternatives" field are combined with the unique, but previously unexplored powers of commercial bondsmen to restrict their clients' movements and to arrest and jail them at the first sign of trouble. Another member of Vera's staff, after tracking into adulthood the careers of the juvenile delinquents sampled for Vera's Family Court Study, has just published a critical examination of the popular idea that sentencing can and should be based on predictions of which adolescent offenders will, if not incapacitated, become "career criminals."

Over the years, Vera has developed and tested a variety of new sentences, and some administrative systems that help make the old ones more enforceable. This year, for example, Vera's Community Service Sentencing Project will supervise more than 1,250 petty recidivists in the performance of court-ordered, unpaid labor for the benefit of community groups. About 60 percent would have drawn short jail terms, if not sentenced to community service; the rest would have "walked," despite their prior convictions. Those who complete their sentences will get help from project staff to find jobs or drug treatment and other services; the 15 percent who do not take the sentence seriously will be tracked down by project staff, taken back to court and resentenced directly to jail.

When Vera launched its pilot community service

sentencing project in 1979, it aimed to demonstrate that it is possible to enforce an alternative punishment for some of the roughly 8,000 offenders who draw jail sentences of ninety days or less in New York City each year, and for an equal number who "walk" because there are not enough jail cells. There is some variety in the criminal records of the offenders in this group, but the bulk are petty thieves—they have long records for stealing a \$20 pair of pants from Macy's, copper pipes from an abandoned building, disco tapes from Crazy Eddie's or sneakers from Bloomingdale's. It is their persistence in thievery that provokes periodic thirty-day jail sentences, not the value of what any one of them steals and not a risk of future violence. While short jail terms are only marginally effective at deterring their future thefts, long prison terms for all of them would be prohibitively expensive. But doing nothing at all offends everyone's gut instinct that theft should be punished.

The pilot project staff gradually proved to grateful judges that there is a way to exact punishment in some jail-bound cases, without jailing. They did it by directly supervising every hour of each offender's court-ordered community service, by seeing to it that those who failed to perform were re-sentenced to jail, and by accepting for supervision only the petty offenders whose prior convictions made them "jail-bound." And exacting punishment this way paid a dividend: Working seven hours a day under Vera's supervisors, the sentenced offenders cleaned out senior citizens' centers, repaired neighborhood playgrounds and parks, helped staff recreation programs for mentally retarded children, and installed smoke alarms in apartments of the elderly.

The pilot project was operating smoothly by 1980-81, when overcrowding in New York City's jails reached crisis levels. Vera was asked to begin expanding it and by 1984 community service sentencing was available to judges city-wide. By September, 1986, over 5,000 had been sentenced to it.

Vera's development of community service sentencing required a mix of practical knowledge and research sophistication. The research design, employing powerful but complicated statistical models, defies brief description in ordinary language. But it worked. Early on, when the data showed that only about 40 percent of those given this alternative sentence would have drawn jail terms, the researchers were able to identify adjustments to the screening criteria which ensured that at least half the community service sentences would displace jail sentences. For the last three years, the "displacement rate" has been on target, at 55 to 60 percent. The research has also permitted Vera and the city to see whether or not sentencing these offenders to community service has less deterrent impact than sentencing them to jail (it does not), and whether the number of jail cells freed up for occupancy by more serious offenders justifies the program's

costs. (It does. Over 100 cells were freed up by the program last year, and it costs the city \$100,000 to build a new cell and \$25,000 per year to keep someone in it.)*

In New York City, sentencing judges now have confidence in at least one alternative form of punishment, for one category of offenders. Nationally, the jail overcrowding crisis has sparked local expenditures on "alternatives to incarceration" of every description. But it has proved very hard to prevent the new "alternatives" from being used exclusively for first (or minor) offenders who wouldn't be jailed in any event. When a new sentence is used this way—as an alternative to "nothing at all"—it gets watered down, becomes unenforceable, and increases the cost of the criminal justice system without remedying its most pressing deficits.


In this context, it is an encouraging sign that other jurisdictions have begun to incorporate elements of Vera's Community Service Sentencing Project into their own development of alternative sentences. Meanwhile, Vera and the New York City and State agencies charged with overseeing probation have collaborated in testing new sentencing projects throughout this jurisdiction. Vera is helping the government agencies avoid investing public funds in alternatives that are poorly designed or cannot be usefully researched.

There are still other avenues to explore. In 1981, Vera embarked on a series of studies on the use of fines. The Institute has now published a survey of how fines are levied and collected in 126 American trial courts, a detailed study of how and how well those judicial and administrative functions are executed in New York City, and an examination of certain unique features of fining in West Germany, Scandinavia and England. This work has shaped recent amendments to the federal sentencing statutes, and has excited interest around the country in testing certain features of the European system in an American setting. In September, 1986, the National Institute of Justice set aside funds for Vera to pilot test the use of these European techniques in New York City at the end of this year. The object is to discover the extent to which better fining and fine enforcement can increase revenues to the public purse and decrease expenditure on new jail construction.

No society can rest easy when some of those it imprisons are locked up only because no reliable provision has been made to punish or control them in a more appropriate way. Nor is it comforting that many who walk from the courtroom will be neither punished nor controlled by the sentences imposed on them. Public safety, economy and justice require that judges be provided with a full spectrum of enforceable sentences. Vera's research projects and demonstration programs are a start.

*The details of this research, and of the project's evolution, are reported in *Punishment Without Walls* (Rutgers University Press, 1986).

Corrections



(Left) At the end of their time behind bars, prisoners are released to the streets of New York City with \$2 for subway tokens. (They are given \$40, if they're released from state prisons.) It's not easy to stay straight without legitimate income. (Right) Vera's Neighborhood Work Project offers any recently released prisoner 75 days of work, with pay at the end of each working day. Here, NWP workers renovate an abandoned apartment for occupancy by a homeless family. NWP has renovated over 9,000 apartments for the homeless in the last eight years.

Every year, America sends more criminals to prison than the year before. We may lock them away, but we seldom throw away the key: almost every prisoner eventually gets released. They return in different emotional states—some seared and others bored, some bent on destruction and some not—but nearly all come back poor. Sprung from a New York prison, they have \$40 in their pockets, less than the price of a bus ticket to Times Square. Released from the city jail on Rikers Island, they get two bucks for subway fare and are bused to the high-crime neighborhoods they already know too well. They are free. Maybe they've been "corrected." But before the day is out, they have no cash, no job, no prospects, and only a prison record with which to try to gain entry to the labor force. It is seldom enough to begin building a straight life.

Too little attention has been paid to the threat to public safety that arises from the conditions into which ex-offenders are released. Perhaps this neglect results from the conventional wisdom which holds that, even after long stretches in prison, the criminal life irresistibly beckons ex-offenders with an alluring mix of hustles and easy marks. But, for several years now, a quarter of the 8,500 released to the city's streets from New York State prisons—over 2,000 inmates each year—have challenged this stereotype by seeking work at Vera's Neighborhood

Work Project. NWP has enough business to hire only half of them. It offers a low wage, paid at the end of each working day, for four months of hard labor. A fifty-fifty chance of getting a very demanding, short-term job may not sound like much of a draw, but the inmate grapevine continues to bring twice as many ex-cons to NWP's door as can get inside.

Like many of Vera's demonstration projects, NWP has its roots in research. In 1978, Vera staffers interviewed prisoners on Rikers Island as the first step in a long research effort to uncover the links between crime and employment. In the course of their discussions several prisoners reported that, upon release, they were heading for New Jersey where they could get paid, day by day, for unloading freight cars. They wanted to work and were prepared to seek it out, but they couldn't survive weeks of waiting for the first paycheck from a conventional employer—even if one were to offer a job. With that serendipitous finding in hand, Vera created NWP to provide short-term, low-skilled, day-labor jobs for any newly released prisoner who wanted one.

There were no funds to subsidize such an apparently quixotic venture, but a market niche quickly appeared: New York City, having seized hundreds of buildings abandoned by landlords, needed a low-cost, reliable work force to rehabilitate apartments scattered all over the city.

Vera used its computers to develop an efficient way to schedule and track this kind of work, and the city contracted with NWP to do it. Over the past eight years, as NWP has grown, it has renovated over 9,000 apartments for homeless families, and has expanded to provide labor to the Port Authority, the Public Development Corporation and the City Department of General Services. But each time Vera has succeeded in getting more business for NWP's work crews, the number of parolees seeking these jobs has also increased. The good news for crime control is that more than 10,000 have found work at NWP in the last eight years; the bad news is that 10,000 were turned away.

If an ex-con applies when an NWP opening exists, he or she is hired—no questions asked—and is assigned to one of the four-day shifts. The fifth day of each working week is left open to look for a permanent job. NWP work can be hard—draining heating oil from the basement in an abandoned building in the middle of July or rebuilding walls in a crumbling tenement. The rules are strict—no drink, drugs, fighting, or unexcused absences. But the pay is immediate. At the end of each day, workers receive checks for about \$23.50, which Vera arranges for them to cash at neighborhood stores.

NWP offers legitimate income for only a short time, but the transitional help may yield long-range benefits. Any laborer who can abide this regimen shows signs of the motivation and discipline needed to enter the straight world and stay there. In 1979, Vera set up a related project for NWP workers eager to move on. This Vocational Development Project offers a mix of job training, basic education and help in job placement. The secret of VDP's success—a job placement rate of about 70 percent—lies in its willingness to tailor programs to each individual's strengths and weaknesses. VDP was able to place over 300 ex-cons in good jobs last year by adhering to the principle that a client who is barely literate needs more than a course in word processing.

Vera's development of programs to ease the transition of prisoners back into society has led to a natural alliance with the State Division of Parole. Continually understaffed and oversubscribed, Parole has been making more and more use of NWP and VDP. In the spring of 1986, Vera and Parole formed a partnership to work together to expand the business base of NWP—and the number of parolees employed by it—and to restructure Parole's own system of employment services.

While both NWP and VDP provide jobs and legitimate income to people who need them, it remains to be determined what crime control benefits flow from finding labor market slots for recently released ex-cons—or for any other crime-prone group—and how most efficiently these crime control benefits can be realized. Vera's research department has been pursuing these issues ever since it conducted, at the Rikers Island jail, the interviews

that led to the creation of NWP. In a series of articles, monographs and books—some published by the National Institute of Justice, and one by Cornell University Press—Vera's economists, anthropologists and sociologists have dissected the complex interactions of crime opportunities, labor market opportunities, the criminal justice system and the myriad other influences on adolescents growing up in high-crime neighborhoods. The Institute's work in this field has become central to the recent flood of analyses and prescriptions from the right and from the left in the crime control debate. This, too, is good news, because crime control strategies that do not take advantage of the power of labor market forces to help shape behavior demand more of police and correctional agencies than they can deliver—and more than the public purse can bear.

Most of Vera's work in the corrections field can be labeled after-care, but the Institute has worked inside the prisons as well. In the mid-1970's, Vera staff helped draft and test the New York State system's first inmate rule book. The ambitious effort, aimed at reducing arbitrariness in prison discipline and the violence it can provoke, was grounded in the work of Vera-led task forces of wardens, guards, and inmates. Vera also designed an empirically sound, rational method for choosing which prisoners are to be sent to half-way houses and work release programs. This project transferred to the corrections field the techniques Vera had used to equip the Pretrial Services Agency to make objective bail recommendations—using computers and statistical models to help identify the best bets for release.

In 1986, Vera turned its attention to the problems presented by two special offender populations: the alcoholic and the mentally retarded. The criminogenic properties of liquor are well known: half of the inmates in New York State are alcohol abusers; more than half of the most feared violent crimes are committed under the influence of alcohol. Much less is known about how often the mentally retarded get caught up in the justice system and how their disabilities affect the way they are treated there. But anecdotal evidence is strong that the retarded are turning up in courts and jails more often than their numbers in the general population warrant—and much more often than the system can handle appropriately. Vera has been asked by city and state officials to help define and respond to the special problems these two groups present.

As several state prisons already run programs for alcoholic prisoners, the Institute is helping state, city and voluntary agencies to design and operate programmatic "bridges" to carry inmates from institutional treatment into stable, sober lives on the outside. There will be no such running start for Vera's work with mentally retarded offenders. Basic data-gathering will be the first step.

Going Beyond Crime

Vera has pursued its mission through precinct houses, holding pens, courtrooms, and prison cells. But even in the earliest days, it was clear that justice and injustice are not the exclusive province of the criminal justice system. And, because the problems confronting urban America defy subject-matter boundaries, Vera's action-research method kept bringing into focus new problems for which the Institute's approach seemed suited. An Institute that presumes to include Justice in its name, if it ventures into the streets as Vera does, cannot help but notice homeless people sleeping in the snow, or able-bodied adults branded "unemployable" and shut out of the labor market, or elderly and disabled people immobilized and trapped at home.

As early as 1967, when it pioneered medical detox in lieu of arrest for derelict alcoholics, Vera's mission was encompassing matters that lie beyond the justice system as it is conventionally understood. Action-research has led the Institute from one problem area to another ever since—from projects to reduce child abuse in the foster care system to architectural designs that have made homeless shelters more humane. Some of this work is sketched in the following pages.

Self-Sufficiency for the “Unemployable”



Rosa S. came to Vera's Job Path program after seven years in a sheltered workshop. Her I.Q. is 54. After training Rosa at several sites in the not-for-profit sector, Job Path counsellors placed her in an unsubsidized job at the Century Cafe on West 43rd Street. She has been off public assistance and self-sufficient for the last three years; she has been promoted and now earns \$175 a week.

Derrick Belfield is mentally retarded and has cerebral palsy. But for most of his life, the biggest handicap Belfield faced was the low opinion of his prospects that the world held out and he was forced to accept. Today, thanks to his own formidable determination and Vera's Job Path program, Belfield has a real job, pays union dues and, he's proud to add, pays state, local and federal taxes. Working as a porter at the main Bloomingdale's department store, Belfield is contributing to a society that once was content to lock him away. In the process, he has achieved a status that anyone, disabled or not, would be proud to claim: Derrick Belfield is living up to his potential.

Belfield's trek began in a notorious state school for the retarded called Willowbrook. Doctors sent Belfield there for "long term care" in a bucolic setting. What he got was an overcrowded and understaffed institution, where residents often stayed for long terms but could expect very little in the way of care. By the early 1970s, Willowbrook was under attack on several fronts. Crusading journalists indicted the institution with a series of unforgettable reports. "I can tell you what it looked like and what it sounded like," commented one, "but how can I tell you what it smelled like?" Less theatrically, some dedicated lawyers and social workers decided to make Willowbrook the focus of an effort to "deinstitutionalize" retarded people and transfer them to smaller, more manageable, group homes. To settle the resulting federal lawsuit, state officials established a more appropriate network of residences and services and began releasing Willowbrook's patients. Having kept Belfield at Willowbrook for seven years, the state sent him to live with foster parents.

For Belfield, life was better but his prospects were miserable—a lifetime of welfare and child-like dependency on others. Like most retarded individuals living outside of institutions, he could look forward to spending his days in a "sheltered workshop." These protected labor markets were a great advance in their day, and they still serve a vital function for many disabled groups. They provide daily activity and some sense of pride for people who cannot make it in the competitive labor market. But for most of them, "sheltered workshop" usually means repetitive, low-skill tasks—sorting buttons into glassine bags for less than minimum wage, and the like. Once placed in a workshop job, few retarded people move on; in 1978, for instance, more than 6,000 individuals were in sheltered workshops in New York, but only thirty-two graduated to real, competitive jobs.

Officials of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, the agency charged with implementing the Willowbrook settlement, worried that many of the individuals they had deinstitutionalized were still destined for lives more sheltered and dependent than was necessary. This did not seem to them to be just, nor did it make economic sense. They brought their concerns to Vera, where the problem had a familiar structure. In the early 1970s, Vera had piloted "supported work," a mix of

job training and management techniques for getting hard-to-employ groups into the competitive labor market and keeping them there. The Wildcat Service Corporation, a Vera spin-off, had demonstrated on a massive scale that many who are viewed as intractably “unemployable” can get off the dole and live economically productive lives.

Wildcat, financed in part by the welfare dollars that would otherwise have done no more than maintain its workers in idleness, was shown by Vera’s controlled research to be a net economic gain to the taxpayer. Investing welfare dollars and other funds in a period of transitional work experience and training created new taxpayers out of long-term welfare recipients*. This first supported work project inspired formal replication in fourteen other jurisdictions, selected for a national demonstration by the federal government and the Ford Foundation. By 1986, Wildcat alone had taken almost 2,000 welfare-dependent New Yorkers through its program.

Vera’s supported work techniques—real jobs, gradually increased demands for productivity, sensitive management, and peer support—had been successful, to varying degrees, for ex-addicts, alcoholics, ex-offenders and welfare mothers. Why not for some of the mentally retarded stuck in sheltered workshops?

In 1978, Vera launched Job Path—a new supported work pilot. Derrick Belfield came to Job Path after two years in a sheltered workshop. His Job Path training counselor assigned Derrick to a job as a porter at St. Barnabas Hospital in the Bronx, and visited him twice each week to review his progress and ease his adjustment. Belfield, like the others in the program, needed a great deal of help at the beginning of his first real job. His particular problem was that, after a lifetime of segregation with other mentally disabled people, Belfield didn’t know how to relate to strangers and did not possess the social skills required in an unsheltered setting. Unintentionally, he would startle people by speaking too loudly; so the counselor taught him to lower his voice and relax his manner. He couldn’t understand the details of the job demanded of him; so, clad in jeans and a work shirt, the Job Path counselor worked alongside Belfield, showing him how to swab a floor without missing hard-to-reach corners and crevices.

The counselor also worked with Belfield’s boss at St. Barnabas. Job Path asks the supervisors at training sites to treat trainees pretty much like other workers—it’s the best way for them to learn about real work. But these trainees are not just like other workers, and sometimes the supervisors need help too. In Belfield’s case, his boss was stymied when Derrick didn’t understand an order to “take care of the fourth floor.” So the counselor showed him that Belfield could respond to specific instructions—“go

scrub the fourth floor”—but not to genial colloquialisms.

After six months at St. Barnabas, Belfield was ready to interview for a permanent job. Bloomingdale’s hired him as a porter. As is Job Path’s practice whenever a trainee lands his first competitive, unsubsidized job, project staff kept a keen eye on Belfield and supported him through the crucial period just after hire. It wasn’t long before he needed help. Derrick kept reporting late for his 5 A.M. shift. The problem: at that hour, few subways were running. The solution: his counselor got a subway schedule, determined which train would get him work on time, and then (the easy part) made sure Belfield didn’t miss it. Before long, Job Path could withdraw the supports. Three years later, Belfield has an excellent work record. The fringe benefits that come with his job have replaced the welfare and Medicaid payments that came out of the public purse when Belfield was in the sheltered workshop. And last May he was chosen Bloomingdale’s employee of the month.

Belfield’s success is not unusual. Job Path enrolls about 100 mentally retarded individuals each year now, and consistently places 70 percent in permanent unsubsidized jobs; about three-fourths of them keep those positions at least one year. Clients who do not make it are counselled back into more sheltered settings. After eight years, more than 500 Job Path graduates can be found in clerical, messenger and custodial slots at major law firms, banks and corporations.

Job Path’s future—both as a service provider in New York City and as a model for reform and replication efforts elsewhere—is clear. New York’s Private Industry Council this year funded eleven agencies, including the City Board of Education, to create Job Path programs for individuals who are mentally ill or physically disabled as well as for those who are mentally retarded, and Job Path is providing technical assistance to them all. New York State has started similar efforts in Rochester and Yonkers, and Vera has provided extensive start-up assistance there too. Job Path itself has adapted its supported work techniques to the different needs of other disabled groups, running pilot projects for the autistic, the deaf, the blind and the visually impaired.

Perhaps most important, the Job Path model is being adopted on a national scale. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has declared Job Path an “island of excellence” and federal regulations have been amended to create financial incentives for states to start supported work programs for retarded and other “developmentally disabled” people. Forty-seven states recently submitted plans to shift the emphasis of their programs away from sheltered workshops and toward supported work. As a demonstration project, Job Path has proved to be a powerful stimulus to change. A lot of Derrick Belfields will be paying their own way in the future—and will be proud of it.

**The Wildcat Experiment: An Early Test of Supported Work* (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1978).

Housing for the Homeless and Mobility for the Homebound


Most urban dwellers have some sense of the pressures bearing down on the housing market and on mass transportation systems. Most New Yorkers endure the burdens with characteristic sangfroid: they rail against rent-controlled apartments, but fervently hope to find one; they complain about delay of an A train, then rue its over-heated arrival. For two groups, however, the most basic problems have proved insurmountable. For some, it's finding any place to live; for others, it's finding any way to get around the city. Every night, more than 22,000 individuals are provided temporary shelter in New York City; there is no reliable count of those sleeping on the streets, on subway gratings and in doorways. A quite different set of forces traps thousands of disabled and elderly individuals in isolated apartments, keeping them from going to the store, to the doctor and to visit relatives or friends—even though New York possesses the nation's largest mass transit system.

Vera projects are attacking these problems too. Vera has stepped in as real estate developer, in a series of

demonstration projects, to assemble the financing and to oversee the construction and management of permanent housing for the homeless—housing that can be maintained at welfare-level rents. And Vera operates a demonstration paratransit system, serving the transportation needs of 10,000 homebound New Yorkers.

Vera began the paratransit company, called Easyride, in 1976. Federal law required cities to start making mass transit systems accessible to the handicapped, and advocates for the disabled and elderly were demanding that it be done. But putting elevators in subway stations and wheelchair lifts on busses was going to be hugely expensive, and a substantial body of opinion held that few of the homebound disabled and elderly could get to subway and bus stops.

Easyride was launched to test a cheaper, simpler idea: through a system of advance reservations and radio dispatching, specially designed vans would pick passengers up at their apartments, deliver them wherever they wanted to go, and return them at the appointed time. Simple though the concept was, it took nearly six years for



A homeless woman darns her sock in Penn Station at midnight.

the Vera pilot project to cut through a knot of conflicting regulations, abutting payment plans, and competing political pressures, to build a properly functioning transportation system for this population.

Now, Easyride operates throughout the West Side and the Lower East Side of Manhattan. With a sophisticated computer program helping staff to plot trips for efficient use of Easyride's fleet, and with mobile radios to add last-minute pick-ups and returns to the drivers' runs, Easyride provides about 90,000 trips a year at a cost of just over \$10 a trip. It enables the frail elderly to escape cruel isolation and dependency, it makes employment possible for the disabled, and it does so at a cost the city can afford. In 1984, at the urging of the Mayor, the New York State Legislature mandated the extension of paratransit services to the rest of New York City and set aside a portion of the annual transportation budget to support it. The plan is scheduled to go into effect in 1987.

Vera's efforts to help alleviate the crisis of homelessness are at a much earlier stage. And the problem is a daunting one. Over the last ten years, New York City

has lost 114,000 lower-priced housing units from its stock of "single room occupancy" hotels. Some have been converted by developers of higher-priced housing, and some have been abandoned. Fortunes have been made, but the dislocation of the poor has been and continues to be devastating. New York's homeless population really began to surge in the late 1970s. By then, Vera was already working with city officials to improve the conditions and referral systems at public shelters—a logical extension of the work begun when Vera created the Manhattan Bowery Project in the 1960s. But improving the temporary shelter services provided to homeless people does not keep their numbers from rising. By the early 1980s, Vera staff became convinced of New York's need for programs that would preserve some of the housing stock as permanent housing for the city's poorest residents.

The Institute had little direct experience in this field, but neither had it known all the answers when it embarked on earlier pilot projects. And Vera did have some relevant knowledge: through its Neighborhood Work Project, Vera has been supervising workers in the



(Left) In the years before Easyride, Florence Lesny was able to get out only once a week—to see her counselor. Now she commutes every day to a volunteer job, and goes on group trips to theatres and museums with others of Easyride's 10,000 disabled and frail elderly registrants. *(Right)* The White House, February 17, 1983. President Ronald Reagan and Ronay Menschel, Mayoral Advisor on Transportation, announce a White House/City Hall/Vera project called Ride-to-Work. An Easyride spin off, Ride-to-Work matches New Yorkers who drive to work with disabled neighbors who have similar commuting patterns.

renovation of apartments in buildings abandoned by their owners and seized by the city. Other Vera projects gave staff the experience to handle particular problems presented by many of the subgroups within the homeless population—the elderly, the mentally impaired, the ex-offender recently released from confinement, the recovering drug addict or alcoholic, and foster children for whom the state's provision ends at age eighteen.

Over the last four years, Vera has built a low-income housing development unit, to provide not-for-profit groups with the kind of expertise that for-profit real estate developers bring to the conversion of properties to "higher" economic uses. Law firms, developers, general contractors and investment banking firms have helped tutor the Vera staff. Now the Vera housing unit is the developer in ten projects around the city. Sometimes the client is a local community group trying to create housing that will save from homelessness elderly neighbors whose current homes are being converted to condominiums or have been abandoned by the landlords. Sometimes the client is a not-for-profit agency mandated to care for a

special subgroup of the homeless population.

New York City has two major resources for development of low-income housing: land and money. The city now owns thousands of vacant buildings which could be rehabilitated for occupancy by the homeless. And New York State and New York City have appropriated over \$4 billion for the creation of housing units for low and moderate income households. What is missing is an efficient mechanism to cut through the red tape, to combine public and private funds imaginatively, to negotiate the bureaucratic maze and to get the housing built. That's what real estate developers do well—it is not what government or non-profit agencies have done yet.

Vera's Housing Project is in its early days. It may or may not play a major part in the solution of New York City's homeless crisis. But, as some of the buildings now under development open for occupancy as scheduled, in 1987, Vera will spin off its housing unit into a non-profit corporation, separately funded to help agencies all over the city develop permanent housing for the homeless without going broke themselves.

Wider Impact

Vera is an intensely local agency, but it aims to have national impact. Solutions to the practical problems and policy dilemmas confronting New York City have a wide, eager audience. This is because human nature—from which the problems flow and from which the solutions must arise—is pretty much the same, no matter what the administrative, legal and economic context. Cities everywhere, in this country and abroad, suffer similar burdens and face similar constraints.

Vera was drawn into the larger arena as soon as the first research results of the Manhattan Bail Project were published. The elements of that story, sketched in the "Beginnings" chapter of this report, have been repeated at every stage of Vera's development. The Manhattan Bowery Project inspired national reform in the handling of public drunkenness. The Court Employment Project sparked pretrial diversion programs across the country, and its redesign in the late 1970s inspired efforts elsewhere to develop similar post-conviction supervision programs. The Wildcat Services Corporation led to formal, federally-funded replications in fourteen other cities and to a host of additional state initiatives. The Victim Service Agency is the flagship of the victims' movement and a continuing source of research to move it forward. The Community Service Sentencing Project is being emulated elsewhere. Job Path has provoked a shift in the treatment of mentally retarded people across the country. And many of the innovative procedures developed jointly by the New York City Police Department and Vera have become standard operating procedures in major departments.

Vera serves its wider audience in various ways. Sometimes, officials and non-profit agency staff from other jurisdictions come to New York to work alongside Vera staff. Their purpose is to take back the analytic tools and practical lessons that characterize Vera's action-research approach to problem solving and program development. Sometimes, other cities ask Vera to send technical assistance staff to work there for substantial periods, as the nucleus of a program development team. Over the years, this practice helped create the Hartford Institute of Justice, the Cincinnati Institute of Justice, Vera's own London Office and the Association de Politique Criminelle Appliquee et de Reinsertion Sociale in Paris. Providing technical assistance this way returns to Vera's

New York staff a steady stream of program ideas and research reports from jurisdictions where similar problems are being attacked differently.

The demand for technical assistance in a particular field is sometimes strong enough for Vera to help set up a national agency to handle it. For technical assistance on bail, pretrial diversion and jail overcrowding, Vera first helped establish the New York State Association of Pretrial Services Agencies; a few years later Vera joined others in creating a National Pretrial Services Resource Center in Washington, D.C. To carry out the national supported work demonstration, the Ford Foundation, Vera and several federal agencies created a Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation; its early staff was leavened with Vera personnel. (MDRC more recently conducted a multi-site test of the techniques Vera has developed in Job Path to get some of the mentally retarded out of sheltered workshops and into the competitive labor market.)

This year, Vera helped set up a national Prosecuting Attorneys Research Council. PARC's mission is to bring together, from all regions of the country, metropolitan prosecutors who want to apply action-research techniques to the issues confronting them in criminal justice policy and in the efficient administration of their offices. A dozen DAs are already involved in the council's evolving agenda, and pilot projects are at the planning stage in Detroit, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Des Moines. PARC meetings are scheduled with interested DAs on the East and West coasts later in the year.

Most of the time, Vera's own publications and the books and articles published by its staff are the vehicles by which the lessons learned in New York get into the nation's store of useful knowledge.

Over the last twenty-five years, Vera has moved from testing an unconventional idea about bail to testing a score or more ideas at any given time and exerting some useful force on the formation of public policy in this country and abroad. It has retained the advantages of being relatively small, mounting a rather low profile, and preserving flexibility in its agenda and its approach to problems. That other jurisdictions have adopted the program and research techniques pioneered by Vera in New York is the highest accolade: if Vera didn't exist, someone would have to create it.

SOME OF THE JURISDICTIONS WHICH HAVE REPLICATED VERA PROJECTS

Adams County, Colorado
 Aitkin County, Minnesota
 Alameda County, California
 Albany, California
 Albuquerque, New Mexico
 Allamakee County, Iowa
 Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
 Allen County, Indiana
 Anchorage, Alaska
 Arapahoe County, Colorado
 Atlanta, Georgia
 Atlantic City, New Jersey
 Austin, Texas
 Bakersfield, California
 Baltimore, Maryland
 Baton Rouge, Louisiana
 Benton County, Iowa
 Berkeley, California
 Bernalillo County, New Mexico
 Berrien County, Michigan
 Binghamton, New York
 Black Hawk County, Iowa
 Bobigny, France
 Bristol, England
 Broward County, Florida
 Buchanan County, Iowa
 Chester, Pennsylvania
 Chicago, Illinois
 Cincinnati, Ohio
 Clark County, Nevada
 Clayton County, Iowa
 Cobb County, Georgia
 Cochise County, Arizona
 Columbia, South Carolina
 Contra Costa County, California
 Cowlitz County, Washington
 Creteil, France
 Cumberland County, Maine
 Dade County, Florida
 Dallas, Texas
 Dauphin County, Pennsylvania
 Davis County, Utah
 Dayton, Ohio
 Denver, Colorado
 Detroit, Michigan
 Devon, England
 Douglas County, Nebraska
 Douglas County, Oregon
 Durham County, North Carolina
 El Paso, Texas
 Elkhart County, Indiana
 Erie County, New York
 Fairfax County, Virginia
 Fayette County, Iowa
 Fond du Lac, Wisconsin
 Gary, Indiana
 Genesee County, Michigan
 Genesee County, New York
 Grand Rapids, Michigan
 Greenville, South Carolina
 Grundy County, Iowa
 Guilford County, North Carolina
 Hartford, Connecticut
 Hennepin County, Minnesota
 Houston, Texas
 Howard County, Iowa
 Ingham County, Michigan
 Iowa County, Iowa
 Jackson County, Missouri
 Jackson County, Oregon
 Jefferson County, Kansas
 Jefferson County, Texas
 Jersey City, New Jersey
 Juneau, Alaska
 Kalamazoo, Michigan
 Kane County, Illinois
 Kent County, Michigan
 Kodiak, Alaska
 Koochiching County, Minnesota
 La Salle County, Illinois
 Lake County, Indiana
 Larimer County, Colorado
 Lehigh County, Pennsylvania
 Liberty City, Florida
 Licking County, Ohio
 Lincoln County, Oregon
 London, England
 Los Angeles, California
 Lucas County, Ohio
 Maricopa County, Arizona
 Marion County, Indiana
 Memphis County, Tennessee
 Mercer County, New York
 Milwaukee, Wisconsin
 Mobile, Alabama
 Monroe County, New York
 Moore County, North Carolina
 Morgan County, Utah
 Morris County, New Jersey
 Multnomah County, Oregon
 Munich, Germany
 Nashville, Tennessee
 Oklahoma County, Oklahoma
 Omaha County, Nebraska
 Orange County, Florida
 Oswego County, New York
 Paris, France
 Passaic County, New Jersey
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
 Pima County, Arizona
 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
 Polk County, Florida
 Prince Georges County, Maryland
 Richmond County, North Carolina
 Riverside County, California
 Rock Island County, Illinois
 Sacramento County, California
 St. Louis County, Missouri
 St. Paul, Minnesota
 Salt Lake City, Utah
 San Bernadino, California
 San Francisco, California
 San Mateo County, California
 Santa Clara, California
 Santa Cruz, California
 Santa Fe, New Mexico
 Schenectady, New York
 Scott County, Iowa
 Seattle, Washington
 Shelby County, Tennessee
 Snohomish County, Washington
 Spartanburg, South Carolina
 Spokane, Washington
 Stark County, Ohio
 Sydney, Australia
 Tama County, Iowa
 Tazewell County, Illinois
 Teller County, Colorado
 Tempe, Arizona
 Topeka, Kansas
 Tuscon, Arizona
 Union County, New Jersey
 Vanderburgh County, Indiana
 Ventura County, California
 Wake County, North Carolina
 Washington, D.C.
 Wayne County, Michigan
 Weber County, Utah
 Wilmington, Delaware
 Winnebago, Wisconsin
 Winneshiek County, Iowa
 Yellowstone County, Montana
 Yonkers, New York

SOME OF THE JURISDICTIONS TO WHICH VERA HAS PROVIDED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Albany, Georgia
Alberta, Canada
Anaheim, California
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Baltimore County, Maryland
Bath, England
Beaver County, Pennsylvania
Beijing, China
Berlin, Germany
Birmingham, Alabama
Birmingham, England
Bismarck, North Dakota
Blackfoot, Idaho
Bloomfield, Connecticut
Bombay, India
Bonn, Germany
Boston, Massachusetts
Boulder, Colorado
Bradenton, Florida
Bristol County, Massachusetts
Burnaby, Canada
Cairo, Egypt
Caledonia County, Vermont
Camden, New Jersey
Champaign, Illinois
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Charleston, South Carolina
Charleston, West Virginia
Charlotte, North Carolina
Charlottesville, Virginia
Clayton, Missouri
Clearwater, Florida
Cleveland, Ohio
Columbus, Ohio
Concord, New Hampshire
Cook County, Illinois
Crown Point, Indiana
Danbury, Connecticut
Davenport, Iowa
Denver, Colorado
Derby, Connecticut
Des Moines, Iowa
Doylestown, Pennsylvania
Dutchess County, New York
East Greenwich, Rhode Island
Essex County, New Jersey
Eugene, Oregon
Fairfield County, Connecticut
Fall River, Massachusetts
Frankfort, Kentucky
Frankfurt, Germany
Gloucester, England
Gujarat, India
Hackensack, New Jersey
Hamburg, Germany
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
Hillsboro, Texas
Honolulu, Hawaii
Indianapolis, Indiana
Jackson, Mississippi
Jefferson City, Missouri
Jefferson County, Colorado
Jerusalem, Israel
Kahoka, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Lafayette, Louisiana
Lagos, Nigeria
Lansing, Michigan
Laramie, Wyoming
Las Vegas, Nevada
Lincoln Parish, Louisiana
Little Rock, Arkansas
Madison, Wisconsin
Madison County, New York
Madisonville, Kentucky
Marin County, California
Martinez, California
Memphis, Tennessee
Miami, Florida
Mineola, New York
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Montgomery, Alabama
Montreal, Canada
Nassau County, New York
New Braunfels, Texas
New Haven, Connecticut
New Orleans, Louisiana
Newark, New Jersey
Newport News, Virginia
Norfolk, Virginia
Oakland, California
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Onondaga County, New York
Orange County, New York
Orlando, Florida
Oslo, Norway
Paducah, Kentucky
Palo Alto, California
Paterson, New Jersey
Phoenix, Arizona
Portland, Maine
Portland, Oregon
Princeton, New Jersey
Providence, Rhode Island
Reno, Nevada
Richmond, Virginia
Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
Robeson County, North Carolina
Rochester, New York
Rockville, Maryland
Saarbrücken, Germany
Sacramento, California
St. Paul, Minnesota
San Jose, California
Santa Barbara, California
Sao Paulo, Brazil
Sinking Spring, Pennsylvania
Sioux Falls, South Dakota
South Bend, Indiana
Springfield, Illinois
Stockholm, Sweden
Stockton, California
Suffolk County, New York
Sullivan County, New York
Sunnyvale, California
Syracuse, New York
Tacoma, Washington
Tallahassee, Florida
Tel Aviv, Israel
Toledo, Ohio
Topeka, Kansas
Toronto, Canada
Trenton, New Jersey
Troy, Ohio
Tulsa, Oklahoma
Tuskegee, Alabama
Ulster County, New York
Vancouver, Canada
Virgin Islands
Warsaw, Poland
West Jordan, Utah
Westchester County, New York
Wichita, Kansas
Will County, Illinois

SOME SOURCES OF VERA GRANTS AND CONTRACTS (1961-1986)

American Express Foundation
American International Group
American Red Cross
Bankers Trust
Barker Welfare Foundation
Blue Cross
Brooklyn Union Gas Company
Florence V. Burden Foundation
Charles E. Culpeper Foundation
Chase Manhattan Bank
Citibank
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation
Cleveland Foundation
Con Edison
Field Foundation
Ford Foundation
France, Ministry of Justice
Gannett Foundation
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Grace Foundation
W.T. Grant Foundation
Greater New York Fund
Harlem Urban Development Corporation
William Randolph Hearst Foundation
Hofheimer Foundation
Hunts Alternative Fund
Inner London Probation & After Care Service
Institute for Child Development
Iowa Department of Social Services
I.B.M.
J.M. Foundation
Law Foundation of New South Wales
Levi Strauss Foundation
Joe & Emily Lowe Foundation
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
Mobil Foundation
Ambrose Monell Foundation
Henry & Lucy Moses Fund
National Broadcasting Company
National Center for State Courts
National Endowment for the Arts
National Institute on Alcoholism & Alcohol Abuse
National Institute of Justice
National Institute on Drug Abuse
New York Community Trust
New York Telephone Company
New York University Community Fund
Henry Nias Foundation
N.Y. & N.J. Port Authority
N.Y.C. Community Board No. 2
N.Y.C. Criminal Justice Coordinating Council
N.Y.C. Department for the Aging
N.Y.C. Department of City Planning
N.Y.C. Department of Employment
N.Y.C. Department of General Services
N.Y.C. Department of Housing Preservation & Development
N.Y.C. Department of Juvenile Justice
N.Y.C. Department of Mental Health
N.Y.C. Department of Transportation
N.Y.C. Human Resources Administration
N.Y.C. Office of Management and Budget
N.Y.C. Office of the Coordinator of Criminal Justice
N.Y.C. Parks Department
N.Y.C. Police Department
N.Y.C. Private Industry Council
N.Y.C. Public Development Corporation
N.Y.S. Commission for the Blind & Visually Handicapped
N.Y.S. Department of Correctional Services
N.Y.S. Department of Education
N.Y.S. Department of Social Services
N.Y.S. Department of Transportation
N.Y.S. Division of Criminal Justice Services
N.Y.S. Division of Housing & Community Renewal
N.Y.S. Division of Parole
N.Y.S. Division of Probation and Correctional Alternatives
N.Y.S. Office of Court Administration
N.Y.S. Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities
N.Y.S. Office of Vocational Rehabilitation
Pfizer Foundation
Pisces Foundation
Pro Bono Publico Foundation
Rockefeller Foundation
Helena Rubinstein Foundation
St. James Church
Scherman Foundation
Society for the Prevention of Crime
South Bronx Development Office
Starr Foundation
Surdna Foundation
Tri-State Regional Planning Commission
Michael Tuch Foundation
United Jewish Council
U.S. Department of Education
U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Labor
U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
U.S. Trust Company of New York
U.S. Urban Mass Transportation Administration
William & Helen Vanderbilt Foundation
West Side Chamber of Commerce
West Side Inter-Agency Council for the Aging
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Robert & Marilyn Wilson Foundation
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BY ORDER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

Chris E. Newring

PRESIDENT

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urban life and to fostering
efficiency, accountability and
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Vera works with government
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