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INTERIM REPORT PURSUANT TO CONTRACT #62914  
BETWEEN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT/  
MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL AND  
THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

MARCH 1, 1975 - JANUARY 31, 1976

Vera Institute of Justice  
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## INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the activities of the Vera Institute of Justice from March 1, 1975 to January 31, 1976, and is submitted in fulfillment of the reporting requirements of the New York City Police Department/Criminal Justice Coordinating Council Contract which ran from December 1, 1973 through November 30, 1975, and was extended through January 31, 1976.

Although most of Vera's programs received direct funding from sources other than the CJCC, virtually all have benefitted from CJCC's support. Contract funds are used for planning and developing projects for the New York City criminal justice system. These funds provide support for the Vera staff who supervise the projects and for the planners at the projects who suggest improvements and new directions.

Funds have been used in direct support of the Police Liaison Office, Pre-Trial Services, Victim/Witness Assistance Project, Appearance Control Unit, Early Case Assessment Bureaus, Felony Disposition Study, Women on Patrol Study, and Supported Work for Ex-Addicts and Ex-Offenders. The contract has also supported planning staff for the Manhattan Bowery Project, Inmate Rule Book, Court Employment Research, Temporary Release, Proposals for Diverting the Mentally Ill and Parole Violators, and Job Creation.

PART I - PROMOTING EFFICIENCY AND  
FAIRNESS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Since the time of the Manhattan Bail Project, Vera has tried to make the criminal justice system do what it was supposed to do, more efficiently and more fairly. In that project, the goal was to have judges require money bail only when it was needed to assure a defendant's appearance in court, and to release on their own recognizance defendants who were likely to appear in court even though they had not been required to post bail. The project was designed to reduce the unfairness of a money bail system for poor defendants and to reduce the costs to both taxpayers and defendants of pre-trial detention.

The Vera projects described in this section have similar goals: providing information, increasing consistency in decision-making and speed in case handling, and decreasing time wasted for those involved with the system.

A. VERA/POLICE LIAISON OFFICE

A Police Liaison Office has operated at Vera since April, 1966. It became a sub-unit of the Police Department's Criminal Justice Bureau in July, 1971 when the Bureau was established as a result, in part, of joint Vera-Police activities.

The responsibilities of the Liaison Office include providing opportunities for police to assist in the design of projects that relate to law enforcement and facilitate project procedures involving police operations.

This year, Vera/Police Liaison activities included:

1) Victim/Witness Assistance Project. The Liaison Office participated and continues to participate in the planning and operation of this project. The Office prepared all necessary Police Department orders, including those outlining procedures for requesting the Repair Team's assistance. The Office has also assisted in making a training film about the project for police officers in Brooklyn.

2) Manhattan Bowery Project. The Office continues to supervise the activity of the police officers assigned to rescue patrol. During 1975, 8,868 destitute or injured alcoholics were removed from the streets of the Bowery and brought to the project. This total represents a 20% increase over the 1974 rescues and was achieved despite a reduction in manpower. The project was also expanded to include two additional precincts in Manhattan.

3) Pre-Trial Services Agency: The Office prepared Police Department orders expanding PTSA to the Borough of

Manhattan. Procedures were also revised so that PTSA personnel are now permitted to interview defendants who are held in police detention facilities prior to arraignment. This practice facilitates the arraignment process and reduces the time police officers must spend in court.

4) Returnable Date Schedules: The Liaison Office prepares these schedules for the Police Department so that officers issuing summonses for moving violations can select a predetermined returnable date for appearances at the Department of Motor Vehicles, Administrative Adjudication Bureau. The use of these schedules minimizes the number of appearances a police officer must make during the year and reduces the need for overtime.

B. PRE-TRIAL SERVICES AGENCY

In the early 1970s New York City faced a detention crisis. Pre-trial detention centers were overcrowded. The Tombs, which housed most City prisoners awaiting trial, needed replacing. The number of defendants incarcerated before trial continued to rise. At the same time, there was a sense among those working in the system that many more defendants could safely be released while awaiting trial.

The CJCC decided in 1973 that an independent agency might make the pre-trial process work better. Because of Vera's demonstrated experience in this area, it was asked by Richard J. Bartlett, Chairman of the New York State Crime Control Board, to set up and run such an agency.

The Pre-Trial Services Agency (PTSA) began operations in Brooklyn in June, 1973 and expanded to Staten Island in June, 1974; to the Bronx in December, 1974; and to Manhattan in March, 1976.

PTSA was established to achieve three basic goals:

1. To decrease the number of days spent in detention by defendants who could be safely released to the community while awaiting trial.
2. To reduce the rate of non-appearances in court by defendants released from detention and awaiting trial.
3. To develop a city-wide pre-trial services agency providing a variety of services to the public, criminal justice agencies and defendants and enabling the pre-trial process to operate with greater efficiency and fairness.

To achieve these goals, PTSA interviews all arrested persons who are being detained pending arraignment. The

interviewer obtains information helpful in measuring the defendant's ties to the community. Simultaneously, he obtains names and addresses of people who can help verify this information and who can help keep in contact with the defendant, should he be released by the court.

The interviewer then attempts to verify the information about community ties. Depending upon the strength of those ties as reported by the defendant, the results of the verification efforts, and the defendant's history of felony convictions, the interviewer arrives at one of seven designations for the Interview Report. The PTSA designation or "recommendation" is an attempt to predict the likelihood of a given defendant's making scheduled court appearances by looking at the attendance records of previously interviewed defendants whose community ties and felony-conviction records resembled his.

The Interview Report is provided to the judge at arraignment. He then decides whether to release on recognizance, require bail, or deny bail. In reaching his decision about the risk of absconding -- and thus the need for bail -- he considers not only the PTSA report but also the seriousness of the charge and the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the sentence which may be imposed upon conviction, and any arrest history or previous record of failing to appear in court or fleeing prosecution (factors which PTSA does not consider in making its recommendation).

If a "recommended" defendant (verifies community ties, no warrant outstanding or current charge of bail jumping) or a

"qualified" one (unverified but adequate ties, no warrant or current charge of bail jumping) is not released on his own recognizance at arraignment, PTSA attempts to secure his release through written re-argument or through arrangement of release to a third party (relative or friend) or community agency. All defendants who are released are notified by mail of the date for their court appearance. If they do not respond as requested by the notification letter, they are called; if they cannot be reached by phone, they are visited.

From June 3, 1974 to November 30, 1975 (the cut-off date for all information which follows unless otherwise noted), Brooklyn PTSA interviewed 46,604 defendants. The Staten Island office, which opened one week later, interviewed 2,012 defendants; the Bronx office, which opened December 1, 1974, interviewed 27,116 defendants. Twenty-two percent of the total of 75,732 defendants interviewed had their cases disposed of at arraignment by either a guilty plea or dismissal.

In Brooklyn and the Bronx, a total of 1,694 Written Re-Argument letters had been sent to the court. As of September 28, 1975, ROR was granted or bail was lowered in 636 cases. In the same two boroughs, also through September, 1975, 168 defendants were released under the Third Party Release Program. Supervised Release presentations were made for 566 defendants, of whom 369 gained release.

PTSA attempts to insure defendants' appearances in court in two ways: by recommending release selectively and by thorough notification.

During the eighteen-months period studied, 47% of all defendants facing arraignment (but not pleading guilty or having their cases dismissed) were "recommended" for release. An additional 17% were found "qualified."

In every borough, the release rate was highest for PTSA "recommended" defendants and next highest for those whom PTSA found "qualified." Rates for each of these categories were higher than the borough's overall release rate. This suggests that judges were using PTSA reports, or the factors underlying those reports (community ties and felony record), as a basis for reaching bail decisions.

The goal of PTSA is, of course, not simply to influence judges' decisions but to help make those decisions the "right" ones. A bail decision is "right" if it uses the minimum coercion (incarceration, release on bail, ROR) necessary to get the defendant to appear in court. A decision is clearly wrong if the defendant fails to appear.

From PTSA's viewpoint, it makes the "right" decision every time it recommends ROR for a defendant who subsequently appears. It makes the wrong decision when it recommends ROR for a defendant who subsequently fails to appear. In order to measure its own success -- its ability to predict who will appear even though not required to post bail -- PTSA calculates a Failure to Appear (FTA) rate. Since some defendants miss court dates due to misunderstanding or conflicting commitments, or intentionally fail to appear but then can be persuaded to come to court, PTSA calculates both an "aggregate" FTA rate (based on total number of appearances missed by ROR'd defendants) and a "willful" FTA rate

(based on the number of defendants who fail to return to court within 31 days of the missed appearance). In both Brooklyn and the Bronx, the lowest aggregate and willful FTA rate was for "recommended" defendants, whether released at arraignment or post-arraignment. The next lowest rate was for "qualified" defendants.\* (Staten Island, with many fewer cases and many fewer scheduled appearances followed this pattern on aggregate rates but had identical willful rates of 1.8% for "recommended" and "qualified" defendants. It still indicated much higher FTA rates -- aggregate or willful -- for non-recommended defendants.) Those ROR'd post-arraignment failed to appear at a rate the same as, or lower than, those released at arraignment.

In every borough, FTA rates for "recommended" defendants were lower than the average borough FTA rate. Surprisingly, in both Brooklyn and the Bronx, among those defendants whom judges ROR'd the aggregate and willful rates increased with decreasing charge severity; i.e., a person arrested for a minor crime was more likely to miss a court appearance than a person arrested for a more serious crime. From these two facts--namely, the fact that non-approved candidates for ROR fail to appear more often than "recommended" candidates, and the fact that a more serious charge within the ROR'd population does not indicate great likelihood of non-appearance -- two conclusions should be drawn. First, the PTSA method (based on verifying community ties and criminal record) of predicting risks

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\* For defendants ROR'd at arraignment in Brooklyn, for example the average aggregate rate was 8.3%. For recommended defendants it was 5.8%, for qualified candidates it was 11.5%, and for candidates given no recommendation it was 14.6%. The comparable willful rates were 4.1% (average), 2.4% (recommended), 6.2% (qualified), and 8.9% (no recommendation).

of non-appearance is better than no method (or whatever method is used by judges who grant ROR to non-approved defendants). Second, for those defendants whose crimes are not so serious as to preclude a judge's decision for ROR, the PTSA method is better than a method based primarily or solely on severity of the charge.

For defendants released under conditions of third party release or supervised release, the FTA rates -- both aggregate and willful -- were lower in Brooklyn than the FTA RATES for defendants simply released on their own recognizance. The Bronx sample is too small to permit reliable calculation of statistics.

By the end of 1975, the detention crises which had led to the creation of PTSA had dramatically worsened. Three detention facilities had been closed because the city could not afford to operate them or to upgrade them as a federal judge had ordered. Consequently, the number of available cells had dropped from 9,766 in October 1974 to 7,464 one year later -- a drop of 24% -- while the pre-trial detention population had remained fairly constant at about 7,100. Since some cells are always under repair or otherwise unavailable, and some cell-blocks are reserved for specially segregated defendants and are therefore underutilized, actual occupancy rates exceeded 100 percent of capacity.

To try to reduce the detention population, the City Commissioner of Correction asked PTSA in late October, 1975 to implement a three-week Crash Bail Re-evaluation Project. This project was operated with the assistance of START, a volunteer Rikers Island program.

These inmates had already failed to gain release under PTSA's four release programs. Review of their cases resulted in seven releases.

Few inmates were released, but the Project was useful in providing information about how the criminal justice system works in New York City. Most important, it demonstrated that there are apparently not a large number of persons being held for long periods in pre-trial detention who could safely be released to the community without some form of third-party involvement or supervised release (options which were not offered in the Crash Bail Project).

C. VICTIM-WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROJECT

Like the Pre-Trial Services Agency, the Victim-Witness Assistance Project was created to help make the criminal justice system operate more efficiently and to improve the treatment and reduce wasted time of one category of people involved with the system, in this case victims and other prosecution witnesses. The goals of efficiency and better treatment are felt to be related: if victims and witnesses understand what is expected of them and if their participation in the judicial process is made as convenient as possible, it is hypothesized that they will be more likely to work with the prosecutor to a case's conclusion, less likely to become unavailable or uncooperative. Witnesses' failure to participate is not, of course, the only reason cases are postponed, lost, or dismissed. But insofar as lack of witness participation does cause these time- and effort-wasting results, increased witness participation should lead to fewer postponements, higher conviction rates, fewer dismissals due to failure to prosecute -- in short, to more efficient use of the criminal justice system's time and effort.

The Victim-Witness Assistance Project began operation in July, 1975, as a cooperative venture of the CJCC, Kings County District Attorney's Office, the New York City Courts, the New York Police Department, and the Vera Institute. It is funded by a one million dollar LEAA grant and matching New York City funds.

The Project's tasks fall into two categories: Appearance Management and Services. Appearance Management activities aim to reduce witness confusion, unnecessary appearances, and dismissals due to lack of effective prosecution. To achieve these goals, the Project notifies all prosecution witnesses (civilian and police) of the date they are expected in court. If necessary, written notification is followed up with a phone call or personal visit. Whenever possible, witnesses are placed on telephone alert rather than asked to appear in court.

Prosecution witnesses are told, in short, what is expected of them. Prosecutors, on the other hand are told what to expect. Every day the Project provides Assistant District Attorneys with a roster of witnesses for each case and the appearance status of each witness (expected to appear, not expected, excused or on alert). This is intended to reduce the waste of court time which occurs when cases are assembled without sufficient knowledge of who is expected.

Service activities aim to increase the likelihood of continued witness participation and to improve the quality of the Victim/Witness's encounter with the criminal justice system.

The Project tries to develop and coordinate community resources and the use of volunteers. It refers victims to existing resources such as the Crime Victim Compensation Board. It operates a comfortable and safe waiting area, a play center, a transportation service and a hotline. And it makes a full-time service counselor available to those who have special needs, have been seriously traumatized as a result of the crime, or need reassurance and explanations about court procedures.

To handle the 36,000 cases which pass annually through the Brooklyn Criminal Court, V/WAP has installed an automated case management system. On November 17, 1975, a computer began to issue the notification letters, prompt the follow-up phone calls and visits, and produce the witness rosters for the court. During the period from October 24, 1975 to February 29, 1976, the Project made an average of 1,386 notifications per week (up 75% from the 793 notifications per week which the Project made during its first four months, when it was still using manual procedures).

In addition to facilitating the Project's day-to-day operations, the computer is also generating a valuable data base which will be used in the future to examine such issues as what the effect of witness appearance is on case outcomes, how many appearances made by witnesses are actually wasted (i.e., the case is adjourned without progress made), what the most frequent reasons for adjournment and dismissal are, and whether it is possible to identify characteristics in the Complaint Room of cases which have a high probability of dismissal.

The placement of witnesses on alert is the most effective way to reduce wasted time -- and thus to promote efficiency. During the period from October 24, 1975 to February 29, 1976, 13% (1,569) of the civilian witnesses whom the Project "stated" were placed on alert; only 282 (18%) of witnesses on alert were actually called into court. In other words, the Project saved 1,287 civilians from appearing unnecessarily in court during the four-month period.

During the same period, 33% (4,341) of police witnesses whom the Project stated were placed on alert. Only 15% of these

police witnesses were called to court; thus, over the four months, 3,685 police appearances were saved. Sample data indicate that like civilian appearances, many police appearances are unnecessary. In 37% of sampled cases in which a police witness was present in court, no progress was made because other necessary elements were not present. This finding and the less than 1% failure-to-appear rate for activated police alerts suggest that increasing the number of police alerts is desirable and could be achieved without hampering court efficiency.

The Project has taken steps to increase the level of police alerts, and the percentage of appearances in which the police officer has been placed on alert status by the Project has risen gradually but steadily from 29% in November to 36% in February, while the increase in numbers of police officers on alert has risen dramatically from 851 in November to 1,166 in February.

The first impact evaluation, issued in December, 1975, found that the Project's pre-computer notification system did increase attendance by civilian witnesses in court; attendance at the first post-arraignment appearance\* rose from 45% of all witnesses known to the police in a "base-line" (pre-project) sample and 39% in a "control" (post-project) sample to 55% for a project sample. The

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\* The police, rather than Victim-Witness, tell a witness whether to appear in the Complaint Room (and thus at arraignment, which follows filing of the complaint). A witness's appearance or nonappearance at arraignment, therefore, reflects largely the police judgment of whether he will be needed there, and not necessarily the witness's willingness to appear or understanding of when and where to appear.

evaluation report also showed that civilian attendance did, as hypothesized, facilitate substantive outcomes. When no civilian witness was present, 12% of the defendants pleaded guilty; when a witness was present, 25% pleaded guilty. In the absence of a witness, only 2% of the cases went to a Grand Jury; in the presence of a witness, 22% went to the Grand Jury. Dismissals declined from 23% in cases where the witness was absent to 14% in cases where he was present.

On the basis of limited data, the evaluation report suggested that providing Assistant District Attorneys with information about their prospective witnesses affected the prosecutors' behavior in a rational way: when a witness was expected to appear but had not done so at the first call, the ADAs asked to have the case placed on "second call." When the Project had not contacted the witness or had reported him unwilling to appear, the ADAs offered more pleas; in other words, they tried to get the case out of the system, rather than allowing it to remain on the calendar, where it would continue to demand the time of the prosecution, defense attorneys, judges, and other witnesses.

A second impact evaluation, to be issued in May, 1976, will consider the Project's effect on the dismissal rate, the time required to adjudicate a case, and the saved police and civilian appearances attributable to the telephone alert system.

No formal evaluation has been made of the Project's services to victims and witnesses, but the Project's records show they have been well received. By April, 1976, over 135 victims, witnesses and visitors were using the reception center each week. Up to

62 children of victims, prosecution witnesses and defendants were being cared for weekly in the Children's Play Center. The Repair Team, which is available from 7 p.m. to 3 a.m., when most commercial services are closed, was being called upon by police or victims about eleven times per week to secure burglarized premises by replacing picked locks, bashed-in doors, or broken windows.

Transportation to and from court was being provided for about twenty-five witnesses each week. This service was originally available primarily for the disabled, the elderly, and those who could not afford carfare or were afraid to come on their own. It is now being offered on an experimental basis to witnesses whose appearance in the Complaint Room and at night arraignment keeps them at court until a very late hour.

The Hotline, which operates 24 hours per day, seven days per week, provides information and crisis counseling not only for people who are already involved with the court and police, but also for victims and witnesses who have hesitated to become involved. It may, therefore, become useful to researchers trying to discover why so many crimes are unreported. Like all the Project's services, the Hotline has been used with increasing frequency as its existence has become more widely known. Currently it receives about fifty calls per week, of which about one-fifth come from the police and an additional two-fifths are made at the suggestion of the police.

D. APPEARANCE CONTROL UNIT

The forerunner of Victim-Witness was the Appearance Control Unit, which Vera created in 1970 in cooperation with the Police Department to operate a telephone alert system for prosecution witnesses. This system allows prospective witnesses to remain at work or at home on the date of a scheduled court appearance until it is determined that they are needed in court.

Appearance Control became a part of the Police Department's Court Division in 1973, but its director continues to be a Vera employee. When Victim-Witness opened in July, 1975, that project took over the appearance control functions for Brooklyn (and approximately doubled the number of policemen placed on alert, raising the daily average from about 25 to about 50). The Appearance Control Unit still performs these functions for Manhattan, the Bronx, and Queens (where it opened a separate office in March, 1975).

The telephone alert system saved 37,840 court appearances in 1975.\* Of these, 24,686 were New York Police Department appearances, 10,440 were civilian appearances, and the remainder were appearances by other law enforcement personnel. In addition, the system allowed 7,168 witnesses including 4,888 police officers, who were eventually called to court, to remain on alert, rather than waiting in court, until they were needed. A total of 216,824 manhours was saved for the New York Police Department.

\* This figure includes Brooklyn appearances, since Appearance Control operated there until mid-year and now has personnel on loan to Victim-Witness.

E. EARLY CASE ASSESSMENT BUREAU

Pre-trial services agencies were the subject of a workshop conducted at Yale in September, 1974, by Vera's Director Herbert Sturz and Yale Professor Daniel Freed. The workshop brought together representatives of the Division of Criminal Justice Services, the New York City Police Department, the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, the Legal Aid Society, the courts, pre-trial services agencies, and Vera.

Out of this workshop developed a proposal to improve the efficiency of criminal court operations by improving the analysis and handling of felony cases as they enter the system. Assistant District Attorneys with Supreme Court (felony) trial experience would replace relatively inexperienced ADAs in the complaint room. They would have the knowledge and the authority to assess cases at this early stage. They could identify strong cases, which should be brought quickly to the Grand Jury for felony indictments and for which evidence should be collected while it was still available. They could also identify weak cases, in which the charges should promptly be reduced to misdemeanors or dismissed. For strong cases, paralegals would be made available to help gather evidence.

Vera and the District Attorneys worked together through the first part of 1975 to turn this proposal into a working program. An Early Case Assessment Bureau (ECAB) funded by CJCC and DCJS was instituted in Manhattan in May, 1975; in Brooklyn in July, 1975; and in the Bronx in October, 1975.

The DCJS has contracted with Vera to investigate the impact of ECAB. Vera's evaluation will try to answer two types of questions:

- 1) Has there been a change in speed of disposition attributable to ECAB? Do cases move more quickly through the system because ECAB enables the prosecutor to make an earlier decision to dismiss, accept a plea to a lower charge, or present to the Grand Jury? What saving of taxpayer dollars can be attributed to this greater efficiency?
- 2) Has there been any change in the nature of dispositions? Are more defendants being convicted of misdemeanors? Are more being convicted after felony trials? Have sentences changed, and if so, how?

The answers to these questions, as well as a more qualitative evaluation, will suggest possible improvements in the ECAB program. Vera will continue to work with the DAs' offices to develop modifications in case-processing procedures.

F. INMATE RULE BOOK

The right to fair treatment does not end when the defendant enters prison. Nor does the desirability of having prisoners understand what is expected of them and what will happen if they do not meet these expectations. To promote both fair treatment and inmate understanding, the Department of Correctional Services contracted with Vera in November, 1975 to produce a new inmate rule book.

The State Legislature had acted in 1975 to promote fair treatment by directing the Department to promulgate a set of standards for inmate behavior for use at all Department institutions. Previously, each of the Department's facilities had its own rulebook containing general rules governing inmate behavior and specific rules for such matters as visiting or inmate use of corridors, mess-halls and recreation areas. As a result, inmates who were transferred from institution to institution often faced confusing inconsistencies in the regulations structuring their lives.

The standards promulgated on September 1, 1975 were a first step in remedying this situation. They provided uniformity but, because they had to be drawn up quickly to comply with the Legislature's mandate, they could not reflect a careful review of institutional needs, inmate concerns, and Departmental policies. Feeling that such a review was desirable, the Department asked Vera to produce the new rule book.

In preparation, Vera is observing Department facilities, interviewing staff and inmates, researching legal and constitutional issues, and studying the policies and relevant experience of other jurisdictions. Its task is to draft a code of inmate offenses and procedures for inmate disciplinary proceedings. In close collaboration with the Department, Vera will formulate a statement of inmates' rights to privacy, property, freedom of expression, and freedom in the exercise of their religion. The code will also include a statement of the right of inmates to participate in major Departmental decisions affecting the conditions of their stay in Department facilities, including decisions on inmate classification and inmate transfer.

Since the needs of a maximum security prison differ from those of a minimum security prison, or a halfway house or camp, each Department facility will draw up its own specific regulations, to be added to the more general rule book which Vera will draft for all facilities. Vera's code will include, as an appendix, a model set of regulations governing inmate movement within the facility, inmate dress, visits, exercise, work assignments, and similar local administrative matters. The model regulations will serve as guidelines to local administrators in framing local regulations which are in harmony with the spirit and intent of the more general principles of the inmate code. The code project will also devise procedure for the review of local facility regulations to ensure that they do not diverge unreasonably from the model regulations, and for the systematic updating of both the rule book and facility addenda.

G. FEDERAL REGULATIONS

Vera's research and reform efforts require access to criminal history records and the privilege not to divulge information acquired in the course of doing research. Both these areas -- access and confidentiality -- are regulated by LEAA, under authority vested in it by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

In February, 1974, LEAA proposed regulations on access which made no reference to private agencies. Vera then testified at hearings on these proposed regulations; the regulations were subsequently amended to reflect Vera's concerns. The official commentary on the regulations finally promulgated in May, 1975 includes the statement that "one subsection would permit private agencies such as the Vera Institute to receive criminal histories where they perform a necessary administration of justice function such as pre-trial release."

Proposed regulations on confidentiality of identifiable research and statistical information were published in September, 1975. At the invitation of LEAA, Vera is helping revise these proposed regulations, to insure -- in the words of the statute -- that individuals' privacy will be protected "by requiring that information identifiable to a private person obtained in a research or statistical program funded by LEAA

may only be used and/or revealed for the purpose for which it was obtained." Establishing such a researchers' privilege would mean, for example, that a Wildcat interviewer who learned about a subject's past criminal activity or drug use could not be forced to divulge his knowledge to the District Attorney; a researcher evaluating the Victim-Witness Project who learned the details of a witness' story could not be forced to reveal this information to defense attorneys. Clearly, the collection of information for research purposes will be severely hampered without such assurance that information provided to the researcher for research purposes (e.g., to evaluate the impact of Wildcat or Victim-Witness) will not be used for other purposes (e.g., prosecuting the Wildcatter, aiding the defense).

H. ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION POLICIES RELATING TO PROSTITUTION

Current methods for handling the problem of prostitution seem ripe for reform. These methods clog the courts, do little to alleviate the problem as it is perceived by the public, and are at best unhelpful and at worst unfair to the prostitutes themselves.

In order to gain the knowledge which would be a prerequisite for any reform efforts, Vera began to explore the types and numbers of arrests; their disposition; and the subject of arrests relating to prostitution (i.e., for "johns," pimps, and those who permit prostitution). Further study is planned on the use of police manpower; street activity and related crimes; and public sentiment toward enforcement and decriminalization.

## PART II - DIVERSION PROGRAMS

Beginning with the Manhattan Bowery Project in 1967, Vera has developed diversion programs to remove from the criminal justice system men, women, and children whose problems might be better treated in other settings. Vera created the Bowery Project for alcoholics, the Neighborhood Youth Diversion Program for young people brought to Family Court, and the Court Employment Project for those who had not yet acquired a criminal record. As each of these projects proved its worth, it was spun-off to become an independent corporation, independently funded.

No new diversion programs were begun in the period covered by this report. Vera has maintained informal ties with the projects it began, sometimes consulting on problems or new directions. It continues to consider new ideas for diversion, including proposals for the diversion of the mentally ill or disturbed, whose problems detention centers are not equipped to handle, and of defendants whose parole has been revoked but who might, under suitable conditions, be safely given a second chance.

A. COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT RESEARCH

The Court Employment Project (CEP) was begun in 1968 to divert from the New York City criminal justice system certain defendants who were judged not dangerous to the community and who might profit from counselling, educational, and employment referral services to be offered by the project. Its goals were to reduce recidivism, dispose of criminal charges, and enhance education and employment opportunities for its participants.

The project is now an independent corporation which operates under contract to the City's Human Resources Administration. Since 1968 it has grown from a one-borough operation, servicing 130 defendants, to a four-borough office (Staten Island is excluded) servicing 3,545 defendants in fiscal year 1974-75. It has served as a model for pre-trial diversion programs throughout the country.

Despite this growth and replication, there has never been an evaluation of CEP or a similar program without serious methodological problems. The most difficult problem in designing such an evaluation has been the absence of a sufficiently large or randomly assigned control group. The lack of a true control group limited the usefulness of a 1973 evaluation of CEP conducted at HRA's request by Professor Franklin D. Zimring of the University of Chicago Law School.

Aware of the need of policy-makers in CEP, New York City, and elsewhere for a better evaluation, the Vera Research Department formulated a two-year research proposal. Vera has received a grant from LEAA to fund the first year of the study and expects to undertake the research shortly.

The application for funding listed four main goals for the evaluation:

- 1) To determine whether the project, using present and expanded entrance criteria, meets its aims of reducing recidivism, increasing the dismissal rate of criminal cases, and enhancing educational and employment opportunities for its participants, both during and after the program;
- 2) To analyze the operation of the program and determine which methods produce results closest to the goals of the program, while providing feedback to the program operators and policy-makers;
- 3) To analyze the costs and benefits of the program to the taxpayer and to society as a whole; and
- 4) To understand the project in the context of the criminal justice system in New York and to compare it with diversion programs in other cities.

The evaluation will try to improve upon past studies by forming concurrent randomized control and experimental groups. It will follow the groups' members, and former CEP participants, for long enough to see whether early diversion from the ordinary criminal justice process and provision of services has an impact on the participants' lives.

Drawing in part on the knowledge of Vera's Technical Assistance Division, the Research Department will attempt to outline the range of services available in various diversion programs, to study the "target groups" that are served, and, where possible, to compare results. In addition, an attempt will be made to establish uniform categories for the collection of information with an eye to parameters by which CEP and other programs might be judged.

B. MANHATTAN BOWERY PROJECT

The expansion of the Manhattan Bowery Project on the West Side continued during the past year despite the City fiscal crisis, but the City's problems may cause a change in the administrative structure of the Project.

Until 1975, the Project -- as its name states -- served primarily the Lower East Side area around the Bowery. Rescue teams went -- and still go -- into the streets to offer the Project's services to male derelicts. Those who accept their offer are brought to the Project's medical detoxification center. A residential facility was opened in 1973 in an existing Greenwich Village single-room-occupancy hotel to provide a supportive living environment to recovering alcoholics for a period of up to six months.

Rescue teams had begun operating on the West Side in December, 1973, but because the Project had no detoxification center there, it brought participants to French and Polyclinic Health Center and Logan Memorial Hospital. In October, 1974, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism and the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene awarded the Project a grant to run a non-medical detoxification center in this area.

Finding a suitable building and negotiating a lease proved to be extremely difficult. A facility was finally found, the approval of the Project's Board and of local community groups was obtained, and a lease is about to be signed. The experimental

program to be run at this center will attempt to determine whether participants can withdraw from alcohol without nurses, doctors, or drugs, at lower cost to the taxpayer.

Although the center's opening had been delayed, the Project went ahead with its plans for a transitional residence patterned after the one in Greenwich Village. In February, 1976, this residence was opened in the Endicott Hotel at 81st Street and Columbus Avenue.

Meanwhile, the existence of the Manhattan Bowery Project was being threatened. The City cut its budget drastically in July, 1975. The Project then sought an alternate source of funding in Medicaid, and was told by the Health Department that such funding was a possibility if the Project became part of a major hospital. Negotiations are now being conducted with Beth Israel Hospital for this purpose.

C. TEMPORARY RELEASE

In the late spring of 1975, at the request of newly-appointed State Corrections Commissioner Benjamin Ward, Vera conducted a study of the manner in which inmates are selected for the State's temporary release (TR) program. This program was established in 1970; by 1974 it had expanded to include over 6,000 of the approximately 17,000 inmates in the state prison system, three-quarters of whom come from New York City and will probably return there when they are finally released. The TR program permits inmates who have completed specified portions of their sentences to leave prison temporarily for education, on-the-job training, employment, community service or personal matters.

Vera identified several problems in the TR selection process:

- 1) The lack of staffing to back up the prison's temporary release committees (TRCs), which decide which inmates will be permitted to participate in the TR program;
- 2) The vague, often inconsistent or undesirable criteria used in making these decisions;
- 3) The remote and impersonal character of the actual selection process, which limits communication between the TRC and the applicant; and
- 4) The lack of centralized information about the temporary release program: number of applications received, decisions made, reasons for them, characteristics of persons accepted

or rejected, and results of the selection process as indicated by the released inmates' job performance, completion of educational and training programs, performance on parole and later recidivism.

In order to tackle these problems, the Department of Corrections applied for and received a six-month planning grant from the Division of Criminal Justice Services. Vera has been hired by the Department to assist in creating and implementing efficient Temporary Release selection procedures for all Department facilities, procedures which will increase inmate understanding of an involvement in the selection process. Vera will also develop a data-collection system for use in administering the program. The ultimate aim of Vera's proposals will be to increase the fairness of the selection process, especially as it is perceived by the prisoners, and to develop selection criteria which will best exploit the TR program's potential for smoothing the reentry of former prisoners into society.

D. PROPOSAL FOR DIVERTING THE MENTALLY ILL

Diversion efforts have traditionally focused on defendants facing arraignment. In the past year, Vera has turned its attention to a group of defendants who are not diverted, are not released, and are particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of detention: the mentally ill inhabitants of the city jails.

The city has neither the facilities nor the professional staff to deal effectively or fairly with these detainees. The stress of imprisonment is likely to make them sick or sicker. It would seem to be to their advantage, and to the advantage of the system which will have to care for them in their worsened condition, to get those who are not severely ill out of jail and into community-based treatment.

To this end, Vera is considering a pilot program for a small number of defendants, selected in conjunction with the Prison Mental Health Service, which is responsible for their welfare in jail. The program would serve as a preliminary test of the defendants' ability to appear in court when necessary and to function before trial without the support of an institutional or residential setting. Experience in choosing defendants for the pilot should help planners develop selection criteria for any subsequent program.

E. PROPOSAL FOR DIVERTING PAROLE VIOLATORS

Originally, Vera's diversion efforts -- Court Employment, the Bowery Project, Neighborhood Youth Diversion -- focused on the defendant facing detention. More recently, Vera has considered the possibilities for diversion later in the criminal justice process: the proposal for diverting the mentally ill discussed diversion for defendants in detention but still awaiting trial; the Temporary Release Project will concern itself with inmates in prison after trial. Now Vera is turning its attention to the last stage of the criminal justice process: parole. In particular, Vera is asking whether a new diversion program, rather than re-imprisonment, might be a desirable response to more serious parole violations.

At present, once a senior parole officer decides that there has been a violation, the parolee waits in jail for a probable-cause hearing on the alleged violation. In nearly all cases, he either waives the hearing or probable cause is found. He then continues to wait in prison for a final hearing on the violation. Less than ten percent of the alleged violators are released after this final hearing; the rest are re-incarcerated, with various provisions for re-release.

Vera planners have developed a proposal to establish, in effect, a second level of parole, a middle ground between the extremes of imprisonment and the rarely utilized alternative of return to parole with additional conditions. The proposed program would avoid incarceration but would provide more services

and a different form of supervision than regular parole. It would help find, or would itself provide, employment and housing for every participant, and would offer other services as needed. The proposal, which is still in the discussion stage, also considers when participants would be admitted to the program, who should constitute the supervisory staff, and how the program could be evaluated.

F. PROPOSAL FOR DELAYING TEENAGE CHILDBIRTH

Vera staff involved in the study and treatment of juvenile delinquents have, naturally, grappled with the difficult problem of causation. As others have done, Vera raised the question, is the child born out-of-wedlock or to a teenage mother more likely to become a delinquent?

An investigation of this theory of delinquency broadened into a full examination of teenage childbearing. The problems it entails and likely future trends were explored. Various educational, employment, birth control and counseling programs were studied, with reference to their efforts to prevent births or to give young girls an alternative to parenthood. Finally, a possible multi-service program was outlined, and various roles for Vera were considered.

PART III - SUPPORTED WORK

In 1970 the Vera Institute of Justice began to experiment with "supported employment" as a rehabilitative mechanism for certain groups of socially and medically disabled persons. In June of that year, Vera established its first supported work endeavor, Project Renewal, which employed a group of ex-alcoholics referred from the Manhattan Bowery Project; the following year Vera established the Pioneer Messenger Service to employ ex-offenders and addicts in treatment.

A. WILDCAT SERVICES CORPORATION

After experimenting with a number of models for testing the concept of supported work, Vera settled in 1972 on the Wildcat Services Corporation as the best way to run a supported work program. Ex-addicts and ex-offenders eligible for welfare are paid by the corporation from a salary pool which combines diverted welfare allowances, income from service contracts, and various federal demonstration grants.\* Employment for the Wildcat crewmembers is obtained primarily through contracts with city agencies.\*\*

By 1974 Wildcat had expanded from 300 to 1400 employees and planned to expand to 2,200 within the following year. These plans collided with the declining economy, rising unemployment, and cutbacks in government spending. Unemployment rates made it difficult for Wildcatters to move out into non-supported work; government cutbacks made it difficult to support employees within Wildcat. The past year and a half at Wildcat has been marked by efforts to respond to these problems.

Cutbacks resulting from New York City's fiscal crisis affected Wildcat in two areas: the appropriation from the Department of Employment (DOE), which provided more than half of Wildcat's budget, and the service contracts with city agencies, which provide jobs.

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\* In FY 1974-75 the New York City Department of Employment provided 54% of Wildcat's total budget of \$13,842,300; SSI (welfare diversion), 18%; service contracts, 12%; National Institute of Mental Health/National Institute on Drug Abuse, 8%; and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and Department of Labor, 4% each.

\*\* In FY 1974-75, of a total of 480 projects, 332 were for the New York City government.

In May 1975, Wildcat submitted to DOE a budget for \$8.8 million which represented a continuation of FY 74-75 level of expenditures. Two months later, DOE requested budget cuts of approximately \$1.4 million.

A \$7.4 million budget was resubmitted to DOE and accepted, and was approved by the Board of Estimate in mid-August. While the sizeable reduction in the level of funding meant that changes in the scope of operation would have to take place, the fact that both DOE and the Board of Estimate approved a \$7.4 million budget in the midst of stringent financial conditions did reaffirm the City's commitment to the Wildcat program, and represented an acknowledgement of the value of the manpower training and the services which Wildcat has performed for city agencies during the past three years.

The cut, however, had an inevitable impact on the scope of operations. The establishment of three borough units had been predicated on the assumption that Wildcat would be expanding to serve a target population of over 2,200 crewmembers. Since the new budget required that the number of crewmembers be reduced from the FY 74-75 peak of 1,600 to approximately 1,300, it became inappropriate to maintain the overhead costs associated with an organization designed for expansion.

Therefore, in September the decision was made to reduce the number of Wildcat units from three to two units organized along geographic lines. This reorganization re-

sulted in a cutback in the size of the Wildcat staff, and a reduction by attrition in the number of employees. It would have enabled Wildcat to stabilize the number of employees at about 1,360. But a second round of cuts in the last quarter of 1975 totaled nearly \$300,000 and forced a further reduction to 1,242 employees as of December 31.

The second area in which New York City budget problems became Wildcat budget problems was the acquisition of service contracts. As city agencies had their budgets cut, and as city contract registration procedures became more time-consuming, obtaining service contracts became more difficult. In spite of these difficulties, Wildcat registered over two million dollars' worth of contracts with city agencies in 1975.

To make itself less dependent on the financially troubled city, Wildcat has intensified its efforts to secure contracts with non-profit agencies. One such effort, a mailing to 200 member agencies of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, brought in over 20 requests for services. Economic conditions have affected more than Wildcat's budget. These conditions -- in particular, a city unemployment rate nearing 12% -- have made it virtually impossible to test Wildcat's original premise, that the work experience and good work habits provided by supported work would enable an "unemployable" to move eventually into the regular work force. Whether due to the economy or due to

a flaw in the basic premise, Wildcatters have not been as successful as expected in finding outside jobs. To improve employees' chances of moving on to non-supported work, Wildcat regrouped and expanded its supportive services into an Employee Services Unit (ESU).

The Unit was created in early 1975 to supplement an employee's work experience. Through the provision of services and the use of career advisors who follow each employee from the time he joins Wildcat, ESU helps each Wildcatter choose, find, obtain and hold outside employment. The Unit conducts extensive vocational testing, and provides training in such non-work skills as filling out applications and interviewing. It has developed salary incentives to promote on-the-job acquisition of work skills and transition to outside employment. The Unit has offered clerical training in cooperation with RCA for beginners, and keypunching, administrative and other white-collar training in conjunction with IBM for those who already have some clerical skills. Success in placing graduates of the IBM program has shown the importance of providing Wildcatters with marketable skills; Wildcat is trying increasingly to provide such skills in blue-collar fields as well.

In December 1975, Vera issued its Third Annual Research Report on Supported Employment. The report presents three years of operations data including statistics on employee flow and on graduation to non-subsidized employment. It also reports findings from the First and Second Annual interviews of participants in a number of controlled experiments to determine the impact of Wildcat. Finally, it offers a cost-benefit analysis for the fiscal year 1974-75.

Research showed that the greatest differences between experimentals and controls were in the areas of employment and income, but that these differences narrowed over time. There was a less dramatic impact on Wildcatters' lifestyles (arrest rate, drug use, self-reported criminal activity, family responsibilities).

In analyzing the benefits of this program, the report noted both non-quantifiable benefits and quantifiable ones. In the former category it included increased public acceptance of ex-addicts and ex-offenders, indirect benefits to industry from Wildcat projects such as tourist information booths, and increased efficiency in city operations due to the availability of a mobile, readily accessible work force. This force is able to meet both regular municipal needs, such as building repair or park maintenance, and emergency needs, such as those created when a fire deprived 170,000 telephone customers of service for up to three weeks.

Quantifiable benefits include the value of the services Wildcat provides, the increase in tax revenues from those employed by Wildcat, and the decrease in welfare and crime costs attributable to Wildcat employment. Estimates of the value of services were based on an estimate of their cost had they been provided commercially. Calculations of tax, welfare and crime-related benefits were based on data from the Manhattan Wildcat experimental and control groups; it was assumed that the patterns displayed by the control group would have applied to experimentals if Wildcat had not existed -- that is, if Wildcatters did not have the opportunity to participate in a supported work program.

The following table summarizes the benefits provided and the costs incurred by Wildcat in Fiscal Year 1974-1975:

|                             | <u>Benefits</u>  | <u>Cost</u>                 |
|-----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| Value of Services           | \$9,000,000      |                             |
| Reduced Welfare Utilization | 2,766,100        |                             |
| Reduced Criminal Activity   | 1,162,650        |                             |
| Increased Tax Revenues      | <u>1,382,400</u> | <u>                    </u> |
|                             | \$14,311,150     | \$13,842,300                |

B. JOB CREATION

To achieve the goal of moving Wildcatters into non-supported employment, the Wildcat staff has taken two approaches: finding individual job slots in the regular labor market and training Wildcatters for areas in which jobs are available. Increasingly, the need was felt for a third type of effort, creating new jobs in which Wildcat graduates would be employed.

In February 1975 a Job Creation Unit was formed at Vera. Its first accomplishment was the development of a plan to provide transportation for the elderly and disabled in Manhattan's Lower East Side. A grant was obtained from the State Department of Transportation to purchase specially equipped vehicles. The many social service agencies in the area were contacted for help in determining residents' needs and, when the project begins operation, for enlisting residents to use the service. A funding commitment to pay for some operational costs was obtained from the Administration on the Aging, and negotiations were undertaken to obtain Medicaid funds to pay for certain type of trips. The plan is expected to go into operation in the summer of 1976.

The transportation service exemplifies the kind of project that the Job Creation Unit is trying to develop. It provides employment for one group of people in need (job-ready Wildcatters) while providing a service for another group in need (those who cannot use public transportation). It combines various funding streams,

as does Wildcat, to purchase a service which no single funding agency could undertake on its own. And it attempts to use one funding stream, Medicaid, in a more sensible way than it has been used. Just as Wildcat used welfare grants to help make grantees employable (and thus, ultimately, independent of welfare), the transportation project seeks to use Medicaid funds to help make Medicaid beneficiaries more mobile -- and thus, ultimately, to postpone institutionalization, which accounted for two-thirds of Medicaid expenditures in New York City in 1974.

The Job Creation Unit was established in response to the difficulties Wildcatters experienced in moving on to non-supported work, difficulties compounded by the state of the economy. Economic conditions have created another class of hard-to-place workers -- laid-off municipal employees whose chances of being rehired are minimal and whose skills are not easily transferable to the private sector. The Job Creation Unit, under a seven-month, \$49,000 grant from the Department of Labor, is planning projects to train and employ these workers. Such projects would again try to meet two previously unmet needs, the needs of those providing services and the needs of those receiving their services. And the projects would try to combine funding streams and develop new uses for existing streams such as unemployment compensation. A crime-prevention project under consideration, for example, might employ former policemen in high-crime areas. It would add to their police training so that they would be more qualified than currently

available guards. And it would finance the training by tapping a new source of funds, industries or residential groups who want preventive services, and by putting an existing funding stream, unemployment benefits, into a little-used channel, the provision of training. In February, 1975, CJCC approved a grant of \$275,895 to conduct and evaluate such a program, but Vera decided to withdraw its application before it was considered by DCJS, because of insufficient commitment at that time from the private sector and the need for further negotiations with the State Bureau of Unemployment Insurance.

#### PART IV - STUDIES

Since the 1960s, politicians, administrators and reformers have tried to respond to the public concern with "law and order" -- the public sense, particularly in the cities, that crime was rife, and the criminal justice system was not doing enough about it. But the politicians and others were hampered in their efforts to respond -- they could not intelligently discuss or choose among alternative courses of action -- because they lacked basic information. To provide such information, Vera produced in 1975 studies on juvenile violence and felony dispositions, and began a study of policewomen on patrol.

A. JUVENILE VIOLENCE

Vera's study on violent delinquents, conducted at the request of the Ford Foundation, involved a general literature search; discussions with numerous researchers, administrators, and professionals who deal with delinquents, as well as juveniles with violent histories; and visits to programs and projects that deal with delinquents in a variety of ways. It also involved analysis of over 500 court records of juveniles in three counties in the New York metropolitan area, in order to determine firsthand the extent and nature of violence among children seen by the courts, and courts' responses to them.

The report discusses the scope of the problem; characteristics of violent delinquents; and official responses to the problem, including various types of correction and treatment programs which have proliferated in the last ten years to deal with violent delinquents. It concludes with recommendations to the Ford Foundation concerning encouragement of data collection and basic research, continued experimentation with intervention programs, and continuous case management: provision of long-term intensified services for those juveniles who have caused the most damage to society, are least likely to desist on their own, and -- in the current system -- are least likely to receive rehabilitative services.

B. FELONY DISPOSITIONS

The Felony Disposition Study, sponsored by LEAA through the CJCC, used official records to trace 1,888 randomly-chosen New York City felony cases from arrest to final disposition. In a second sample of 369 felony arrests, researchers conducted interviews with the arresting officers, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and the judge involved in the case.

From the data collected in the larger sample, the report drew a statistical picture of defendants arrested for felonies and the disposition of their cases.

In 1971 in New York, 89 percent of those arrested for felonies were men. Thirty-one percent were under 20 years old, and close to 50 percent of those arrested for burglary and robbery were under 20 years of age. Half of those arrested were black, one-quarter were Hispanic, and one-quarter were white. Thirty-nine percent had never been arrested before. Half of those charged with victim crimes had a prior relationship of some kind (friend, neighbor, relative, acquaintance) with the victim.

Of every 100 persons arrested for felonies in the 1971 arrest sample, 14 were diverted into Family Court, 6 jumped bail, and the remainder had their cases disposed

of in the criminal court system. Of these, 55 percent were convicted, while the defendants in the remaining 45 percent were acquitted or had their cases dismissed. Only 2 percent of felony arrests reached trial.

Of the 55 percent convicted, three-fourths were convicted of a misdemeanor; one-fourth (14 percent of defendants arrested on a felony charge) were convicted of a felony. The sentences of the 55 percent convicted persons were distributed as follows: 26 percent of them "walked" (received no prison sentence) and 29 percent were sentenced to prison, with 5 percent sentenced to more than one year.

The most striking thing about the disposition picture is how few felony arrests result in convictions, and how few of the convictions result in prison sentences longer than one year. This so-called "deterioration" of felony arrests is a major object of public criticism.

Critics of felony dispositions generally take the view that more defendants would be convicted, and more would receive longer sentences, if more were brought to trial. They are not convicted or severely sentenced, popular opinion holds, because the system -- with its shortage of judges, prosecutors, Legal Aid lawyers, and court facilities -- cannot handle any more trials than it does at present. Consequently,

the reasoning goes, ADAs are pressured to plea bargain, and judges are pressured to accept bargains, to the advantage of the defendant.

The Disposition Study raises questions about the popular conception that congestion accounts for the leniency of the courts. Although the study did not attempt to quantify the degree to which congestion affected court outcomes, the data suggest that congestion may contribute to the high rate of dismissals, pleas to lower charges, and light sentences. However, the deterioration of felony arrests could also be explained in many cases by other factors: evidentiary problems; complainants' withdrawal; courts' and prosecutors' view of the crime as minor (although perhaps technically a felony); and defendants' lack of a prior record. In fact there were cases in which the pressure on the participants for speedy plea bargaining -- if not speedy trial -- perhaps caused a harsher sentence than would have been meted out in a less congested system. This is because arrests without sufficient investigation, the absence of a complaining witness and lack of evidence might have led to an acquittal if the case had gone to trial but did not enter the plea negotiations.

C. WOMEN ON PATROL

Vera undertook the Study of Women on Patrol in June, 1975, at the request of, and in conjunction with, the Police Department. Vera intended to study the women who had been hired in large numbers to comply with federal mandates. These women expected to do patrol work, as well as the more traditional "women's" jobs in which female police officers had always been accepted: intervention in family disputes and cases involving children, investigations, desk work.

As the last hired, these women were the first fired in the massive layoffs of July, 1975. The focus of Vera's attention then shifted to women who had joined the force expecting the traditional jobs but who had done patrol duty and continued to do it.

Vera's study centers on the performance of women in situations involving stress or violence and situations demanding physical strength or the establishment of authority. Observers are accompanying women and men on patrol and recording how they behave in order to exert control. Interviewers are speaking to complainants and officers involved in incidents in which male and female police officers were involved. In addition, the researchers are attempting to analyze how women officers are socialized in the male-dominated precincts.